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

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS, PART I*

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Economic development has consequences for many aspects of social life. Some of these social consequences, in turn, have an impact on a nation's political life. Studies of social mobilization, for example, have demonstrated that economic development is associated with sharp increases in the general level of political participation.[1] These studies report strong relationships between aggregate socio-economic measures such as per capita income, median level of education, and percentage of the population in urban areas, on one hand, and aggregate measures of political participation, such as voting turnout, on the other. Simultaneously, scholars conducting surveys of individual political participation consistently have reported that an individual's social status, education, and organizational memberships strongly affect the likelihood of his engaging in various types of political activities.[2]

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[*] Various institutions and individuals have been of considerable help to the authors in the preparation of this research. The department of Political Science, Washington University, provided summer support to two of the authors at an early stage of data preparation. Under NSF grants, the computation centers at both Washington University and Stanford University made machine time available. The facilities and the personnel of the Stanford Institute of Political Studies, particularly Mr. C. Hadlai Hull, the Institute's computer consultant, were invaluable aides to the completion of this research. The Center for the Comparative Study of Political Development at the University of Chicago provided funds to help us prepare the final draft for publication. For critical comments we are indebted to many readers, in particular to Sidney Verba, Duncan MacRae and Hayward R. Alker, as well as to Warren E. Miller, who, as a referee for the REVIEW, made a major contribution to the current version of the paper. Other, more specific, debts are acknowledged below. This is Part I of a two part article.

[**] The authors are listed alphabetically to indicate equal co-authorship.

[1] Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 493–515. Also, particularly, Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958). For important analysis which in part contradicts the social mobilization hypothesis, see Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 7–28. Burnham indexes political participation with voter turnout; we deliberately exclude voting from our scale of participation (see footnote 7). It is not clear, therefore, whether our general findings are in opposition to Burnham's. There is some reason for presuming that voting and other types of political participation are much more independent than a previous generation of scholarship has assumed.

[2] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 282–301; V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961); Lester

In spite of the consistency of both sets of findings across many studies and although the findings appear frequently in analysis of political stability, democracy, and even strategies of political growth,[3] we know little about the connections between social structure and political participation. With few exceptions the literature on individual participation is notable for low level generalizations (the better educated citizen talks about politics more regularly), and the absence of systematic and comprehensive theory. While the literature on the growth of national political participation has been more elaborate theoretically, the dependence on aggregate measures has made it difficult to determine empirically how these macro social changes structure individuals' life experiences in ways which alter their political behavior.

I. THE PROBLEM AND THE APPROACH

The task is to identify the significant social experiences which explain the growth of political participation in economically advanced nations. Having identified these social concomitants of economic development, it is also necessary to fill in the *causal* links between macro socio-economic processes and citizen political participation. These links, we hypothesize, are the resources, the attitudes, and the needs of individual citizens.

Multi-level analysis requires data about individuals and about nations. Such data is available in the form of the survey research data from the Almond-Verba five-nation study and aggregate statistics on the level of economic development in these five nations.[4] The theoretical assumptions we explore require a technique showing the relationships between socio-economic attributes, intervening attitudinal characteristics and rates of political participation; such a technique is provided by causal modeling, which is applied to the analysis in Part II of the study.

II. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The process of economic development drastically alters the social structures of a nation, and consequently, the social life of its citizens. The effects of social change on political behavior and on the operation of the political system are numerous and complex. In a given nation the political consequences of economic development cannot easily be separated from such issues as historical social cleavages, existing social patterns, and the timing of the developmental process itself.[5] The complexity and variations notwithstanding, some changes in social life appear inevitably to be brought about by the process of economic development. It is these persistent changes which, we hypothesize, have a universal and predictable impact on citizen participation in political life.

Economic development and changes in the class structure. As a nation develops economically, the shape of its social stratification structure is substantially altered. There are increased requirements for trained labor, a growth of opportunities for social mobility, and expanded facilities for formal education. As a consequence, the pyramidal class structure associated with peasant and peasant-worker societies changes to a more diamond-shaped structure. The middle stratum expands and eventually becomes the majority class as great numbers of citizens, whose parents were agricultural or unskilled workers, find jobs in the service industry or otherwise become members of the educated white-collar class.

Economic development and changes in organizational structure. As a nation develops economically, its organizational infrastructure becomes increasingly complex. Differentiation and specialization occur. Social life becomes more organized; work groups (such as trade unions and professional societies), leisure groups (such as youth organizations and voluntary associations), and special task groups (such as civic associations) expand in number and take over duties formerly carried out by the extended family or the small, face-to-face social group. Additional organizations become necessary to coordinate activities of an increasingly interdependent social and economic life. There is a corresponding growth of membership in secondary organizations. The group life structure of a society cannot avoid being substantially affected by the development process.

Economic development and changes in residence patterns. As a nation develops economically, it becomes more urban. Youths leave the farms and small towns in search of education or better paying jobs in the nation's cities. Indus-

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W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1965).

[3] For example, Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 (April, 1965), 386–430.

[4] Some of these data were analyzed by Almond and Verba, *op. cit.* For description of the methods employed and the sampling problems, see Chapter II and Appendices A and B of that work.

[5] See, for example, the introductory chapter in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

try expands where there is population concentration, and availability of jobs attracts yet more people. Larger proportions of the population seek employment and establish homes in urban areas as a consequence of development.

Thus, along with Deutsch and other students of development, we identify three areas of social life known to vary with level of economic development: social stratification, organized economic and secondary associations, and urbanization. The research task is to move from these macro variables to an explanation of whether a given individual citizen will engage in political activity. To carry out this research task, we proceed in four steps:

1. We determine the strength and the cross-national consistency of correlations between the citizen's class position, his organizational involvement, his place of residence, (i.e. urban versus rural) and his level of political participation.
2. We integrate the survey data with aggregate information available for the five nations in order to clarify and evaluate the effect that the individual level correlations have on the larger relationship between economic development and national rates of participation.
3. Within this analysis we explore the possibility that other variables in the development process might have additional effects on national rates of participation. We also examine the rates of participation among similar groups in the five nations, searching for the presence and magnitude of the effects that discrete cultural or historical variables might have on rates of participation. The magnitude of these differences is then compared with the more patterned impact of the development variables.
4. Finally, with the aid of causal modeling, we examine the role played by several cognitive and attitudinal variables in explaining the persistent relationship between socio-economic attributes on the one hand and political participation on the other. In so doing we attempt to refine further the linkages between national economic development and individual acts of political participation. Part II of this study (which appears in the September 1969, issue of the *Review*) presents this analysis.

III. THE PRIMARY VARIABLES: IDENTIFICATION AND CORRELATION

The impact of economic development on class structure, secondary group structure, and residence patterns has been documented.[6] However, in an attempt to assess their impact on levels of participation, we need some means of determining whether they are independent phenomena or a package of relationships which are so tightly intertwined as to be inseparable in terms of their impact on citizens' participation in politics. If, for example, the changes in social class structure take place only in the urban population centers, and if only urban middle and upper class citizens are active in a nation's organizational life, then there would be only one major dimension of social structural change important for this study—urbanization.

In order to answer these questions, we set forth an extensive list of socio-economic items presumed to be related to the social structural changes. We subjected these items to a factor analysis in each nation and then for all five nations grouped together as a single population. In both cases there emerged two relatively independent and very consistent clusters of items. Other items, fewer in number, were consistently unrelated to each other or to either cluster.

The two clusters and two unrelated items are analogs for the individual citizen of the structural variables outlined above. One cluster includes items which measure socio-economic status: education, income, occupation, and an interviewer's rating of social status. The second cluster includes items which measure organizational involvement: number of organizational memberships, amount of organizational activity, involvement in the economic market-place, and involvement in group-related leisure time activities. Thus, there is a cluster which corresponds to the social stratification system and a cluster which corresponds to the organizational infrastructure of the society. Unrelated to these clusters were two items corresponding at the individual level to urbanization: size of present community and length of residence there.

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[6] For the relationship between economic development indicators and various indices of unrbanization and class structure, see the data in Bruce M. Russett, *et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Also see Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde "Toward a Communication Theory of Democratic Political Development," this REVIEW, 61, (March, 1967), 72–79. The literature on general processes of change in the social structure during modernization is, of course, very large. See, among other analyses, S. N. Eisenstadt, "Social change, Differentiation, and Evolution," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (June, 1964), 375–387; and Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (June, 1964), 339–357.

TABLE 1. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS IN FIVE NATIONS[a]

Correlation Relationship	Nation				
	U.S.	U.K.	Germany	Italy	Mexico
Urban Residence with Participation Scale	.068[b]	−.023	−.022	−.002	.073
Social Status with Participation Scale	.431	.303	.181	.283	.238
Organizational Involvement Scale with Participation Scale	.523	.480	.480	.490	.515
Urban Residence with Social Status	.159	.040	.166	.175	.118
Urban Residence with Organizational Involvement Scale	−.010	.043	−.011	−.021	.017
Social Status with Organizational Involvement Scale	.435	.313	.213	.304	.227

[a] See Appendix A for comparison of Spearman rank order correlation coefficients and these product-moment coefficients.

[b] Conservative estimates of statistical significance in a random sample whose minimum size is 800 would be as follows:

Significant at .05 level is any coefficient greater than .059.
Significant at .01 level is any coefficient greater than .081.
Significant at .001 level is any coefficient greater than .108.

With a minimum sample of 800 for each coefficient, and using the Fischer Z transformation, the following would represent estimates of significant *differences between* any pair of coefficients:

Significant at .05 level when the difference is greater than .083.
Significant at .01 level when the difference is greater than .116.
Significant at .001 level when the difference is greater than .154.

Actual samples are always greater than 860 after missing data are excluded. Calculations based on Frederick C. Mills, *Statistical Methods*, (N.Y.: Henry Holt and Co., 1955), pp. 306–307. However, it should be noted that, as described in Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, pp. 509–525, the national samples were cluster samples and collected in somewhat different ways with different degrees of success. In Mexico, no interviews were collected in towns under 10,000. Given these differences and the fact that much of the sampling data were not available in our analysis tapes, we have not attempted to compute a sampling error—it could only be a guess. In general we prefer to rely on the strength and consistency of the relationships rather than on significance tests presuming probability samples. These significance estimates are included primarily to give readers unaccustomed to such data some idea of magnitude.

Three summary indexes were constructed: social status, organizational involvement, and size of place of residence. A political participation scale was also constructed, including the following items: talking politics, contacting local authorities, contacting national authorities, involvement in electoral campaigns, and membership in political organizations and political parties.[7] Table 1 presents pertinent correlation coefficients.

The relationships in Table 1 are clear and remarkably consistent from nation to nation. Although problems in the design of the samples are such that significance tests must be used with care, the following inferences are warranted: (1) Organizational involvement is the predictive variable with the most strength. Within each of the five nations the citizen who is an active member of social groups is more likely to be a political participant than the citizen with few or no organizational involvements. The relationships observed in Table 1 are extremely strong for data of the type available.[8] If the correlation coefficients are squared, using the general rule of estimate, organizational involvement alone predicts approximately 25 percent of the variation in participation. The strength of this relationship is consistent across the five nations. (2) In addition, as expected, the citizen's tendency to be politically active is related to his social status; however, and not fully expected, the relationship between social status and political activity is weaker and less consistent cross-nationally than the relationship between organizational involvement and political activity.[9]

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[7] See Appendix B for specific scale items and methodology of scale construction. The urban residence variable is size of place of residence for individuals reporting two or more years of residence in that location. (Adding the length of residence control increases the correlation slightly.) It should be noted that the political participation scale does not include voting turnout, partially because the Almond-Verba questions on voting do not lend themselves well to participation analysis, partially because electoral participation seems to include a slightly different dimension than these other factors. There are, of course, variances among these different participation items themselves. Although factor analysis does justify a single scale, future analysis must explore differences among the items. Some separation of the political participation variable is undertaken at various points below.

On balance, these findings are familiar ones. The educated, wealthy and occupationally skilled citizen participates in political life at a greater rate than the uneducated, poor and occupationally unskilled.[10] It is well known that social and economic resources provide a citizen with currency he transfers to the political sphere. To turn the statement around, political influence is not randomly distributed across social categories but, rather, tends to concentrate in very disproportionate amounts among the well-to-do and socially involved. Perhaps, however, the difference between social status and organizational involvement as predictive variables is not as familiar. We will have much more to say about this difference.

Urbanization and Political Participation. The least expected pattern in Table 1 is the consistent *absence* of any relationship between urban residence and political participation. Only in two nations (the U.S. and Mexico) is the relationship significant at the .05 level, and even in these nations the relationship is weak, explaining less than one percent of the variance in participation. For nations as developed as the five reported on in Table 1, the tendency for urbanization and mass political activity to co-vary is *not* because city-dwellers are more active than country-dwellers. The absence of a relationship between urban residence and activity rates at the individual level may, thus, help to erase from the literature on political development an ecological fallacy.[11]

We reason as follows: as nations develop economically, two things increase, the proportion of urban-dwellers and the proportion of active political participants. However, the ecological correlation between urbanization and mass political participation is spurious, as is indicated by the absence of a relationship between urban residence and participation *within* each nation. To further investigate the inconsistency between the widely reported ecological correlation and the absence of the correlation at the individual level, we merged the file from the five nations. The correlation between urban residence and activity for the merged file is positive and significant and thus is consistent with the relationship found when aggregate data are used.

It is evident that the ecological correlation is a derivative of the greater levels of urbanization and political participation in more advanced nations. For when the aggregate correlation is decomposed, as in Table 1, political activity is seen to vary hardly at all by urban-rural differences. The fourth and fifth lines in Table 1 suggest part of the reason: while urbanization is somewhat associated with social status, it is not at all related to organizational involvement. As we have seen, in every nation organizational involvement is the strongest predictor of participation.

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[8] For readers unfamiliar with correlation coefficients in assessing the strength of relationships, Table 4 below presents some of the same patterns in terms of differences between percentages. The reader may wish to review that Table before continuing.

[9] It is interesting that social status is a stronger predictor of political participation in the United States than in any of the other nations. However, it still lags behind organizational involvement. For all the nations, of course, the status measure and the involvement measure are moderately correlated, with the U.S. showing the strongest relationship.

[10] When the individual items composing these summary indices were correlated with political participation, the coefficients obtained were almost always considerably lower than those shown in Table 1. Further, no single item accounts for a disproportionate amount of the correlation between the summary indices and the participation scale. This indicates (1) that the unidimensionality indicated by the factor loadings is justified and (2) that no single variable, such as education, for instance, is the "real" explanation for the strong correlations which appear in Table 1. Social status, in other words, seems to be the common dimension being tapped by the varied findings linking participation to education, income, and the like.

[11] For a discussion of the general problem of ecological fallacies see W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals," *American Sociological Review,* 15 (1950), 351–357. Also see Hayward R. Alker, "A Typology of Ecological Fallacies: Problems of Spurious Associations in Cross-level Inferences," International Social Science Council: Symposium on Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences, Evian, France, September, 1966.

In making these initial observations we were troubled by the fact that the five nations being studied would be clustered toward the top end of any development continuum on which all nations of the world could be arrayed. Even Mexico, the "low" case, ranks well above the median. What was needed was a nation, with a democratic form of government, much less developed than those studied in the Five-Nation study. Such a nation would provide a "hard test" for the inferences drawn from the patterns in Table 1. As a matter of scientific interest and personal generosity, Professors Sidney Verba, Rajni Kothari, and Bashir Ahmed made available data from a forthcoming study of political participation in India for our purposes. These data, which suit our needs ideally and which have been preliminarily analyzed by Nie, are from the "Cross National Research Program in Social and Political Change."

The India data provide a striking confirmation of the findings presented in Table 1. The correlation between political participation and organizational membership is .420; between participation and social status, .300.[12] These correlations are of the same order of magnitude as those reported in Table 1, although the former is slightly lower.[13] Social status and organizational involvement appear to be similar in their explanatory power even in the much less developed nation of India.

The India data also confirm our inferences about urbanization and political participation. As is to be expected, citizens of high social status and high organizational involvement are more concentrated in urban areas in a nation at India's developmental level than in the more advanced nations. The correlation between urban residence and social status is .339, much higher than in the five more developed nations; the correlation between urban residence and social involvement is .127, again much higher than the other nations. In spite of the greater concentration of persons with social and organizational resources in the cities of India, the correlation between urban residence and political participation is an insignificant .035. Place of residence is no predictor of political activity.

Urbanization and Local vs. National Political Participation. The findings at the individual level showing no relationship between urban residence and disposition to be politically active run contrary to findings reported in studies using aggregate data. For this reason, and because of the long-standing interest in how urbanization affects political behavior, we felt it necessary to probe more deeply into this question. In particular it is important to insure that a true relationship has not been accidently or mechanically blurred.

The literature about the effects of urbanization on political participation reveals an interesting anomaly. First, stemming largely from Deutsch, there are theoretical notions found in the studies of social mobilization and modernization. Urbanization, it is stressed, creates among citizens new ties to the national scene, increases the amount of political communication, and leads to greater awareness of social and political needs. In short, urbanization is one of the processes of modernization which shifts the political orientations of citizens from parochial to national and participant.[14]

Second, using individual survey data rather than national aggregate data, other investigators have noted that the process of urbanization weakens the ties between individual and community. Presumably one consequence of this has been to decrease citizen participation in local politics. For instance, Dahl writes how living in large political communities can lessen the likelihood of political participation:

> Yet, the larger and more inclusive the unit with a representative government, and the more complex its tasks, the more participation must be reduced for most people to the single act of voting in an election.

Conversely, the smaller the unit, the greater the

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[12] Although the effort was to tap the same basic variables of social status, organizational involvement, and participation as in the 1960 study, different specific questions were believed appropriate to the Indian context. The Indian sample is also particularly useful for testing urbanization hypotheses because interviews were conducted in towns as small as 200 persons.

[13] The slight falling off of the relationship between participation and organization membership might be due to the differences in the measures used in India, on the one hand, and the original five nations, on the other. In India, only information on number of memberships was available and this had to be used in place of a composite involvement scale. The correlations between participation and organizational membership only in the five nations are comparable to the correlation produced by the India data.

[14] See citations under footnote 1 above.

TABLE 2. URBAN RESIDENCE AND ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE LOCAL OR NATIONAL POLITICAL DECISIONS: PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS CONTROLLING FOR STATUS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN SIX NATIONS[a]

Correlation Relationship	Control	Nation					
		U.S.	U.K.	Germany	Italy	Mexico	India
A Urban Residence with Political Participation *Scale*	NONE	.068	−.023	−.022	−.002	.073	.035
	SES	−.001	−.037	−.054	−.054	.046	.104
	ORG. IN.	.085	−.049	−.019	.010	.035	.020
	SES and ORG. IN.	.039	−.055	−.036	−.022	.059	−.109
B Urban Residence with Attempting to Influence *Local* Decisions	NONE	−.008	−.060	−.089	−.006	−.028	−.016
	SES	−.054	−.066	−.114	−.054	−.041	−.126
	ORG. IN.	−.006	−.071	−.089	−.002	−.032	−.037
	SES and ORG. IN.	−.031	−.073	−.108	−.044	−.040	−.155
C Urban Residence with Attempting to Influence *National* Decisions	NONE	.087	.037	−.003	.064	.030	.098
	SES	.043	.029	−.011	.044	.019	−.036
	ORG. IN.	.094	.027	−.002	.068	.027	.058
	SES and ORG. IN.	.063	.023	−.005	.057	.022	−.036

[a] Again we wish to express our thanks to Sidney Verba, Rajni Kothari, Bashir Ahmed and the "Cross National Research Program in Social and Political Change," for permission to present the data on India. See notes in Table 1 on significance tests and levels of significance for correlation coefficients. The sample sizes are roughly comparable with the exception of India which has a much larger sample.

opportunity for citizens to participate in the decisions of their government. . .[15]

These seemingly contradictory observations about urbanization and political participation are not actually in direct conflict. The social mobilization literature refers to national participation and mainly uses voter turnout to support the hypothesis. The Dahl thesis refers to local participation and deliberately excludes the act of voting from the consideration.

However, the two observations do present us with difficulties. The operational procedures used in Table 1, which show little to no relationship between urbanization and political participation, combine both national and local items in the participation scale. Thus it is possible that both the Deutsch and Dahl views are correct and that our data manipulation hides two opposing effects, urbanization is increasing national participation and decreasing local participation. To check this possibility, we decomposed the participation scale and separately correlated urban residence, controlling for social status and organizational involvement, with *national* and *local* acts of political activity.[16] Table 2 presents the data.

Part A of Table 2 presents the correlations between urbanization and the overall participation scale, with and without controlling for social status and organizational involvement. In all six countries, the relationship between urbanization and overall participation is weakened by introducing controls. If the uncontrolled relationship is positive it either becomes less positive (U.S. and Mexico) or reverses direction (India) when status and organizational involvement are entered as controls. The relationships which are negative to begin with (U.K., Germany, and Italy) become more negative when the controls are introduced. The first and second-order partials confirm the inference drawn from Table 1: urbanization has little independent effect on political participation when the latter is measured by a scale including both national and local acts of political participation.

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[15] Robert A. Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," this REVIEW, 61, (December, 1967), p. 960. For a very different perspective on size of city and citizen representation in local matters, see Kenneth Prewitt and Heinz Eulau, "Political Matrix and Political Representation: Prolegomenon to a New Departure from an Old Problem," this REVIEW, 63 (June, 1969) pp. 427–441.

[16] Methodologically it is quite possible and, for that matter, common for items to demonstrate a strong relationship to a principle factor (e.g., participation level) and at the same time contain uncorrelated portions which are strongly related to different orthogonal factors. This may be what is taking place with the local-national distinction.

Part B of Table 2 repeats the same analysis with one part of the participation scale, attempts to influence *local* governmental decisions. Here the simple correlations are all negative. When controls are introduced, the relationship between urban residence and local participation becomes even more strongly negative in every case. While the correlations are weak, they are all in the predicted direction and shift further in that direction when the confounding effects of status and organizational involvement are removed from the relationship.

The findings in Part B lend support to the proposition set forth by Dahl: the larger the place of residence, the less likely is the citizen to be involved as an active participant in local political life. This finding is the first indication that the lack of relationship between urban residence and political participation may partly relate to the different manner in which urbanization affects local and national participation.

Part C of Table 2 is addressed to the social mobilization hypothesis: urbanization is presumed to increase the rate at which citizens attempt to influence national political decisions. The hypothesis is not unequivocally supported. Although five out of the six simple correlations are positive, when social status and organizational involvement are introduced as controls, all but one of these correlations are reduced to an insignificant level. (In the U.S. the coefficient remains just above the .05 level of statistical significance.) It appears that living in an urban area has no significant independent effect on rates of national participation but that urbanization is associated with higher social status which does increase political participation.[17]

The patterns in the data tend to confirm the conflicting implications of urbanization for political participation. The citizen living in the city is likely to have the social status and, in less developed nations (if India is a representative case) the organization involvement which leads to political participation. But the city-dweller loses the facilitating effect of small town life on local participation. The general problem sketched out by Dahl appears to be confirmed by these findings: with respect to participation in local matters there is an "optimal" size for cities. However, the effects of city size are not strong, especially when compared with the impact on participation of social status and organizational involvement. In no case does urbanization explain more than two percent of the variance in rates of participation; in most cases it is less than that. This compares to about ten percent of the variance explained by social status and about twenty-five percent explained by organizational involvement. The comparative weakness of urbanization as a predictive variable leads us to pay much less attention to it than to the other two variables in the remainder of the analysis.

Political Participation: Shifting From Individual Correlates to National Patterns. Analysis presented thus far shows: first, within each of the five nations a citizen's tendency to be politically active strongly varies according to his social status and his organizational involvement; and second, the citizen's tendency to be politically active is but slightly affected by his place of residence, and this weak relationship masks two counter trends. Living in an urban environment depresses the likelihood of local participation while not significantly altering the likelihood of national participation.

We infer from these findings that economic development increases mass political participation *because* associated with economic development are greater numbers of citizens in the middle and upper social classes and greater numbers involved in organizations. From data presented thus far this can only be an inference. We have yet to examine in a direct manner how economic development affects political participation. It is to this issue that we now turn.

With only five cases it is not possible to devise a single definitive test which would substantiate a hypothesis linking economic development with national rates of political participation. What is possible is to carry out a number of smaller tests, each of which can confirm or reject a part of the more inclusive theory. If each of the independent tests confirms the general theory, the cumulative effect will provide some rationale for considering the theory verified.

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[17] The very strong correlation between social class and urban residence and the quite substantial correlation between urban residence and organizational involvement in India may help explain why the aggregate correlation between urbanization and political participation is so powerful when the entire spectrum of the world's nations are included in the analysis. The fact that the correlations between all three of the independent variables and particularly between urban residence and organizational involvement are much stronger in India than in the five more developed nations under study, suggests the magnitude of the changes in social structure which take place in the development process.

If true (a) that economic development is the major determinant of national rates of participation; and (b) that this relationship is largely the result of how development affects society's class structure and organizational infrastructure, then data should demonstrate the following:

1. Strong covariance between a nation's level of economic development and its rate of mass political participation.
2. The disappearance of this relationship when social class and organizational involvement are controlled.
3. The lack of strong relationships between mass political participation and non-development-associated variables.
4. Similar *absolute* rates of participation among citizens of similar social class and organizational involvement irrespective of nation, as well as the same *relative* differences from one nation to the next already indicated by the coefficients in Table 1.

Comparing National Rates of Political Participation. Comparing rates of political participation among the five nations shows that the United States and Great Britain have the highest rate; Germany is slightly lower; Mexico and Italy follow in that order and have considerably lower rates of participation than the three more developed nations.[18] With the exception of the reversal between Italy and Mexico,[19] this ranking corresponds with an economic development ranking constructed from aggregate statistics. (Aggregate data on which the rankings are based are presented in Appendix C.)

Five cases "prove" nothing, but the predicted pattern is apparent. The correspondence in rankings of economic development and mass political participation, based in the present case on survey and aggregate data from five nations, does conform to the rankings reported in studies using only aggregate data but based on many more than five cases. It is consistent with Deutsch, Lipset, Lerner, and others to conclude that national rates of political participation covary with levels of economic development.

The Component Variables: Social Class and Organizational Life. It comes as no surprise to learn that a nation's level of political participation covaries with its level of economic development. The more difficult task is to identify what components of economic development account for the growing numbers of citizens who become active in political life. The theory which guides our analysis points to two component variables: social class and organizational life. These variables are chosen from a long list of social factors known to be affected by development for two reasons. Findings about individual political behavior indicate that status and organizational membership are strongly related to political activity. Further, at the national level, social class composition and organizational life change in highly predictable ways during the process of economic development. It is on the importance of these variables at the individual *and* the national level that our theory depends.

What is needed is some manner of determining whether social class and organizational structure are indeed the components of economic development which predict rates of mass political participation. The theory is strengthened if it can be shown that other components of development are not associated with participation. Although the data available impose constraints on us, and we cannot directly examine the possible impact of additional variables, one simple test can be performed. The relative importance of the two structural variables can be compared to all remaining development-associated variables taken as a residual group.

This can be accomplished by correlating economic development with political participation while controlling for social status and organizational involvement. To accomplish this each respondent was given a score based on his nation's level of economic development. Thus each respondent in the U.S. was scored 5, each British respondent was scored 4, each German 3, each Italian 2, and each Mexican 1. This variable was added to each respondent's data record and the files from the five nations were merged. Level of economic development, now treated as a prop-

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[18] The ranking was achieved by calculating the national means on the participation variable. This is the same variable used in Table 1. Medians were also calculated and in no case did this alter the ranking.

[19] The Mexican sample contains no respondent from communities with populations less than 10,000. The .232 correlation between size of place of residence and social status in Mexico may account for the reversal in rankings between Italy and Mexico. Indeed, the means are so close at present that it is highly probable that they would reverse with a representative Mexican sample.

TABLE 3. RESIDENCE IN NATIONS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATIONS CONTROLLING FOR SOCIAL STATUS AND ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Correlation Relationship	Control	Residence According to National Level of Economic Development
Residence in Nations at Different Levels of Development *with* Political Participation	NONE	.133[a]
	SES (only)	.048
	ORG. IN. (only)	.015
	SES and ORG. IN.	−.012

[a] Sample size is about 4000. The zero-order correlation is, of course, significant at better than .001.

erty of the individual, was correlated with political participation.

Table 3 presents the results. The now familiar hypothesis derived from social mobilization literature is confirmed. There is a significant relationship between national economic development and individual political participation, as the uncontrolled relationship indicates. The simple correlation between political participation and economic development is .133.

The question we ask, then, is how much of this relationship can be attributed to national patterns of social class and organizational involvement and how much of it can be attributed to other factors associated with economic development. To answer this question we compute the partials, controlling first for social class, then for organizational involvement, and finally simultaneously controlling on both class and organizational involvement. Controlling for social class, the .133 correlation is reduced to .048; controlling for organizational involvement it is reduced to .015; controlling for both (the second order partial), it is essentially zero, a non-significant −.012.[20]

If other factors associated with economic development were independently affecting levels of citizen political participation, then some significant relationship should have remained when the effects of status and organizational membership were partialed out. However, this clearly is not the case. The partial correlations show that *the two variables alone account for all of the difference between the participation levels of citizens in the more and the less developed nations.*

This finding can be rephrased in terms of the general theory being advanced in this paper. Economic development leads to greater rates of political participation *because* associated with economic development is an expanding middle-class and an expanding organizational infrastructure. Social class and organizational life are the components of economic development which most strongly affect mass political participation.

Since we have only five nations and since there can be nation to nation differences not attributable to economic development, the test we devised is hardly a conclusive one. The test is adequate, however, for us to conclude that the inference about economic development and political participation withstands this particular attempt to falsify it. We are unable to show any relationship between development and rates of participation which cannot be explained by reference to the two important social structural variables—social class and organizational involvement.

Three types of data have now been presented: (a) individual correlations showing the association between social status, organizational involvement, and urban residence, on the one hand, and political participation, on the other; (b) rankings of national levels of economic development and of aggregate measures of political participation; (c) partial correlations showing the effect of economic development on political participation when social class and organizational involvement are controlled. These data, from different perspectives, tend to confirm the general hypothesis that economic development alters the class and organizational structures of societies which in turn increases the level of mass political participation. No single test is conclusive, but taken together they present a strong case for the theory. Each of the following sections in Part I of this article present additional analysis further testing and clarifying these relationships.

Idiosyncratic National Differences and Cohart Comparisons Across National Boundaries. The analysis has left two important questions

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[20] As an additional check stemming from our concern for the accuracy of the rankings among the more developed nations a second dichotomous variable was created giving each respondent in the three developed nations a score of "2" and those in the two less developed nations a "1." The same analysis was then performed on this variable.

The results of this analysis are similar to those reported in Table 3. The simple correlation between the development index and level of participation is .142. The partial for this relationship controlling only for SES is .073. That controlling for only organizational involvement is .030. The second order partial controlling for both SES and ORG. IN. is an insignificant .002.

TABLE 4. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION LEVELS AMONG STATUS AND INVOLVEMENT GROUPS IN FIVE NATIONS

Organizational Involvement Level	Social Status Level	Percentage of Active Participants				
		U.S.	U.K.	Germany	Italy	Mexico
High	High	75[a]	77	62	66	61
High	Low	67	67	65	53	71
Medium	High	41	53	30	34	26
Medium	Low	27	33	30	23	22
Low	High	32	38	21	10	16
Low	Low	10	21	14	11	8

[a] That is, 75% of those American respondents classified as having high involvement and high status report participation levels high enough to be classified as "active." Cutting points are the same in absolute score terms from nation to nation, but are intrinsically arbitrary. The size of the groups upon which the percentages are based are as follows: High-high 315, 134, 198, 62, 101; High-low 43, 101, 130, 30, 149; Medium-High 203, 170, 142, 211, 108; Medium-low 106, 345, 123, 242, 315; Low-High 154, 49, 137, 80, 127; Low-low 134, 146, 116, 162, 495.

unanswered. First, are the absolute levels of political participation among social status or organizationally involved cohorts similar from one nation to the next? To learn (as we do in Table 1) that a Mexican laborer participates in politics less frequently than a Mexican businessman *and* that a German laborer participates less frequently than a German businessman cannot tell us whether Mexican and German laborers or Mexican and German businessmen display similar rates of political participation.

The second unanswered question is a corollary of the first. Are there historical or cultural factors particular to a nation which, independently of that nation's level of economic development, affect how politically active its citizens are? To a degree the answer to such a question will always be yes. However, the theoretical thrust of this paper suggests that the effects of discrete national experiences will be minimal in comparison to the effects directly attributable to economic development, at least to the two components of economic development identified in the analysis. Our next task, then, is to devise a way to test this assumption. In answering the first question about political participation of coharts across national boundaries, we provide an indirect answer to the second question. If we find that individuals at the same level of social class and organizational involvement are approximately equal in their political participation from one nation to the next, it is unlikely that unique cultural, historical or political variables are causing different rates of mass political participation.

Table 4 presents relevant findings. Respondents in each nation are classified into six groups by trichotomizing the organizational involvement scale scores and dichotomizing the social status scores.[21] Using the same absolute criteria in all nations, the proportions of "politically active" citizens in each of the six groups are calculated for each nation. These proportions range from 8% among lower class organizationally uninvolved Mexicans to 77% among upper class organizationally involved British.[22]

The soundest and most obvious conclusions to be drawn from Table 4 are those already clear from the correlation coefficients in Table 1; Social status and organizational involvement, especially the latter, are extremely powerful predictors of political participation. An average of 11% of the Low-Low citizens are classified as active participants; an average of 70% of the High-High citizens are politically active. These relationships, it should be emphasized, overwhelm all other factors shaping the participation patterns.

Table 4 does show, however, that there are important differences between nations which *do not* correspond to levels of economic development. For instance, in each of the six cohort groups, Germans are less politically active than British. Yet these two nations are at roughly similar levels of development. Similarly, British, within each group, are more active than Americans and yet the U.S. measures higher on economic development.

Note as well the unusually high proportion of political participants among those low on both social status and organizational involvement in Great Britain. Historical or political factors appear to be operating in Britain which increase mass political participation at a rate greater than would be predicted from knowledge of Britain's economic development level alone.

Other patterns in Table 4 are also indicative of non-developed associated differences between nations. Mexicans of low status but high organizational involvement have an exceptionally large number of political participants (Mexico also shows an unusually large number of low status high involvement citizens). Germany reveals a similar, if less dramatic pattern. These figures possibly indicate a more organized, and therefore politically relevant lower class in these two nations.

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[21] The same absolute cutting points were used in each nation. Cutting points were chosen to equalize, as far as possible, the size of the groups. Initial tables showed a trichotomization of both variables, but the size of the groups obtained was too small, especially among upper class respondents in the less developed nations, and the results of that procedure were somewhat misleading. On the other hand, a three group division along organizational involvement lines does help show visually, more effectively than a simple dichotomy, the strength and consistency of that variable.

[22] Politically active citizens are arbitrarily defined as citizens participating at or above the grand mean of the participation variable when all five national samples are combined.

In short, idiosyncratic differences between countries do exist, but they are very small when compared to the extremely strong pattern revealed in Table 4.[23] With a few important exceptions *individuals with similar social statuses and similar organizational involvement display similar absolute levels of political participation no matter in which of the five nations they live.* This finding confirms once again the hypothesis that the two components of economic development, expanding middle-class and growing organizational infrastructure, sharply affect levels of mass political participation.

IV. THE LINKING VARIABLES: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS

Examining general relationships between social structures and political participation can take us only so far. To explicate more fully how economic development relates to political participation it is necessary to complicate the causal model. Up to this point, we have utilized the model suggested by Deutsch and others which looks as follows:

Economic Development → Changes in the Social Structures → Increased Political Participation

Discussions involving this model suggest that changes in the social structure affect political participation *because* citizen attitudes about politics are altered. Numerous survey studies in the U.S. and elsewhere show, for example, that persons who feel confident of success in influencing decisions are more likely to be political participants, and that middle class persons are more likely to feel confident.[24] Hence, increasing the number of middle class citizens increases the number of confident citizens, and this, in turn, increases political participation.

The causal model with the intervening attitude component looks as follows:

Economic Development → Changes in the Social Structures → Changes in the Distribution of Certain Political Attitudes → Increased Political Participation

There may be feedback loops in this process. Successful political participation, for instance, promotes greater confidence; successful participation may even alter the political structures of society so that participation itself is facilitated (expanding the franchise, for instance). However, for the moment we set aside the problem of feedback effects and limit attention to testing the basic assumptions of the model.

Questions included in the Five Nation study allow us to explore this causal model in a limited way. We begin by identifying five attitude sets which frequently are cited as the likely intervening variables explaining why socio-economic attributes predict rates of political activity.[25] The five are: 1) sense of citizen duty, 2) basic information about politics, 3) perceived stake in political outcomes, 4) sense of political efficacy, and 5) attentiveness to political matters.

We examine the relationship of these intervening variables to the general theme of economic development and political participation in two steps. First, at the nation-state level, we examine the relationship between measures of economic development and aggregate scores for the five attitude sets, and between the attitudes and general rates of political participation. Second, using causal modeling techniques, we investigate the importance of these attitude sets in linking socio-economic attributes and political participation.

Table 5 presents data pertinent to the first step. The five nations are ranked by level of economic development. Then, in column B, the nations are ranked in terms of mean level of organizational involvement and social status. The next five columns (C) present the rankings of the various political attitudes (again using mean level). The final column shows the mean level of political participation for the five nations.

Although there are various methodological difficulties in such absolute rankings (and we especially must recall the bias in the Mexican sample),[26] Table 5 does confirm the reasoning outlined. Across Table 5, the three more developed nations *always* rank above the two less developed. The Kendall coefficient of concordance, or W, which measures the amount of agreement among multiple rankings, is .859 and is statistically significant at the .001 level. (The maximum observable value of Kendall's W is 1.0.)

Economic development alters the social class structure and the organizational infrastructure of a society. One consequence of these alterations

TABLE 5. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, ATTITUDE STRUCTURE, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

A		B		C					
Economic Development		Social Structure		Attitude Structure					D
Rank Order of[a] Countries with Respect to Measures of Economic Development		Social Status[b]	Social Involvement	Citizen Duty	Political Information	Impact of Politics	Political Efficacy	Political Attentiveness	Political Participation
United States	1	(1)	1	1	2	1	1	1	1.5
United Kingdom	2	(2)	2.5	3	3	3	2	3	1.5
Germany	3	(3)	2.5	2	1	2	3	2	3
Italy	4	(4)	5	5	4	5	4.5	5	5
Mexico	5	(5)	4	4	5	4	4.5	4	4

Kendall Coefficient of Concordance $W = .859$ Sig. $> .001$.

[a] Appendix C presents the aggregate data of measures of economic development for the five countries on which the rankings are based.

[b] Because three of the four measures of social status (income, occupation, and interviewer rating of SES) included in the survey were designed only to measure relative positions of respondents within each of the nations, meaningful comparison of mean level of social status between nations is not possible. Therefore, the rankings of social status in this table are based on information available from aggregate indicators of social status rather than on the survey samples. For this reason the rankings in this column were excluded from the computation of the coefficient of concordance presented above.

is the greater proportion of citizens who have social attributes—education, stable incomes, white-collar jobs, organizational memberships—which, as already shown, relate to political participation. Further, the more developed nations have more citizens holding the views normally associated with political activity. Greater proportions of Americans, British, and Germans

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[23] Table 4 also reveals a systematic pattern for citizens of the three developed nations, at any given status and involvement level, to be slightly more active in politics than their coharts of the two lesser developed nations. This finding is in direct contradiction to Table 3 which reports, and was so interpreted, that once social status and organizational involvement have been controlled there are no significant differences in participation rates directly related to the development process. Table 4 appears to suggest just the opposite.

A brief methodological excursion is necessary to explain the seeming contradiction. The explanation turns on how sub-categories are constructed. What is happening in Table 4 is that those classified as upper status in the more developed nations contain a much higher proportion of *very high status* citizens than does the cohart group in the less developed nations. The converse is true as well. There is a higher concentration of *very low status* persons in the low status categories in Italy and Mexico than in the three more developed countries. There is no easy way to compensate for this artifact of data manipulation. Irrespective of where these continuous variables are cut, there are greater proportions of very highs or very lows in comparable categories when shifting from the more to less developed nations. This reflects the social structures of the different nations—a reality which derives directly from overall level of economic development. The unequal concentrations of very highs and very lows explains most, if not all, of the differences between most and least developed nations detected in Table 4. It also alerts us to the methodological problems of making inferences from category groupings.

[24] See, for example, Dahl, *Who Governs?*, *op. cit.*

[25] A more detailed discussion of these five attitudes as well as the logic connecting them to socio-economic traits and to political participation can be found in Part II, appearing in the September 1969 issue of this REVIEW.

[26] See footnote 19 above.

than Mexicans or Italians have a sense of civic duty, are politically informed, see the impact of public policies on their lives, feel politically efficacious, are attentive to politics—and, finally, actively participate in political life.

We should emphasize again that there are national differences in political attitude scores which cannot be explained by differences in developmental levels alone. Obviously cultural heritages and specific national experiences or diverse system arrangements leave their particular impact on national attitude patterns. Germany ranks higher than the United States on mean level of political information, even though its general level of development is lower. An exploration of other attitude patterns, especially those associated with affect towards national institutions and inter-group perceptions and evaluations would reveal further differences.[27] Many of these were pointed out by Almond and Verba in their initial analysis and we shall not explore them here.[28] Nonetheless, we wish to emphasize that insofar as attitudes bearing on individual political involvement and attentiveness and personal political competence are concerned, the development-associated patterns seem to be extremely powerful. Future analyses of cross-national differences should be sensitive to the often overriding power of these relationships.

We can summarize the theoretical argument briefly: economic development alters social structures, particularly the class structure and the secondary group structure. Expanding the middle class and increasing the organizational complexity of society changes political socialization patterns; greater proportions of citizens have those politically relevant life experiences which lead to attitudes such as political efficacy, sense of civic duty, etc. These attitudes motivate the citizen to participate in politics, sensitize him to available opportunities, and provide him with political resources. Thus it is that economic development increases the rate of mass political participation.

The many implicit hypotheses in this causal model cannot be directly examined in a table reporting aggregate measures. To investigate systematically the pathway from development to political participation we must examine the extent to which individual traits associated with position in the class structure and with involvement in organizational life do in fact affect political attitudes and the extent to which political attitudes are intervening variables between socio-economic characteristics and political participation. These tasks are undertaken in Part II of this paper.

The second part of the paper will return to the data presented in this part insofar as these data are relevant to several important issues. For instance, that organizational involvement leads to political participation irrespective of the social status of the individual is directly related to questions about mass politics and political mobilization. Further, as we shall stress in the second part, those who are politically active because they are organizationally involved express different political attitudes from those who are active because of their social status. This finding leads to consideration of the ancient debate between advocates of mass democracy and apologists for elite democracy. Our inattention in Part I to some of the "larger" issues suggested by the data will hopefully be remedied in Part II.

APPENDIX A

*General Methodology and Data Analysis**

A Note on the Use of Parametric Statistics with Survey Data:

Most of the data analysis reported in this two-part paper consists of product moment correla-

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[27] Further research will have to distinguish, of course, between the different dimensions of the variables here considered. For example, the "information" questions here only cover very basic items like the names of national party leaders. It might be that detailed information would tend to follow, rather than proceed, participation. The various dimensions of political efficacy are also a matter for investigation. At a very abstract level, efficacy seems to become more related to general national affect items. At the more concrete and personalistic level, it follows the pattern here outlined: linked to personal status and involvement, varying little by national pattern. Thus, the only item on which an underdeveloped nation scored higher than a developed one was on an estimate as to whether possible national participation might succeed in influencing outcomes. Here, Mexicans scored higher than Germans, although very few felt they understood local or national events, or could name any potential strategy of influence. Again, the factor analysis justifies the dimension of the scale, but there are obviously additional dimensions to explore.

[28] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*

* Data analysis for this paper was performed at the Stanford Computation Center under an NSF grant to Stanford University for unsponsored research. Most of the analysis was accomplished with programs from the *Statistical Package For the Social Sciences.* See Nie, Norman H., Dale Bent, and C. Hadlai Hull *SPSS: Statistical Package For the Social Sciences* (New York McGraw Hill Book

tions, partial r's, and standardized regression coefficients (path coefficients) all of which assume interval ratio scales. When employing this type of analysis with indexes which are based primarily on groups of ordinal survey items, there is always some question as to the validity of the relationships. We also quickly discovered that there is less than unanimous agreement among statisticians concerning both the advisability and/or the effects of violating the assumptions of interval scales.

As a check on the validity of the matrix of simple correlations (between our eight indexes) an identical matrix was computed using Spearman rank order coefficients.** The product moment correlations were then compared to the Spearman correlations. A visual comparison of these two matrices revealed that the majority of pairs of coefficients were separated by less than .01 and that no pair had a spread greater than .03. The mean difference between the pairs of coefficients was .014. As a further check we examined the direction of these differences to determine if the small differences tended to introduce any systematic bias. This analysis indicated that the errors were also totally random with the Spearman coefficients tending to be *very* slightly lower on the average.

We feel relatively confident from this comparison that very little distortion was introduced by the data's inability to meet the assumptions of interval ratio scales. We also feel, however, that this may to a large part be due to the method of index construction used. The vast majority of our scales had an absolute zero point; most approached a normal distribution and most were variables ranging from 0 to 100.

A Note on the Desirability of Multiple Item Indexes:

Throughout our experiments with different scale construction techniques for our analysis one clear finding emerged. When some test of unidimensionality could be demonstrated for any group of three or more of our survey items, a composite index of those items always produced a relationship with a given dependent variable which was greater than twice the relationship between any single item in that index and the dependent variable. This remained true irrespective of the type of scale construction technique used or the type of test of unidimensionality employed. Thus the relationship (r^2) between the social status index and the participation index is greater than two times the (r^2) between any item in the SES index and the participation index. If we reverse the procedure, decomposing the participation index, the results are similar, i.e., the r^2 between the two indexes is greater than two times the r^2 on any item in the participation index correlated with the SES index. A *very* small part of this finding may be explained by the slight tendency of correlation coefficients to vary with the number of categories contained in the variables. The vast majority of these differences, however, are clearly a function of the greater reliability of multiple item indexes. It seems clear that multiple item indexes greatly reduce random or idiosyncratic errors introduced by the interview situation, the wording of specific questions, and the meaning of specific attitudes and behaviors as they relate to a larger underlying dimension.

APPENDIX B

Scales and Indexes: Construction and Contents

I. Scale Construction Techniques.

A. Weighted Scales

A number of different techniques for scale and index construction were experimented with during the preparation for our analysis. Guttman scale analysis had to be abandoned because of item rotation within the scales among national samples. While the same items were usually scalable in the five countries, the position of the items would often be arranged in totally different patterns from one nation to another. Further, a number of indices that we desired to create did not meet the Guttman criteria—some for conceptual reasons and others for operational ones.

After some experimentation, an index construction technique was used which we felt would meet the following desired criteria:

1. Items would be weighted in the index proportional to their relationship to the common underlying dimension of the index.
2. Missing data should be handled in a way which minimized the number of missing cases and at the same time insured that the multi-variate analysis would be based on roughly the same populations from one set of variables to another.

For indexes containing three or more items, the following procedure was employed:

1. The items were entered into a factor analysis, and the item loadings from the first unrotated (principal component) factor were used as item weightings for the indexes. A loading of $\geq$ .50

Co., forthcoming). Several special purpose programs required by our analysis were written by C. Hadlai Hull, systems programmer for Stanford's institute of Political Studies.

** We are grateful to Professor William Paisley of the Communications Department at Stanford for consulting with us on this matter and for suggesting this checking procedure.

was required for an item to be used in an index.*

2. The respondent's score was divided by the number of categories in the item so that a given item's contribution to an index would be based solely on its factor loading and not inflated or deflated by the number of categories in the original coding.
3. A minimum number of non-missing responses for each index was decided upon based on the amount of missing data in the items entering a given index and on what we felt would constitute a minimum reliable score. Respondents with a greater number of missing items than were specified by this minimum were excluded from further analysis. A procedure was worked out so that scores based on a different number of items would be comparable and have a minimum distortion on the weightings. With this procedure no more than 14% of any national sample was missing on any index, and the average was about 5%.
4. Sums were then adjusted and rounded so that scores always ranged from 0 to 100.

The formal procedure for computing these weighted indexes is:

weighted index$_i$

$$= \left(\frac{(X_i/C_i \cdot W_i) + (X_{j\_}C_j \cdot W_j) \cdots + (X_n/C_n \cdot W_n)}{\sum_{i=1}^{1(n)} W^n} \right) \cdot 100$$

where X_i = a respondent's score for the ith item of the index.

where C_i = the number of categories or values in the ith item of the index

where W_i = the factor loading of the ith item of the index.

The sum of these values is then divided by the sum of the weights for all items used in the index. This remainder is then multiplied by 100 and rounded, yielding index scores between 0 and 100. When one or more items is missing, the corresponding $(X_i/C_i \cdot W_i)$ steps in the numerator are deleted, and the denominator is adjusted by the following procedure:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{1-N} W = \sum_{i=1}^{1-N} - \left(\sum mw\right)$$

where ΣMW corresponds to the sum of the weights of the missing items for a given respondent. A tally is kept on the number of missing items for each case. If this tally was greater than the maximum allowed for that index a scale score was not assigned for that case.

B. Simple Additive Indexes.

1. The items were required to correlate with each other at .45 or higher.
2. The coding categories were adjusted where necessary so that each item contributed equally to the index.
3. Cases were rejected when either of the items were missing.

II. Contents of the Indexes

Items Included in The Socio-Economic Status Index—Weighted Index—Three Non Missing Responses Required

Item 1: Occupation of respondent coded from unskilled worker to higher management. Note: If respondent was housewife, the spouse's occupation was coded instead.

Item 2: Family income. Eight categories of income were used in all countries. See the Five National Study Codebook.

Item 3: Educational level. Collapsed recoding required for compatibility in five nations into following categories: no schooling, grammar school, high school, college, missing data.

Item 4: Interviewer rating of socio-economic status. Coded in four categories. See documentation from NORC interviewer instructions for Five Nation Study for criteria used.

Items Included in the Organizational Involvement Index—Weighted Index—Three Non Missing Responses Required.

Item 1: Labor force participation. Economically active versus non-active. Housewives, persons permanently unemployed or unemployable were coded as economically inactive.

Item 2: Organizational memberships coded by number of memberships. Special recording: If respondent was a member of a political organization as indicated by another item or interview schedule it was subtracted out of tally on this variable to remove auto correlation between this scale and the scale of political participation.

Item 3: Leadership activity in organizations, held leadership position, yes or no.

Item 4: Activities outside of work and family. Exact wording "Now aside from your work and your family what are the activities that interest you most that you spend your free time on?" Coded as (1) loner activities (2) informal group activities (3) formal or organizational group activities. Recoded from Five Nation Study data.

Items Included in the Place of Residence Index

Item 1: Size of community of residence at time of interview.

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* For a discussion of the basic concepts of principle component factor indexes see Hagood, M. J., and P. O. Price, *Statistics for Sociologists* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1952), Chapter 26.

Item 2: Length of residence in Community at time of interview. (Used only as a control. Respondents with less than 3 years of residence excluded from the index).

Items Included in the Political Participation Index—Weighted Index

NOTE: A slightly different index was used in the U.S. due to the absence of the phenomena of memberships in political parties in this country. In all countries except the U.S. out of a possible five non-missing responses were required out of a possible of six.

Items used in all countries.

Item 1: What about talking about public affairs to other people? Do you do that nearly every day, once a week, from time to time, or never?

Item 2: Have you ever done anything to try and influence a local decision?

Item 3: Have you ever done anything to try to influence an act of (SPECIFY NATIONAL LEGISLATURE)?

Item 4: (IF A MEMBER OF SOME ORGANIZATION) Are any of the organizations you belong to in any way concerned with governmental, political, or public affairs? For instance, do they take stands on or discuss public issues or try to influence government actions?

Items Used in All Countries But the United States

Item 5: Now we would like to find out something about your party preference and how you vote. Are you currently a member of any political party or organization?

Item 6: Were you ever a member?

Item Used Only in the United States

Item 5: Have you ever been active in a political campaign? That is, have you ever worked for a candidate or party, contributed money, or done any other active work?

Items Included in the Index of Citizens Duty—Simple Additive Index

Item 1: We know that the ordinary person has many problems that take his time. In view of this, what part do you think the ordinary person ought to play in the local affairs of his town or district? (IF NEEDED) What *specifically* ought he to do?

Item 2: People speak of the obligations that they owe to their country. In your opinion, what are the obligations that every man owes his country?

NOTE: Both items were coded with most active types of participatory obligations given the highest value and the most passive types of obligation the lowest value.

Items Included in the Index of Political Information—Simple Additive Index

Item 1: We are also interested in how well known the national leaders of the various political parties are in this country. Could you name three leaders of the ———— party? Could you name three leaders of the ———— party? Could you tell me the name of a leader from the ———— party?

Item 2: When a new Prime Minister (MEXICO AND UNITED STATES: PRESIDENT) comes into office, one of the first things he must do is appoint people to cabinet positions and ministries. Could you tell me what some of these cabinet positions are (IF NEEDED) Can you name any others? (PROBE UNTIL RESPONDENT NAMES FIVE CABINET POSITIONS OR UNTIL HE KNOWS NO MORE)

Items Included in the Index of Political Efficacy—Weighted Index—four non-missing responses required.

Item 1: How do you feel about this? Thinking of the important national and international issues facing the country, how well do you understand them?

Item 2: How about local issues in this town or part of the country? How well do you understand them?

Item 3: Suppose a regulation were being considered by (SPECIFY MOST LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL UNIT: TOWN+ VILLAGE+ ETC.) that you considered very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?

Item 4: If you made an effort to change this regulation, how likely is it that you would succeed?

Item 5: Suppose a law were being considered by (SPECIFY APPROPRIATE NATIONAL LEGISLATURE FOR EACH NATION) that you considered to be very unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do? (IF NEEDED) Anything else?

Item 6: If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?

NOTE: Items 3 and 5 were coded so that respondents who felt they could do something (no matter what) were coded high while those who said they could do nothing were coded low.

Items Included in the Index of Political Attentiveness—Weighted Index 3 non missing responses required

Item 1: Do you follow the accounts of political and governmental affairs? Would you say you follow them regularly, from time to time, or never?

Item 2: What about newspapers—do you follow accounts of political and governmental affairs in the newspapers nearly every day, about once a week, from time to time, or never?

Item 3: What about on the radio or television? Do you listen to accounts of public affairs nearly every day, about once a week, from time to time, or never?

Item 4: What about magazines? Do you read about public affairs in magazines about once a week, from time to time, or never?

Items Included in Index of Perceived Government Impact on Life—

Item 1: Thinking now about the national government in (LONDON, BONN, ETC.), about how much effect do you think its activities, the laws passed and so on, have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect or none?

Item 2: Now take the local government: about how much effect do you think its activities have on your day-to-day life? Do they have a great effect, some effect, or none?

APPENDIX C

Ranking of Countries by Measures of Economic Development

Country	% of Labor Force in Service Occupations*	Gross Nat'l Product in U.S. $**	Literacy	Overall Rank
U.S.	42.0%	$2577	98%	1
G.B.	39.8	1189	98.5	2
Germany	29.9	927	98.5	3
Italy	22.9	516	87.5	4
Mexico	21.3	262	50	5

* Source: United Nations, Compendium of Social Statistics, 1963, New York, 1963.

** Source: Mikoto Usui and E. E. Hagen, World Income, 1957. Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass., 1959.

CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: HERDER'S SUGGESTIVE INSIGHTS*

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I. INTRODUCTION

When in the early thirties Harold Lasswell declared that "political symbols and practices are so intimately intertwined with the larger array of symbols and practices in culture that it is necessary to extend the scope of political investigation to include the fundamental features of the culture setting"[1], he was very much a voice in the wilderness. Today Lasswell's words have almost become commonplace in the vocabulary of political science. In this, as in many other current concerns, Lasswell's early work has rightly been judged seminal.[2] It substantially contributed towards the prolific expansion of the academic boundaries of political enquiry within the last three decades, in particular to the growth of interest in psychological and sociological approaches. Increasingly students of political behavior in both 'established' and 'emergent' nations have come to realize that purely formal and legalistic conceptual frameworks are inadequate to provide meaningful answers to such problems as persistence and change, socialization, political cohesion, and the complex bases of political authority and legitimacy. This realization, though it has made political science a more rather than less problematical undertaking, nonetheless has had the result of adding new dimensions or perspectives to its analytical vision. Indeed, in the course of this development the very notion of the political has undergone a profound re-appraisal.

In this paper I wish to draw attention to an eighteenth-century thinker, J. G. Herder, many of whose ideas can be said to have foreshadowed both the current re-appraisal of the political and the terms in which it has found expression. His challenge to the accepted, and essentially Bodinian and Hobbesian doctrines of law, sovereignty and nationhood remarkably presages not only Lasswell's injunction to heed the relevance of culture patterns to political processes, but also several other themes that figure prominently in contemporary socio-political theorizing. It would seem, therefore, that Herder's thought has gained rather than lost in significance in the period separating his time from our own.

To say this is not to suggest, however, that Herder was a political thinker first and foremost. Indeed, only one of his publications, the essay *On the Reciprocal Influence of Government and the Sciences* (1780) bears a title which readily identifies it as a political treatise. But then, political conditions in eighteenth-century Germany generally—Herder called it a *terra obedientiae*[3]—and his official position at the court of Weimar in particular, were hardly conducive to the public expression of political ideas. The chapter on government in the *Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (1784–91), the work for which Herder is best known, had to be rewritten four times in order to pass the censor. In contrast to other West-European countries, Germany was a political desert. None of the major or minor states that composed the only nominally-existing Empire offered any scope for shared political activity. There was no effective parliamentary life, no political parties, few, if any, political clubs, and merely the semblance of a popular press. 'Politics' was virtually tantamount to personal rule by the princes, assisted by councillors so privy that no one ever heard them speak.[4] Under

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* An award by the Canada Council in 1967 enabled me to do further research on unpublished Herder sources in Germany.

[1] Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1935, Free Press ed. 1965), p. 158.

[2] Heinz Eulau, "The Maddening Methods of Harold D. Lasswell: Some Philosophical Underpinnings", *Journal of Politics*, 30 (1968), 3–24.

[3] XVIII, 315 and 535. (All references are to the Suphan edition of Herder's *Werke*, 33 vols., Berlin, 1877–1913).

[4] Thus wrote F. K. von Moser, one of the outstanding publicists of the period in his challenging tract *Der Herr und der Diener* (1759), cited in A. Fauchier-Magnan, *The Small German Courts in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Methuen, 1958), p. 55. Regarding the political and intellectual background of Herder's Germany, probably the best recent works in English are Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom* (Boston: Beacon, 1957), pp. 8–80; W. H. Bruford, *Culture and Society in Classical Weimar (1775–1806)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962) and Isaiah Berlin, "Herder and the Enlightenment," in Earl R. Wassermann (ed.), *Aspects of the Eighteenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), pp. 47–104.

those circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that men of humble birth like Herder could cherish little hope of making any impact by word or deed on political life. Acutely aware of these conditions, Herder preferred, therefore, to confine his more radical ideas to private letters or to disguise and disperse them in non-political contexts.[5]

An equally weighty reason for Herder's merely sporadic writing on specifically political questions lies in the heterogeneity of his intellectual interests, ranging from literary criticism, aesthetics, philology, folklore and history to psychology, anthropology, philosophy and theology. His was a synoptic quest. What may to an intellectual in the age of specialization seem a suspiciously diverse, if not odd, array of fields was to Herder a necessary condition for acquiring a 'whole view' of man and his world. This multi-dimensional approach no doubt accounts for the fragmented nature of most of his writings. But it also has the qualities of its defects. Herder's social and political thought, devoid though it is of systematic elaboration, makes up in breadth and originality of insight for what it lacks in orderliness of treatment. Indeed, at times it reveals a perspicacity of vision which perhaps we can only now truly recognize. This holds true for both 'substantive' and 'methodological' issues. Herder was one of the first to acclaim the French Revolution as the most important historical event since the Reformation. He saw the magnitude, and foresaw many of the consequences of ethnocentrism, racial discrimination and colonialism, and the various forms of social disintegration associated with industrialization and urbanization. In his stress on interaction, the dialectic interplay of opposites, and the essential oneness of persistence and change, he anticipated in important respects subseqent methodological trends in the social scienes. There is also a striking similarity between Herder's interest in 'wholes' and *Gestalt* or systemic approaches, and between his theory of inter-generational value transmission and contemporary critiques of replicative socialization. Finally, his problematic notion of social and political activity free from norms of centrality and hierarchy appears less utopian in the light of the 'stateless communities' described by political anthropologists, or of some current thinking on administrative processes and decision making.[6] Several of these themes have been elaborated elsewhere.[7] Here I shall primarily focus on those ideas which bear upon problems of nation-building; by sketching in their philosophical underpinnings I also hope to point up aspects of methodological import.

II. CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION

Although the intimate linkage of science, technology, secularism and the nation state is characteristic of only one particular form of historical development, it has come to be identified as a 'world culture.'[8] Similarly, the notions of dynamic change, of 'modernization' and ineluctable progress, said to underlie this particular historical development, have come to assume the status of cultural absolutes, of universal value objectives.[9] Coupled with this mode of thinking is the belief that the leading representatives of the world culture are inherently capable of responding to the diverse challenges attending rapid and continuous change.[10] Hence they are presented (and frequently accepted) as models worthy of emulation. To be sure, élites in emerging states are not altogether unaware of the conflicting pulls of socio-cultural distinctiveness on the one hand and modernization through the adoption of the world culture on the other. Yet even if it is sensed that the diffusion of the 'scientific world culture' might constitute a threat to indigenous cultures, such fears are often assuaged by identifying the world culture with purely 'material' elements incapable of impairing the 'spiritual' content of a society's traditional values. Underlying this desire to fuse traditional cultures with the new 'ideals' of scientific and material progress, is unfortunately, a great deal of confusion about what is to be confirmed and what negated, about how much adaptation is necessary and what form the fusion should take. As Lucian Pye rightly observes, "the seemingly easy formula of the distinction between 'technology' and 'culture' cannot satisfactorily resolve the profound problems of identity which are in fact its origins."[11] More often than not, therefore, chaos and bewilderment rather than a new social and political order have followed attempts to fuse modern scientific, technological and administrative practices with basic components of indigenous cultures.

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[5] Herder's *Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie* (The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry), published in 1783, is perhaps the best example of this. I have found this rather neglected source of Herder's socio-political thinking quite intriguing. For an interpretation of this work, see F. M. Barnard, "The Hebrews and Herder's Political Creed," *Modern Language Review,* 54 (1959), 533–546, or "Herder and Israel," *Jewish Social Studies,* 28 (1966), 25–33.

[6] See, for example, Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 293–310; Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden (eds), *Political Anthropology* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966); David Easton, "Political Anthropology," *Biennial Review of Anthropology,* ed. B. Siegel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 210–262; and Carl J. Friedrich and Morton Horwitz, "Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 536–545.

[7] F. M. Barnard, "Herder's Treatment of Causation and Continuity in History", *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 24 (1963), 197–212; *idem, Herder's Social and Political Thought: from Enlightenment to Nationalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, rev. ed. 1967); *idem,* "Metaphors, Laments, and the Organic Community", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,* 32 (1966), 281–301; *idem,* with Jene M. Porter, "Discontent and Political Development: a Discussion of Some Contemporary Methodological and Substantive Problems," paper presented at the 1968 meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association; and *idem, Herder on Social and Political Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). This work includes translations from the *Travel Diary, Essay on the Origin of Language, Yet Another Philosophy of History, Dissertation on the Reciprocal Influence of Government and the Sciences, Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind,* and shorter extracts from the *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity.*

[8] See Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 8.

Two crucial misunderstandings seem to be at the heart of this confusion and bewilderment: (1) a misconception of the notion of tradition and (2) an erroneous belief that 'spiritual' elements of culture are easily separable from 'material' elements. I propose to deal with the second misunderstanding first since it provides a convenient handle for contrasting the philosophy underlying it with Herder's conception of culture and also because the first misunderstanding is symptomatic of a more general and fundamental problem, that of the relationship between persistence and change, which is the subject of a later part of this paper.

The separation between material and spiritual elements in the dichotomous manner indicated parallels the distinction that is at times made between 'civilization' and 'culture'. According to this distinction, civilization is identified with the development of material conditions and man's growing control over natural forces, while culture is identified with man's spiritual development in which intellectual, moral, and artistic values are the prime concern. Perhaps Alfred Weber's analysis of this distinction comes closest to the culture diffuson 'theory' that has gained currency among leaders of transitional societies.

In his main work *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie* (1935) Weber classified the chief structural components of man's development as the social process, the civilization process, and the culture process. By 'social process' he understood the recurrence of certain societal sequences which, notwithstanding individual variations, reveal sufficient uniformity to provide the basis for a comparative study of social development. The succession from kinship organization to territorial groupings is cited as an example of a social process. The 'civilization process' consists in the accumulation of knowledge about techniques of controlling natural and material energies and resources. Weber considered the discovery of these techniques as a continuous and cumulative process susceptible to the generalizing methods of science and hence causally explicable. Such knowledge is transferable. The 'culture process,' on the other hand, is not transferable. Culture can be understood only by acknowledging the incomparability or uniqueness of each of its manifestations, since it derives from the creative spontaneity of man which is not susceptible to the generalizing methods of science. Causal laws, therefore, have no applicability to the realm of culture. Nor can one speak of developmental stages of culture, for culture does not follow a lineal order of development but occurs sporadically, defying the causal determinism operative in the realms of science and technology.[12]

In contrast to Weber, Herder rejected the dualism between 'material' and 'nonmaterial' activity. It is one of his basic ontological principles that "nature has not put iron bars between what commonly is called material and immaterial. . . . The fundamental antithesis which is presumed to exist between them is entirely unfounded."[13] Not surprisingly, therefore, culture is viewed as an inseparable whole. Western science and technology are part and parcel of the Western cultural ethos rooted in its Judaic, Christian and Greek tradition. Artifacts are as much part of culture as ideas, beliefs and values. Formed to walk erect, man has his hands free to manipulate objects and is thus capable of making tools, weapons and objects of art.[14] Accordingly, 'culture' would seem to comprise all of man's activities: what he *does* and what he *thinks*. That so wide a connotation of the term threatens to make it meaningless appears to have been evident to Herder. In the very first pages of the *Ideas* he remarked that nothing is apt to be more elusive and indeterminate than this word.[15] He therefore tried to bring it into sharper focus. And while, in doing so, he cannot perhaps be said to have attained the "modern scientifically generalized concept of culture,"[16] his relativistic, pluralistic and process-centered approach undoubtedly did blaze the trail of modern socio-cultural inquiries. We shall now consider these strands in Herder's approach to culture, reserving the question of what constitutes the integrative element of a 'cultural whole' to a later stage.

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[9] See S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 12 (1964), 345–367 and *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 40; and E. Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), pp. 7–8.

[10] Manfred Halpern, "The Rate and Costs of Political Development," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 358 (1965), p. 22. See also Claude E. Welch, Jr., (ed.), *Political Modernization* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 319–382; Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), ch. VII; and Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, *Issues of Political Development* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 220–235.

[11] Pye, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[12] This is a revised and abridged version of my article on Alfred Weber in the *Encyclopedia of*

III. CULTURAL RELATIVISM

At a time when it was common to distinguish cultured from uncultured nations, Herder's insistence upon culture as a universal phenomenon was a novel idea. There is no such thing, he flatly declared, as a people devoid of culture. Wherever men have lived together as a group over a period of time there is a culture. To be sure, there are differences, but these are differences of degree, not of kind. "The picture of nations," he wrote in the *Ideas,* "has infinite shades, changing with place and time. But as in all pictures, everything depends on the point of view or perspective from which we examine it."[17] Yet despite his recognition of culture as a universal phenomenon, Herder denied that the standards and goals of human development can be subsumed under any single or immutable universal. He treated with the utmost scorn his contemporaries' attempt to use the concept of European culture as a comparative criterion or as a universal standard of human values. "To apply such a standard," he wrote,

> is not just misleading, it is meaningless. For 'European culture' is a mere abstraction, an empty concept. Where does, or did, it actually exist in its entirety? In which nation? In which period? . . . Only a misanthrope could regard European culture as the universal condition of our species. The culture of *man* is not the culture of the *European;* it manifests itself according to place and time in *every* people.[18]

As early as 1769 Herder laid down what may be regarded as the basic premise of his cultural relativism. "Human nature under diverse climates is never wholly the same."[19] If, he asked, we can scarcely express the individuality of one man, determine what specifically distinguishes him and how he feels and experiences things, why should we presume to be able to survey "an ocean of entire nations, times and countries" at one glance, with two or three general categories, without even making the slightest effort to enter into the spirit of their thoughts and deeds? Who can compare the different forms of satisfaction perceived by men in different times and different worlds? Each man, each nation, each period, has its center of happiness within itself, just as every sphere has its center of gravity.[20]

This principle of relativity has far-reaching implications. Taken to its logical extreme, it denies not only any basis of comparison, but the very possibility of an explanation. If each culture and each generation carries within itself its own immanent validity, if we have to think of the world as being composed of uniquely different socio-cultural entities, each with its own peculiar pattern of development, its own inner dynamic growth, it is hard to see how any general theory or even taxonomy could validly be applied as a tool of explanation. And if it cannot, how can one ever explain or analyse a given culture? For surely we need at least some general concepts in order to see and convey meaning or significance in any complex of relationships.

Herder's way of meeting this criticism can be discerned from his epistemological treatise, the *Metakritik* (1799), a work intended as a critique of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.* One of the major principles he wished to establish

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Philosophy (New York: Crowell, Collier and Macmillian, 1967), Vol. 8, pp. 281–282.

[13] VIII, 193 and 178.

[14] XIII, 137.

[15] XIII, 4.

[16] A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 286.

[17] XIII, 348.

[18] XVIII, 247–249.

[19] IV, 38.

[20] V, 502 and 509.

there is that no single thing can be known or understood outside the context of its inter-relationships.[21] Accordingly, before we can even start to analyse a thing we have to *identify* it within a given temporal and spatial situation. And to identify is to explore the characteristics that govern its contextual relationships which, in the case of social actions, essentially comprise the norms, values and customs that are operative in a particular society at a particular point in time. Facts, by themselves, are meaningless. A chronicle or array of unrelated facts is neither history, nor sociology, nor philosophy. To understand the meaning of a fact, say that of an action, therefore, we have to understand the position of an actor in a specific situation. And in order to be able to do this, we must attempt to relive the action, to feel ourselves into the situation surrounding it, taking into account the times and circumstances. This requires both empathy and analytical imagination. Only by a careful blending of contextual enquiry and imaginative interpretation can we avoid the pitfalls of either drawing glib analogies based on *a priori* general frameworks or of naive factual empiricism.[22]

It may rightly be argued that this reply does not adequately meet the logical criticism of Herder's cultural relativism. For while contextual analysis may enable us to discover what the characteristics of a given situation are, the determination of their significance, and hence at least part of their explanation, hinges on the possibility of drawing comparisons, however implicitly, with apparently comparable situations that are more familiar to us. But the heuristic intent of Herder's emphasis on relativism and contextual understanding is evident enough. It is meant to alert us against the danger of assuming that similarity between two situations with a number of characteristics in common necessarily implies that other, and possibly more significant ones, are also alike. This danger is particularly real in metaphorical or analogical reasoning. For while the function of a metaphor is to express similarity rather than identity, in practice the degree of similarity implied by a metaphor has a wide range of variation, and this may easily cause attention to be withdrawn from unique attributes that may prove on occasion to be the most decisive. Since analogies, once chosen, have the peculiar tendency of acquiring credibility through repeated use, the risks of faulty understanding and hence of empty explanations are compounded still further.[23]

However, Herder's cultural relativism need not be carried to such logical extremes that it wholly inhibits comparison and generalization. Herder's own historical and sociological thinking, in particular his treatment of causation, certainly does not suggest this. He would therefore have scarcely subscribed to Alfred Weber's view that causal laws have no applicability to the realm of culture. To be sure, Herder did distinguish between the mode of causation operative in nature and that applicable to human action. Yet at no time was he prepared to deny the feasibility of sociological explanations in terms of law-like propositions.[24] In short, by upholding cultural relativism as a methodological principle, Herder primarily wished to stress that comparative and generalizing treatments of social cultures must not be simplistic in terms of an arbitrary taxonomy or a preconceived universal (though invariably ethnocentric) criterion, but rather that they must be sensitive to diversity, to differences no less than similarities. To this end, no effort should be spared to study each culture in terms of its own particular pattern or structure.

Before turning to the 'substantive' implications of Herder's cultural relativism at least a passing mention of a common objection to cultural relativism—that it entails, if not condones, ethical nihilism—would seem in order. Frequently such criticism involves confusing universals with absolutes. Now Herder indeed questioned the wisdom of approaching or judging cultures in terms of a single immutable standard of value. But he would have dismissed the idea that one value was as good as another as a vulgarized distortion of cultural relativity. Just as he did not wish to imply that cultures are in all respects utterly disparate and incomparable entities, so he likewise had no desire to impugn the authenticity of universals as such, properly understood and concretely perceived "within the actuality of the particular"—to borrow Ernst Cassirer's apt phrase.[25] Indeed, his philosophy of *Humanität* is an eloquent affirmation of the hope that ethical norms will assume the status of meaningful universals, in terms of which men will come to recognize the standards of mutuality to which they ought to aspire as human beings.[26] But the realization of this hope seemed to him contingent upon, rather than contrary to, the recognition of their temporal and spatial relativity. For in order to be operative, ethical universals have to be believed and cherished, and this is plainly inconceivable, he felt, in abstraction of time and place. Thus Herder's admission of the relativity and plurality of values must be seen principally as a challenge to that myopic form of universalism which views every variant as a deviant, and as a corrective to the tempting desire to underrate the problematic tension that characterizes the relation between diverse human goals.

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[21] XXI, 179.

[22] XIII, 290 and V, 504.

[23] See M. Landau, "On the Use of Metaphor in Political Analysis," *Social Research*, 28 (1961), 353; F. M. Barnard, "Metaphors, Laments and the Organic Community," *op. cit.*, pp. 281–285, and A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," this REVIEW, 62 (1968), 425–439.

[24] For a more detailed discussion of Herder's approach to causation and determinism, see G. A. Wells, *Herder and After* (The Hague: Mouton, 1959), pp. 262–269; F. M. Barnard, "Herder's Treatment of Causation and Continuity in History," *op. cit.*, pp. 197–212; and *idem, Herder's Social and Political Thought, op. cit.*, pp. 51–53. See also Lewis W. Spitz, "Natural Law and the Theory of History," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 16 (1955), 453–475, for a most penetrating study of Herder's conception of historical laws.

An approach which so markedly highlights diversity and the immanent distinctiveness, if not uniqueness, of socio-cultural entities cannot fail to have a bearing upon problems of nation building and political development generally. Indeed it could be said to suggest a particular archetype or paradigm of development, that of *internal* development or growth. For while Herder did not deny that external factors can and do affect the distinctive culture configuration of social entities, promoting or inhibiting it, he saw the essential driving power as coming from within.[27] The essence of development is fulfillment, the actualization of that which is latent or germinal. This way of viewing social and political development invites us to respect the distinctive configuration of each sociopolitical whole or system that lays claim to its separate existence in terms of criteria of its own making, however particularistic these might seem in terms of other, more or less common, collectivity symbols or boundary determinants. Any attempt, therefore, to come to grips with the political sensibilities of new, but also of not quite so new, nations, can scarcely dispense with the perspective afforded by the paradigm of internal development and the principle of cultural relativism. There is enough evidence to refute the belief that emergent nations take kindly to the idea of embracing lock, stock and barrel, political systems that are urged, if not imposed, on them from outside.

This is not to deny the possibility, or even desirability, of cultural diffusion, nor to suggest that environmental geopolitical and economic pressures can be dismissed as irrelevant. What Herder's paradigm of internal development and his emphasis on cultural relativism, however, make amply clear is the need to see cultural diffusion as an *historical* process, as something that takes time and something that is not mono-dimensional, unproblematic, or without its inner sources of tension.

Anthropologists, of course, have realized this all along; yet policy-makers in both the Communist and non-Communist world have been rather slow in acknowledging that what has become known as 'polycentrism' is a trend not confined to socialist countries wishing to travel their own road to a given universalist goal. Nationalism may be one of the most persistent features of the western 'world culture' but it also embodies 'primordial sentiments,' not unknown in pre-western or non-western cultures, in favor of particularistic distinctiveness.[28] In short, the conflicting pulls of particularistic and universalistic tendencies are not new in the history of political development. It may well be that parochial or particularistic tendencies within diverse political cultures receive too little rather than too much attention by governmental elites in their zeal for rapid economic development. That this zeal is often frustrated as the result of an inadequate recognition of the problems entailed in cultural diffusion, in particular the problem of reconciling external with indigenous cultures, has been the burden of argument so far. The inability, or reluctance, to conceive of political development as a problem *sui generis,* as something which, though related with, is also different from economic or other forms of development is another and no less important, reason for the frustration and disenchantment that has beset nation builders throughout the world. I now propose to inquire to what extent Herder's pluralist conception of culture might help to shed some light in this direction.

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[25] Ernst Cassirer, *The Logic of the Humanities* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 25.

[26] F. M. Barnard, *Herder's Social and Political Thought, op. cit.,* ch. 5, esp. p. 98.

[27] To this inner driving power Herder applied the term *Kraft.* It signifies the prime source of all that is alive and the dynamic force of its continued existence. See his *Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind* (1784–91), esp. XIII, 172–188 and 274–277. For a fuller discussion of the notion of *Kraft* see Robert T. Clark, Jr., "Herder's Conception of Kraft", *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America,* 57 (1942), 737–752 and F. M. Barnard, *Herder's Social and Political Thought, op. cit.,* pp. 38–39 and 44–53 where Herder's views are compared with those of Rousseau, Locke, Spinoza and Leibniz.

[28] See, for example, Edward Shils, "Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties," *British Journal of Sociology,* 8 (1957), 130–145; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States," in Welch, *Political Modernization, op. cit.,* pp. 167–188; and David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1964), p. 22.

IV. CULTURE AS A COMPLEX

When Herder thought of culture as an integral whole, he conceived this 'whole' not as a homogeneous or unstructured mass, but as a composite or complex *configuration* which, by virtue of its inherent relational characteristics, is something more than a mere sum total or aggregate. In an aggregate the parts are separate and unrelated, and their number can be increased or reduced without this having any effect on the *nature* of the total but merely on its *size*. A whole, on the other hand, is something more than the sum of its constituent parts. This 'more' is not contained in the parts considered in isolation, but rather arises from their interrelation and the varying degree of their integration. Herder contrasted the holism characterizing culture with the atomism characterizing an aggregate, by comparing the former with the unity of an organism. In so doing he wished to focus on two crucial qualities: functional interrelatedness and self-generated activity.

The coherence of a culture, like that of an organism, is held to be contingent upon relations that arise from, but at the same time govern, the degree of reciprocal interaction between the constituent parts, where the parts (unlike those of a mechanical assembly) are activated by their *own* source of energy. In other words, the distinguishing characteristic governing culture viewed as a complex whole is the *intrinsic* creativity of its inter-related parts. And in order to underline its *composite* nature, Herder spoke in terms not of a single organism but of a complex of organisms. Thus, like St. Thomas's 'accidental whole' (as distinct from the substantial whole of a physical body) or Aristotle's concept of the state as a composite, Herder's holism comprises multiplicity as well as unity. And though each of the component parts is considered as an active whole in itself, comparable to the Leibnizian monad, it also differs from it in that the Herderian monad *has* windows: it is not wholly self-contained but interconnected.[29]

Herder's organismic conception of culture as a complex whole posits a further characteristic, which indeed is implicit in his philosophy of cultural relativism: diversity. The notion that the world consists in nature, no less than in society, of inter-related and interacting processes, each of which pertains to the whole in its most distinct individuality, is the principal theme of Herder's organismic cosmology and sociology and one of the central theses of his philosophy of history.[30] Multiplicity is but a corollary of the postulate of diversity and the unity characterizing Herder's brand of holism, therefore, is a unity in and through diversity. To be sure, Herder was sufficiently a child of the Enlightenment to hazard the belief that amidst infinite diversity there was a tendency "striving for unity which lies in all things and which urges all things forward."[31] But he was also sufficiently a critic of the Enlightenment not to identify this tendency with continuous, linear progress.[32] Thus while he maintained that diversity united by creating the conditions of reciprocal activity, he also recognized and indeed emphasized that the plurality of values did not rule out their incompatibility. Tensions and conflicts must be accepted as the price of diversity. Incongruities and contradictions are not mere accidents; they are of the very essence of the human condition and so cannot be divorced from social and political development. "A nation," he writes in *Yet Another Philosophy of History* (1774)

> may have the most sublime virtues in some respects and blemishes in others, show irregularities and reveal the most astonishing contradictions and incongruities. These will be all the more startling to anyone carrying within himself an idealized shadow-image of virtue according to the manual of his century, one so filled with philosophy that he expects to find the whole universe in a grain of sand. But for him who wants to understand the human heart within living circumstances, such irregularities and contradictions are perfectly human.[33]

It follows that to speak of a cultural whole, or the unity of a social or political culture, is not necessarily a way of referring to a state of blissful harmony; it may just as conceivably refer to a field of tension. This is borne out also by Herder's process-oriented conception of culture, about which more will be said later. According to it, culture is seen both as the product of the past and as the creator of the future. A cultural whole, therefore, it not a 'thing' at all, but a relational *event*. It is a continuum which, moreover, is not unilinear but subject to an inherent dialectic entailing preservation *and* innovation. Within such a continuum 'unity' is not a state but a *tendency,* a potentiality seeking realization, not a necessary actuality.

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[29] The most systematic exposition of Herder's philosophy of organicism is to be found in his *Metakritik;* see esp. XXI, 152–182.

[30] See *Ideas,* esp. XIV, 83–84.

[31] XIII, 346; see also XIV, 227; XVI, 119, 551; XVII, 116; XVIII, 302, 408; XXIV, 375; and XXIX, 133, 139. This faith in the attainability of harmony between conflicting interests is by no means absent from modern pluralistic ideology.

[32] Undoubtedly the most vigorous expression of Herder's repudiation of the idea of linear progress is to be found in *Yet Another Philosophy of History;* see esp. V, 527, 559, 564.

[33] V, 506.

It will be evident by now that Herder understood by culture a *relational* attribute pertaining to a group of individuals rather than to individuals in isolation, and that it involves a *two-dimensional* relationship. The mode of causality said to be operative in this relationship is depicted rather vividly in a formulation dating back to one of Herder's earliest works, the *Fragments* (1767):

> A series of causes act together, reciprocally and in succession; one wheel interlocks with the other, one spring acts upon the other.[34]

The formulation indicates an analytic distinction between two *types* of processes which, empirically, are closely interwoven. In one type of process the emphasis is on inter-relations and interactions occurring *at any given time* between culture constituents, which may be described as the 'horizontal' dimension, whereas in the second type of process the emphasis is on inter-relations and interactions occurring in *succession over time,* which may be described as the 'vertical' dimension. This distinction is, I believe, analytically useful in that it helps to point up the principal characteristics of situational and process analysis.

Of these two interrelated dimensions each is concerned with the tracing of causal connections: the horizontal dimension aims at the explanation of social action in terms of 'givens' operative at a certain time; the vertical dimension aims at the evaluation of its purposive direction in terms of both situational *origins* and situation-affecting *development*. I am aware that this distinction does not substantially diminish the problems attending the selection of relevant 'givens' or the determination of decisive situation-affecting development factors. Nonetheless I believe that the distinction between 'cause' as a situational given and 'cause' as a directional purpose is important in the treatment of human affairs. For by drawing this distinction it seems perfectly admissible to uphold the idea of causal theorizing without committing oneself to viewing any particular action as inevitable.

In the remaining part of this section I shall briefly illustrate Herder's conception of culture as a *complex* of segmental cultures where the horizontal dimension is chiefly involved, returning to the vertical dimension in the subsequent section. A closer analysis of the concept of interaction itself will be postponed until we discuss Herder's approach to political culture.

In view of the co-existence at any given time of diverse social and political cultures, Herder felt that it would be more accurate to speak of specific cultures (in the plural) rather than of culture in general. This would, he thought, help to reduce the inherent ambiguity of the concept and at the same time direct attention to the distinctive culture patterns arising from social, psychological, religious, economic, political or geographic differences as well as from diverse historical traditions. Although he was mainly concerned with eliciting sources of socio-political cohesion, i.e., the *integrative* elements of a particular socio-political culture such as a nation, he recognized that there are diverse cultures existing side by side even within any one nation, owing to differences in occupation, education, religion, social birth, private wealth and so on. He distinguished, for example, between the culture of intellectuals and the culture of craftsmen and traders.[35] The reason he thought of these co-existing cultures as sub-cultures, or more precisely, as *segmental* cultures (owing to his pluralistic and non-hierarchical orientation) is that he considered the differences between, say, occupations within one nation, to be less fundamental or significant than those existing between the same occupations among different nations. Herder's careful formulation on this point merits, I think, quoting in full. Its methodological import has scarcely been out-dated.

> It is customary to divide the nations of the world into hunters, fishermen, shepherds, and farmers, not only to determine accordingly their level of cultural development, but also to suggest that culture as such is a necessary corollary of a given occupation or mode of life. This would be most admirable, provided the diverse modes of life were defined in the first place. Since these, however, vary with almost every region and for the most part overlap, it is exceedingly difficult to apply such a classification with accuracy. The Greenlander who harpoons the whale, hunts the reindeer and kills the seal, is engaged in both hunting and fishing, yet in quite a different manner from that of the Negro fisher or the Arancoan hunter. The Bedouin

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[34] II, 65.

[35] XIV, 34–35.

and the Mongol, the Lapp and the Peruvian are shepherds; but how greatly do they differ from each other, with one pasturing camels, the other horses, the third reindeer, and the last alpacas and llamas. The farmers of Whidoh are as unlike those of Japan as the merchants of England are to those of China.[36]

Of particular interest to our purpose is Herder's realization that segmental cultures can develop at different rates and that, in doing so, they may result in acute imbalance capable of threatening the cohesion or 'wholeness' of a society. For this realization highlights the point made earlier regarding the unilinear development fallacy. Once again this point has not lost relevance. Not many social theorists today, it is true, share their nineteenth-century precursors' faith in unilinear progress. Yet seemingly this does not prevent some eminent sociologists and economists from theorizing about political development in a way which clearly suggests that they are correlating progress in one direction, say in the consumption of telephones, automobiles, or bathtubs, with progress in another, say in achieving stable democracy.[37] And only fairly recently have Marxist policy-makers begun to realize that the exclusive emphasis on highly centralized and hierarchical economic structures did not necessarily entail *pari passu* the disappearance of the state or the attainment of other cherished political goals.[38]

To put the matter differently, what Herder reiterates here is the possible clash and conflict between interacting cultures and co-existing forms of development. The horizontal dimension of interaction, that is to say, may involve areas of tension no less than spheres of co-operation. One crucial consideration concerning horizontal interaction, therefore, is the degree of balance between segmental cultures. Significantly, Herder remarked to this effect that it is not the *number* of cultural divergences, nor the *progress* achieved in this or that direction that is decisive for the social and political cohesion of a collectivity, but the *balanced relationship* of its constituent cultures.[39] When certain forms of culture are widely out of step with other forms, in particular if 'techniques' and 'values' markedly diverge, alienation results.[40]

In this connection we may also note Herder's interesting treatment of the relation between co-existing 'ideas' and 'institutions'. For the tendency to view the former as epiphenomenal, as mere superstructures of the latter, is still widely prevalent. Certain myths, for example, may co-exist and, indeed, be intimately associated with particular religious or political institutions. But this does not prove anything about their respective origins or significance, nor does it deny their essential autonomy. By the same token, whatever 'functions' either of them may be said to perform within a given 'system' proves nothing about their necessary or even sufficient inter-relationship. Myths and religions may or may not serve the function of maintaining authoritarian (religious and/or political) structures, but this is not tantamount to saying that the latter would necessarily disappear with the disappearance of the former (or vice versa), or that shamans, priests, or dictators invented certain beliefs, or again that they deliberately used such beliefs to deceive people. "By dismissing them as cheats," Herder wrote,

> one is inclined to think that one has explained everything. They may well have been cheats in many or most places, but this should not induce

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[36] XIII, 310.

[37] See, for example, S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1959, Anchor ed., 1963), pp. 31–37. If European stable democracies are characterized by the ownership of 43–400 telephones per 1,000 persons and European dictatorships by 7–196 telephones per thousand, one wonders how those nations whose population possesses 43–195 telephones manage to remain stable democracies. See also, on this point, Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development" in Polsby, Dentler and Smith (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1963), pp. 569–582, Joseph La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: a Dissent and an Interpretation", this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 8; and Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy", this REVIEW, 61 (1967), 1002–1009. If one prefers automotive production to bathtubs as an indicator of democratic development, W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: a Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), or his more recent "Unsolved Problems of International Development", *International Development Review,* 7 (1965) no. 4, 15–18, and 8 (1966) no. 1, 2–5, will prove instructive. See also Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society,* (New York: Macmillan, 1958) and Max F. Millikan and Donald L. M. Blackmer, *The Emerging Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961).

[38] Milos Samardzija, "The Yugoslav Economic System and Contemporary Socialist Economic Theory" in J. M. Porter (ed.), *Contemporary Developments in the Theory and Practice of Communism* (Springfield, Mo.: Drury College, 1967), pp. 28–38.

[39] XIV, 149.

[40] XIII, 371.

us to forget that they themselves were people too, and the dupes of myths older than themselves.[41]

Any attempt, therefore, to explore the origins or significance of a particular culture, be it values, ideas, institutions or artifacts, can scarcely dispense with process analysis. The horizontal dimension of interaction, which dominates situational-functional analysis, taken by itself is plainly inadequate as an explanatory tool if what we seek in terms of an explanation is content evaluation and/or purpose determination. Thus, far from being inconsistent, functional and historical approaches are indeed complementary, one could almost say interdependent. Moreover, Herder's heuristic principle of treating every manifestation of culture as something which, though interrelated in the two-dimensional sense indicated, is essentially autonomous, also enjoins us to view the mode of causality that is applicable to the culture process in terms of multiple causation. Now, both the idea of two-dimensional interaction and the idea of multiple causation are merely perspectives, conceptual categories. As such, we may reiterate, they provide no guarantee of obtaining correct answers, or indeed, of even asking the right questions. Yet, without them, it is hard to see how any questions could be raised at all.

V. CULTURE AND PROCESS

Two inter-related concepts characterized Herder's process-oriented approach to culture: *Bildung* and *Tradition.* Both words were used by him in their original dynamic sense of 'becoming' or 'building up' and of 'passing on' respectively, and not in their better-known, acquired sense.

Thus *Bildung* is not identified with a particular *state* of development nor confined in its connotation to intellectual or strictly individual pursuits as was (and still is) customary in German literature (and everyday use).[42] Instead it is viewed as an interactive social process in which men receive from and add to their distinctive heritage. This interactive and reciprocal building up of societal values (including knowledge and skills) represents for Herder the true purpose of human association. The modern concept of 'socialization' comes, perhaps, closest to his interpretation of *Bildung.* It is important, moreover, to note that Herder conferred upon the concept not only a dynamic denotation, but also a distinctly dialectic meaning. Man, by virtue of his capacity for speech, perceives nature not directly but through the mediation of ideas. By means of ideas the 'imitator' (or 'internalizer') has powers to receive and convert into his own nature what has been transmitted to him, just like the food he eats. What and how much he receives, where he derives it from, and how he applies it to his own use, is no doubt in part contingent on environmental factors; but largely it is determined by the learner's own receptive and creative powers. In view of this, Herder spoke of the process as a continuous genesis, investing it with both 'genetic' and 'organic' attributes. It is genetic, by virtue of the inter-generational manner of transmission, and organic, by virtue of the creative manner in which that which is being transmitted is assimilated and reapplied.[43]

Bildung, then, is a process not only of assimilation, but also of *evaluation.* Man both collects impressions and also incessantly evaluates the supply collected, and thus he not only receives stimuli but at the same time cumulatively and creatively converts them in his own peculiar manner.

> One activity is increased by another; builds upon, or evolves from, the foregoing. . . . We are always in motion, restless and dissatisfied. The essence of human life is never fruition, but continuous becoming. . . . The bee, on the other hand, was a perfect bee when building her first cell.[44]

Clearly, therefore, *Bildung,* thus understood, is not simply a replicative process; it is not socialization conceived solely or chiefly in terms of 'system maintenance'. On the contrary, Herder saw in it the only alternative to abrupt socio-cultural discontinuities attending the replacement of societal values through their prior destruction rather than their transformation.[45]

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[41] XIII, 307.

[42] Of German contemporaries, Goethe perhaps comes closest to Herder's conception of *Bildung,* although he views the process in wholly apolitical and individualist terms, as 'self-improvement.' (See W. H. Bruford, *Culture and Society in Classical Weimar, op. cit.,* p. 236). Herder's faith in the power of *Bildung* to engender in a people the will and ability to govern itself reflects, of course, the influence of Rousseau's educational gospel which in like manner came to dominate Jefferson's democratic creed.

[43] XIII, 343–348; see also XIV, 84. Lest these terms are interpreted in a biological, as distinct from a socio-cultural sense, Herder—much to the chagrin of Kant—goes out of his way to assure us in the *Ideas* that he is not thinking of biological or 'racial' heredity. In fact he bluntly declares that he has no use for the concept of race. (XIII, 257–258). Regarding Kant's criticism, see his review of the *Ideas* in the *Allgemeine Literaturzeitung* of 15 November, 1785. Surprisingly enough, Herder has been presented as a racist by some commentators.

[44] V, 98; see also XIII, 182.

Tradition, likewise, is not identified with a stock of accumulated beliefs, customs and ways of doing things, but with an ongoing process of inter-generational transmission which, like *Bildung,* entails by its very nature the continuous merging of the old and the new. Herder was aware, however, that the merging of the old and the new involves in its operation both affirmative *and* negative properties, and that change, therefore, if it is to mean the coming into being of new and specifically different constellations and not merely the replacement of one set of conditions by a new set of the same specific type, is not tantamount to a smooth advance or progress. Tension may indeed be the rule governing this innovative process, rather than the exception. Every discovery in the arts and sciences, in technology and industry, he wrote in the *Ideas,* knits a new pattern of society. New situations create new problems, and every increase in wants (even if they are satisfied) is not necessarily conducive to an extension of human happiness.[46]

At the same time Herder refused to view stages of development in a dichotomous manner. Although he was one of the first of modern thinkers to make use of organismic and mechanistic typologies, he did so for essentially 'ideological' reasons, employing them as sociological props for his community model.[47] One reason for his refusal to apply such dichotomies as traditional and modern, primitive and civilized, static and dynamic, sacred and secular, was his cultural relativism. The other, and perhaps even more significant reason was that he found these dichotomies inherently unhistorical and incompatible with the conception of development as an interacting, dialectic process of change. Hence in place of the idea of polarity, Herder advanced the idea of *interplay.* Tradition and progress no longer embody two opposed entities, but a single continuum. Progress, or more precisely, change, becomes a built-in characteristic of tradition. And since the inter-generational process of transmission is held to involve the fusing of both negation and affirmation in a manner analogous to that described with reference to *Bildung,* tradition, too, entails its own immanent dialectic. Change or development, therefore, is at once part of a given culture continuum *and* the instrument for its transformation. If tradition fails to grow it becomes warped and, as such, constitutes "a real opium of the spirit and the death-knell of states and individuals alike."[48] Healthy social development, then, requires not only historical antecedents but also emerging goals pointing to the future.

Since *Bildung* and *Tradition* reveal so close a similarity in their mode of operation, and since Herder also considered them inextricably linked, why did he bother to distinguish between them? Herder gave no explicit answer to this question. It appears, however, reasonable to assume that he found the distinction useful in separating the process of internalization as such from the social context of communication, association, and institutionalization, in and through which it takes place. These two processes entail, as it were, 'culture' as both a product and an emergent force at any given time, in so far as *Bildung* leads to shared patterns of social behavior that have become 'patterns' by virtue of a greater or lesser degree of institutionalization through *Tradition.*

There is a tendency towards indeterminacy, if not circularity in Herder's process analysis of culture. For it would seem that 'cause' as a directional determinant (emerging goals) could have a decisive bearing on 'cause' as a given or temporal antecedent. If actual consequences would always, or at least in most instances, match intended consequences or goals, this should occasion no concern. But this is an unlikely prospect, especially in 'developing' societies where the directional determinant will be predisposed towards drastic change and innovation, injecting into the existing situation a highly incalculable element. On the other hand, this very circumstance helps to underline the distinction made earlier between causality and inexorable determinism or that between explanation and prediction in regard to the culture process. It also tends to militate against 'interaction' being conceived as a hopelessly circular mode of operation.

What is also worth noting is that Herder admitted of conflict and tension as potentially inherent in the processes of *Bildung* and *Tradition,* yet categorically denied the possibility of *complete* discontinuity within any given culture. In this he revealed considerable astuteness. For it is difficult to see how one can speak of 'development' in terms of complete or total change without raising serious problems of identity. When a culture or a 'system' is said to have changed completely, what exactly *is* being said? How can one identify a system as still being in some respects the same system if it has undergone complete change?

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[45] In view of this, Herder, though hailing the French Revolution as the most momentous event since the Reformation, could not help feeling that it was a regrettable alternative to *Bildung* as he conceived it. See esp. XVIII, 313, 314–320 and 331–332.

[46] XIII, 372–373.

[47] On this point see F. M. Barnard, "Metaphors, Laments and the Organic Community", *op. cit.,* pp. 281–301.

[48] XIV, 89.

But undoubtedly Herder's most original idea in this context lies in his insistence upon the essential oneness of the problem of persistence and the problem of change. His analysis of socialization as a non-replicative process and his interpretation of tradition as a dialectic continuum clearly suggest that any attempt to explain change must entail a recognition of persistence, or vice versa. A theory which cannot account for both is therefore unlikely to account for either. This realization is not an obvious commonplace in our own day. It was appreciably less so when Herder wrote.[49]

VI. INTEGRATIVE ELEMENTS: POLITICAL CULTURE

Herder did not explicitly offer a definition of culture, and it almost seems that this was deliberate. At the same time we cannot complain of a dearth of indications of what, essentially, he meant by it. The characteristics that emerge as basic to his scheme of thought can perhaps best be summarized as: relativism, pluralism, historism, a non-deterministic form of causalism, and a type of holism which embraces diversity as well as unity. Within the conceptual framework formed by these categories, culture—we found—is presented as the relational attribute of a social group, indeed as the very hallmark of its existence as a group, in that it is the distinctive quality which is at once the product and the source of its shared activities, ideas, values, artifacts and process, in short, its shared way of life over an inter-generational period of time. Though complex in its composition, it is nonetheless held to constitute an integral whole by virtue of one or more determinants that act as cohesive agents.

Herder was particularly concerned with determinants that help to produce a sense of collective identity in terms of which men come to recognize not only what unites them with, but also what distinguishes them from, others. Hence much that is relevant to social culture is also relevant to political culture understood in the broader sense of social organization, shared symbols and values, customs and norms of reciprocity. Indeed we shall see how firmly political culture in the narrower sense is embedded, for Herder, in the broader socio-political culture, with which it is said to interact. Yet despite his stress on interaction and on viewing political culture as a dimension of social culture, Herder makes an analytical distinction between levels of political culture which approximates to David Easton's system categories of political community, regime and government or "authorities".[50] I am not suggesting, of course, an identity of nomenclature or explicit treatment; moreover, Herder's distinction between 'regime' and 'government' is not merely analytic but also real. Nonetheless, the similarity of analytical insight seems close enough to warrant the adducing of Easton's more familiar terms. They should, I believe, prove illuminating rather than misleading. Let us roughly equate, then, Herder's 'political culture in the wider sense' with Easton's 'political community' and survey briefly the range of determinants that he deemed pertinent to both its emergence and persistence.

Among external determinants, physical environmental factors—to which Herder applied the generic term of 'climate' (*Klima*)—are considered of secondary importance. Climate, he said, can only influence, favorably or unfavorably, but it cannot compel a given course of development.[51] The *social* environment, on the other hand, is quite another matter. Indeed, external social conflict and hostility—and here Herder anticipated Georg Simmel—are posited as the most potent agents in arousing a sense of collective identity and solidarity. "The more a group is threatened", he remarked to this effect, "the more it will turn in upon itself and the closer will be the ties of its members."[52] But the degree to which external conflict can perform a positive function in strengthening the cohesion of collectivities is made contingent upon the existence, or at least the potential existence, of integrating agents *within* a social group.

It is on internal determinants, therefore, that, fundamentally, Herder placed the greatest emphasis. A group threatened by hostile forces may or may not succeed in repelling the aggressor, but it will not even act as a group in the first place unless there are some actual or potential foci around which individual members can rally and in terms of which they can see themselves as part of a larger whole. It is interesting, in this connection, both from the point of view of modern sociology and psychology and also against the historical background of the 'age of reason,' to note Herder's recognition of the crucial significance of non-rational elements as molding agents of social and political cultures, that is to say of sentiments that defy 'logical' analysis and/or 'empirical' verification. Neither myths nor prejudices are dismissed as irrelevant aberrations. And very much in contrast to the cosmopolitan thinking of the Enlightenment, particularism (or even 'parochialism') is given right of place in the process of socio-political self-identification which Herder regards as the *sine qua non* of eventual *inter*nationalism. "If, in this development of particular national tendencies towards distinctive forms of collective happiness", he declared in *Yet Another Philosophy of History,*

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[49] For modern critiques of replicative socialization see, for example, Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Culture and Personality* (New York: Random House, 1961), esp. pp. 84, 111–119; and David Easton, "The Theoretical Relevance of Political Socialization", *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* I (1968), 125–146.

[50] See David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems", *World Politics,* 9 (1957), 383–400; see also *idem,* "Political Anthropology", *op. cit.*, pp. 228–229 and *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965) pp. 171–219.

[51] XIII, 273.

[52] V, 141.

> the distance between existing nations grows too great, we find prejudices arising. . . . Similarly, prejudices, mob judgment, and narrow nationalism, arise when the dispositions and spheres of happiness of two nations collide.[53]

But prejudice, he added, is good, in its time and place, for "self-esteem and happiness may spring from it. It urges peoples to converge upon their center and attaches them more firmly to their roots."[54] Herder regretted that so little had been done to explore the intermixture of notions that are rationally analyzable and/or empirically verifiable with those that are neither, yet equally relevant molding agents of social and political cultures. Folklore, myths, folksongs, rituals and customs are, he felt, vital clues to a people's collective 'personality', its social or political sense of identity.[55]

Language plays another, if not *the* pivotal role in Herder's anatomy of political culture in its broader meaning. As for Humboldt, and more recently, Sapir, Wittgenstein, and Peter Winch, language constituted for Herder the inescapable bedrock of social life.[56] For it is both the medium through which man becomes conscious of his inner self *and* the key to the understanding of his outer relationships, of the world in which he lives. It also links him with the past. It is through language that man is able to enter into communion with the way of thinking and feeling of his progenitors, to take part, as it were, in the workings of the ancestral mind. Language, therefore, is a living link in the chain of tradition. This is so, Herder significantly remarked in his highly original essay *On the Origin of Language* (1772), because words do not merely describe or classify objects; they also transmit feelings, and they do this not only explicitly but also implicitly via emotional overtones which they acquire in the process of transmission. Particularly words we learn during infancy and adolescence carry secondary associations which are re-kindled in our minds whenever we use them. And frequently it is these associations which sway the mind more powerfully than the main concepts with which they were originally linked. These "companions of the dawn of life", as Herder called them, permeate social cultures far more than we are wont to recognize, and may well prove, he caustically added, more decisive than "all political contracts and systems devised by the philosopher," in that they vitally determine the distinctive character of family, kinship or national modes of thought.[57] The question, therefore, is not solely, or very often chiefly, "what a word can mean according to a few dictionaries," he already observed in the *Travel Diary,* "but what it means in the consciousness of living people—here, now, in all its capriciousness."[58] Here again Herder regretted that the origin and significance of turns of phrase had not been sufficiently studied from the sociological and political point of view.[59]

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[53] V, 510.

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] Herder's early interest in this direction is evident from his highly perceptive observations in the *Travel Diary* of his voyage from Riga to France in 1769, which was not published during his lifetime. He resolved there to collect data from the mythology of all ages and cultures and "to examine everything from the point of view of politics" (IV, 363–364), which in fact he subsequently did in his pioneering collection of folksongs from the most diverse and almost forgotten nationalities, and in other works.

[56] Peter Winch's close similarity to Herder's ideas on this point was brought to my attention by my colleague, Dr. J. M. Porter. Winch writes: "Our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use. The concepts we have settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world. . . . There is no way of getting outside the concepts in terms of which we think of the world. . . The world *is* for us what is presented through those concepts. That is not to say that our concepts may not change; but when they do, that means that our concept of the world has changed too." (Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science,* London: Routledge, 1958, p. 15).

[57] V, 117–136.

[58] IV, 423.

Language, then, embodied for Herder the living manifestation of historical continuity and the psychological matrix in which man's awareness of his distinctive social heritage is aroused and deepened. A nation may lose its state and political independence, but it will survive as a national community if it succeeds in preserving its distinctive linguistic traditions.[60] On this view it is through language that the individual becomes at once aware of his selfhood *and* of his membership of a collective culture. Such close identification between the private and public self unmistakably reveals the influence of Rousseau's philosophy of the general will; yet at the same time it also signals its transcendence. For by substituting a 'common language' for the 'general will' Herder stipulated an empirical and historically derived basis for socio-political association in place of a metaphysical and moral absolute. What is more, by advancing such an empirical basis, he also hoped to render the concepts of both sovereignty and contract superfluous. This seemed essential to him in order to present the idea of 'political culture'—he explicitly used the term in the *Ideas*[61]—as a *postulate* rather than merely as a concomitant of that level of a political system which Easton designates as 'regime.' In a sense, this line of thought is a logical corollary of Herder's paradigm of internal development, according to which only that is capable of actualization which is already latent or germinal. On the other hand, Herder was realistic enough to recognize—albeit rather reluctantly at times—that political culture is not a wholly natural growth, not something that just happens, but rather a carefully nurtured 'plant.' Nation-building, in short, *is* an act of will, even though the 'will' Herder had in mind has little or nothing in common with either Rousseau's transcendentalism or Hobbes' Leviathanism.

We finally have to enquire, therefore, what Herder meant by 'political culture' in the narrower sense of Easton's 'regime', and how he conceived of political development *sui generis.*

Regarding Herder's conception of political culture proper, the most succinct formulation can be found in his treatise *On the Reciprocal Influence of Government and the Sciences,* a work that, unfortunately, has been far too neglected by Herder scholars. This formulation depicts the 'regime' as something that, though crucially determinate per se, is also part of a broader physical and social environment; it is revealing, too, in the way it illustrates Herder's understanding of 'interaction.' Climate, he reiterated, is only a conditioning factor, promoting or inhibiting political development as all other activities, making them "thrive better in one place than in another"; national character (by which he meant those characteristics that distinguish one political culture in the broadest sense of 'political community' from another) "may more closely determine the kind of seed; whilst the political constitution of a nation *in its widest sense*—its laws, principles of government, civic traditions and ideals—undoubtedly represents the close tilling of the soil; the sowing of the seed and the determination of all those vital resources without which nothing can prosper, nothing can grow."[62]

The political constitution, then, determines the fundamental rules of the political game *and* the manner in which they are likely to be made, re-made, and observed. In this respect, no doubt, the values of the social infrastructure—the 'political community'—will play their part. But, significantly, Herder included in the political constitution a *specific* type of value—civic traditions and ideals—which clearly embodies an ethos *sui generis,* a *political ethos.* In this, indeed, he saw the king-pin of politics and the leaven of a political culture; for, as we shall note, his attitude to 'government' was essentially negative.

The quoted passage also interestingly suggests a distinction between two forms or modes of interaction, between 'interaction' in the strict sense and 'interaction' in a broader and less precise sense. Interaction in the strict sense refers here to the operation of such distinctly human spheres and man-made factors as laws, political principles, ideals and civic traditions, while interaction in the broader sense refers to the diverse inter-relations between human and non-human factors, such as geographic and meteorological influences. Implicit in this distinction is the (obvious, yet occasionally overlooked) recognition that only some form of *human* activity

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[59] IV, 429.

[60] XIV, 87.

[61] Herder uses the term when discussing the political culture of the ancient Hebrews in comparison with that of the Greeks. (See esp. XIV, 67). This may indeed have been the earliest use of the term, which makes somewhat surprising the omission of any mention of Herder in current literature on political culture, although attention is paid to such writers as Montesquieu, Tocqueville and Bagehot. See, for example, Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (*eds.*), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 514.

[62] Herder's italics. IX, 311–312.

(including thought and its product, ideas) is capable of reciprocal inter-*action,* either (as I suggested earlier) 'horizontally,' in so far as at any given time men influence each other directly or indirectly, or 'vertically,' in so far as this influence involves the historical dimension. That Herder was concerned to make and, indeed, underline this distinction is borne out further by his treatment of climate in the *Ideas*.[63]

As to the third analytical level of Easton's political system, 'government', much of what Herder had to say is extremely critical and one might say, radical, in the populist sense. While he granted that the formal expression of government through the person of the head of state might fulfill the 'functional' requirement of a collectivity for symbolic representation, being as it were "the abstracted symbol of the whole nation," as he put it,[64] he had nothing but scorn for hereditary monarchy or any form of absolute leadership.[65] Kant's dictum that man in the realm of politics is like an animal needing a master to rule and control him,[66] provoked Herder's angry retort that man is man only if he no longer needs a master in any real sense. The idea that man *needs* a strict master, Herder added, presupposes that he is weak or under age, and therefore incapable of managing his own affairs, or that he is a wild detestable creature, demanding a tamer or minister of vengeance.[67] He rejected, no less vehemently, the concept of government as the legitimate wielder of physical power. The institution of a central political power was for him not the beginning, but the collapse of politics; an obvious symptom of social decay and political bankruptcy.[68] It would seem that Herder here failed to distinguish the possession of power from its actual use, arguing as if the very existence of power in itself constituted the erosion of politics as a pursuit worthy of adult men. This complete rejection of even the *ultima ratio* variety of coercion theory may (perhaps rightly), be judged as utterly unrealistic. At the same time it should be borne in mind that Herder did not rule out power other than physical force, by his stress on collective values and customs and on solidarity sentiments derived from participation. Nor did he reject power in the sense of 'influence,' provided it is widely diffused, in keeping with his pluralist scheme.

Herder's attitude to bureaucracy was no more favorable. He had little faith in it as an instrument for nation-building. Its hierarchical structure, based on seniority rather than talent or vision, its endemic conservatism and hostility to change, its arrogance and conceit stemming from the belief that the bureaucrats as experts know best what is good for a polity, did not enamour it to him as a desirable 'government.'[69] This viewpoint is not quite so unrealistic as it may seem, neither within the context of eighteenth-century Germany, nor with reference to the contemporary scene in some ex-colonial countries.[70] Indeed, the example of the United States where, in Joseph La Palombara's words, "an enormous amount of national development took place" before bureaucracy had to any appreciable extent been established, supports Herder's low estimate of bureaucracy as an agent in nation-building.[71]

Politics, in short, did not mean 'government' for Herder in any of the senses we just sketched. Politics is not an 'instrument,' but an *activity,* and it is not confined to the 'state.' As soon as there is a family, he declared, there is some form of politics.[72] And since he viewed a polity as but an extension of the family—the same sort of plant, only with more branches[73]—'family' and 'state' are not differentiated in kind but merely in degree. While this denial of a fundamental difference between the family and the state involves Herder in a number of perplexities (which I have discussed elsewhere),[74] it also signals an important departure from the still common identification of the political with one specific type of organization such as the state. For the rejection of the Aristotelian 'state and non-state' distinction as *the* criterion of what is or is not political introduces a new and potentially fruitful dimension into political theorizing, which makes it possible to view the political development of diverse cultures in terms of a continuum.

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[63] See particularly the section entitled "Concluding Remarks about the Conflict between Climate and the Genetic Force." (XIII, 284-289).

[64] XIII, 453.

[65] XIII, 377 and 383.

[66] Kant, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,* 1784; *Kant Schriften,* Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften edition (Berlin, 1923), Vol. VIII, p. 23.

[67] XIII, 383-384.

[68] XIII, 319-322.

[69] XIII, 384-385; see also XVI, 48.

[70] See, for example, Ralph Braibanti, "The Civil Service of Pakistan," *South Atlantic Quarterly,* 58 (1959), 258-304, and his chapter on "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan" in Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 360-440.

[71] La Palombara, *ibid.,* p. 55.

[72] IX, 313.

[73] XIII, 384. Aristotle by contrast, is emphatic in stressing that the distinction between a family and a state is not a simple, numerical difference, but a difference in kind. (*Politics* I, chs. 1, 3 and III, ch. 4).

[74] See F. M. Barnard, *Herder's Social and Political Thought, op. cit.* ch. IV, esp. pp. 84-86.

What, then, was, for Herder, the essence of *political* development? Let us assume he were confronted with the ten definitions of political development cited by Lucian Pye in *Aspects of Political Development*. In view of what Herder had to say about social welfare, education and the need for maximizing occupational opportunities for everybody—he referred to the provision of such conditions as 'humanization'[75]—it is fair to presume that he would have concurred with the importance attached to economic development in most of them. But it is usually fair to presume that he would have regarded only two definitions as specifically referring to *political* development: mass participation and the building of democracy. For his own notion of political development was essentially the realization of a democratic ethic, even though he conceived of 'participation' in a sense different from both its 'western' and 'eastern' expression, in that he visualized it as free from elitist centralism. Its aim is the fusion of free co-operation with a high degree of diversity and competition, particularly in the realm of ideas.[76] What Herder chiefly had at heart was political freedom, and, as for others before and after him (and Hannah Arendt in particular in our own day)[77] political freedom meant for him first and foremost popular participation.

This stress on participation evidences once again the measure of Herder's almost prophetic vision. At least this is what the modern reader is bound to feel when he is told by contemporary authorities on political culture and political development that if there is one aspect of the "new world political culture" discernible, it is "a political culture of participation." Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba indeed speak of a "political revolution going on throughout the world," which they call "the participation explosion":

> In all the new nations of the world the belief that the ordinary man is politically relevant—that he ought to be an involved participant in the political system—is widespread.[78]

But like most concepts in the vocabulary of politics, the notion of participation is rich in ambiguity. In order, therefore, to delineate somewhat Herder's participatory vision, it should be pointed out that he thought of two stages or levels in the realization of the envisaged democratic ethic. These can be distinguished as 'transfer' and 'goal' culture respectively.

The transfer culture corresponds to Herder's 'aristo-democracy,' that is to say, to the period of transition from what Almond and Verba call the "subject political culture" to what they call the "participant political culture."[79] Herder envisaged this transformation from elitist tutelage to increasing popular participation as an educational process oriented towards the gradual innovation of societal values which would provide an alternative to abrupt socio-cultural discontinuities. The task of guiding this 'educational' transformation Herder assigned to popular leaders whom he called aristo-democrats. Like Plato's guardians, the aristo-democrats are expected to be men of intellectual excellence rather than men of property. But unlike Plato's philosopher-kings, Herder's popular leaders are only a transitional expedient, for their function is not to rule, let alone to perpetuate their rule, but rather to help all members of the nation to achieve that degree of political maturity which will render their future leadership dispensable.[80]

The assumption underlying this conception of political leadership is perhaps somewhat less than realistic. For Herder assumed that these leaders, in their desire to relinquish power at the earliest possible opportunity—presumably in order to return to their preferred scholarly pursuits—would do everything to hasten the attainment of universal civic consciousness within the nation. Until such a stage is reached, until, that is, the state can dispose of elitism however popularly based, it remains *qua* state a mechanical contrivance.[81] But he had no illusions about the difficulties that may attend this political transformation. He granted that there may be "some disorder and a good deal of disagreement," that "men are not always honest," and that "the institutions as they emerge may be far from perfect," but, he asked,

> is it healthier or more beneficial for mankind to

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[75] IX, 407; see also *ibid.*, 401–408; XVI, 601 and XXX, 234.

[76] Herder's advocacy of freedom of thought and expression in his treatise *On the Reciprocal Influence of Government and the Sciences* forcibly recalls Milton's pleas in the *Areopagitica*, as it also foreshadows Mill's central arguments in his essay *On Liberty*. (See esp. IX, 357–361).

[77] Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*. (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 221.

[78] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 4.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[80] XIV, 217.

[81] XIII, 455; see also *ibid.*, 385.

produce only the lifeless cogs of a huge, wooden, machine . . . in which men are forced to rot and decay during their lifetime, or to arouse and activate living energies?[82]

Clearly, political legitimacy (understood here as stemming from maximum popular participation in government) mattered more to Herder than effectiveness, to speak in current terminology. At the same time, Herder questioned the necessary correlation between absolutism and effective government. "Those who feel they are accountable to no-one," he wrote towards the end of the century, "must shoulder the blame for our political disorders. . . . A state cannot be a healthy polity unless all its members share a sense of civic responsibility."[83] Thus while in some respects Herder's conception of political leadership seems frankly utopian, it is not wholly devoid of sober realism. In particular the importance which it attaches to 'grass roots' politics and the socializing function of education has an undoubted relevance to current concerns over political participation in developing areas.

The goal culture that is to emerge from this political transformation is to witness the disappearance of the state as an administrative machine and its replacement by a pluralist diffusion of government, where 'government' is virtually reduced (or elevated perhaps) to what Herder in the *Ideas* called 'joint endeavor' (*Zusammenwirken*), which would dispense with coercion and central direction of any sort.[84] It is not important for our purpose to decide whether this almost eschatological vision of the ultimate goal of political development is utopian or not. But what is highly significant is the paradigm of participation which it projects. Perhaps a comparison with Rousseau's vision of political participation may bring this paradigm into sharper relief.

The paradigms of Rousseau and Herder each typify a distinctive interpretation of the democratic ethic. They share a belief in a high measure of equality based on achievement principles, but they differ about the conditions conducive to political participation. Rousseau's paradigm favors participation within a closely knit and highly centralized framework. Herder's paradigm favors participation within a diffuse framework operating from diverse and autonomous bases of power. For Herder the group rather than the individual constituted the nuclear unit of socio-political association. Hence, in contrast to Rousseau's undisguised hostility to any form of group interest, Herder envisaged the socio-political structure of a polity on pluralistic lines. The constituent groups are seen as power bases (in the sense of foci of influence) in their own right; there is no single focus of power. Diffusion rather than concentration of authoritative functions characterizes Herder's scheme. Its structure is intended to combine a high degree of horizontal differentiation with a minimum of vertical differentiation: all are "masters' in some spheres but none are masters in all spheres. The chief participants in this scheme are the representatives of the diverse groups and institutions that make up the polity. They are chosen by their peers on purely achievement criteria: they are the best men for the job. But their sphere of competence and range of power (influence) starts and ends in carrying out the limited task that has been allotted to them.[85]

Herder's starting points, then, are plurality and diversity. Consensus is not a prerequisite of participation but only the operational goal of a process that admits of conflict. Consensus is potentiality seeking realization, not *a priori* actuality. It is neither the decree of a transcendental will, nor the unanimous voice of a monolithic *macro-anthropos*. With Rousseau, on the other hand, the chief emphasis is on the primacy of unity and a highly integrated and centralized political structure. Factions or sectional interests are *a priori* inimical to a common purpose. They may reflect the 'will of all,' but, in so doing, they militate against the 'general will.' While Rousseau's scheme, no less than Herder's, presupposes voluntary and spontaneous participation, and co-ordination rather than sub-ordination, its practical operation has, so far at least, proved compatible only with forms of political organization that procedurally deny, or severely inhibit, the expression of dissent or diversity.

Doubts about the viability of either paradigm in its pure or extreme form seem justifiable enough. However, one important corollary of Herder's paradigm is worth noting. By focussing on the diffusion of political power rather than vesting it in a totality, the 'sovereignty of the people,' Herder revealed a truer understanding of what political analysis is essentially about.[86]

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[82] V, 516; see also XIII, 340–341. J. S. Mill argues similarly in *Representative Government,* Ch. 8.

[83] XVIII, 309.

[84] XIV, 227.

[85] XIII, 376.

[86] Lasswell and Kaplan make this point rather well: "To speak of society as a whole as a power holder is to miss the whole point of political analysis. Power is distributive, and the aim of political science is to determine how and on what basis it is distributed." Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 96.

Rousseau's paradigm also appears the more precarious under any but emergency situations. But I fully admit that many new nations may view their gigantic tasks in terms of emergency operations and that they therefore may rightly feel prompted to choose the Rousseauian rather than the Herderian model of political participation and political development. I realize also that the former corresponds more closely to the philosophy of the positive state which is judged by many to meet more satisfactorily the urgent requirements of modernization. I am not certain, though, whether or not the Herderian model necessarily presupposes some form of *economic* liberalism; experience with pluralist systems so far would seem to suggest that it does.[87]

The idea of maximal participation as the cornerstone of democracy has, to be sure, been questioned by contemporary political scientists. It is considered a useful myth, not an idea politicians really believe in. Voting studies have raised serious doubts not only about the actual degree of political participation but also about the desirability of intense participation. And yet, to a growing number of people—as we remarked earlier—political participation is not just a lofty ideal, beautiful to behold though impossible to realize, but a tangible goal within man's attainable reach. Disagreements about procedural means, they feel, there might well be. But that it is more, not less, necessary today, is a conviction few would easily surrender.

To speak of 'the crisis' of this or that has become rather fashionable these days; but to refer to the ambivalence over political participation as a crisis symptom is perhaps not unduly melodramatic. For it may well be that the style political participation is to assume is a problem that will defy purely pragmatic tinkering and involve instead a searching re-appraisal of the very content of the democratic ethic. In such a re-appraisal Rousseau's no less than Herder's paradigm of participation could prove of more than academic import.

VII. CONCLUSION

Modernization, nationalism, and popular participation, we are told, are the distinctive characteristics of a 'world culture.' To admit this is not, however, to refute the need for raising the formidable unknowns that are involved. Herder's gospel proclaiming the nation state as the most natural unit for men to live in has indeed become a world religion. Likewise the idea —which it enshrines—that the nation state, and only the nation state, can provide the proper arena for popular participation has indeed gained well-nigh universal currency. Yet the determination of what constitutes a 'nation,' its 'proper' territorial boundaries, the 'equitable' representation of ethnic, religious, regional, or economic interests, are by no means settled questions in even highly 'developed' polities.

Moreover, it can scarcely be gainsaid that modernization, nationalism and popular participation embrace values the reconciliation of which have proved, and may continue to prove, exceedingly problematical. The logic of nationalism, whatever it may be, is not necessarily the logic of economic rationality or administrative efficiency. Considerations relevant to the one need not therefore be relevant to either of the others. A nationalist does not ask himself whether or not he is more competently governed, or economically better placed, in one political setting rather than another. Sudeten-German nationalists in pre-war Czechoslovakia did not, and Arab nationalists in present-day Israel do not, entertain such 'rational' calculations. Max Weber was undoubtedly right in maintaining that no regime can rely on coercion alone;[88] but to grant the validity of this observation does not warrant the conclusion that a democratic regime based on consent rather than force, self-evidently induces a sense of participation in the citizen, especially if he feels alienated from the prevailing political culture. Multi-ethnic polities, incapable of integrating particularist sentiments, are continuously threatened from within until or unless they can resolve the problem of minorities one way or another. Nation building can hardly be expected to proceed if minorities unwilling to identify themselves with a state are treated as if they did not exist.[89]

In short, political development does not *mean* technological innovation, military prowess, administrative efficiency, national self-determination or, for that matter, popular participation. And even if it is maintained that it does, it is more than unlikely that aspirations towards all these can be met at one and the same time.

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[87] See La Palombara, *Bureaucracy and Political Development, op. cit.*, pp. 30 and 57.

[88] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1957), p. 382.

[89] See, for example, I. Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa," *Sociologie Politique de l'Afrique Noire. Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines* 3 (1960), 129–139; Fred R. von der Mehden, *Politics of the Developing Nations, op. cit.*, pp. 33–47; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States," in Welch, *Political Modernization, op. cit.*, pp. 167–188; and Pye, *Aspects of Political Development, op. cit*, p. 23.

Choices have to be made. That is why political development, in the last analysis, is an act of will. The refusal to face up to admittedly difficult, and often distressingly bitter, choices is at the heart of what is known as the crisis of rising expectations, the hub of many current discontents.

Most themes touched upon in this article clearly bristle with difficulties. I believe, however, that Herder offered a number of extremely suggestive insights, particularly into problems of culture diffusion, continuity, socialization and socio-political cohesion and solidarity, and that these insights may be of interest to students of political culture and political development.

POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND BELIEF SYSTEMS*

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The word ideology points to a black box. As a philosopher puts it, ideology "signifies at the same time truth and error, universality and particularity, wisdom and ignorance."[1] Likewise, for the political scientist the term ideology points to a cluster concept, i.e., belongs to the concepts that bracket a variety of complex phenomena about which one tries to generalize; and the growing popularity of the term has been matched, if anything, by its growing obscurity.[2] All in all, one is entitled to wonder whether there is any point in using "ideology" for scholarly purposes.[3] And my specific question will be whether there is a technical meaning, or meanings, of "ideology" which constitute a necessary tool of enquiry for a science of politics.

Discussions about ideology generally fall into two broad domains, namely, *ideology in knowledge* and/or *ideology in politics*. With respect to the first area of inquiry the question is whether, and to what extent, man's knowledge is ideologically conditioned or distorted.[4] With respect to the second area of enquiry the question is whether ideology is an essential feature of politics and, if so, what does it explain. In the first case "ideology" is contrasted with "truth," science and valid knowledge in general[5]; whereas in the second case we are not concerned with the truth-value but with the functional value, so to speak, of ideology. In the first sense by saying ideology we actually mean *ideological doctrine* (and equivalents), whereas in the second sense we ultimately point to an *ideological mentality* (also called, hereinafter, ideologism).

The distinction between ideology in knowledge and ideology in politics is not necessarily neat, for a number of issues draw from both domains. For instance, if one asks whether the various "isms" of politics—e.g., liberalism, so-

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(*) This is an abridged draft of a paper prepared for the meeting on "Ideology and Politics" of the *Institut International de Philosophie Politique,* Chatillon, June 1967.

[1] Remo Cantoni, *Illusione e Pregiudizio* (Milano: Mondadori, 1967), p. 103.

[2] Concerning the popularity it is symptomatic that while the 1930–1935 *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* did not include the item ideology, its successor, the 1968 *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* contains two articles on ideology. For the bibliography see Norman Birnbaum, "The Sociological Study of Ideology 1940–1960: A Trend Report and Bibliography," *Current Sociology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962); and Kurt Link, "Bibliographische Einfürung," in *Ideologie, Ideologiekritik und Wissensoziologie* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1961).

[3] See the conjecture of Arne Naess that "the movement of the term 'ideology' into social science, social psychology and political science will, within a generation, be followed by a movement in the other direction. It will continue to be used in headlines, in summaries and popularizations, but scarcely in statements intended to express . . . theories, hypotheses or classifications of observations." *Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity—Studies in the Semantics and Cognitive Analysis of Ideological Controversy* (Oslo: Oslo University Press; and Oxford: Blackwell, 1956), p. 171. The book also reviews many current definitions of ideology, esp. pp. 141–198.

[4] Marx and Mannheim are the obvious references, and the literature is extensive. See esp. I. L. Horowitz, *Philosophy, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge* (Springfield: Thomas, 1961); and Jacques J. Maquet, *Sociologie de la Connaissance —Etude Critique des Systèmes de K. Mannheim et de P. A. Sorokin* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1949). A particularly brilliant criticism is Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: Free Press, rev. ed. 1957) chaps 12 and 13. See also Raymond Aron, *La Sociologie Allemande Contemporaine* (Paris: P.U.F., 2nd ed., 1950) pp. 74–94. My own position (*Democratic Theory,* New York: Praeger, 1965, pp. 455–460) is that the Mannheim type of sociology of knowledge attacks the consumer's end of the problem, thereby explaining the success, the spread of mental products. How mental products are produced is, however, an entirely different matter.

[5] This is actually the major and more persistent controversy. The theme has been especially pursued by analytical philosophy. See Theodore Geiger, *Ideologie und Warheit: Eine Soziologische Kritik des Denkens* (Stuttgart: Humboldt Verlag, 1953); Gustav Bergmann, "Ideology," now in *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (New York: Longmans Green, 1954); E. Topitsch, "Begriff und Funktion der Ideologie," in *Sozialphilosophie zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft* (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1961).

cialism, nationalism, etc.—are *only* ideologies (there is no quarrel that in some sense of the word they also are ideologies), it can be readily conceded that our treatment of the "isms" of politics will be more perceptive if it presupposes a stand vis à vis the sociology of knowledge. But the distinction is neat when one is exclusively concerned with the question: what does ideology explain about the nature of politics?

For the sake of brevity a number of preliminary points will have to be laid down axiomatically.

First, there is no object in adopting new terms unless they are employed to cover new phenomena or new sets of observations. I take it, therefore, that the word ideology has been increasingly adopted in response to, and as a pointer of, the development of politics—if not the development of an unprecedented aspect of politics. To be sure, one may choose to apply "ideology" to any time and place; but not without loss of conceptual substance.

Second, either we dispose of a notion of ideology that lends itself to falsification, or we do not dispose of an empirically usable term. We are logically required, then, to declare what ideology is not, i.e., to qualify the notion *a contrario*. In other terms, we are required to conceive ideology as a dimension or an aspect of politics which may, or may not, be found to apply to the real world. For this purpose "ideological politics" will be opposed here to "pragmatic politics," i.e., pragmatism will be used as a designation for non-ideology. To be sure, I am not saying that we *must* oppose ideological to non-ideological politics. My argument is, rather, that if no such opposition is justified. then the notion of ideology loses much of its interest and has little explanatory value.

Third, I take the methodological view that *awaiting contrary proof* (subsequently called the a.c.p. clause) no concept should be used as a synonym for any other concept. Ideology is generally qualified by how it relates to idea, belief, opinion, creed, myth, utopia, ethos, and similar or derivative concepts. However, I shall not be content with implying that the aforementioned concepts are largely interchangeable and tend to overlap. This way of handling conceptual problems I call "superfluous coextensiveness," and represents an intolerable waste for the economy of language and clarity of thought. The more a set of concepts is closely interlinked, the more their meanings need to be specified and distinguished. And the point is that under the a.c.p. (awaiting contrary proof) clause, it is the equivalence between two concepts, not their difference, that requires demonstration. Therefore, unless it can be demonstrated that "ideology is nothing other than x,"[6] I shall aim at using ideology to signify something that no other neighboring concept signifies.

Fourth, the relation between ideology and "idea" (i.e., conceptual thinking) bears on the genesis of ideological doctrines, on how they originate and are born, and is eventually conducive to an epistemological discussion. It will suffice to note here that ideologies are no longer ideas, in the sense that ideological doctrines no longer fall under the jurisdiction of logic and verification. When we pass on to consider ideologies we are confronted with "the conversion of ideas into social levers,"[7] i.e., with a *persuasive treatment* (not a logical treatment) of ideas leading to action-oriented ideals.[8] However, for the present enquiry ideological doctrines are givens—they exist in their distinctiveness, whatever their *genesis* in relation to "idea." I propose, therefore, to investigate a different relationship, namely, the relation of ideology to "belief" and belief systems, under the assumption that this is the pertinent focus for discussing the *structure* and *function* of ideologism. By saying structure I refer to *how* one believes; and by speaking of function I shall be concerned with the *efficacy*, or effectiveness, of belief systems.

A final clarification is in order. Given the fact that we are confronted with a black box, it will be necessary to begin with a pure and simple *semantic explanation*.[9] My first assignment is, then, to clarify the various meanings of the term ideology as they stand in actual usage.

A term may have a "notational use," i.e., it may be a useful shorthand, an economizing device, and yet explain nothing.[10] This is notably the case with the authors that are satisfied with saying that ideology amounts to the views of any and all social groups, or that everybody has political beliefs which amount to everyman's ideology. To abridge "social views" or "political beliefs" into "ideology" is perhaps convenient, but we are simply left to describe what people believe or have to say in political matters. If the term ideology were not employed, no loss of conceptual content would follow. Moreover, the foregoing definitions are not falsifiable: they simply lead to the conclusion that everything (or, conversely, nothing) is ideology.

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[6] This is called by Abraham Kaplan the "pattern model of explanation," as against the "deductive model of explanation": *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), esp. pp. 332–341. The pattern model of explanation does not necessarily coincide with Hempel's "reduction to the familiar": *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 430–433.

[7] Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology,* New York: Collier Books, 2nd rev. ed., 1962, p. 400.

[8] See C. J. Friedrich: "It is confusing . . . to call any system of ideas an ideology . . . Ideologies are action-related systems of ideas . . .": *Man and his Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 89. In a similar vein Z. B. Brzezinski qualifies ideology as "essentially an action-program suitable for mass consumption": *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 5–6.

[9] Abraham Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 327.

[10] Kaplan contrasts *notational* and *substantive* terms as follows: "Substantive terms cannot be eliminated without loss of conceptual content, but

This is not to say that the notational use of the term ideology is necessarily trivial. Not only do we need notations, but we equally need "explanation stoppers," i.e., terms defined in such a way as to avoid endless regression of enquiry. Ideology is, however, an ambitious term; it does belong to the concepts that are supposed to have broad and farreaching causative significance. Hence, if the eminence attributed to the notion of ideology is justified, it must be justified because the term *explains,* not merely because it abridges and/or provides a regression stopper. Therefore, as the discussion proceeds the focus will be progressively shifted to the *explanatory value* of the various meanings of ideology, for my ultimate purpose is to probe and single out the conceptualizations that are cognitive instruments, that do have explanatory-causative potency.[11]

I. THE IDEOLOGICAL MENTALITY

If ideology is linked to "belief," it is readily apparent that the general class is "belief systems" and that ideology is the narrower conceptualization. Properly speaking, "a person's belief-disbelief system is really a political-religious-philosophic-scientific-etcetera system,"[12] i.e., a total and diffuse framework; whereas ideology indicates only the political *part* of a belief system. Whatever the psychological functions of a belief system, for the present discussion it can be simply defined as the system of symbolic orientations to be found in each individual. Correlatively, a *political* belief system consists of the set of beliefs according to which individuals navigate and orient themselves in the sea of politics.

It is not sufficient to say, however, that ideology is the political slice, or part, of a belief system. Under the a.c.p. (awaiting contrary proof) clause, I assume that ideology indicates a particular state, or structure, of political belief systems. By definition, then, not all political belief systems are ideological.

Two corollaries follow. First, pragmatism is also a state of belief systems. Indeed to contrast ideologism and pragmatism as representing, respectively, a belief versus a belief-less orientation toward politics is to preempt the issue from the outset. The first corollary is, therefore, that *both* ideologism and pragmatism are possible states of belief. Second, and conversely, the presence of beliefs does not suffice to qualify, per se, the ideological nature of such beliefs: the pragmatic actor also is belief-oriented. The second corollary is, then, that beliefs are, as such, a *common,* not a discriminating element. While not every polity need contain ideological publics, no polity can exist without publics that have beliefs.

A number of authors seemingly agree to the effect that not all political belief systems are ideological, but they founder on the reefs of definition by failing to provide a discriminating element. According to Talcott Parsons, for instance, ideology is "a system of beliefs, held in common by the members of a collectivity . . . which is oriented to the *evaluative integration* of the collectivity."[13] But the discriminating power of the notion of evaluative integration, and, in general, of having recourse to the value dimension, is almost nil.[14] Beliefs are inextricably value-laden—they precede the analytical distinction between value and fact—and any belief system serves the purpose of integrating (axiologically or otherwise) the belief-collectivity.[15] It is not without reason, therefore,

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notational terms are fundamentally abbreviations, and could be replaced": *op. cit.,* p. 49.

[11] I purposely avoid saying "explication" on account of the technical meaning attributed to the term by Carnap followed by Carl K. Hempel, *Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 11–12. For the sake of simplicity I equally neglect the more sophisticated test suggested by K. R. Popper with regard to the "informative content" of scientific statements: *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson, 1959), pp. 119–121. For an introductory overview see Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1961), chap. 2: "Patterns of Scientific Explanation."

[12] Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind* (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 35.

[13] *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1964 ed.), p. 349 (My italics).

[14] This applies also to the attempt, notably pursued by Bergmann and Geiger, to qualify ideology (vis à vis scientific truth) as any value judgement mistaken for, or disguised as, statement of fact. This view makes ideology far too broad.

[15] Let alone the fact that the "integration" of a belief group may well be a "disintegration" vis à vis other groups. We are forcefully reminded of this

that I propose to search for structural elements of differentiation bearing on *how* one believes.

Speaking of belief systems, both the notions of "belief" and "system" must be taken seriously. Under the awaiting-contrary-proof clause a *belief* is neither an opinion nor an idea. Opinions include and characterize the more ephemeral and superficial level of discourse, and can be safely set aside, therefore, with reference to belief systems. On the other hand, in the strict sense ideas are *thought of,* they typically belong to the more self-conscious dimension of discourse, to reasoning and theorizing. If the sentence is understood *cum grano salis,* beliefs can be defined as "ideas that are no longer thought,"[16] to signify that beliefs are idea-clusters that routinize the cost of decisions precisely because they are taken for granted. Beliefs are *believed*—not explored, tested and held under the searchlight of consciousness.[17]

As for the notion of *system,* a first obvious caution is that the system may have properties which are not exhibited by its parts. But it is more important to underline that a "belief system" points to a state of *boundedness,* to the fact that beliefs hang together. This belief-linkage is presumably what a number of authors have in mind when they define ideology as a more or less coherent set of ideas. Now, logical (or rational) attributes such as "coherence," "consistency," and the like, are hardly applicable to a belief-linkage. Indeed the single belief-elements can be logically contradictory. But there is no question that beliefs are "bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."[18] Beliefs, then, cluster in *systems,* though not in rationally congruent and organized systems.

Having issued the caveat that the system should be taken seriously, no harm follows if one decomposes belief systems in a number of ways. Following Rokeach, one may distinguish between 1) primitive beliefs, 2) intermediate, and 3) peripheral regions of belief.[19] I propose to dwell briefly on the intermediate region, and then to decompose the more peripheral regions of belief into single belief-elements.

The first problem is to pinpoint the discriminating element, the mentality (*forma mentis*) that qualifies an ideological structure of belief in its difference from a pragmatic structure of belief. Following Rokeach again, it appears that the crucial single factor resides in so-called "authority beliefs," and more precisely in the beliefs concerning cognitive authority: the beliefs that tip us off to what is true or false about the world and its events.[20] More concretely one may say that the crucial factor is "the authorities," those on whom we rely for information.

Since nobody can avoid reliance on cognitive authorities, the difference must reside in how authorities are chosen and how the instructions emanating from these authorities are assessed. It is on this basis, in effect, that Rokeach draws the distinction between the *closed* and *open* mind. His initial basic definition is as follows: "A person's [belief] system is open or closed . . . [to] the extent to which the person can receive, evaluate and act on relevant information . . . on its own intrinsic merits."[21] The closed mind is defined, accordingly, as a cognitive state in which a person does not discriminate substantive information from information about the source. Hence the more closed one's belief system, the more he is unable to evaluate relevant information on its own intrinsic merits. In substance, the closed mind relies on, indeed yields to, absolute authority, and is hardly in a position to select and to check its authorities.

Doubtless the association of the ideological mentality with the closed mind can be accused of representing an anti-ideological bias. However, ideological closedness is bad and pragmatic openness is good only according to an intellectual yardstick—and one could well say an intellectualistic prejudice. If we are reminded that the pertinent yardstick is "efficacy" the evaluation could be reversed, for reliance on absolute authorities does obtain the kind of efficacy praised by the man of action and is surely in keeping with the purpose served by ideologies.

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other side of the coin by Ben Halpern: "The function of ideologies . . . is . . . to segregate and consolidate competing groups around rival ideas": "Myth and Ideology in Modern Usage," in *History and Theory,* 1 (1967), p. 136.

[16] I paraphrase from Wladimir Weidlè, "Sur le Concept d'Ideologie," *Le Contrat Social,* (March 1959), p. 77. The author speaks of ideology, but the sentence applies more directly to beliefs.

[17] *Contra,* among others, Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in T. Parsons and E. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 432: "*Belief* refers primarily to the categories, 'true' and 'false,' 'correct' and 'incorrect'." This intellectualistic conceptualization overlooks the difference between idea and belief.

[18] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in D. Apter (ed.), *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 207.

[19] *Op. cit.,* pp. 39–51.

[20] *Ibid.,* esp. p. 44.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 57, and *passim* pp 54–67.

In short, the ideologist cannot have it both ways, he cannot claim at the same time an intellectual and a practical primacy.

The foregoing underpins nicely the common opinion according to which the ideological mentality represents a typically *dogmatic,* i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics. On the other hand, it should be noted that a cognitive closed structure fails to justify the other characteristic generally imputed to the ideological mentality, namely, its typically *doctrinaire* bent. Should this characterization be dropped? Or does it draw from another source? I shall abide by the latter suggestion, thereby shifting the focus to the notion of *ideological culture.*

When we speak of ideology as a "culture"—or a cultural pattern—we are more or less implicitly referred to the anthropological notion of culture. Perhaps we may say that we are referred once again to the intermediate regions of belief, though no longer to the "authority-beliefs" but to the "processing-coding-beliefs." The simplest and closest analogy appears to be, however, the *Gestalt* analogy: a cultural pattern is characterized by the forms, or the matrixes, with and within which our mind stores and orders whatever it apprehends. For our purposes these processing-coding *Gestalten* will be labelled "rationalism" and "empiricism," and the assumption will be that these cultural matrixes help explain why only certain polities characteristically display, over time, an ideological patterning.

What strikes me in this connection is the extent to which the typically ideological *isms* of politics—marxism being the outstanding current example—were born and have developed (before being exported) in the cultural area qualified by the notion of *rationalism,* hardly in other cultural contexts, and surely not in the cultural area of *empiricism.*[22] I find it equally striking that only the "rational ideologies"—I mean, the ideologies drawn from rationalistic philosophies and nurtured in a rationalistic soil—travel easily throughout the world.[23] Hence my hypothesis is that ideology and pragmatism qua "political cultures" are related, respectively, to the "cultural matrixes" rationalism and empiricism.

Rationalism and empiricism are generally associated, respectively, with a "coherence" theory of truth as against a "correspondence" theory of truth. Oakeshott equally makes a good point when he writes that "Rationalism is the assertion that . . . practical knowledge is not knowledge at all."[24] But, however sweepingly, let us attempt to qualify rationalism and empiricism in more detail, with the understanding that the following characterizations represent a syndrome, so that the full enumeration is required to appreciate the meaning of the separate assertions.

The *rationalistic* processing-coding tends to approach problems as follows: i) deductive argumentation prevails over evidence and testing; ii) doctrine prevails over practice; iii) principle prevails over precedent; iv) ends prevail over means; and v) perceptions tend to be "covered up," doctrine-loaded, typically indirect. Hegel's famous sentence "the rational is real" goes to the very heart of the rationalistic mind,[25] for the rationalistic attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray, there must be something wrong with the practice, not with the theory.

Conversely, and symmetrically, the *empirical* processing-coding can be described as follows: i) evidence and testing prevail over deductive argumentation; ii) practice prevails over doctrine; iii) precedent prevails over principle; iv) means prevail over ends, and, therefore; v) its perceptions tend to be more "direct." Consequently the empirical attitude is to argue that if the practice goes astray, something is likely to be wrong with the theory, not with the practice.

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[22] If "liberalism" is conceived as an ideology, I suggest that it represents the ideological apex attained by the empirical mind; and surely liberalism has been a poor competitor, ideologically speaking, of socialism, communism, equalitarianism and the like.

[23] In this connection it should be noted that the ideologies of the developing nations and, in general, of the third world have been hardly nurtured and taught in London and Oxford, and even less in the United States. A perusal of Paul E. Sigmund (ed.), *The Ideologies of the Developing Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1963), suffices to confirm, in spite of nebulous and bizarre melanges, their unmistakably rationalistic Western source.

[24] *Rationalism in Politics* (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 11. I cannot follow Oakeshott, however, in his positive identification of rationalism with technical knowledge. ("The sovereignty of 'reason,' for the rationalist, means the sovereignty of technique," *ibid.*) It seems to me, rather, that technical knowledge represents the point at which rationalism and empiricism converge. On its own premises, rationalism looks down at technical knowledge as an inferior knowledge.

[25] To be sure, Hegel's sentence had a dialectical circular formulation. But "the rational" is the subject: it is rationality that qualifies reality, not the reverse. Hegel's philosophy was a realistic *rationalism,* hardly a rationalistic *realism.*

The *ad hoc* implications for our subject are that the rationalistic *Gestalt* is characterized (relatively speaking, of course) by openness to deductive axiomatization and deafness to empirical evidence, by low *practical* problem-solving flexibility and by high *theoretical* problem solving ability. Also, and consequently, the rationalistic mind soars at a higher level of explicitness and especially of abstraction than the empirical mind. This implies, in turn, that rationalism is able to embrace and to cover in terms of *Weltanschauung* a comparatively broader "space," either with long deductive chains or with acrobatic leaps—a quality that I shall call comprehensiveness.

The foregoing can be easily translated into a "cultural" characterization of the ideological mentality. If we assume ideologism to result from a rationalistic cultural matrix, it follows that to the extent that the ideological mentality is "open," it is open to rational, deductive argument, hardly to evidence: the sentence "experience proves" proves nothing to an ideologically-minded actor. An ulterior implication is that the ideological mentality identifies *par excellence* with highly "abstract" and "comprehensive" belief systems. In particular an important feature of the ideological mentality that neatly flows from its rationalistic matrix is that the central elements of an ideological belief system are necessarily "ends," not "means."

I shall revert to these characteristics later. For the moment let us simply retain that to the extent that the ideological mentality is characterized by the rationalistic cultural matrix, to the same extent it can be legitimately qualified as a typically principled and doctrinaire way of perceiving political problems and of constructing their solution.[26] It should be clear that I am *not* saying: given a rationalistic cultural matrix, the ideological mentality necessarily follows. I am simply saying that a rationalistic culture is particularly vulnerable on this score. It should be equally clear that a number of individuals react to the culture to which they belong. Therefore, an ideological culture will contain non-ideological minority groups, just as an empirical culture will breed ideological minorities.

Bringing our two threads together, the ideological mentality now results in both a *personality trait* and a *cultural trait,* and the following conclusion appears reasonably warranted: ideologism can be legitimately understood to mean not only a rigid and dogmatic approach to politics, but also a principled and doctrinaire perception of politics. Needless to say, the two characterizations reinforce one another but can exist disjointly. However, for the simplicity of the argument in the following section, the ideological mentality will be reduced to a "closed" cognitive structure, and cognitive closedness will be defined as a state of dogmatic impermeability both to evidence and to argument. Conversely the pragmatic mentality will be simplistically identified with an "open" cognitive structure, and cognitive openness will be defined a state of mental permeability.

II. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Thus far the analysis has been confined to a single dimension—cognition. But beliefs and belief systems vary not only along a cognitive but also along an emotive dimension. Along the former a belief system can be, as we know, closed or open. Along the emotive dimension beliefs can be intense or feeble, passionately or weakly felt. Possibly, in each individual cognition and affect are tightly interlinked, but with reference to mass phenomena—e.g., abrupt transitions from "hot politics" to "cool politics," and vice versa—cognition and affect seem to vary independently. Assuming cognition to be constant, we can still have formidable oscillations of emotional intensity.

The difference between cognitive structure and emotive status underpins two different conceptions of ideology: *ideologism,* i.e., the mentality on the one hand, and *ideological passion* on the other hand. Per se the ideological mentality is not necessarily conducive to an active involvement and thereby to "ideological activism." Thus whenever we find a mobilized polity displaying a high degree of political activism, reference should be made to the emotional component, and thereby to the notion of ideological affect, or passion. This is also to say that the *effectiveness* of ideology, its capacity of activation, of arousing and unleashing energies, does not reside in the ideological mentality as such but requires, in addition, "ideological heating." Likewise, whenever politics is depicted as a matter of faith, as a religion or even as a mystique, reference is made more often than not to a particular intensity of feeling, of emotional involvement, and we should speak, therefore, of ideological passion.

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[26] The rationalist matrix also explains the "logicality of ideological thinking" forcefully highlighted—perhaps in an overly speculative vein—by Hannah Arendt, "Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government," in *The Review of Politics* (July 1953) 303–327.

FIG. 1. Scheme of Analysis.

		EMOTIVE STATUS	
		Strong	*Weak*
COGNITIVE STATUS	*Closed* (Neither subjected to evidence nor argument)	I	II
	Open (Subjected to evidence and/or argument)	III	IV

The overall scheme of analysis is thus the one recapitulated in Figure 1.[27]

Let us now enter the peripheral regions of belief and decompose belief systems into distinguishable belief-elements which are generally expressed in a slogan form. As Dahl introduces the argument, "it is convenient to think of the content of a belief system as made up of identifiable elements or components (e.g. beliefs expressed by propositions like "Democracy is the best form of government," "Bourgeois democracy must be replaced by a dictatorship of the proletariat," "A capitalist economy is more efficient than a socialist economy.")[28] With reference to the four combinations afforded by the scheme of Figure 1, the belief-elements can be broken down, following the roman numerals of the previous table, as follows.

(I) Closed and strongly felt. These elements will be called *fixed*.

(II) Closed but weakly held. These elements may be called *inelastic*.

(III) Open but strongly felt. These elements will be called *firm*.

(IV) Open and weakly felt. These elements will be called *flexible*.

The scheme of Figure 1 can thus be filled with the typology of belief-elements represented in Figure 2.

Some additional but in no way exhaustive qualifications are as follows. (I) The *fixed* elements are rigid, dogmatic, impermeable to argument and evidence. One may also call them "adamant" elements. As such, they are subject only to traumatic change under conditions of great stress. Given the fact that they are emotively participated in, the dynamic, activistic potential of the adamant elements is high. (II) The *inelastic* elements are still impermeable to argument and to evidence, but display a low dynamic potential, for they are not passionately felt. Furthermore, even though they tend to be persistent over time, they can fade away, or be dismissed, without traumatic consequences. (III) The *firm* elements are firmly held, but are open to evidence and/or to argument. Even though they tend to be persistent, they are not impermeable and are, therefore, changeable, at least in principle. On the other hand, firm ele-

FIG. 2. Typology of Belief-Elements (*).

		AFFECT	
		Strong	Weak
COGNITIVE STATUS	Closed	*Fixed* elements	*Inelastic* elements
	Open	*Firm* elements	*Flexible* elements

(*) This table repeats, in substance, Dahl's scheme on page 3, *op. cit*.

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[27] The scheme is largely inspired by Robert E. Dahl, *Ideology, Conflict and Consensus: Notes for a Theory* (mimeographed), a paper prepared for the panel on "Consensus and Dissent," VII IPSA World Congress, Bruxelles, September 18–23, 1967, p. 2. This essay is particularly indebted to Dahl's intellectual stimulation.

[28] *Ibid.*

FIG. 3. Patterns of Belief Systems.

I *Adamant* “fixed-strong” elements prevail	II *Resilient* “fixed-feeble” elements prevail
III *Firm* “flexible-strong” elements prevail	IV *Flexible* “flexible-feeble” elements prevail

ments have a stronger dynamic potential than the inelastic elements. (IV) The *flexible* elements are feebly held, open to argument and/or to evidence and, furthermore, to convenience. They are changeable by definition. On the other hand, their dynamic potential is very low.

It can be easily seen that the foregoing typology of belief-*elements* can be turned into a typology of belief-*systems* tentatively labelled as in Figure 3.

Conceivably, the simplest way of establishing the nature of a pattern is provided by the following criterion: which type of element prevails in terms of intensity. However, we are also reminded by Converse that “the idea-elements within a belief system vary in a property we shall call centrality.”[29] Whenever possible, therefore, one should use centrality as a criterion.

The individuals imbued with an *adamant* belief system are impenetrable vis à vis external influence and are strongly motivated toward outward expansion, either in the form of proselytism or of overt aggression. The individuals imbued with a *resilient* belief system resist change and support the internal *status quo,* but lack dynamism and outward orientation. The individuals sharing a *firm* belief system are both open to change and motivated toward outward expansion. Finally, the individuals sharing a *flexible* belief system easily accept changes but lack outward dynamism.

Be that as it may, we are now in a position to perceive clearly the *placement* of the ideological and pragmatic varieties of belief systems, and to *define* them accordingly (regardless of *what* one believes).

Having reference to our initial scheme (Figure 1), qua ideal types or, better, qua polar opposites, a “perfectly ideological” belief system falls in quadrant I, whereas a “perfectly pragmatic” belief system falls in quadrant IV—as shown in Figure 4.

Definition: Whenever ideology and pragmatism are confronted dichotomously, and thereby conceptualized as polar types, *ideology* is a belief system based on i) fixed elements, characterized by ii) strong affect and iii) closed cognitive structure. *Pragmatism* is, conversely, a belief system based on i) flexible elements characterized by ii) weak affect and iii) open cognitive structure.

Granted that pure types seldom, if ever, are approximated in the real world, this means only that we are also required to define ideology and pragmatism as “concrete” systems. It does not follow that it is logically erroneous, and even less that it is logically superfluous, to define concepts *ex adverso*. I would argue, on the contrary, that the logical error is to hold that if ideology and pragmatism are conceived as blends of a same continuum, they should not be defined as opposites. A continuum of what? Unless the ends of a continuum are defined, the continuum itself remains undefined. Hence, even if one abides by the “continuum language,” polar definitions remain the *sine qua non* condition for having a continuum at all.

The usefulness of these mappings, and the extent to which crucial distinctions are often bypassed, can be illustrated with reference to the

FIG. 4. Ideology and Pragmatism as Polar Opposites.



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[29] “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” *loc. cit.,* p. 208.

FIG. 5. Decline of Ideology Hypothesis.


I
IDEOLOGY
II
The fixed elements become weakly held
III
The closed elements become open

decline or end of ideology debate.[30] If the question is, What do we mean by *decline of ideology,* Figure 5 shows that we are liable to confuse, in this connection, two very different processes.

A shift from box I to box II merely reflects a decline of emotive intensity and amounts to a relatively easy and easily predictable transformation. On the other hand, this shift does not necessarily indicate a point of no return. At least in short run terms (from one to two generations), returns from box II to box I, i.e., from cooler to warmer politics, are only to be expected and not difficult to obtain. Moreover, in this respect the argument largely hinges on the point in time chosen as parameter. E.g., with respect to the base 1918–20 the thirties represented a decline of ideology, but the 1946–50 period represented an increase of ideology with respect to a pre-war base; and it seems to me that the late sixties reveal no decline, but resurgence, with respect to the late fifties. A real decline of ideology is safely indicated, then, by the passage from box I to box III. However, a transformation of fixed into firm belief-elements is not an easy transformation, for it involves a radical change in the mental posture, a shift from closedness to openness.[31]

The expression *end of ideology* pushes the matter further, at least in forecasting terms. If "end" is meant seriously, it calls for an overall transformation of an ideological belief system into a pragmatic belief system. If so, Figure 6 underpins how many conditions need to be satisfied and, by implication, the hazardous nature of the prediction.

Let us now turn to the problem of defining ideology and pragmatism as *concrete* belief systems. In the real world, an ideological pattern can be identified as such when the overall distribution of the belief-elements gravitates—with reference to the scheme utilized so far—around quadrants I and II. Conversely, when the overall distribution of the elements gravitates around quadrants IV and III, the polity can be identified as being pragmatic.

This is not to deny the possibility of spill-overs in other boxes as well. Varieties and variations within each concrete belief system can be very great, as suggested by the following rule of thumb: an ideological polity will be *less ideological* the lesser the elements contained in quadrant I; conversely, a pragmatic polity will be *less pragmatic,* the lesser the elements contained in quadrant IV. The two patterns fall wide apart with reference to their respective centers of gravity; but the feebler the gravitational attraction of each *noyeau,* the greater the diffusion, and therefore the overlaps. This is, admittedly, very vague. But one can hardly be more specific until an additional set of distinctions is brought to bear on the discussion.

If belief systems are broken down into elements, they can be classified with respect to the following properties: a) their relative articulation, or richness; b) their correlative constraining power; c) their divisibility in belief strata corresponding to belief publics.

a) With reference to the first property, a belief system can be *rich* (articulate) or *poor* (inarticulate).[32] A rich belief system is necessarily explicit and contains a relatively large number of elements. Conversely, a poor belief system has a low degree of explicitness and consists of relatively few elements. b) With regard to the second property, a belief system may be *strongly constraining* or *feebly constraining*: in the former the elements are tightly related in a "quasi-logical" fashion, while in the latter the elements are loosely connected and follow, at best, an "idiosyncratic" syntax.[33] c) As for the

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[30] Jean Meynaud's book on the *Destin des Ideologies* is actually a review and a discussion of the decline of ideology literature. See it. transl. *Destino delle Ideologie,* (Cappelli ed., 1964), esp. pp. 37–112. Raymond Aron, Daniel Bell and S. M. Lipset are the standard references on the subject.

[31] Another possibility is that the decline of ideology amounts—all other conditions remaining equal—to a convergence among different ideologies, either in the sense that the opposed "disbelievers" come to share a greater number of beliefs in common, or in the sense that the distinctive elements which oppose the various belief systems become feebly or more feebly held. This is the suggestion perceptively set forth by Dahl (*op. cit.,* pp. 5–8). However, in this case the "decline" would be an optical illusion, for the process described is, in reality, a mere process of growing "affinity" or of diminishing distance between two or more ideologies.

[32] Dahl, *op. cit.,* p. 3.

[33] As Converse puts it, *loc. cit.,* especially pp. 210–211 and 241.

Fig. 6. End of Ideology Hypothesis.



stratification aspect, the various "belief strata" can be identified by the amount of political information received and absorbed by each belief-public.

These properties, or aspects, appear highly correlated. The correspondence between the richness of a belief system and various levels of belief publics is hypothesized by Dahl as follows: "In every country the number of identifiable elements ('richness') in the political belief system of different individuals is most highly related to (1) the amount of political activity an individual engages in; (2) the level or extent of his political interest, and (3) the amount of formal education he has had."[34] The hypothesis is highly plausible on the ground of its sheer logical force, and is supported on empirical grounds by the factual evidence reviewed by Converse. Furthermore, if the argument of Dahl is combined with the "constraint argument" of Converse, two conclusions appear reasonably warranted:

a) A rich, articulate, quasi-logical—and therefore constraining—belief system corresponds to an elite belief system.[35]

b) In comparison, mass publics are likely to display, in whatever country, a poorly explicated, inarticulate, disconnected—and therefore relatively unconstraining—belief system.

If the foregoing is correct, a number of consequences follow. First, investigations are rewarding only if the public under investigation is clearly identified, if we deal with one belief public at a time, and only if each stratum is measured in accord with its standards. Second, the order of investigation suggests that precedence should be given to the rich elite belief systems. Third, mass belief publics appear to be dependent variables of elite belief publics.

The last suggestion is not only crucial, but also appears, at first, hazardous. Yet the thesis is largely implied in the basic finding of Converse that at the lower levels individuals "lack the contextual grasp of the [belief] system to recognize how they should respond to it without being told by elites who hold their confidence."[36]

On the one hand, belief systems are "diffused in 'packages' which consumers come to see as 'natural' wholes"; i.e., they are constraining in that they are presented in such terms: "If you believe this, then you will also believe that, for it follows in such-and-such ways."[37] On the other hand, however, what "follows in such-and-such ways" is not easy to follow—I mean, the argumentative chain is grasped only by the attentive, articulate citizen. The inarticulate public not only lacks, without guidance, the grasp of *what goes with what* in the deductive chain of a highflown, abstract argument; it equally and especially lacks the information and the inductive capability of deciding on his own how a *specific* event relates to a general principle, and specifically to *which* principle.

The thesis is, then, that a poorly articulated belief system becomes constraining if and when subjected to "linkage-guidance." This means that elite rich belief systems tend to be *self-constraining,* whereas poor and poorly articulated belief systems are basically *hetero-constraining.* The first provide a self-steering, inner-directed system of orientation; the latter require, *at least for dynamic purposes,* other-direction. The implication is that elite publics are largely in a position to manipulate mass publics. It should be clear, in this latter connection, that "elites" also include so-called counter-elites; the term applies to whichever authorities happen to be recognized by a distinct belief-group.

The argument can be recapitulated as in Figure 7.

I propose to elaborate on the relevance of

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[34] Dahl, *op. cit.,* p. 4.

[35] See Converse, *loc. cit.,* p. 248: "Ideological constraints in belief systems decline with decreasing political information, which is to say that they are present among elites at the 'top' of political systems . . . and disappear rather rapidly as one moves 'downward' into their mass clienteles."

[36] *Ibid.,* p. 216.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 212.

Fig. 7. Breakdowns and Properties of Belief Systems.


Belief Systems
Belief Strata
Properties
Rich
Elite Publics
Self-constraining
Quasi-logical
Intermediary publics
Poor
Mass Publics
Unconstraining (or)
Hetero-constraining

these points in the final section. Meanwhile I only wish to make the point that unless one distinguishes among the various belief strata he is hardly in a position to discuss ideology and pragmatism qua concrete belief systems. Indeed I would go as far as to say that this discussion edges on meaninglessness unless the distinction is sought at the elite belief level.

My conjecture is, in fact, that under unexposed "rest conditions" any mass public would display at best a latent political belief system. If so, and always assuming a hypothetical "non-exposure," mass belief systems are likely to be largely undifferentiated, largely amorphous with respect to the ideology-pragmatism distinction. This is to suggest, then, that the ideologic or pragmatic qualification of mass publics—of the *latent* beliefs—is largely decided by the *forensic* beliefs, by the elite belief systems to which mass publics are exposed.[38]

The argument should be placed, however, in perspective, in the sense that the ideology-pragmatism bifurcation should be traced back to the original impetus with which a belief system was launched by the founding fathers. Assuming that the take-off point of an ideological elite is likely to be situated in quadrant I, whereas the take-off point of a pragmatic elite is likely to be in quadrant III, *over time* an ideological elite public is likely to vary across a mix of "closed" strong-weak elements (boxes I and II); whereas a pragmatic elite public is likely to vary across a mix of "open" strong-weak elements (boxes III and IV). Therefore, to the extent that each elite remains as it is—either ideological or pragmatic—the respective areas of variation can be represented as in Figure 8.

By contrast, the *independent* area of variation of mass belief publics is more likely to be the one suggested in Figure 9. According to the hypothesis, at the lower belief stratum there is no reason to assume that in response to a situation of stress shifts from quadrants II to I necessarily represent, in themselves, an increase of ideologism: they are more likely to signify a sheer growth of intolerance. Likewise, shifts from quadrants II to III do not necessarily indicate, in themselves, the acquisition of a pragmatic mentality: they may simply mean a loss of beliefs and thus increased apathy and indifference. As for the blank of quadrant III, the suggestion implicitly conveyed by the table is that an "open-firm" political belief system typically represents an elite achievement. For a latent state of belief left to itself, this appears to be a very unlikely pattern.

Fig. 8. Mixes and Variations of Elite Belief Publics.


I
More ideological elites
II
Less ideological elites
III
Less pragmatic elites
IV
More pragmatic elites

III. IDEOLOGY AND CONFLICT

It should be acknowledged that so far we have been explaining "ideology" more than

Fig. 9. Mixes and Variations of Mass Publics.


High Intolerance
High conservatism or traditionalism
High indifference

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[38] The distinction between "latent" and "forensic" is borrowed from Robert E. Lase, *Political Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), p. 16. In line with my preoccupations, I would say that Lane's "latent ideology" can either become, at the forensic level, an ideological or a pragmatic type of political belief system.

using "ideology" to explain. Hopefully we have thrown light in a compartment of our black box. Yet the question remains: having explained the term, what does the term explain? I suggest that the question can be squarely met at least in two respects. First, I shall argue that ideology is an important variable in explaining conflict, consensus and cohesion. Second, I shall argue that ideology is the decisive variable in explaining mass mobilization and manipulation.

With regard to the problem of conflict and consensus the question is: how do two or more belief systems relate to one another? If belief systems are compared among themselves, some belief-elements may be shared, and they are the *common elements;* whereas the elements that differentiate one belief system from another are the *distinctive elements*.[39] It is also convenient to assume that the belief-elements that really matter are the "central" ones. On these premises our earlier distinctions between fixed, firm and flexible belief-elements[40] immediately outline three typical patterns of interrelation between different belief systems and belief groups.

i) If the distinctive elements are *fixed* (i.e., closed and strongly held) two belief systems are *incompatible* or mutually exclusive, and the relations between the corresponding belief groups will definitely be *conflictual*: conciliation is impossible. However the intensity and scope of conflict may vary greatly, for the more numerous the (central) distinctive elements, the greater the hostility; the less numerous, the lesser the occasions of conflict.

ii) If the distinctive elements are *flexible* (i.e., open and weakly held) two belief systems are *coalescent* or fusible, and the relations between the corresponding belief groups will be *consensual*: cooperation is likely. Of course, the fewer the distinctive elements, the greater the amalgamation and the convergence.

FIG. 10. Conflictual versus Consensual Politics.



iii) If the distinctive elements are *firm* (i.e., open but strongly held) two belief systems are *compatible,* that is, capable of peaceful coexistence, and the relations between the corresponding belief groups will be of the *bargaining* type: mutual adjustment is possible. Of course, the fewer the (central) distinctive elements, the easier the coexistence.

In essence, then, political conflict (in its autonomy vis à vis economic conflict, or conflicts of interest) largely depends on *which* distinctive elements are distributed *how* within a national community or across nations. With regard to the pure and simple distribution—i.e., disregarding for the moment the nature of the elements—political conflict reflects the rise of a controversy which taps the distinctive elements of two (or more) belief systems. Conversely, the sharing of common belief-elements indicates the area in which we obtain political consensus. This preliminary argument can be reformulated also along the lines suggested in Figure 10.

However, Figure 10 accounts for two variables—the numerical magnitude and the emotional intensity of the elements—but fails to account for a third, crucial variable: the nature of the distinctive elements. We are thus referred to the question: which is the distribution of *which* elements? If the central distinctive elements are "closed," the controversy will be ideological; if they are "open" it will be pragmatic. In either case controversy is inevitable, but the chances and the ways of conflict resolution are conspicuously different.

At one end, if the distinctive elements are not only closed but also passionately held we shall have "ideological warfare," the relation is incompatibility and conflict is unmanageable. At the other end, the more the distinctive elements are open and feebly felt, the more we shall obtain "pragmatic transactions" and relations of mutual adjustment.

The same applies to the shared elements. At one end, a belief group whose common elements are closed and strongly held will display "ideological cohesion," that is, strong and lasting solidarity ties, discipline and active dedication to the whole. At the other end, a belief group whose common elements are open and feebly held will display "pragmatic consensus," which means low cohesion, ephemeral and feeble solidarity ties, and a tendency to dissolve into multiple loyalties.

Thus far we have hypothesized relations among homogeneous belief systems, i.e., between two belief systems which are both ideological or both pragmatic. We can also obtain, however, heterogeneous interrelations between pragmatic and ideological belief groups. In this case the additional complication is a serious communication lag. The two mentalities simply do not fit: their very logic, their *Gestalten,* are different. On the other hand, each belief group is inevitably prompted to project its own *forma mentis* on the opposing group. A blind game results in which misinterpretation, misperception, frustration and a spiral of distrust play the major roles.

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[39] Dahl, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[40] *Supra,* Figure 2: "Typology of belief-elements." For the present discussion the "inelastic elements" will be neglected.

For instance, the pragmatic actor tends to assume that interests and conflicts of interests—along a continuum ranging from total coincidence of interest to zero-sum conflict—suffice to explain and to predict political behavior.[41] But in the ideological actor the "logic of interest" combines with a "logic of principles." In fact, ideological politics represents a situation in which the utility scale of each actor is altered by an ideological scale. Hence, and much to the bewilderment of the pragmatist, in this case the logic of interest no longer suffices to explain, and even less to predict, political behavior.

In conclusion, unless we are sensitized to the existence of distinctly ideological publics and belief systems we are likely to miss the very nature of "big conflict." For instance, we are easily misled into believing that ideological conflicts can be reduced to underlying economic conflicts which can be cured with economic medicines. Likewise, we are likely to miss the fact that the dialogue of politics may well be a dialogue among deaf men. On the other hand, the foregoing equally alerts us to the fact that ideological consensus is not the same as pragmatic consensus, and that the in-group cohesion of an ideological community is a far cry from the in-group solidarity of a pragmatic community.

IV. IDEOLOGY AND MASS MANIPULATION

Before turning to the explanatory value of "ideology" vis à vis the unprecedented scale of contemporary mass manipulation—which is also my major and most comprehensive point—it will be necessary to recapitulate, however sweepingly, the route travelled thus far.

Having reference to the more basic features, belief systems vary, as we know, along the following dimensions: i) closed and open cognition, ii) emotive intensity, iii) rich-poor articulation, and iv) constraining power.

With respect to their cultural matrixes belief systems vary, in addition, with respect to the following characteristics: i) accessibility either to argumentative demonstration or to factual evidence; ii) centrality of the belief-elements; iii) level of abstraction; and iv) comprehensiveness.

It is unnecessary to elaborate further on the first set of basic characteristics. As for the additional underpinnings, attention should be called to the following hypotheses.

With regard to *accessibility,* the hypothesis is that to the extent that the ideological mentality receives external communications, it is receptive to rational demonstration, hardly to empirical proofs. Conversely, the pragmatic mentality is open to evidence far more than to the "reasons of reason."

With regard to the *centrality* of the belief-elements, the hypothesis is that in ideological belief systems the "ends" constitute the central elements; whereas in pragmatic belief systems the "means" tend to be more central.

With regard to the *abstraction* ladder, ideological belief systems soar on a far more remote, abstruse and highflown level of discourse than the pragmatic belief systems.

Correlatively, and finally, with regard to *comprehensiveness,* the coverage, or the space for expansion, of ideological belief systems is far more universal and "totalistic" than the coverage of the pragmatic belief systems.

The import of these qualifications is readily apparent in the light of the most crucial aspect of belief systems, namely, their *constraining power.* It was suggested earlier that mass publics are, in general, easily hetero-constrained, in the sense that poorly articulated believers need guidance not only for the horizontal inter-belief linkage, but also for the vertical event-principle linkage.[42] But now the argument can be pinned down, according to the following three points.

First: The greater the centrality of the belief elements designating *ends,* the more a belief system will elicit normative, goal-oriented, if not futuristic or even chiliastic responses and behavior.

Second: The more *abstract* a belief system, the more "what follows from what" (inter-belief linkage), and "which event goes with which principle" (event-principle linkage) escape the grasp of mass publics and require elite guidance. Hence, the more abstract a belief system, the more it allows for elite manipulation and maneuvering.

Third and correlatively: The more a belief system transcends common sense spatial and temporal boundaries, that is, the more it obtains a totalistic *comprehensiveness*, the more it calls for elite interpretation and facilitates elite control.

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[41] Interest is understood here as the utility scale of each individual, as perceived by the interested party according to the culturally accepted standards of economic rationality.

[42] The need, if not the inevitability of guidance is also the conclusion implicitly conveyed by the literature on the closed and open mind. In particular Rokeach brings out neatly the extent to which cognitive closedness is exposed to manipulation from the authorities.

The foregoing forcibly suggests, then, that the hetero-constraining potentiality of belief systems increases the more the system is ideological, and diminishes the more the system is pragmatic. In short, ideologies are the *hetero-constraining* belief systems par excellence. And this is the same as saying that ideologies are the crucial lever at the disposal of elites for obtaining political mobilization and for maximizing the possibilities of mass manipulation. This is, it seems to me, the single major reason that ideology is so important to us. We are concerned about ideologies because we are concerned, in the final analysis, with the power of man over man, with how populations and nations can be mobilized and manipulated all along the way that leads to political messianism and fanaticism.

The focus on ideology as a lever of political mobilization, as an instrument of mass manipulation, satisfies the requirement of causal explanation. At this stage we are not merely saying, "this is *what* the term indicates;" we are also saying "this is *why* we have ideological politics." Yet the reader may feel that this is a too narrow conclusion, and surely a conclusion that requires some justification.

At the outset of this exploration I had two queries in mind. One was: What should we seek to explain? The other one was: What is it that remains unexplained? Clearly these are the two sides of a same question. But the first query is virtually limitless, whereas the second narrows the problem, thereby providing the guideline that I have resolved to follow. By now we know a great deal about why individuals act and react in politics the way they do. Nevertheless we are still at a loss when we come to macro-phenomena and try to understand why the distribution of the "open" and "closed" minds, of high or low affect, does not follow any statistical logic and varies as it does. If so, the concept of ideology still has an important explanatory role to play—under the condition, however, that we sharpen it for the purpose of explaining what other convergent conceptualizations and disciplines leave unexplained. My view is, then, that ideology is crucial to an empirical theory of politics because, and to the extent that, it is conducive to the understanding of *variations* and *varieties*.

Politics is not a monotonic phenomenon. At times it is a mystique, a matter of faith, a secular religion; at other times the logic of politics is no less practical, no less "matter of fact," than the logic of economics. Some political systems display a high extractive capability and succeed in eliciting enthusiastic, passionate and trustful allegiance; other political systems display a low mobilizational and extractive capability. In certain instances we are confronted with monolithic political units characterized by extraordinary cohesiveness; but in other instances we find equivalent political units characterized by a hopeless lack of solidarity ties. Finally, the dialogue of politics is confronted with very different types of "deafness."

Does political science need the variable ideology to explain, at least in part, these varieties and variations? My reply has been in the affirmative, provided we do not overload the concept in pursuing ambitious attempts to explain (worse) that which other disciplines or conceptualizations explain better; and provided, therefore, that the use of "ideology" is restricted to the meanings that appear to have a *unique* explanatory value.

WHO PAYS FOR DEFENSE?[1]

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I. THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF DEFENSE

Theories of the economic causes of war are at least as old as capitalism, and have in recent years appeared in myriad forms. Around the turn of the last century J. A. Hobson and Lenin developed their famous arguments about the economic driving forces behind imperialist expansion; American opponents of their country's entry into World War I blamed the lobbying of munitions makers; more recently we have had C. Wright Mills and the New Left. The assertions of these theorists are not always susceptible to scientific examination, but to supplement them there have in the past few years been a number of sound and well-documented studies locating in the national economy the groups that benefit most from military expenditures.[2] Such studies show very effectively which industries, and which states, *gain* disproportionately from defense spending and hence develop some special interest in maintaining or increasing those expenditures. One need not accept Marxist or other extreme positions on the causes of war to find such information relevant to identifying political pressure groups that must be countered or compensated in any effort to reduce the level of military spending.

A question closely related to "Who benefits from defense spending?" is, of course, "Who *pays* for it?"; but curiously this second problem has received very little attention. Nothing comes free, and defense is no exception. In this paper we shall examine some evidence about what segments of the economy and society sacrifice disproportionately when defense spending rises. What kinds of public and private expenditure are diminished, or fail to grow at previously established rates, when military expenditures take a larger proportion of a less than infinitely expansible economy? The exercise will use economic data to address some critical political questions. It should point to particular interests, or pressure groups, that are relatively strong (or weak) and able (or unable) to maintain their accustomed standards of living during periods of international adversity, or to seize the pecuniary opportunities presented by the reduced defense effort that may accompany a relaxation of global tensions. Furthermore, it will enable us, in a sense, to do a "cost-benefit" analysis of war or preparedness, to identify the opportunity costs in the kind and amount of social benefits that are likely to be foregone. Such costs may be entirely in the form of current benefits foregone or, if the nation's resource base is eroded, they may be paid largely by future generations.

The basic question has two prongs, of which only one can be considered here. One part would require detailed data on tax incidences and on wage and price changes. Expanded defense needs are usually financed by a combination of increased taxation and deficit spending. Tax rates would tell us what income or occupational groups suffered disproportionately from assessment increases. Deficit spending in the absence of adequate tax increases normally produces inflation. The wage and price data would show which groups saw inflationary pressures diminishing their real income more sharply than was happening to the average consumer. Generally, one would expect owners of common stocks and land, and union laborers with cost-of-living clauses in their contracts, to suffer least. White collar workers and, especially, pensioners and poor unorganized laborers, have the most nearly fixed incomes and the greatest vulnerability.

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[1] Research for this paper was supported by the World Data Analysis Program of Yale University under grant #GS-614 from the National Science Foundation, and the comparative sections were done under contract #N-0014-67-A-0097-0007 from ARPA, Behavioral Sciences, monitored by the Office of Naval Research. I am grateful to Kenneth Boulding, Peter Busch, John Sullivan, and Murray Weidenbaum for comments. Of course no person or agency is responsible for errors or for the opinions expressed.

[2] See, for example, Walter Isard and James Ganschow, *Awards of Prime Military Contracts by County, State, and Metropolitian Area of the United States, Fiscal Year 1960* (Philadelphia: Regional Science Research Institute, 1962) and Walter Isard and Gerald Karaska, *Unclassified Defense Contracts: Awards by County, State and Metropolitan Area of the United States, Fiscal Year 1962* (Philadelphia: World Friends Research Center, 1962). Murray L. Weidenbaum, "Problems of Adjustment for Defense Industries," in Emile Benoit and Kenneth E. Boulding (eds.), *Disarmament and the Economy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) presents data on the distribution of contracts by industry. See also James L. Clayton, "Defense Spending: Key to California's Growth," *Western Political Quarterly,* 15 (June 1962), 280–293. *Science,* 161 (1968), p. 448 reports the receipts of various universities for Department of Defense-sponsored research in the physical, biological, and social sciences. On Canada, see Gideon Rosenbluth, *The Canadian Economy and Disarmament* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967).

While there is some information on these matters, a high degree of precision and specificity is required before the data can yield reliable answers, and I have chosen not to develop that side of the problem here. What I have done is to examine information on *expenditures* by G.N.P. categories, by function, and by governmental unit to see what kinds of alternative spending bear the brunt of heavy military spending. For the United States we have this data for the period 1939–1968 or 1938–1967. This allows us to see the effects of two earlier wars (World War II and the Korean War) as well as the burdens of the current Vietnam venture. Toward the end of the paper we shall compare the American experience with that of several other developed Western states, albeit for a shorter time span.

First, an overview of the changing level of defense expenditures may be helpful. For 1939, in what was in many ways the last peacetime year this nation has experienced, defense expenditures were under $1.3 billion. They rose rapidly with the new preparedness, to a still-unsurpassed peak of $87.4 billion in 1944. The 1968 figure (annual estimate based on the first three quarters) was by contrast $78.4 billion, reflecting a build-up, for the Vietnam war, from levels of around $50 billion in the early-to-mid 1960's. The raw dollar figures, however, are deceptive because they reflect neither inflation nor the



FIG. 1. Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of U.S. G.N.P., 1939–1968.

Source: See Table 1.

steady growth in the economy's productive capacity that makes a constant defense budget, even in price-adjusted dollars, a diminishing burden. Figure 1 shows the trend of military expenditures as a percentage of gross national product over the past 30 years.

We immediately see the great burdens of World War II, followed by a drop to a floor considerably above that of the 1930's. The cold war, and particularly the Korean action, produced another upsurge in the early 1950's to a level that, while substantial, was by no means the equal of that in the Second World War. This too trailed downward after the immediate emergency was past, though again it did not retreat to the previous floor. Not since the beginning of the cold war has the military accounted for notably less than five per cent of this country's G.N.P.; not since Korea has it had as little as seven per cent.[3] Finally, we see the effect of the Vietnam build-up, moving from a recent low of 7.3 per cent in 1965 to 9.2 per cent in 1968. This last looks modest enough, and is, when compared to the effects of this nation's two previous major wars. At the same time, it also represents a real sacrifice by other portions of the economy. The 1968 G.N.P. of the United States was well in excess of $800 billion; if we were to assume that the current war effort accounts for about 2 per cent of that (roughly the difference between 7.3 per cent and 9.2 per cent) the dollar amount is approximately $16 billion. That is in fact too low a figure, since some billions were already being devoted to the war in 1965, and direct estimates of the war's cost are typically about $25 to $30 billion.[4] The amounts in question, representing scarce resources which might be put to alternative uses, are not trivial.

II. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION

The method of analysis is straightforward. I have computed various kinds of private and public expenditures as proportions of G.N.P., and regressed them against the proportion of G.N.P. represented by defense spending. Both linear and curvilinear regressions (second order curves) were tried, but the curvilinear fit will be reported only when it improves notably on the results of the linear model. Defense is the independent variable, with the implication that the others are dependent upon it; that is, that increases in civil expenditures are made possible by relative reductions in defense spending, and that increases in defense must force relative reductions, whether deliberate or unintended, in nonmilitary items.[5] The causal chain is of course not fully demonstrable with regression analysis, but seems generally plausible.

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[3] This repeated failure to shrink the military establishment back to its prewar level is a phenomenon of some interest to students of the dynamics of international arms races and/or Parkinson's Law. It shows up even more clearly in the data on military personnel, and goes back almost a century to demonstrate the virtual doubling of the armed forces after every war. From 1871 to 1898 the American armed forces numbered fewer than 50,000; after the Spanish-American war they never again dropped below 100,000. The aftermath of World War I saw a leveling off to about 250,000, but the World War II mobilization left 1,400,000 as the apparent permanent floor. Since the Korean War the United States military establishment has never numbered fewer than about 2,500,000 men. See Bruce M. Russett (ed.), *Economic Theories of International Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), p. 521. Should the post-Vietnam armed forces and/or defense portion of the G.N.P. prove to be higher than in the early and mid-1960's, that will represent another diversion from private or civil public resources and a major indirect but perhaps very real "cost" of the war.

[4] Much of the war's costs are undoubtedly absorbed by other military categories, such as the number of troops kept in other parts of the world, and reductions in new procurement and maintenance of old equipment not being used in the war zone. Even so, it is likely that our method understates the cost of the war to the civilian sectors of the system. President Johnson's State of the Union Message in January 1968 put the annual cost at $25 billion in 1967. For 1968 it was nearly $29 billion.

[5] It must be made clear that this procedure is not the only plausible way of processing these data. For instance, using another theoretical model one might compute the *differences* between spending levels from one year to the next (t_1-t_0) and run the regression on them, giving different results. The procedure I used here assumes that it is a high *level* of defense spending that gets in the way of particular civilian expenditures; the alternative assumes that it is a sharp *increase*, regardless of level, that forces civilian cutbacks. In fact, though I report only the former, I did also process the data by the other method, finding on the whole lower r's. In part, I hypothesize that the reason for weaker relationships with the difference model stems from varying time lags for various types of expenditure. For example, many purchases of suppliers may be sharply reduced simultaneously with the new military demands; reductions in tenured personnel, or liquidation of construction commitments, may take one or two years. To the degree that this is true, analysis of the aggregates with any *particular* time relationship specified (e.g., simultaneous differences, or

I assume that defense spending has to come *at the expense* of something else. In the formal sense of G.N.P. proportions that is surely true, but it is usually true in a more interesting sense as well. Economics is said to be the study of the allocation of scarce resources; despite some periods of slack at the beginning of war-time periods (1940-41 and 1950) resources have generally been truly scarce during America's wars. Major civilian expenditures have not only lost ground proportionately (as would nevertheless happen from a military spending program financed entirely out of slack) but have failed to grow at their accustomed rates, have lost ground in constant dollars as a result of inflation, or even have declined absolutely in current dollars. During World War II, for example, such major categories as personal consumption of durable goods, all fixed investment, federal purchases of non-military goods and services, and state and local expenditures all declined sharply in absolute dollar amounts despite an inflation of nearly 8 per cent a year.

Some observers might argue that high levels of military spending are introduced to take up the slack and maintain demand in an otherwise depression-prone economy. If this were the case, opportunity costs would be minimal. But there is little evidence for that proposition in the American experience of recent decades. Certainly the Vietnam experience does not support it. I assume, *pace* "Iron Mountain," that with the demonstrable public and private needs of this society, and with modern tools of economic analysis and manipulation, full or near-full employment of resources would be maintained even in the face of major cuts in military spending.[6] Because of the skills with which economic systems are now managed, in modern economies defense expenditures are much more likely to force tradeoffs than they were some 30 years ago. Thus the original formulation, "Who pays for defense?" is not inappropriate.

Defense expenditures are not necessarily without broader social utility. Spending for military research and development produces important technological spill-overs into the civilian sector. The education, skills, and physical conditioning that young men obtain during service in the armed forces are likely to benefit them and their society, when they return to civilian life. Rarely, however, is the achievement of such benefits as spillovers the most efficient way to obtain them. While scientific research may be serendipitous, the odds are better that a new treatment for cancer will come from medical research than from work on missile systems. Hence we must still consider the tradeoffs that appear in the official functional categories as real costs, though not quite as heavy costs as a literal interpretation of the dollar amounts would imply.

Finally, we must recognize that some civilian expenditures, for health, for education, and for research, have been stimulated by cold war and ultimately military requirements. Various pro-

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one-year lag) would show only a weak relationship.

Also, the r^2's and regression coefficients are sensitive to the *particular* set of *years* examined. I also analyzed the World War II years and the post-war years separately, producing different and generally lower r^2's than for the entire period. Hence much of the variance found in this paper stems from differences between rather than within those two periods. Furthermore, inclusion of the war-time years with the others produces a distribution of defense percentages that would offend a purist data analyst—those for 1943 and 1944 are clear outliers nearly three standard deviations from the mean, and hence they exert disproportionate weight in the analysis. Excluding 1939–1945, however, would sharply reduce both the number of data points and the range of experience being analyzed. Thus I have left the earlier years in, but have also been careful to examine the scattergrams to be sure that the r^2's were not deceptively high or low because of any inordinate statistical effect of the wartime peaks.

Although I believe my handling of these two problems was appropriate, the caveat that the conclusions depend on these assumptions, and could be modified by others, is a serious one. The data are available on request from the World Data Analysis Program, 89 Trumbull Street, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520. Further analysis of the methodological problems with these data will appear in my contribution to volume 5 of *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (1970).

[6] This position is adhered to by most economists. See, for example, Benoit and Boulding (eds.), Disarmament and the Economy; U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Economic Impacts of Disarmament* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965); Emile Benoit, "The Monetary and Real Costs of National Defense," *American Economic Review,* 58 (May 1968), 398–416, and Walter Isard and Eugene Schooler, "An Economic Analysis of Local and Regional Impacts of Reduction of Military Expenditures," *Peace Research Society (International) Papers,* I (1964).

grams of the 1950's fit this characterization, when a need more for long-run girding of the loins than for more immediate military capabilities was widely seen. Still, this is appropriate to precisely the kind of question we shall be asking. If the civilian and military expenditures consistently compete for scarce resources, they will be highly negatively correlated; if they both are driven by the same demands, they will be positively correlated. If they generally compete but sometimes are viewed as complementary, the negative correlation will be fairly low.

An evaluation of the experience of this and other nations requires some explicit criteria. There is room for serious argument about what those criteria should be, but I will suggest the following:

1) It is bad to sacrifice future productivity and resources for current defense or war-fighting activities; insofar as possible such activities "should" be financed out of current consumption. Such an assumption might be easily challenged if it were offered as a universal, but for the developed countries of North America and Western Europe in recent years it seems defensible. All of them are now, relative to their own past and other nations' present, extremely affluent with a high proportion of their resources flowing into consumption in the private sector. Furthermore, for the years being analyzed the demands of defense have not usually been terribly great. Since World War II ended, none of these countries has had to devote more than about 10 per cent of its G.N.P. to military needs, save for the United States during the Korean War when the figure rose to just over 13 per cent. It surely is arguable that such needs rarely require substantial mortgaging of a nation's future.

a) By this criterion one would hope to see periodic *up-swings* in defense requirements financed largely out of personal consumption, with capital formation and such social investment in the public sector as health and education being insensitive to military demands.

b) Another aspect of our criterion, however, is the anticipation that in periods of *declining* military needs the released resources would largely be *kept* for investment and education rather than returned to private consumption. In a strong form the criterion calls for a long-term secular increase in the proportion of G.N.P. devoted to various forms of investment, and with this secular trend realized through a fluctuating line made up of a series of upward slopes followed by plateaus, insensitive to rising defense needs but responsive to the opportunities provided by relaxations in the armament pace.

2) Another point of view, partially in conflict with the last comment, would stress the need for a high degree of *insulation from political shocks*. A constant and enlarging commitment to the system's social resources is necessary for the most orderly and efficient growth of the system, avoiding the digestive problems produced by alternate feast and famine. Some spending, for instance capital expenditures for buildings, may be only temporarily postponed in periods of fiscal stringency, and may bounce back to a higher level when the pressure of defense needs is eased. To that degree the damage would be reduced, but not eliminated. In the first place, school construction that is "merely" postponed four years will come in time to help some students, but one age cohort simply loses out. Secondly, boom and bust fluctuations, even if they do average out to the socially desired dollar level, are likely to be inefficient and produce less real output than would a steadier effort.

III. GUNS, BUTTER, AND STRUCTURES

Calculation of a nation's G.N.P. is an exercise in accounting; economists define the gross national product as the sum of expenditures for personal consumption, investment or capital formation, government purchases of goods and services, and net foreign trade (exports minus imports). Each of these categories can be broken down further. Private consumption is summed from expenditures on durable goods (e.g., automobiles, furniture, appliances), non-durables (e.g., food, clothing, fuel) and services (airline tickets, haircuts, entertainment); investment includes fixed investment in non-residential structures, producers' durable equipment (e.g., machinery), residential structures, and the accumulation or drawing down of stocks (inventories); government purchases include both civil and military expenditures of the federal government, and spending by state and local units of government. Except for inventories (which fluctuate widely in response to current conditions and are of little interest for this study) we shall look at all these, and later at a further breakdown of public expenditures by level and function. Table 1 gives the r^2 (proportion of variance in the dependent variables accounted for by defense), the regression coefficients, and an index of proportionate reduction. The r^2 tells *how closely* the two variables vary together, and the regression coefficient tells *the amount* in dollars by which the dependent variable changes in response to a one dollar increase in defense. The proportionate reduction index shows the damage suffered by each category relative to its "normal" base. It assumes for illustration a total G.N.P. of $400

TABLE 1. THE EFFECT OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1939–68

	r^2 (linear reg.)	Regression Coefficient	Index of Proportionate Reduction
Personal Consumption (Total)	*.84*	*−.420*	*−.041*
Durable Goods	.78	−.163	−.123
Nondurable Goods	.04	−.071	−.014
Services	.54	−.187	−.050
Fixed Investment (Total)	*.72*	*−.292*	*−.144*
Nonresidential Structures	.62	−.068	−.140
Producers' Durable Equipment	.71	−.110	−.123
Residential Structures	.60	−.114	−.176
Exports	.67	−.097	−.115
Imports	.19	−.025	−.037
Federal Civil Purchases	.38	−.048	−.159
State & Local Gov't Consumption	.38	−.128	−.105

Source: *Survey of Current Business*, 45, 8 (August 1965), pp. 24–25, 46, 11 (November 1966), p. S-1, and 47, 11 (November 1968), p. S-1. Data for 1968 are provisional figures for first three quarters only.

billion, an increase of $25 billion in defense spending from the previous period, and that the "dependent" expenditure category had previously been at that level represented by its mean percentage of G.N.P. over the 1939-68 period. This last measure is important for policy purposes, since the *impact* of the same dollar reduction will be far greater to a $100 billion investment program than to a $500 billion total for consumer spending.[7]

In general, the American experience has been that the consumer pays most. Guns do come at the expense of butter. Changes in defense expenditure account for 84% of the variance in total personal *consumption,* and the regression coefficient is a relatively high −.420 (That is, a one dollar rise in defense expenditures will, all else being equal, result in a decline of $.420 in private consumption).

Of the sub-categories, sales of consumer durables are most vulnerable, with 78 per cent of their variance accounted for by defense. Spending on services is also fairly vulnerable to defense expenditures, with the latter accounting for 54 per cent of the variance. But the *linear* regression between defense and non-durables is not nearly so high, with an r^2 of but .04. This is not surprising, as needs for non-durables are virtually by definition the least easily postponed. The low r^2 from the linear model is deceptive, however, because a look at the plot of defense against non-durable consumer goods purchases shows that the proportion of G.N.P. spent on the latter *increased* somewhat in the early 1940's, when war costs were reaching their peak; it was as high in 1942-45 as in many prewar and postwar years. Using a curvilinear regression with a second-degree curve adds another 22 per cent of the total variance to the 4 per cent accounted for by the linear model. The explanation is fairly simple: During the war years new consumer durables such as automobiles and appliances were virtually unavailable, since the factories that normally produced them were then turning out war materiel. Similarly, due to manpower shortages almost all services were expensive and in short supply, and long-distance travel was particularly discouraged ("Is this trip necessary?"). Hence, to the degree consumers' spending power was not mopped up by taxes, or saved, an unusually high proportion was likely to go into non-durables.

Investment (fixed capital formation) also is typically hard-hit by American war efforts and, with its consequence of a smaller productive capacity in later years, diminished investment is a particularly costly loss. The r^2 of .72 is only a little less than that for defense on consumption, and the regression coefficient is a substantial −.292.[8] The slope is of course much flatter than that for defense and consumption (with a coefficient of −.420) but that is very deceptive considering the "normal" base from which each starts. Over the 30 years for which we have data, the mean percentage of G.N.P. consumption typically was about five times as great as investment. Thus in our hypothetical illustration a $25 billion increase in defense costs in a G.N.P. of $400 billion would, ceteris paribus, result in a drop in consumption from approximately $256 billion to roughly $245, or only a

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[7] This index is computed by the formula

$$\text{IPR} = \frac{25 \text{ (reg. coef.)}}{400 \text{ (mean prop. of G.N.P.)}}$$

for the dependent variable. This choice of illustrative values for the G.N.P. and defense increases does *not* of course imply that the impact is thus in any *particular* build-up.

[8] The high r^2 is nonetheless a bit deceptive, as a close examination of the plot discloses. If one looks at the periods of moderate defense expenditure since 1940 one finds only a mild relationship between the two variables. Most of the variance is concentrated on the differences between the moderate and high defense groups, and *within* the latter.

little over 4 per cent of total consumption. Investment on the other hand would typically fall from $51 billion to about $44 billion, or more than 14 per cent. *Proportionately,* therefore, investment is much *harder* hit by an expansion of the military establishment than is consumption. Since future production is dependent upon current investment, the economy's *future* resources and power base are thus in a very real sense much more severely damaged by the decision to build or employ current military power than is current indulgence. According to some rough estimates, the marginal productivity of capital in the United States is between 20 and 25 per cent; that is, an additional dollar of investment in any single year will produce 20–25 cents of annual additional production in perpetuity.[9] Hence if an extra billion dollars of defense in one year reduced investment by $292 million, thenceforth the level of output in the economy would be *permanently* diminished by on the order of $65 million per year.

This position is modified slightly by the detailed breakdown of investment categories. Residential structures (housing) shows the lowest r^2 of the three, but its regression coefficient is the strongest and it takes the greatest proportionate damage. Within the general category of investment, therefore, non-residential structures and equipment usually hold up somewhat better proportionately than does housing. Doubtless this is the result of deliberate public policy which raises home interest rates and limits the availability of mortgages while trying at the same time to maintain an adequate flow of capital to those firms needing to convert or expand into military production. One other feature should be noticed, however. The curvilinear model (second order curve) adds as much as 43 per cent of the remaining variance with non-residential structures. Relative spending goes *up* with increments to very low levels of defense spending to where defense equals about 9 per cent of G.N.P. It then flattens out until, by around the 13 per cent mark, it begins to fall off sharply. This phenomenon is probably the result of construction of new factories for war production and, especially, facilities for military bases and camps when a large army must be mustered quickly from low manpower levels.

The nation's international *balance of payments* is often a major casualty of sharp increases in military expenditures; the present situation is not unusual. Some potential exports are diverted to satisfy internal demand, others are lost because domestic inflation raises costs to the point that the goods are priced out of the world market. *Imports* may rise directly to meet the armed forces' procurement needs—goods purchased abroad to fill local American military requirements show up as imports to the national economy—and other imports rise indirectly because of domestic demand. Some goods normally purchased from domestic suppliers are not available in sufficient quantities; others, because of inflation, became priced above imported goods. If the present situation is "typical," the Vietnam war's cost to the civilian economy would be responsible for a loss of more than one and one-half billion dollars in exports.

The import picture is more complicated. According to the sketch above, imports should *rise* with defense spending, but the r^2 in the table is very low and the slope of the regression line is actually *negative*. This, however, is deceptive and gives a conclusion quickly reversed by a curvilinear regression. The second order curve shows the expectable sharp *positive* relation between defense and imports up to a level of defense more or less equal to 13 per cent of G.N.P. Only then does it flatten out and then turn down dramatically. The four years of World War II show unusually low importation activity, and the reasons are obvious. A combination of enemy occupation of normal sources of goods for the U.S., enemy surface and submarine activity in the sea lanes, and the diversion of our allies' normal export industries to serve *their* war needs drastically reduced America's opportunity to import. To assess the impact of defense expenditures on imports in a less than global war one must omit the World War II data from the analysis. Doing so produces the expected positive regression coefficient, on the order of +.060. This suggests that the current effect of Vietnam may be to add, directly and indirectly, over $1 billion to the nation's annual import bill.[10] Coupled with the loss of exports, the total damage to the balance of payments on current account (excluding capital transfers) is in the range $2.5–$3.0 billion. That still does not account for the entire balance of payments deficit that the United States has experienced (recently as high as 3.4 billion annually) but it goes a long way to explain it.

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[9] Robert M. Solow, *Capital Theory and the Rate of Return* (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1963).

[10] The costs of military procurement abroad can of course be figured more precisely and directly than we have done here, but by missing the indirect effects of inflation and diverted demand such a computation would understate the loss. Defense Department calculations of the direct cost do in fact come to but $1.5 billion; a complex independent analysis that includes the indirect effects suggests $4.0 billion, or that without the war the United States would actually have maintained a balance of payments surplus. See Leonard Dudley and Peter Passell, "The War in Vietnam and the United States Balance of Payments," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 50 (November 1968), 437–442.

IV. THE PUBLIC SECTOR

In the *aggregate* there is no very strong impact of defense on *civil public expenditures*. The linear r²'s are a comparatively low .38; the regression coefficients only —.048 for federal civil purchases and —.013 for state and local governments. For the federal government a curvilinear regression helps, however, adding approximately one-sixth of the variance left unexplained by the linear model. During the four peak years of World War II changes in federal civil expenditures were essentially unrelated to changes in defense spending, hence the curve at that end is flattened out. But it is simultaneously steepened, from the linear model, for the 1 per cent to 15 per cent defense range.[11] Samuel P. Huntington notes that "Many programs in agriculture, natural resources, labor and welfare dated back to the 1930's or middle 1940's. By the mid-1950's they had become accepted responsibilities of the government," and hence politically resistant to the arms squeeze. If so, the overall inverse relationship we do find may be masking sharper changes in some of the less well-entrenched sub-categories of central government budgeting. We shall investigate this below.[12]

TABLE 2. THE EFFECT OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON PUBLIC CIVIL ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEARS 1938–67

	r^2 (linear reg.)	Regression Coefficient	Index of Proportionate Reduction
Education—Total	*.35*	*−.077*	*−.139*
Institutions of Higher Ed.	.12	−.013	−.146
Local Schools	.34	−.053	−.125
Other Ed.	.19	−.014	−.265
Federal Direct to Ed.	.16	−.013	−.309
Federal Aid to State & Local Gov'ts for Ed.	.08	−.004	−.140
State & Local Gov't for Ed.	.24	−.060	−.124
Health & Hospitals—Total	*.32*	*−.017*	*−.113*
Total Hospitals	*.30*	*−.014*	*−.123*
Fed. for Hospitals	.25	−.004	−.130
State & Local for Hospitals	.29	−.011	−.120
Total Other Health	*.22*	*−.003*	*−.087*
Fed. for Health	.06	−.001	−.101
State & Local for Health	.45	−.002	−.078
Welfare—Total	*.54*	*.019*	*−.128*
Fed. Direct for Welfare	.13	.003	−.493
Fed. Aid to State & Local Gov'ts for Welfare	.17	−.005	−.087
State & Local for Welfare	.30	−.011	−.134

Source: G.N.P. same as for Table 1, but adjusted for fiscal year. Others: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1960), pp. 719, 723–27; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 392, 419, 422; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1967* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 390, 421, 423; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957; Continuation to 1962 and Revisions* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 98–101, 148–50. Budget data for 1967 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Governmental Finances in 1966–67, Series GF67-No. 3* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 15, 17–19. Data for Institutions of Higher Education, Local Schools, Other Education, Total, Federal, and State and Local for both Health and Hospitals include 1938, 1940, 1942, 1944, 1946, 1948, 1950, 1952–67; others same except for addition of 1951.

Some restraint is required when relating state and local government expenditures to defense. There really is no relationship except *between* the points above and below the 15 per cent mark for defense. During World War II state and local government units did have their spending activities curtailed, but overall they have not been noticeably affected by defense purchases. Quite to the contrary, spending by state and local political units has risen steadily, in an almost unbroken line, since 1944. The rise, from 3.6 per cent of the G.N.P. to 11.2 per cent in 1968, has continued essentially heedless of increases or diminution in the military's demands on the economy.[13]

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[11] Although recent experience may make it seem obvious that public civil expenditures are likely to be inversely related to defense shares, this perception has not always been universal. Several years ago W. Glenn Campbell reported a strong inverse relationship for the 1953–63 period, in "Assuring the Primacy of National Security," in David M. Abshire and Richard V. Allen, *National Security: Political, Military and Economic Strategies in the Decade Ahead* (New York: Praeger, 1963), pp. 963–984. Otto Eckstein, however, noted some questionable assumptions in Campbell's analysis and followed with a stronger expression of doubt: "I think that historical experience has been that governments are either stingy, or they're spenders. And if they're stingy about defense, they're stingy about everything. I would say that the historical record suggests that the association between civilian spending and military spending is positive, not negative." "Discussion" in *ibid.*, p. 1012.

[12] *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 208. Further masking of the impact on actual programs may stem from the inability of government agencies to reduce costs for building maintenance and tenured employees, thus forcing them in dry times to cut other expenses disproportionately.

When we look at the breakdowns by function, however, it becomes clear that the effect of defense fluctuations is serious, if less distinct than for G.N.P. categories. Three major items —education, health, and welfare—were selected for further analysis, on the grounds that one might reasonably hypothesize for each that expenditure levels would be sensitive to military needs, and, for the first two, that a neglect of them would do serious long-term damage to the economy and social system of the nation.

All three are sensitive to defense spending, with *welfare* somewhat more than the others as is not surprising. In most of this analysis reductions in expenditure levels that are forced by expanded defense activities represent a *cost* to the economic and social system, but welfare is different. Insofar as the *needs* for welfare, rather than simply the resources allocated to it, are reduced, one cannot properly speak of a cost to the economy. Rather, if one's social preferences are for work rather than welfare, the shift represents a *gain* to the system. Heavy increases in military pay and procurement do mean a reduction in unemployment, and military cutbacks are often associated with at least temporary or local unemployment. The effect seems strongest on state and local governments' welfare spending. In fact, the inverse relationship between defense and welfare at most spending levels is *understated* by the linear regression model. When a second-order curve is applied to the regression of defense on total welfare expenditures, 32 per cent of the variance remaining after the linear regression is added, to make a total of more than two-thirds of the variance. At all but the highest levels of defense spending, achieved in World War II, the inverse relationship is very steep, with small increases in military needs having a very marked dampening effect on welfare costs. But manpower was quite fully employed during *all* the years of major effort in World War II, so ups and downs in defense needs during 1942–45 had little effect, and the curve flattens out.

Both for education and for health and hospitals their relationship to the immediate requirements of national defense is less powerful (lower r^2), but nonetheless important. Furthermore, the regression line is quite steep for education, and since the mean share of G.N.P. going to education is only 3.5 per cent for the period under consideration, the proportionate impact of reductions is severe.

A widespread assumption holds that public expenditures on *education* have experienced a long-term secular growth in the United States. That assumption is correct only with modifications. The proportion of G.N.P. devoted to public education has increased by three quarters over the period, from 3.0 per cent in 1938 to 5.3 per cent in 1967. But it has by no means been a smooth and steady upward climb. World War II cut deeply into educational resources, dropping the educational percentage of G.N.P. to 1.4 in 1944; only in 1950 did it recover to a level (3.6) notably above that of the 1930's. Just at that point the Korean War intervened, and education once more suffered, not again surpassing the 3.6 level before 1959. Since then, however, it has grown fairly steadily without being adversely affected by the relatively modest rises in defense spending. Actually, educational needs may have benefitted somewhat from the overall decline in the military proportion of the economy achieved between the late 1950's and mid 1960's. The sensitivity of educational expenditures to military needs is nevertheless much more marked on the latter's upswings than on its declines. Education usually suffers very immediately when the military needs to expand sharply; it recovers its share only slowly after defense spending has peaked. Surprisingly, *federal* educational expenditures are less related (lower r^2) than is spending by state and local units of government; also, local schools at the primary and secondary level are more sensitive than are public institutions of higher education (whose share has grown in every year since 1953).

Public expenditures for *health* and hospitals are only a little less sensitive to the pressures of defense than are dollars for education. Here again the image of a long-term secular growth deceptively hides an equally significant pattern of swings. They accounted for a total of .77 per cent of G.N.P. in 1938; as with education this was sharply cut by World War II and was not substantially surpassed (at 1.00 per cent) until 1950. Once more they lost out to the exigencies of defense in the early 1950's, and bounced back slowly, at the same rate as did education, to recover the 1950 level in 1958. Since then they have continued growing slowly, with a peak of 1.23 in 1967. Thus, the pattern of health and hospitals is almost identical with that for education—some long-term growth, but great cutbacks in periods of heavy military need and only slow recovery thereafter. In detail by political unit the picture is also much the same—despite reasonable *a priori* expectation, federal spending for this item is less closely tied to the defense budget than is that by state and local governments. It should also be noted that though the r^2 is much the same, the *impact* of defense on health and hospitals is slightly less severe than on education.

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[13] It might be thought that this would be a case where, if there were no immediate effects of defense needs on state and local government finances, defense might nevertheless force some delayed cutbacks by the areal units. But this too is not the case, since an effort to lag local expenditures a year or two behind defense made no improvement in the fit. Apparently the federal and the areal units of government are sufficiently independent in their major revenue sources that fluctuations in the needs of the former do not seriously hamper the latter.

It seems fair to conclude from these data that America's most expensive wars have severely hampered the nation in its attempt to build a healthier and better-educated citizenry. (One analyst estimates that what *was* done to strengthen education accounted for nearly half of the United States per capita income growth between 1929 and 1957.)[14] A long-term effort has been made, and with notable results, but typically it has been badly cut back whenever military needs pressed abnormally hard.

It is too soon to know how damaging the Vietnam war will be, but in view of past regularities one would anticipate significant costs. The inability to make "investments" would leave the nation with a smaller resource base of skill and well-being than would otherwise be the case. We can already see the effect of the war on fixed capital formation, discussed earlier in this paper. Consumption absorbed a larger *absolute* decline in its share of G.N.P. between 1965 and 1968 than did fiscal investment—from 63.3 to 62.1 per cent in the first instance, from 14.3 to 13.8 per cent in the second, but given the much smaller base of investment, the *proportionate* damage is about twice as great to the latter. In most of the major categories of public social "investment," nevertheless, the record is creditable. Despite a rise from 7.6 to 9.1 per cent in the defense share between 1965 and 1967, the total public education and health and hospitals expenditure shares went up 4.5 to 5.3 and 1.17 to 1.23 respectively. And even federal spending for education and health, though not hospitals, rose. There are of course other costs involved in the inability to *initiate* needed programs—massive aid to the cities is the obvious example. But on maintaining or expanding established patterns of expenditure the score is not bad at all.

The pattern of federal expenditures for *research and development* indicates some recent but partially hidden costs to education and medicine. From 1955 through 1966 such expenditures rose spectacularly, and every year, from \$3.3 billion to \$14.9 billion.[15] Obviously such a sky-rocketing growth could not continue indefinitely; not even most of the beneficiary scientists expected it to do so. Still, if one regresses R & D expenditures against G.N.P. over the entire period 1955 to 1968, the r^2 is a very high .93 and the "estimated" level for 1968 is \$19.4 billion, instead of the actual level of \$16.3 billion. The actual level of expenditures in fact fell below the estimated level for the first time in 1966—the first year since 1961 when the defense share of G.N.P. showed any notable increase.

Finally, we must note a very important sense in which many of these cost estimates are substantially underestimated. The entire analysis has necessarily been done with expenditure data in current prices; that is, not adjusted for inflation. Since we have been dividing each expenditure category by G.N.P. in current dollars that would not matter *providing that price increases were uniform throughout the economy*. But if prices increased faster in say, education or health, than did prices across the board, the *real* level of expenditure would be exaggerated. And as anyone who has paid a hospital bill or college tuition bill recently knows, some prices have increased faster than others. From 1950 through 1967 the cost of medical care, as registered in the consumer price index, rose by 86.2 per cent. Thus even though the health and hospital share of public expenditure rose in *current* prices, the *real share* of national production bought by that spending *fell* slightly, from 1.00 per cent to about .99 per cent. Presumably the difference has been made up in the private sector, and benefits have been heavily dependent upon ability to pay. Comparable data on educational expenses are less easy to obtain, but we do know that the average tuition in private colleges and universities rose 39 per cent, and in public institutions 32 per cent, over the years 1957–1967.[16] This too is faster than the cost of living increase over those years (not more than 20 per cent), but not enough to wipe out a gain for government education expenditures in their share of real G.N.P.

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[14] Edward F. Denison, *Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before US* (C.E.D., 1962) as cited in Ruth P. Mack, "Ecological Process in Economic Change," *American Economic Review*, 58 (May, 1968), 47. See also Gary S. Becker, *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research and Columbia University Press, 1964) and Theodore W. Schultz, "Investment in Human Capital," *American Economic Review*, 51 (March 1961), 1-17. On this idea of educated manpower as a form of national capital see also the chapter by Kenneth Boulding in Walter Adams (ed.), *The Brain Drain* (New York; Macmillan, 1968).

[15] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1968* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 526, and *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 544. Comparable data for earlier years are not available, so this variable was not used in the computations for Table 2.

In evaluating the desirability of an expanded defense effort, policy-makers must bear in mind the opportunity costs of defense, the kinds and amounts of expenditures that will be foregone. The relationships we have discovered in past American experience suggest what the costs of future military efforts may be. These relationships are of course not immutable. Should it be concluded, after enlightened discussion, that certain new defense needs must be met, it is possible by careful choice and control to distribute the burdens somewhat differently. If costs cannot be avoided, perhaps they can be borne in such a way as better to protect the nation's future.

V. THE EXPERIENCE OF SOME OTHER WESTERN NATIONS

We may also examine material on the relation of defense to civilian expenditures in three other major nations: Canada, the United Kingdom, and France. In each the time span is reasonably long and the average level of defense expenditures is high enough and the range wide enough to provide a reasonable test of the impact of periods of military build-up and retrenchment. The data are shown in Figure 2. The post-World War II experiences of Canada and Britain have pretty well paralleled each other, with the Canadian effort somewhat smaller. Both have drastically reduced their relative defense shares since the Korean War. France's pattern is basically similar, but complicated by special efforts for colonial wars in Indo-China and Algeria, and for the *force de frappe*. Data are not available on all the desired dependent variables for each of these countries, and the time span covered varies a little, so we



FIG. 2. Defense Expenditures as a Percentage of G.N.P. in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom, 1947–1965.

Source: See Table 3.

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[16] Myron Brenton, "The Higher Cost of Higher Education," *New York Times Magazine*, April 28, 1968, p. 32.

must be cautious in pointing out differences among them or, especially, from the United States (which includes World War II data). Nevertheless some tentative conclusions can be suggested. Most important, perhaps, is that there is no single universal pattern for the impact of military spending. Each political system absorbs the economic impact in an different way.[17]

In both Britain and France *investment* suffers substantially from high levels of arms acquisition. The regression coefficient is in every case quite high, with a slope three to four times as steep as we observed in the United States (−.29). In France the absolute amount by which investment changed actually *exceeded* the variation in defense spending. Yet the steep slope is less important because the linkage between defense and investment is much less close; even in France less than half the variance in investment can be attributed to changes in defense (as contrasted with 72 per cent in the U.S.). But investment has not suffered in Canada; on the contrary there is a mild but clearly discernible *positive* relationship. At least at the level of exertion reached by Canadians over the past two decades, military expenditures may actually serve as a net stimulus to fixed capital formation. Only in Canada does there seem to be a very direct conflict between defense and private *consumption*. There the proportion of variance in consumption explained by defense is substantially lower than in the United States (84 per cent) but the slope of the regression line is much steeper (−.814 vs. −.420). It is impossible to tell from this kind of analysis whether the tradeoff is the result of deliberate and explicit policy, but certainly the effect is strong. More than half of the additional dollar expenditures required for defense ultimately come out of personal consumption, or, when the defense proportion declines, go back into consumption.

The French and British experiences are both quite different and more complex. The years of greatest defense effort in France were 1952 and 1953, times when the French economy still had not fully recovered from World War II, and there were some slack resources that could be mobilized by an infusion of public demand. In those years the goods and services needed for the military effort came in large part out of slack, and not in any case much at the expense of consumption. Private consumption essentially maintained its fraction of G.N.P. during the build-up and then fell *after* the first push of the defense effort was largely completed, accounting for the moderate *positive* association we observe between trends in defense spending and in private consumption. This drop in relative defense spending since the early 1950's, despite the French nuclear effort and *force de frappe*, has perhaps enabled investment to rise. Certainly it is capital formation rather than consumption (which has *declined* proportionately) that has in fact increased its share of resources over the period. In Britain, on the other hand, the level of private consumption has been quite unrelated to the defense effort. Consumers were not forced to sacrifice particularly for the rearmament of the early 1950's, nor were they especially indulged when, in the late 1950's and 1960's, military spending was curtailed. Investment has grown somewhat faster than the economy as a whole, but the relationship is not terribly strong ($r^2 = .30$).

For France and Britain it is quite apparent that defense expenditures have been negatively correlated with *government spending* for *civilian* needs. In both cases the former explains roughly half the variance in the latter, and the regression coefficients are remarkably similar. Actually, the figures in Table 3 tend to understate the dependence of government spending on defense in the U.K., because they apply only to the linear model. When a curvilinear fit is attempted, it adds more than 25 per cent of the remaining variance. The curve shows a steep downward slope (inverse relationship between defense and civil government) over most of the range, but flattens out to a low level plateau for the greatest Korean War period rearmament exertions. The slope for the low-to-middle defense levels then becomes much sharper than appeared with just the linear regression model; for that range the coefficient becomes approximately −1.0. In other words, from the mid-1950's onward every decrease in defense expenditures made possible a *fully equivalent* increase in civil

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[17] This was also the conclusion of Charles Wolf, Jr., from examining a limited amount of data for some Asian nations. See his *Competition and Complementarity Between Defense and Development—A Preliminary Approach,* P-1743 (Santa Monica California: Rand Corporation, 1959). Similarly, Frederick L. Pryor, in *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (Homewood, Ill.: Irwin, 1969) examined the short-run effects of defense changes on various types of expenditures in most Western developed nations for the 1950's and early 1960's. In those nations where defense spending was relatively high, typically there was an inverse relationship between defense and public civil expenditures; in the small states where the defense proportion was low, no relationship appeared. Some relationships of defense to other G.N.P. categories were found in individual countries, but there was no standard pattern.

TABLE 3. THE EFFECT OF DEFENSE SPENDING ON CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES IN SOME MAJOR WESTERN NATIONS

Dependent Variable	r^2 (linear)			Regression Coefficients		
	Canada (1947–64)	U.K. (1947–65)	France (1950–65)	Canada	U.K.	France
Private Consumption	.57	.06	.35	−.814	.494	.825
Fixed Investment	.25	.30	.49	.529	−.842	−1.135
Gen'l Gov't Civil Consumption	*.13*	*.48*	*.63*	*−.354*	*−.469*	*−.440*
Education & Research	.01	.35	.49	−.060	−.247	−.395
Health Services	.01	.05	.24	−.031	−.064	−.041
Special Welfare Services	.24	—	.71	−.180	—	−.027
Transfers for Ed. & Res.	—	.40	—	—	−.065	—
Transfers for Health	—	.00	—	—	.008	—
Social Security & Assistance	—	.34	.39	—	−.240	−.016
Total Education & Research	—	*.37*	—	—	*−.312*	—
Total Health	—	*.03*	—	—	*−.054*	—
Total Welfare	—	—	*.39*	—	—	*−1.596*

Sources: Canada: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Information Services Division, *The Canada Yearbook, 1945* (Ottawa: S. E. Dawson, 1945) and later annual editions; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *National Accounts Income and Expenditure, 1926–1950* (Ottawa, 1951); United Nations, *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1957* (New York: United Nations, 1958), and *Yearbooks* for *1960* and *1966;* O.E.E.C., *Statistics of National Product and Expenditure, 1938, 1947 to 1952* (Paris: O.E.E.C., 1954).

U.K.: Central Statistical Office, *National Income and Expenditure, 1946–1952* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1953); Central Statistical Office, *Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1950* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1950); U.N., *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1957, 1966.* No data for 1954 on public expenditure breakdown.

France: O.E.E.C., *Statistics of National Product and Expenditure;* U.N., *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1957, 1960, 1966;* Ministere des Finances et des Affaires Economiques, Institut National de Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, *Les Comptes de la Nation, 1949–1959* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1964); Ministere des Finances, *Annuaire Statistique de la France, 1954* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1954), and *1956, 1957, 1965, 1966;* Ministere des Finances, *Statistiques et Etudes Financieres,* "Situation Provisoire des Recettes et des Despenses de L'Etat Pour 1949," (Paris: 1949), p. 260–62, also studies No. 23 (1950), No. 49 (January 1953), No. 52 (April 1953), No. 69 (September 1954), No. 73 (January 1955), No. 100 (April 1957), No. 142 (October 1960), No. 160 (April 1962), Nos. 163–64 (July-August 1962), No. 197 (May 1965), No. 220 (April 1967).

consumption expenditures in the public sector.[18] The Canadian situation has again been different. The linear regression shows only a very small relation between military spending and public non-military consumption. These figures are deceptive, however, because a curvilinear fit adds almost half the remaining variance. Above the mark of approximately 5 per cent of G.N.P. to defense government civil consumption is sharply reduced.

Finally, we must look at the breakdowns for public expenditure. Some of the categories are subsets of the government consumption aggregates, others come under the rubric known as "transfer payments." According to the standard accounting definition, transfers are *unilateral* payments from government which are considered to provide additions to the income of their recipients, who may be households or private non-profit institutions. They are in effect subsidies rather than payments for goods or services received by government; they include pensions, unemployment compensation, public scholarships, and subventions to educational institutions. Except for social security and public assistance they are typically fairly small as compared with government consumption in Britain, for instance, the health and education transfers amount to only one-fifth to one-fourth the amount expended under consumption for the same categories.

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[18] Note the similar conclusion of Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics,* 20 (July 1968), 660–693.

In Britain and France expenditures and transfers for *health* are not much affected by changes in the armed forces budget. Most of the major components of these aggregates represent long-term social commitments that at least in the European countries are not readily changed. *Welfare* and/or social security assistance responds somewhat more strongly to changes in the defense budget, but, as in the United States, this is not especially surprising. Periods of heavy defense expenditures are likely to be characterized by low unemployment and the return of some retired workers to the active labor force.

The effects of defense needs on education, however, are much more interesting. Expenditures for *education and research* suffer seriously in periods of heavy military demand or, to put it in the direction that military spending has been going in those nations over the last decade and a half, the *diminution* in relative defense costs has made possible substantial *increases* in educational efforts. Since the early 1950's both these nations have pared their defense budgets by an amount that is equal to about four per cent of their G.N.P.'s. This has been accompanied by a shift of about a third of that amount in France into educational enterprises. Since public educational expenditures amount to only 3 or 4 per cent of G.N.P. in any case, the improvement has been very great when measured against the base from which it began. Coupled with the relative increase in investment over these same years that we noted earlier for France and Britain, it is plain that they have turned their defense savings to good long-term use, substantially expanding the productive resources of their economies.

At first glance defense in Canada appears unrelated to *health* and *education* budgets. The linear regression coefficients nevertheless hide a most important development in the postwar Dominion, and a curvilinear fit accounts for about 45 per cent of the variance in each case. Since 1947 Canadian public health and education expenditures combined have risen from 3 per cent of G.N.P. to more than 8 per cent. This expansion was halted, but not reversed, during the Korean War rearmament period. Since then it has proceeded under great steam. In fact, the decline from 8 per cent to below 4 per cent of Canadian resources devoted to defense since 1953 has been matched by a fully equivalent transfer of resources into the health and education sectors. With fixed capital formation we found that Canada did not earn high marks specifically for expanding investment with the funds released by savings in military spending—capital formation in recent years has taken just the same proportion of national income that it did in the early 1950's. But its social investments in a healthier and better educated populace are impressive indeed.

VI. A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

Normatively, it is difficult to make a clear-cut evaluation of the overall virtues and defects of each nation's experience. None of the countries examined has any monopoly of either. On the requirement that defense upswings be financed largely out of personal consumption, both the United States and Canada come out very well over most of the period; on the requirement that capital formation and public sector social "investment" in education and health be insensitive to military demands, the United States performance is mixed. During the post-World War II and Korean War rearmament periods investment pretty effectively held its own in Canada and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. For example, in the early 1950's the Canadian fixed investment percentage actually rose slightly, and health and education combined fell by only about .3 per cent of G.N.P. In the most recent American military expansion, investment has suffered proportionately more than consumption, though the health and education shares have actually risen.

Another criterion, however, is that in periods of declining military needs the released resources largely be kept for investment and education rather than returned to private consumption. Here one finds that the United States has performed rather badly with its *fixed capital formation* in the past decade. Some revival of investment occurred after World War II and the Korean War, but not during the modest 1962–65 dip in defense expenditures. Nor is there any secular trend toward increased investment. And since 1953 Canadian defense expenditures have been fully halved as a proportion of G.N.P., without any systematic increase in investment to take advantage of the opportunity thus presented.

Britain and France both fit the ideal picture rather better. The French have been very good at substituting capital formation for defense during the latter's downturns, though investment gave a bit during periods of rising defense needs; the British were very good at maintaining investment during periods of expanding military demands, though perhaps they were sometimes a little slow to take advantage of a declining arms budget.

As for *education and research* funds, the United States, Britain, and France all have been fairly sensitive to defense requirements on both the upswings and the downturns of the latter. In the eyes of many Britons and Frenchmen, and of some American leaders too, educational needs apparently can be sacrificed or postponed when military needs are great, but will be fairly readily indulged when defense pressures are relaxed. All three countries nevertheless can point to a long-term secular increase in the proportion of resources going to education, a trend on which the fluctuations, with upward and downward slopes, are superimposed. The Canadians have most dramatically devoted a rising share of their resources to education in every year but 4 of the last 18; this long-term growth in commitment to education has brought its G.N.P. percentage from 2.1 to 5.2, an upward trend broken seriously by military needs only in 1951. In 1952 education resumed its growth despite a concomitant rise in military expenditures. The experience of other nations suggests some possible alternative policies for American decision-makers.

POLITICAL MATRIX AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: PROLEGOMENON TO A NEW DEPARTURE FROM AN OLD PROBLEM*

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Scholars interested in theorizing about political representation in terms relevant to democratic governance in mid-twentieth century America find themselves in a quandary. We are surrounded by functioning representative institutions, or at least by institutions formally described as representative. Individuals who presumably "represent" other citizens govern some 90 thousand different political units—they sit on school and special district boards, on township and city councils, on county directorates, on state and national assemblies, and so forth. But the flourishing activity of representation has not yet been matched by a sustained effort to explain what makes the representational process tick.

Despite the proliferation of representative governments over the past century, *theory* about representation has not moved much beyond the eighteenth-century formulation of Edmund Burke. Certainly most empirical research has been cast in the Burkean vocabulary.[1] But in order to think in novel ways about representative government in the twentieth-century, we may have to admit that present conceptions guiding empirical research are obsolete. This in turn means that the spell of Burke's vocabulary over scientific work on representation must be broken.[2]

To look afresh at representation, it is necessary to be sensitive to the unresolved tension between the two main currents of contemporary thinking about representational relationships. On the one hand, representation is treated as a relationship between any one individual, the represented, and another individual, the representative—an *inter-individual* relationship. On the other hand, representatives are treated as a group, brought together in the assembly, to represent the interest of the community as a whole —an *inter-group* relationship. Most theoretical formulations since Burke are cast in one or the other of these terms.

Current empirical studies of representation by and large make individualistic assumptions. Partly these presuppositions are rooted in the individualistic culture of democratic politics; but they are also eminently congenial to the methodology of survey research that takes the individual as the empirical unit of analysis. In concentrating on the individual, be he representative or represented, contemporary research has gained much insight into the ideology of representation and possibly into representational behavior. We know, for instance, that the representative may see himself as a "trustee" or "delegate" (or some mixture) and that such self-images serve the public official in defining political situations, in guiding his actions, or in justifying his decisions.[3] But research into the rationalizations of the representatives has not

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* The larger project of which this analysis is a part, the City Council Research Project, is sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, and is supported by the National Science Foundation under grants GS 496 and GS 1898.

[1] See, for instance, Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, 53 (September, 1959), 742–56; or Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56.

[2] For a fuller discussion of this point of view, see Heinz Eulau, "Changing Views of Representation," in Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), *Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 53–85.

[3] We may note, in making this statement, that of 474 state legislators interviewed in the late fifties, 38 per cent failed to articulate any kind of representational role in response to an open question about how they would describe the job of being a legislator. See John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau et al. *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 281. Ten years later, of 435 city councilmen interviewed in connection with this study, as many as 59 per cent failed to make any spontaneous mention of their putative representational role in response to the same question. As far as we know, no student of representational behavior has as yet examined the implications of the evidently low salience of thinking about representation among political practitioners. The matter will be treated in a forthcoming monograph by Katherine Hinckley.

led to an adequate theory that would explain the functioning of contemporary representative government. Other investigations are less "individualistic" in their presuppositions. In particular the theoretical discussions of "public interest" or "general will" suggest an understanding of representation as a relationship between collectivities. These investigations, however, have not provided the empirically grounded theory of representation we feel is needed.

A viable theory of representation, it seems to us, cannot be constructed from individualistic assumptions alone. It must be constructed out of an understanding of representation as a relationship between two collectives—the representative assembly and the represented citizenry. However, neither can a viable theory be advanced in the absence of empirical investigation into the thinking and the acting of the individuals in the collectives. What we grope toward, then, is a theoretically adequate treatment of representation as a property of the political system, a treatment tutored by systematic data.

I. A FRESH LOOK AT REPRESENTATION

Our beginning point is a highly suggestive passage in Professor Pitkin's recently published explication of the concept of representation. She elaborates on representation as something that "must be understood at the public level:"

> The representative system must look after the public interest and be responsive to public opinion, except insofar as non-responsiveness can be justified in terms of the public interest. At both ends, the process is public and institutional. The individual legislator does not act alone, but as a member of a representative body.[4]

By elevating representation from the level of individual relationships to the level of the political system, Pitkin suggests that representation is, in her own words,

> primarily a public, institutional arrangement involving many people and groups, and operating in the complex ways of large-scale social arrangements. What makes it representation is not any single action by any one participant, but the overall structure and functioning of the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people.[5]

Having pointed out that representation is a systemic phenomenon, Pitkin goes on to note that representation may or may not emerge from whatever is the relationship between citizens and public officials. "I am not suggesting," she writes, that representation "must emerge from any particular system; there is no guarantee that it will. But it may emerge, and to the extent that it does we consider that system as being a representative government."[6]

If, as Pitkin suggests, representation is a collective and public phenomenon that may or may not emerge in a political community, and if emergence of a representative relationship is conditioned by the "over-all structure and functioning of the system," our attention should be directed to properties of the political system that either facilitate or impede representation. This we propose to do.

Some Methodological Considerations. In describing representation as an emergent property of the political system, Pitkin anticipates a course of methodological inquiry that has engaged us for a number of years and that underlies the procedures adopted in present research on the governance of cities. First, our analysis assumes that representation as well as other variables we consider are group rather than individual properties; thus we make statements about governing bodies and not individual public officials. Second, although we study 82 governments formally defined as "representative," we see representation not as something existing by definition but as something which emerges in the relationship between governing assemblies and governed citizens. Third, whether the particular relationship we might call representation does emerge is affected by the political matrix within which representatives and represented act. Finally, the analysis is configurative, not causal; we want to determine how a particular configuration of system properties, including representation, are linked together.

Of course not all properties of the political community are likely to be equally relevant to the emergence of representation. Our reading of the theoretical literature about American politics directed us to four variables usually considered germane to representation: the degree of social pluralism, the effectiveness of elections as sanctioning mechanisms, the support available to the governing group, and the recruitment processes that select public officials. For present purposes, we consider these four variables—taken together—to constitute a political matrix. The configuration of the political matrix, then, should be critical to how the governing group responds to social pressures and political demands.

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[4] Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, *The Concept of Representation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 224.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 221–222.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 224.

Two of these properties—degree of social pluralism and election effectiveness—are first-order system variables that can be directly measured with relevant indicators. The other two properties—recruitment and support—in addition to representation, are constructed into group properties from individual data. The data base for our measures of these three variables are interviews with 423 city councilmen in 82 cities of the San Francisco Bay metropolitan region. In order to make the relevant information appropriate for systemic analysis it was necessary to convert the responses of individuals into group properties. This we did in one of two ways. In the case of representation and support we treated the councilmen as informants. We read appropriate questions in the interview schedule for the council *as a whole* and assigned the council to a code category. Because in this analysis we use only one measure of representation, no further index construction was necessary. Our measure of support is constructed from five separate indicators that are sufficiently cumulative to permit a simple summation index. Recruitment as a systemic property, on the other hand, was measured by aggregating the codings of each individual councilman's recruitment pattern into a single council measure. We describe the procedures more fully as we introduce the measures in the analysis.

To employ these coding procedures, of course, is to take certain liberties. For example, although we sometimes speak of community support for the council, we actually are inferring level of support from responses of the councilmen themselves. This is not the place to engage in a complicated defense of whether "definitions of the situation" do indeed serve as the "reality" for those who see it as such. Our intent is to explore in a tentative fashion the relationship among several variables; level of community support being one of these variables, we sought the best measure possible within the confines of our data. A second methodological assumption made is that single group measures can be constructed from the individual responses of those who belong to the group without doing violence to the data. Again, this is not the time to present an extended discussion of "group properties" and how to construct them. Our general strategy is to pursue certain theoretical questions as vigorously as possible, but to report specific findings in a tentative way, paying full heed to the data difficulties.

II. REPRESENTATION AS RESPONSE

Whether the relationship between the governing few and the governed many can be said to be a representative one depends, of course, on how the term is defined. Representation has been subject to a variety of definitions. Some studies have described a legislative assembly as representative when the social and economic characteristics of the constituency were fairly well mirrored in the assembly. Other studies, pursuing the logic of "mirror representation," have been less concerned with demographic representation and instead have examined whether in ideology or general values the assembly reflected the constituents. Yet other studies, dropping the mirror analogy, have defined representation in terms of equal access to the assembly by all members of the constituency.

The definition of representation which guides the theoretical endeavors in this paper differs from these formulations. In coding the interviews we made what to us was a surprising discovery: of the 82 councils, as many as 36 did not in any discernible manner seem to act in response to any politically organized views in the public. These 36 councils seemed to rely on their own sense of what the community needs were. This finding alerted us to Pitkin's observation that representation is an emergent property whose appearance cannot be taken for granted. The finding further suggested the importance of looking at the representative relationship in terms of whether the elected assembly acts in response to public views, especially views as delivered in some identifiable manner.

Pitkin left no stone unturned in her effort to salvage the concept of representation as a viable tool for theorizing about problems of democratic governance. After reviewing and interpreting almost any conceivable formulation of the concept's meaning, she settles for this definition: "representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner repsonsive to them."[7] We find this definition useful because it seems to conceive of representation in two related ways: first, the representative assembly defines *what* it should do—"acting in the interest of the represented"; that is, it decides on the political agenda and, in so doing, formulates community goals. Second, the assembly does so in a manner *responsive* to the sentiments of the constituents.[8]

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[7] *Ibid.*, p. 209.

[8] Pitkin's treatment of responsiveness appears to stress the condition in which the representative assembly stands ready to be responsive when the constituents do have something to say. An assembly may, therefore, be responsive whether or not there are specific instances of response. Our analysis, as will be clearer shortly, stresses the actual

In studying the protocols from the councils, it became clear that, as they govern, councils can act in response to two types of politically organized and publicly voiced opinions. First, councils can consider the views and wishes of attentive publics, of fairly well-defined and permanent interest clusters in the community. These attentive publics may have differing views of how the community should be governed, in which case the council must compromise and adjust. Or the attentive publics may be more or less of the same view, in which case the council need only determine what this view is and act upon it. In either case, we say that the council, by acting in response to the viewpoints and thinking of attentive publics represents these publics. Second, the council may not concern itself with cohesive attentive publics but may, instead, act in response to ad hoc pressures and petitions. Neighborhood groups, for instance, may organize on a sporadic basis, make claim on the council for some service or benefit, and expect to be listened to by "their representatives." Under these conditions, councils placate or respond to specialized and transitory citizen groups. If in the first case the council represents attentive publics, in this case it represents issue-specific groups of citizens.

There is a third type of representative relationship with the public. As previously noted, some councils appear to be altogether immune to external pressures; no identifiable groups of citizens, permanently or sporadically organized, appear to intrude on council deliberations about community affairs. In such cases, councils may or may not be acting *in the interest* of the represented (an issue we do not explore here); they are not, however, acting *in response to* the represented. Rather, these councils entertain a self-defined image of what community needs are. It is in terms of its own image that the council tackles the problems which come to its attention.

The 82 councils divided into the three categories as follows:[9]

Councils responsive to attentive publics	20	24%
Councils responsive to ad-hoc issue groups	26	32%
Councils entertaining self-defined image	36	44%

The distribution of the councils into this three-category classification essentially sets the question. For present analytic purposes, representation is taken to mean a relationship between governed and governors wherein the governing group responds to ("represents") politically organized viewpoints among citizens, that is, responds to something *other* than its own image of what the community needs. With representation so understood, we ask: under what political conditions is a representative relationship between governors and governed likely to emerge in a community? Our analysis examines the patterns among the four variables that we have singled out as relevant for representation and examines the connections between the political matrix, as constructed from these four indicators, and the emergence of representation.

III. REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE STYLE AND SOCIAL PLURALISM

An assumption which frequently appears in discussions of representation and modern society might be stated as follows: increasing complexity and differentiation in modern societies makes it more and more difficult for representative bodies to respond to the variety of interests which constitute the political community. Persons who make such observations usually assume representation to be a relationship between

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act of response rather than simply the potential for it. The difficulties of empirically working with a concept stressing the possibility of an act rather than the act itself dictated our decision to modify Pitkin's theoretically suggestive definition.

[9] The coding procedure used was as follows: Both investigators, reading jointly, read through all parts of the interview schedules pertinent to how councilmen defined their relations with the public for all members of any given council. If the councilmen seldom mentioned any groups or groupings in the public or if they failed to describe an actual case where they had been responsive to public pressures or if they simply asserted (a not unusual occurrence) that they knew what was best for the community and acted upon it, the council was placed in the "self-defined image" code. If the councilmen made references to neighborhood groups or to transitory groups wanting, say, a stop-light at a given corner, or to election groups and if the councilmen indicated that they responded to pressures from such groups and attempted to placate them, then the council was coded in the "responsive to issue-groups" category. If the councilmen defined for us a fairly well organized public, attentive to what the council was doing, and if the councilmen indicated (usually by citing an illustrative case) that they were responsive to these attentive publics, the council was placed in the "responsive to attentive publics" code. The procedure, then, used the councilmen as individual informants about the response style of the council. It is quite possible, though not a frequent occurrence, for a given individual councilman to not feel responsive to, say, attentive publics but to describe the council as acting in that way.

individuals. We were interested to see if representation, treated at the systemic level, was indeed less likely to emerge in larger and more complex communities. Table 1 presents relevant data.

Using population size as an indicator of a community's social pluralism,[10] it is clear that responding to interests voiced from the community is *facilitated* in the more pluralistic communities. How are we to reconcile this finding with the assumption that social complexity impedes the exercise of the representational function? It may be correct that the larger and more complex a social system, the more difficult it is for any *one* citizen to make his wishes known or for any *one* representative to respond to individual constituents. The data in Table 1 emphasize why an individualistic conception of representation is obsolete. Representation as a relationship between two collectivities—the represented and the representatives—appears to emerge more easily in the larger, more complex communities than in the smaller, more homogeneous communities. To understand representation as a systemic property we may have to re-think many of our conventional assumptions. Indeed, the responsiveness of the representative assembly is facilitated under just those conditions assumed to impede individual responsiveness.

The pattern in Table 1 makes considerable sense. It may well be that in the smaller and more homogeneous communities, the social structure is such that there is simply little opportunity for the council to respond to stable, attentive publics or to ad hoc, spontaneous issue groups. Unlike in larger and heterogeneous cities, where various social groups are present and likely to make their demands known to the city council, in the smaller, more homogeneous settings, the group life is likely to be less developed and the public pressures brought on the council are probably less frequent or urgent. If this is so, councils in small cities are unable to identify groups to which they might wish to respond, if they only could, and will have to rely on their own images of what is in the best interest of the represented. As Table 1 shows, this is in fact the case: the smaller the city, the more councils act in their self-images; the larger the city, the more councils are responsive to groups that articulate interests.[11]

TABLE 1. CITY SIZE AS INDICATOR OF SOCIAL PLURALISM AND COUNCIL RESPONSE STYLE

Representational Response Style	City Size		
	<10,000 N = 32	10–50,000 N = 33	>50,000 N = 17
Self-defined Image	56%	39%	29%
Ad-hoc Issue Groups	31	36	24
Attentive Publics	13	25	47
	100%	100%	100%

$$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{8.10}{4} = 2.03$$

Gamma = .38

IV. REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE STYLE AND ELECTORAL TOLERANCE

It is customary to entertain many assumptions, which often remain untested, about the consequences of elections for representation. Different nominating procedures (primaries vs. conventions), voting rules (list vs. transferable vote), electoral arrangements (at-large, multi-member vs. single-member constituencies), counting procedures (majority vs. proportional) election types (partisan vs. non-partisan), and so on, are said to produce very different types of elected representatives.

Even more to the point, assumptions about elections are very central in writings which consider such issues as "accountability" and "responsiveness." As Dahl has written, elections "are crucial processes for insuring that political leaders will be somewhat *responsive to the preferences of some ordinary citizens*."[12] The assumption made by Dahl and by many other writers on democratic politics is that public officials choose policies in anticipation of likely electorate response at the next election. Schlesinger employs similar reasoning and states the point even more strongly: "The desire for election and, more important, for reelection becomes the electorate's restraint upon its public officials."[13] In democratic theory, then, elections are viewed as the sanction available to the public. In the absence of this sanction, office-holders would not be accountable. And, if the governors are not accountable, it is difficult to imagine them being responsive. "The point of holding [the elected official] to account after he acts is to make him act in a certain way—look after his constituents, or do what they want."[14]

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[10] That size is an adequate indicator of "social pluralism" may not be self-evident. We refer the reader to Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, *American Cities: Their Social Characteristics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) for evidence of the correlative power of size as an indicator of a city's demographic and ecological diversity and pluralism.

[11] In Table 1 and all following tables our interpretation of the data is largely based on comparison of the distributions in "high" and "low" categories of the "independent" (column) variable. However, we are attaching to each table two statistics: the raw chi square score adjusted for degree of freedom which can tell us something about the relative order of the data; that is, by dividing chi square by the table's degree of freedom, it is possible to compare tables of different numbers of cells as long as the "N" remains the same or nearly so. Because we are not essentially dealing with a sample but with a universe (82 out of 90 cases in the defined universe), we are not concerned with the sampling problem of whether the distribution in any table is due to chance or not at some set level of confidence. Gamma is introduced as a measure of relationship because it seems especially suitable to data ordered by ordinal or weak ordinal scales.

The difficulty with these assumptions about representative democracy is that they, in turn, make the assumption that elections do indeed remove or threaten to remove men from public office. We have serious doubts that this is the case. For one thing, and a fact too often overlooked by theorists who emphasize elections as a sanction, a very sizeable group of office-holders retire from office voluntarily. As Charles Hyneman sharply pointed out three decades ago, turnover in legislatures is due not to election defeats, or even to fear of same, but because men simply decide to leave public office. The real task, Hyneman wrote in 1938, "is to find out why so many legislators, senators and representatives alike, choose not to run again."[15] In his analysis of eight states covering the period 1925–33 he found that *more than 60 percent* of the retirements from both lower house and Senates were due to failure to seek reelection.[16]

Alerted by Hyneman to the question of voluntary retirement, we checked to see how frequently city councilmen retired from office for reasons other than election defeat. In 82 cities over a ten year period (5 elections per city), more than half of the councilmen retired voluntarily from office. Although a few leave the council to seek higher office, survey data indicate this number is not large. And though a few might retire out of threat of election defeat, survey data indicate that this occurs very infrequently.[17]

This high and persistent rate of voluntary retirement from elected office certainly should caution us against the easy assumption that "elections make public officials responsive" and thus guarantee representative government. For if the representative body plans to depart from office in any case, why should it be concerned with voter approval of its policies? To explore the relationship between elections and representative response style, we need to determine whether the voting public does indeed ever remove incumbents from office.

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[12] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 131, italics added. At another point Dahl argues, "The effective political elites, then, operate within limits often vague and broad, although occasionally narrow and well defined, set by their expectations as to the reactions of the group of politically active citizens who go to the polls." *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[13] Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand, McNally & Co., 1966), p. 2. Schlesinger's study is a very careful and ingenious examination of how the political opportunity structure in the U.S. might facilitate or impede political ambitions and thus affect the working of democracy. He does not, however, consider the consequences for democratic politics if men in public office are not ambitious.

[14] Pitkin, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[15] Charles S. Hyneman, "Tenure and Turnover of Legislative Personnel," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 195 (1938), p. 30. Hyneman also remarks that his finding "completely knocks out the supposition that the transiency of legislative personnel is due to the fickleness of the voter at the polls. . . . Only 16.1 per cent of the 1,965 House members and 14.7 per cent of the 511 senators who quit service during this period were eliminated by defeat in the general election." Pp. 25–27.

[16] Possibly one of the reasons Hyneman's findings have had such little impact on theories about elections is that he was concerned with the implications of turnover for questions of legislative experience. Students who followed Hyneman's lead also addressed themselves to this question. As far as we have discovered, no political scientist has yet considered how the high rates of voluntary retirement might affect the attention of lawmakers to voter preferences. This question is addressed more systematically in Kenneth Prewitt, "Democratic Elitism From Another Angle," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 24–26, 1969.

[17] The mean percent of voluntary retirements is .53; the standard deviation is .18. The rate of voluntary retirement is not related to any major demographic characteristic of the city, not to size, population density, per cent of the working force in manufacturing occupations, nor to median income. The stability of this rate across all types of cities suggests that it is a very permanent, even institutionalized, feature of nonpartisan city politics in the Bay Area. By the way, only 3 of the 82 cities studied have limitations on tenure. The survey data which help us understand the reasons for the high rates of voluntary retirement are presented and analyzed in Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen Politicians* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, in press).

We constructed an index of "forced turnover" based on the number of incumbents who won, divided by the number of incumbents who sought reelection over a ten-year period (five elections). (The index does not include incumbents who were appointed to office in the expired term.)[18] In 21 cities no incumbent seeking reelection was defeated. On the other hand, in only four cities did as many as half of the incumbents suffer defeat. The distribution, therefore, is highly skewed toward success in being reelected. Nevertheless the spread of election defeats in sufficient to permit us to classify cities into three theoretically useful groups: those in which a bid for reelection never failed, those in which it sometimes failed but less often than 25 percent of the time, and those in which it failed for at least one of every four incumbents.

We derive from general democratic theory a simple hypothesis. Cities with the highest rate of forced turnover, where electoral tolerance is relatively low, should have councils tending to act in response to public pressures and petitions. Conversely, councils which govern in a milieu where elections never force anyone from office will act in response only to their own image of what the community needs. This, as Table 2 shows, is the case.

Thus, on the one hand, conventional democratic theory appears to be confirmed. The presence of an electorate which removes men from office leads to more acts of response by the representative body. On the other hand, conventional theory also holds that councils not responding to political groups would be ousted from office. If we read Table 2 in reverse it is evident that this does not happen; elections do not necessarily remove councils which respond only to their own image of community needs. The inability of conventional theorizing about elections to help us explain Table 2 is due to an oversight in much of the contemporary literature about representative democracy. Nowhere that we could find have scholars systematically examined the implications for representation *if elections are not used to force turnover* on representative bodies. But the reluctance, or inability, of the electorate to remove public officials is something we must take into account if our theory of representation is not to make unfounded empirical assumptions. Just why non-responsive councils are seldom removed from office is a question to which we turn momentarily, but first we take a quick look at the relationship between social pluralism and electoral tolerance.

TABLE 2. FORCED TURNOVER AND REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE STYLE

Representational Response Style	Per Cent of Forced Turnover		
	None N=21	1–24 N=39	25+ N=22
To self-defined image	71%	41%	23%
To ad-hoc issue groups	19	31	45
To attentive publics	10	28	32
	100%	100%	100%

$$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{10.96}{4} = 2.74$$

Gamma = .44

We expect that the electorate uses its voting powers to force turnover more often in larger cities, where pressures on the governing bodies are diverse and frequent, than in the more homogeneous and politically quiet environment of the smaller community. Table 3 shows this to be the case. The medium-sized and larger cities are characterized by higher rates of forced turnover than are the smaller cities, though even in the latter election defeats are not uncommon. Interpreting Tables 2 and 3 together, it seems that electoral tolerance is negatively related to the degree of representational response. Where councils need not fear the vote of the people, they are also less likely to act in response to the voice of the people.

V. REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE STYLE AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT

For purpose of our theoretical exploration, let us assume that the first three tables provide

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[18] Appointed incumbents were excluded because of the high rate of appointment to the councils—24 per cent for all cities averaged over the ten year period. Appointment can be a strategy designed, in this context, to assure election. Omitting these appointed incumbents therefore strengthens the index of forced turnover. The aggregate election data which were used in constructing these analyses were initially collected by Gordon Black, now at the University of Rochester, in collaboration with William Hawley, Institute of Governmental Studies, Berkeley. We are indebted to both Black and Hawley for their help.

TABLE 3. CITY SIZE AND FORCED TURNOVER

Per Cent of Forced Turnover	City Size <10,000 N=32	10–50,000 N=33	>50,000 N=17
None of incumbents	37%	25%	7%
1–24	41	45	64
25 or more	22	30	29
	100%	100%	100%

$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{6.26}{4} = 1.57$

Gamma = .28

TABLE 4. FORCED TURNOVER AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Level of Community Support	Per Cent of Forced Turnover None N=21	1–24 N=39	25+ N=22
Relatively high	81%	49%	45%
Relatively low	19	51	55
	100%	100%	100%

$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{7.14}{2} = 3.57$

Gamma = −.42

findings on which we can build. Governing bodies with self-defined images of the public interest are found in smaller communities and are less subject to electoral sanctions than councils which act in response to public pressures. This is a paradox for representational theory. In order to solve the paradox, it is necessary to consider another aspect of the political matrix that may be related to a council's representational response style—a system property we characterize as "community support." We expect, for instance, that where a council is generally supported in what it does by the citizenry, it is relatively free to define the community interest in its own image. And if this is so, it helps explain why a council, though non-responsive, faces little risk in being ousted from office.

In order to characterize the citizenry of the 82 cities as more or less supportive of the council, we assumed that support was forthcoming if, according to council reports, any one or all of the following conditions were met: (1) that the public held a favorable and respectful image of the council; (2) that the public was in general agreement with the council on its duties; (3) that the public did not include disruptive elements; (4) that there were not many groups steadily critical of the council's policies. We combined these items into a single index of community support.[19]

The measure of community support allows us to investigate the paradox that councils acting on the basis of their own images are less exposed to electoral sanctioning than councils which placate ad-hoc issue groups or are attentive to more stable interest groups. As Table 4 shows, communities in which the electorate does not force incumbents from office are seen as overwhelmingly supportive of their councils; in communities where some or relatively many incumbents are forced from office, the citizens are seen as almost evenly split in the support they are giving their councils.

In communities, then, in which the citizenry is on the whole satisfied with council operations and policies and is apparently giving the council its support, we can assume that citizens do feel "represented" by the council even though the council follows its own definition of what is in the best interests of the governed. If this inference is sound, it helps explain why councils which do not act in response to community groups are yet free of threats of election defeats. It is precisely because it does not hear from the public that the council is able to rely on its own judgment. As Table 5 indicates, there is a very significant difference in councils' representational response styles between the more and less supportive political milieux, and the relationship is exceptionally strong. The table and our analysis suggest that, in dealing with representation as a

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[19] Four of the five items used in the support index were coded by using the informant procedure described in footnote 9. Councils were classified according to whether they reported 1) the public to have a respectful view toward councilmen, 2) the public to be in agreement with the council's definition of its duties, 3) the public to include disruptive and unfriendly elements, and 4) the public to be generally supportive in its behavior toward the council. The fifth item, whether there are critical groups in the community, was initially an aggregate measure of individual responses to a question about the number of critical groups. Councils were ranked in terms of this aggregate measure and those above the median were said to have supportive publics, those below, to be operating in a non-supportive environment. Each council was given a score of 1 for each plus on the five items. The support scores were then dichotomized to provide the "relatively high" and "relatively low" classifications used in the analysis.

TABLE 5. COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE STYLE

Representational Response Style	Community Support Relatively High N = 46	 Relatively Low N = 36
To self-defined image	63%	19%
To ad-hoc issue groups	17	50
To attentive publics	20	31
	100%	100%

$$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{16.52}{2} = 8.26$$

Gamma = .54

system property, we must at all times keep in mind that it is embedded, as Pitkin so well put it, "in the complex ways of large social arrangements." It remains, therefore, to ascertain in what type of community support is forthcoming. From all that we know about small, relatively homogeneous cities we expect that they are more likely to have a supportive citizenry than will larger, more heterogeneous cities. Table 6 shows that our expectations are met: the relationship between support and social pluralism is as strong as between support and response style. Small communities, it appears, generate relatively high levels of political support that, in turn, leave the governing body free to pursue community interests as it sees fit.

VI. RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATION

The study of political representation must, at some time, confront the naked fact that in any political community a handful of men are chosen to govern over a very large number of citizens. As Lord Bryce observed:

> In all assemblies and groups and organized bodies of men, from a nation down to a committee of a club, direction and decision rest in the hands of a small percentage, less and less in proportion to larger size of the body, till in a great population it becomes an infinitesimally small proportion of the whole number. This is and always has been true of all forms of government, though in different degrees.[20]

TABLE 6. CITY SIZE AND COMMUNITY SUPPORT

Level of Community Support	City Size <10,000 N = 32	 10–50,000 N = 33	 >50,000 N = 17
Relatively high	72%	58%	23%
Relatively low	28	42	77
	100%	100%	100%

$$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{10.59}{2} = 5.30$$

Gamma = −.53

The phenomenon that so impressed Bryce alerts us to the fascinating research problem of linking political recruitment and political representation. Since it is clear that a few men are chosen to govern the many and since, at least under democratic rules, the few are charged to "represent" the many, it is important for a theory of representation that we investigate how the few are chosen. This directs our attention to political recruitment—the process or set of processes by which in a city of, say, 30,000 inhabitants, the population is narrowed to only five men who, as councillors, assume formal authority to govern the remaining 29,995 citizens.

In spite of the obvious logical connection between how the governors are recruited from the people and how they represent the people, the linkage has received little attention in empirical political studies. Some years ago, one of us had occasion to point out that "the relationship between the process of selection of legislators and the modes and consequences of legislative behavior . . . offer wide and fertile fields for empirical research,"[21] but the relevant questions were not pursued in *The Legislative System* or, as far as we can tell, in any other subsequent work.

One of the main reasons for this inattention to the link between recruitment and representation is the tendency of scholars to treat recruitment as an individual characteristic. There are studies of the political career, of the selective effect of personality on political success, of nominations of candidates, of the ascent and descent of political leaders, and so on.[22] Although these studies are productive in their own right, the preoccupation with recruitment at the individual level blocks theorizing and empirical research which could connect recruitment and representation. If the position taken in this paper that representation is a systemic property be accepted, however, it is evident that recruitment must also be conceptualized at that level.

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[20] James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1924), p. 542.

[21] Wahlke, Eulau, *et al*, *op cit.*, p. 269.

[22] The literature, of course, is quite large. Representative studies are reviewed in Prewitt, "Political Socialization and Leadership Selection," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 361 (September, 1965), pp. 96–111.

We should note that there are studies which treat recruitment and representation at least as aggregate variables. These are the studies which examine the socio-economic attributes of elected officials and compare them with a demographic profile of their constituents.[23] The difficulty with this research design is that it locks the analyst into a very narrow definition of both recruitment and representation. As to recruitment, it means studying who is selected but not the processes by which this happens. For representation it means that the analysis is limited to a "mirror theory" wherein the very complex process of representation is reduced to a very simple formula of statistical "representativeness." This approach can yield only limited understanding.

Our own conception of recruitment centers in the problem of "sponsorship"—the degree to which the recruitment process is open or unsponsored and the degree to which it is closed or sponsored. Where sponsorship is highly developed, persons already in established political positions exercise considerable control over who will sit on the council. Sponsorship implies that there are fairly determined or even institutionalized pathways to office. The route to the council might be through an apprenticeship on the planning commission or by being an officer of the Chamber of Commerce or by being active in a local ethnic association. For a man to gain a council seat in a community where sponsorship dominates political recruitment, it is important and maybe even necessary for him to first join the inner circles. Sponsorship does not mean, however, that restrictive criteria are being applied, at least as we normally think of restriction in political recruitment. Our analysis is not concerned with whether persons with the "wrong" social traits are eliminated from consideration. In addition, sponsorship is not a notion which masks some conspiracy theory. A community can rely heavily on sponsorship as a means for recruiting political talent without there being manipulation by powerful persons behind the scene.

Sponsorship is an issue of considerable theoretical interest to students of political recruitment. A problem for most elected governing groups is how to maintain some policy continuity despite personnel turnover. This is an especially difficult problem for city councils where, as we have seen, the rate of voluntary retirement is high and where the average tenure is fairly low. (The average number of years of service is 6.5). Continuity of policy viewpoint can be maintained despite turnover if control can be exercised over successive recruits. A procession of like-minded men through office is equally as effective in stabilizing city policies as is low turnover. If indeed sponsorship aids a governing group to maintain control over both its members and its policies, sponsorship should also relate to how the group defines its representational function. A reasonable hypothesis is that sponsored recruitment insulates the council from certain political experiences and that this insulation will in turn lead to a representational response style that minimizes the impact of organized demands from the public on council thinking.

The measure of sponsorship used here was derived by aggregating individual recruitment patterns at the council level. Just as any one councilman could, on the one extreme, be an "outside challenger" who initiated his own career and attained a council seat with minimum prior contact between himself and those already in office, so the council group as a whole could have followed this career line. At the other extreme, just as an individual might have been asked to run for office by current incumbents or even appointed to office, so the council as a group could have had this experience. Between these extremes more or less prior involvement with city affairs could be characteristic of individual councilmen or the council as a whole. Sponsorship is admittedly a highly multidimensional measure as it pertains to the council, but it undoubtedly captures at the group level something of the rich variety of recruitment patterns that are possible.[24]

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[23] See, for instance, the collection of articles in Dwaine Marvack (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961); Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1954); and the chapter by Thomas R. Dye in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1965). This issue is explored with the city council data in chapter 2 of the book by Prewitt cited in footnote 17.

[24] The measure of sponsorship is particularly problematic since we are summing not just individual experiences to get a group score but individual experiences which took place over a considerable span of time in some cases. It may be that the aggregation of individual career experiences into a council recruitment measure disguises more variance in the original data than the index should be burdened with. Councilmen enter the council at very different points in time and recruitment, as a system property, may have undergone major changes since the entry experiences of the older members. For the present, however, we are trapped by our own data; when we began the study we still were thinking of recruitment as an

TABLE 7. FORCED TURNOVER AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

Amount of Sponsorship	Per Cent of Forced Turnover		
	None N=21	1–24 N=39	25+ N=22
Little	5%	36%	27%
Some	38	51	59
Much	57	13	14
	100%	100%	100%

$$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{18.59}{4} = 4.65$$

Gamma = −.44

TABLE 8. COMMUNITY SUPPORT AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

Amount of Sponsorship	Community Support	
	Relatively High N=46	Relatively Low N=36
Little	19%	33%
Some	48	53
Much	33	14
	100%	100%

$$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{4.50}{2} = 2.25$$

Gamma = .38

Recruitment patterns, of course, are part of the political matrix and are likely to be related to other system properties. In communities where elections are not a sanctioning mechanism and where there is, as a result, little or no forced turnover, the recruitment pattern is likely to be characterized by considerable sponsorship, while in politically volatile systems relatively little sponsorship is likely to be practiced. As Table 7 reveals, these expectations are reasonably well substantiated by the data.

Similarly, we expect that sponsorship is more likely to appear in a supportive political environment than in a critical one. In a community seen as supportive, where the council is relatively free to do as it pleases precisely because what the council does pleases the citizenry, incumbents are likely to bring into the council men who have already had experience in local community affairs and who can be counted on to continue the policies which seem so satisfactory. On the other hand, and the relatively weaker relationships shown in Table 8 underline the point, a council more exposed to criticism and social pressures may *also* seek to perpetuate its policy views by bringing like-minded and trusted members into the council fold. On balance, then, either alternative is possible. Support as a system property and recruitment through sponsorship are moderately related.

Recruitment practices might also be related to the degree of social heterogeneity or homogeneity of a community. In small communities where men are more likely to share each other's characteristics, know each other better and are more likely to be of similar mind, sponsorship should be practiced more frequently than in more pluralistic settings. Again the data suggest, as Table 9 shows, that this seems to be the case, though a good deal of sponsorship is evidently also practiced in the larger and medium-sized cities.

We noted in connection with Table 1 that the response style of a council depends in some important measure on the actual presence of groups or publics to which the representative group can respond. We assumed that the same reasoning would hold for recruitment practices; a socially diverse community would sustain a relatively open recruitment process. Although the reasoning is not incorrect, Table 9 indicates that recruitment practices may be less affected than response style by community characteristics. This being the case, the relationship between recruitment and representation is perhaps more problematical than our initial theoretical reasoning might suggest.

Where a council is free to recruit its own suc-

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individual attribute and thus mainly collected data about individual careers. Despite the relatively weaker nature of our sponsorship measure, we are reluctant to give up our theoretical posture. We simply note, then, that the weaker relationships in tables using the sponsorship measure may be traced to these methodological difficulties. A council was given a sponsorship measure by computing the mean of six alternate paths to office. The "sponsorship continuum" ranged from the case in which an outside challenger initiates his own career and attains a council seat with minimum contact between himself and those already in established positions, to the case in which a councilman was deliberately selected—either asked to run or appointed to the council—by those already in office. The means were then ranked and, for present purposes, the lowest quartile in the rank constitutes the low sponsorship councils; the highest quartile constitutes the high sponsorship councils; the remainder we assigned to the middle group.

TABLE 9. CITY SIZE AND POLITICAL RECRUITMENT

Amount of Sponsorship	City Size		
	<10,000 N=32	10–50,000 N=33	>50,000 N=17
Little	19%	30%	29%
Some	37	61	53
Much	44	9	18
	100%	100%	100%

$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{11.14}{4} = 2.79$

Gamma = −.34

TABLE 10. POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE STYLE

Representational Response Style	Amount of Sponsorship		
	Little N=21	Some N=41	Much N=20
To self-defined image	38%	37%	65%
To ad-hoc issue groups	33	36	20
To attentive publics	29	27	15
	100%	100%	100%

$\frac{\chi^2}{\text{d.f.}} = \frac{4.85}{4} = 1.21$

Gamma = −.25

cessors, with a view toward maintaining continuity in policy leadership by like-minded and trusted men, it should also be free from those public pressures which would force it to consider views other than its own when selecting policies. But, it seems, sponsorship is practiced to some degree in the larger, more pluralistic cities where councils are exposed to a politically more active environment. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as Table 10 shows, the relationship between recruitment and representation is relatively weak. Although the data point in the theoretically expected direction—councils practicing "much" sponsorship seem more likely to follow their own image of the community interest, while councils characterized by "little" sponsorship are more likely to respond in one way or another—the relationship between the two variables is lower than that between any other unveiled in the total configuration of the analysis.

Because of the small number of cases, we are generally reluctant to subject the data to a multivariate analysis which would permit us to untangle the relationship between recruitment and representation. However, since councils in the larger cities reported more sponsorship than expected, we decided to control the relationship between recruitment and representation by city size, collapsing however both the size and the representation variables. Table 11 reports the results.

It appears that where *much* sponsorship is practiced in a city's recruitment process, size does not have an independent effect on representational style. In large and small cities, councils practicing a great deal of sponsorship tend to follow their own image of community interests. But where sponsorship is less frequently practiced, councils in large cities are more responsive to issue groups or attentive publics than councils in the smaller cities. In the latter, one half of the ten councils with open recruitment practices yet are able to pursue their own conceptions of the community interest. This may be due, of course, to the fact, suggested in regard to Table 1, that in smaller cities there may just

TABLE 11. POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE STYLE, CONTROLLED BY CITY SIZE

	City Size					
Sponsorship	<25,000			>25,000		
Representational Response Style	Little N=10	Some N=27	Much N=15	Little N=11	Some N=14	Much N=5
To self-defined image	50%	41%	67%	27%	29%	60%
To issue groups & publics	50	59	33	73	71	40
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	Gamma = −.25			Gamma = −.32		

TABLE 12. POLITICAL RECRUITMENT AND REPRESENTATION RESPONSE STYLE, CONTROLLED BY COMMUNITY SUPPORT

	Community Support					
Sponsorship	Relatively High			Relatively Low		
Representational Response Style	Little N=9	Some N=22	Much N=15	Little N=12	Some N=19	Much N=5
To self-defined image	78%	50%	73%	8%	21%	40%
To issue groups & publics	22	50	27	92	79	60
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	Gamma = .00			Gamma = −.52		

not be any groups or publics sufficiently active to be paid attention to by the council. In general, we can conclude that the uncontrolled results of Table 10 do not give too distorted a picture of the relationship between recruitment and representation.

Because community support seems strongly related to the kind of representation that emerges, whereas recruitment seems less critical, we controlled the recruitment-representation relationship by our support variable. Table 12 shows some interesting outcomes. Where the community is supportive, sponsorship has no effect at all on representational style. Regardless of whether much or little sponsorship occurs, councils in supportive communities are pursuing their own notions of the public interest. There is, of course, one very plausible interpretation of why sponsorship is so unrelated to response style in such communities. In small cities, recruitment processes need not be controlled to insure a succession of like-minded men through office. In the socially homogeneous and politically satisfied community, anyone who presents himself for office is acceptable. Selection of public leadership by some random method is as likely to produce men with roughly the same views as does selection by sponsorship. Thus the high support but low sponsorship communities do not present an anomaly at all.

However, in communities where support from the citizenry is relatively low, sponsorship has the expected consequences for representational behavior. Councils with little sponsorship are almost always those which respond to public pressures, while those with more sponsorship apparently are those less likely to respond (but the small number of cases does not permit us to be confident that this result is sufficiently stable to allow a firm inference). While recruitment does seem to play a role in representation, the degree of support that a community is willing to give is clearly a more important factor in shaping representational style.

Support, in turn, is attenuated by the political system's electoral tolerance. As Table 13 indicates, in a relatively supportive environment where retirement is forced upon incumbents by

TABLE 13. FORCED TURNOVER AND REPRESENTATIONAL RESPONSE, CONTROLLED BY COMMUNITY SUPPORT

	Community Support					
Representational Response Style	Relatively High			Relatively Low		
% Forced Turnover	None	1–24	25+	None	1–24	25+
To self-defined image	82%	58%	40%	25%	25%	8%
To issue groups & publics	18	42	60	75	75	92
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	Gamma = .55			Gamma = .42		

electoral defeat, councils tend to be attentive rather than self-sufficient in their representational behavior. In less supportive communities forced turnover accentuates the tendency for councils to act in response to community groups. Eleven of twelve councils with high forced turnover rates indicated responsiveness to issue groups or attentive publics, 15 per cent more than reported in the original Table 2. The fact that our measure of forced turnover is truly independent of our representational style and support measures makes this result all the more significant.

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The analysis suggests that the four components of the political matrix—the complexity of the social environment, the impact of elections in forcing incumbents from office, the degree of public support perceived by the council, and the amount of sponsorship in political recruitment—may explain a great deal about whether a responsive relationship between governors and governed will emerge. Since the analysis has been configurative, on the assumption that representational "responding to" emerges, if it does, in the context of the "over-all structure and functioning of the system," we do not assess the relative impact of any given variable. Rather we stress two things: first, there seems to be a theoretically meaningful cluster of political phenomena that is strongly related to the response style adopted by the governing body; and second, under certain, very identifiable political conditions the governing body may remain indifferent to any views of the public good except its own and yet not suffer at the hands of an antagonistic electorate. What then do we make of these findings for a theory of representation?

In order to pursue a theory of representation we have chosen a particular concept of representation. The concept with which we work stresses that political representation is a relationship between two collectivities—i.e., representation occurs when the few who are chosen to govern respond to some organized demands or preferences of the many who permit themselves to be governed. The theory to which this concept directs us is one which emphasizes that a politically responsive relationship may or may not emerge, and that the type of community in which it does emerge is characterized by an identifiable matrix of properties.

The analysis led to some unexpected findings; we summarize them here, but remind the reader that the "prolegomenon" in the title is a word to be taken seriously. What we have attempted is to break new ground in theorizing about representation in modern society; the specific findings to which our theorizing activity give rise will undoubtedly be modified as additional empirical work along these lines takes place. The findings, then, are presented as suggestive of what we may expect from a re-thinking of "representation" rather than as confirmed facts about the political world.

1. By the definition we introduced, an elected assembly is representative when it acts in response to publicly expressed and more or less organized viewpoints from the citizenry. We found that the governing councils often act in response to interest groups or attentive publics in the larger, more diverse communities. In the smaller, homogeneous cities, councils tend to rely on their own image of what the community requires. Thus, as an initial observation, we suggest that as a system property representation is more likely to emerge under just those conditions often presumed to impede responsiveness at the individual level.

2. A theory of representation as an emergent property may have to be adjusted in the light of certain facts about elections too long ignored. We are not sure, as one author has recently stated it, that "elections are thought of as providing the great sanction for assuring representative behavior."[25] The patterns uncovered in our analysis suggest a considerably more complex relationship between elections and representative government. Where an aroused electorate does, from time to time, unseat incumbents, the governing groups do tend to be attentive. However, it does not follow that elected assemblies concerned only with their own definition of the political situation will be turned out of office, for such self-images may indeed coincide with public preferences.

3. A council tends not to be responsive, as we use the term, where the public is viewed as being most supportive. This finding suggests a major qualification to the assumption that "elections force representativeness." Representative government can function quite independently of elections, though only under certain conditions. A politically satisfied community is apparently unconcerned about whether the council acts in response. If the job is being done, the citizens would just as soon not be bothered. It appears then not to be the inattentive council which is thrown out of office but only the council whose performance is suspect.

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[25] J. Roland Pennock, "Political Representation: An Overview," in Pennock and John W. Chapman (eds.), *Representation: Nomos X* (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), p. 8.

4. A fourth finding is one which validates the observations just made; communities in which the council sees itself as generally supported tend to *leave to the council itself* the selection of its successors. The pattern of sponsored recruitment, in which candidates are insulated from the competitive struggle for a council seat, tends to be associated with a representational style also suggesting a certain insulation from public pressures.

Students of democratic politics are deeply interested in the processes available to the public for controlling and holding accountable the political leadership; the analysis presented here is closely related to an understanding of these processes. It appears that members of the public dissatisfied with their representative assembly can intrude into its deliberations and force attentiveness in two ways at least, (1) by playing a role in determining who is selected to the representative body, and (2) by defeating incumbents when they stand for reelection. Put differently, when members of the public control the constituting of the representative assembly, they also influence how that assembly will define its representational role. When, however, citizens do not exercise that control, allowing the assembly more or less to determine its own members and seldom unseating an incumbent, they thereby permit the representative group the privilege of defining for itself the goals and programs of the community.

WILBUR D. MILLS: A STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE*

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> All leaders are also led; in innumerable cases, the master is the slave of his slaves. Said one of the greatest German party leaders referring to his followers: "I am their leader, therefore I must follow them."
>
> Georg Simmel[1]

Political scientists studying Congress have shown the same disinclination for the study of individual leaders as that of the profession as a whole. Whatever the reasons for avoiding an analysis of social and political processes from the perspective of an individual—and there are several good ones[2]—it is difficult to ignore, if not discount, the extreme emphasis placed on personalities by experienced participants and observers of the congressional process. One may decide, with Fenno, to underplay references to specific individuals in an effort "to show how much generalization is possible short of a heavy reliance on personality data."[3] But the fact remains that those closest to the legislative process do see it in terms of individuals and personalities; more important, much can be learned, as evidenced by Huitt's work, by focusing on individual legislators and the contexts within which they function.[4] Whether it is Lyndon Johnson as Senate Majority Leader searching for the man who is the "key" to a particular bill, the differences between a Rayburn and a McCormack, or the skill of a Judge Smith, the individual looms large on Capitol Hill.

Among the reasons why political scientists have shied away from individual or personality-centered studies of Congress are, first, the extreme variability of personalities, which stands as a barrier to generalization; and, second, the fact that it is hard to say how much of the legislative process is due to individuals and how much is due to the situational factors that confront them. Faced by these old problems, there is an understandable tendency to downplay individuals and personalities, and, implicitly or explicitly, to treat the situation and the group as the primary determinants of behavior. Before taking this step, however, it might be wise to consider a warning made by Homans apropos of Durkheim's social mold theory (which overemphasized the impact of society on individuals): "Intellectually the descent into hell is easy. One false step, and logic will do the rest."[5]

Durkheim erred, according to Homans, because he thought of the individual-society dichotomy in terms of cause and effect and not in terms of mutual dependence.[6] Norms, for example, are the result of human interaction but they may also be the cause of such interaction if, once established, they govern future behavior. The same kind of mutual dependence exists between individual leaders and the group. "Neither individual character structure nor the contextual configuration alone," Edinger writes, "can explain a leader's behavior, but careful analysis of their interaction—in as many instances as possible, may reveal certain patterns and facilitate understanding."[7]

Thus, for certain analytical purposes, one may take either a group-sociological or an individual-personality approach to the study of

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[1] "On Superordination and Subordination," *Theories of Society,* eds. Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Kasper D. Naegele, Jesse R. Pitts (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 542.

[2] Edinger discusses many of them. See Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and Political Biography: Reflections on the Study of Leadership (I)," *Journal of Politics,* 26 (May, 1964), 423–39.

[3] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p. xxiii.

[4] Ralph K. Huitt, "The Morse Committee Assignment Controversy: A Study in Senate Norms," this REVIEW, 51 (June, 1957), 313–329; "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 333–344; "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 566–574.

[5] George C. Homans, *The Human Group* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1950), p. 318.

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 319.

[7] *Op. cit.,* p. 437.

Congress, but the two approaches may also be treated as complementary. Indeed, in the case of the Ways and Means Committee, Chairman Wilbur D. Mills stands out as one of the most influential committee chairmen in recent years, if not in history, and, like all leaders, he also follows. The paradox of leadership is that it always involves followmanship; and, as a leading House liberal once said of Mills, "He's an expert in followmanship."[8] The group that forms the base of his influence in the House and that he is most likely to follow is the Committee.

Mills's leadership is here conceived not solely in terms of the traits he possesses which enable him to lead others, a view of leadership which has been rejected for many years,[9] but as a function of his relationship to his colleagues on the Committee. "There can be no leadership," as Gibb says, "in isolation, it is distinctly a quality of a group situation."[10] We will be concerned with Mills as he interacts with the Committee, a concern which tends to stress the group-sociological side of leadership. A balance is sought between Mills as an individual leader and the nature of the group he leads, but the approach to the former is primarily through the ways in which Mills is seen by the rest of the Committee: their perceptions of his leadership, what they like and dislike about the way he runs the Committee, the scope and limitations of his leadership as they see it, why they respond to him in certain ways, and how it is that he is allowed to exert influence on them. The justifications for this emphasis are the conception of leadership discussed above and, secondly, the fact that much better data have been collected on Mills vis-a-vis the Committee members than on Mills the inscrutable personality who intrigues, and frustrates, those in Washington whose view is restricted to him as a particular kind of individual.[11]

Part I describes and analyzes Mills's instrumental or task leadership of the Committee and ties it to his socio-emotional or affective leadership. The main finding is that, with qualifications, he is both the task leader and the socio-emotional leader of the Committee, and that the two kinds of leadership are inextricably linked in the Committee. Part II discusses Mills's influence in the Committee—as distinct from power—and explores the bases and scope of his influence with the members. The theory of exchange is employed as a useful way to conceive of and explain such problems. In Part III the Chairman is discussed in terms of the voting coalitions in the Committee and his central position as a swing vote is analyzed as a basic factor in explaining his influence.

I. MILLS AS INSTRUMENTAL AND AFFECTIVE LEADER

Studies of small groups, as is well-known, commonly report a tendency for two types of leaders to function in groups: the instrumental or task-oriented leader, and the socio-emotional or affective leader.[12] Instrumental leaders are primarily concerned with realizing the goals of the group and directing the group toward the completion of its tasks. Task-oriented direction may give rise, however, to intra-group conflict and disintegrative pressures, creating a need for some way to relieve tension. The affective leader helps to cool internal tensions and to stimulate a harmonious working atmosphere. Theoretically, the activities of the two leaders complement each other and the stable group achieves a state of equilibrium internally and in relation to its environment. Experiments with small groups

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[8] Quoted in Julius Duscha, "The Most Important Man on Capitol Hill Today," *New York Times Magazine,* February 25, 1968, p. 78.

[9] Seligman wrote one of the obituaries in 1950. See Lester G. Seligman, "The Study of Political Leadership," this REVIEW, 44 (December, 1950), 912–914.

[10] Cecil A. Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," *Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction,* eds. A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 91. Likert comments: *"To be effective and to communicate as intended, a leader must always adapt his behavior to take into account the expectations, values and interpersonal skills of those with whom he is interacting."* Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 95 (italics his).

[11] A reporter who is very close to Mills and has studied him for ten years once observed to me, "I know Wilbur Mills better than anyone in this town, and I don't know him at all." For a more complete account of the nature of Ways and Means, and some fragments on Mills which are used in the present study, see John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 927–939.

[12] Robert F. Bales and Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Decision-Making Groups," *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process,* Talcott Parsons, et al., (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956), pp. 279–306. See also Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Groups," in Hare, Borgatta and Bales (eds.), *op. cit.,* pp. 498–515.

TABLE 1. TASK AND SOCIO-EMOTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE

	Mills	Mills and Byrnes	No One Stands Out	Other and No Response
Task Leadership				
Democrats	9	2	2	0
Republicans	1	4	2	0
Socio-Emotional Leadership				
Democrats	6	2	1	3
Republicans	4	1	1	1

have found that one man may perform both task and maintenance functions, but by and large the opposing requirements of these functions lead to a division of labor within the group.

The author's initial research on the Ways and Means Committee led to no evidence that the task and affective leadership functions were separated in the Committee; in fact, Mills appeared responsible for guiding the Committee's task efforts and his leadership seemed to be the main reason that the affective tone of the Committee was high. In order to test this hunch, the members of the Committee were asked two questions:

1. When you come to particularly difficult problems, does any member of the Committee stand out as being the one who most often comes up with a way out?
2. During the course of discussing legislation things can get rather tense from time to time. I know that this happens even in Ways and Means at times. Does anyone stand out as the peacemaker in these situations?

Table 1 categorizes the responses to these questions by party. The results on the task leadership question show a greater tendency among Democrats to assign this function to Mills than the Republicans. For the Republicans, Mills and the ranking Republican, John Byrnes (Wis.), together and in that order, are the instrumental leaders in the sense posed by the question. The results on the affective leadership question are more mixed but again Mills is most often seen as the man who stands out in this regard, for Republicans and Democrats alike. Although the data are more suggestive than conclusive, it is interesting to note that the Republicans were more inclined to cite Mills as the affective leader by himself, while they linked Mills and Byrnes as the instrumental leaders.

The great qualification that must be made on the responses summarized above is that the complexity of leadership in the Committee far transcends the scope of the two questions that were asked. Suggesting ways out of difficult problems, for example, is only one form of task leadership, and perhaps not the most important form at that. Acting as the peacemaker in tense situations is only one form of affective leadership, and it is probably more important to Mills's leadership that the mark of the meetings is the absence of tension, not its relaxation.

What is not shown in the table is that although the members named Mills as the task and affective leader of the Committee, many members qualified their answers with the comment that Mills and Byrnes are the dominant figures on the Committee but any member is free to participate and contribute if he so desires. Leadership is both more diffuse in the Committee than the task-affective dichotomy implies, and there is a relationship between affective relations in the Committee and the way Mills performs the taskmaster function. Task leadership, in short, is more collegial in the members' eyes than the conspicuousness of Mills in the public eye might lead one to expect, and because this is true Mills also rates high as the affective leader of the Committee.

Such a finding should not be altogether unexpected. Simply because leadership functions are separated in some groups is no reason why they cannot be joined in others. There is no reason why a skillful leader cannot operate in such a way that although he is the primary instrumental leader of the group he guides the group in performing its tasks so that he is the main reason why the job gets done, and without much tension. Thibaut and Kelley comment on this:

> The dichotomous separation of task and maintenance roles may not be necessary under all conditions. If . . . there are clear norms as to what each person should do on the common task and when he should do it, instigation to conform to these norms may come from many members, and no person will need to generate much hostility toward himself if he uses the norm. . . . This is an important part of the pattern of behavior referred to as 'democratic' leadership. The democratic leader encourages the members to influence one another in their work on the task. . . . By group decision and participation procedures, he attempts to distribute many of the task functions among the membership at large, and in this manner is enabled to perform a maintenance role himself.[13]

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[13] John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, *The*

Mills is a democratic committee chairman par excellence. In this way, he guides the Committee on tasks and maintains good affective relations in the process.

Seen in this light, one familiar observation on Mills's style of leadership, i.e., that he is a consensus-seeker, an observation made by almost everyone who has ever looked at the contemporary Committee, is of great interest. Mills's search for a consensus in the Committee is another way of saying that he is a democratic chairman of the Committee, a task leader who encourages the members to influence one another, who shares the quest for solutions to problems with the members even though at the end of the process he may articulate and legitimate the conclusion they reach together, a leader who directs the members along lines he may favor but who does not attempt to force his predilections on others. Mills's task leadership of the Committee, subtle and indirect, is an important source of the high esteem in which he is held by the members and a major factor in explaining why the members like the Committee as well as they do.

Several members (six Republicans, three Democrats) touched on this in the course of discussing who suggests solutions to the Committee's substantive problems, but no one put it better than a Republican,

> I don't really understand our mark-up. . . . Many times we don't have a bill. The first two-thirds is like a rudderless ship, flopping all over, anyone brings up anything on his mind. The drafters are right there, we never draft anything, they take their notes and write it up. Mills will say, 'Well, I guess we can agree on this, draft it up.' He gives direction, yes, but anyone can jump in. He's quick to see an idea that will have appeal in the House.

When the members say that the Committee is like a rudderless ship, loosely directed by the Chairman, they are expressing the feeling that the hand of leadership weighs lightly on them in the Committee. "When you get to the [crucial] stage it's Mills and Byrnes. But we all participate. I do. Less than they, but if I have something to contribute, or if anyone else does, there's no problem." A Republican concurred, "I'd say the final legislation is never very far from the way Mills wanted to go, the general direction. He consults with Byrnes: 'Here we have a piece of legislation, where do we go?' They decide the general direction. Now when we get into the Committee there is general participation. A number of us give suggestions." "If the members start from points apart," a Democrat summed up, "[Mills] puts them together to points similar. But I'd say it's *one* committee with a head."

That the members of Ways and Means tend to blur the distinction between Mills's task leadership and his affective leadership within the Committee is evident from the last-quoted Democrat. He was answering, interestingly enough, the peacemaker question, not the problem-solving question, and he depicted Mills as the peacemaker because the Chairman brings the members together on substantive issues. The close relationship between the two leadership functions became even clearer when the members talked about Mill's general style of leadership. When left free to discuss leadership and conflict in the Committee as they pleased, most of them spoke favorably of Mill's consensus-seeking style and many of them linked it in a causal way to the quality of relations among the members. First we will look at Republican perceptions of Mills, then at the Democrats.

To reach a consensus in the Committee Chairman Mills will compromise, bargain, cajole, swap, bend, plead, amend, coax and unite until as much of the controversy as possible is drained from the bill, and as many members of the Committee as possible support it. "Mills, although he may feel strongly about things, is not by nature an uncompromising man, you know, even on some principles he may have. . . He likes to be a leader, to be in front of the troops, and if he sees that the troops are ahead of him then he'll circle around and make sure that he gets out in front again." Other Republicans say that if Mills "finds out my backers have a lot of votes, he'll give in, he'll compromise," "he encourages you to participate and the first 95 percent of the approach is nonpartisan," "our committee is a little unique in that we have a chairman who doesn't let the political dominate," and

> If we had a partisan chairman the Committee would become partisan overnight. In some ways, for political purposes, it might be better to have a partisan chairman. This would unite the minority, we could come out with our political position, and perhaps get some votes in the next election. But I don't think on our committee it should be like that.

Republican appreciation for the way Mills runs the Committee is probably heightened by

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Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959), p. 282. See also Verba's observation that in ongoing groups the development of a legitimate leadership structure replaces dual leadership. Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 171.

their awareness that there is no absolute necessity for Mills to treat them well. In fact, a few of them commented on this point. "Some committee chairmen just use their authority and ram things through. Wilbur won't do this." A second Republican refuted an erroneous popular image of the Chairman which he felt was propagated by the newspapers,

> Although consensus is a bad term since Johnson screwed it up, he is a consensus seeker. He never pushes things to votes, we reach a compromise. Nothing bothers me more than to read, as you do in the newspapers, that he's an authoritarian—the 'little authoritarian from Kensett, Arkansas.' That's not it, he's no authoritarian. The reason the tax bill is not going through is because they have to cut expenditures. . . . It's not that Mills is a dictator, the newspapers are all wrong.

A third Republican put the matter strongly, but well, "Anyone who has ever been on another committee appreciates the way Mills conducts Ways and Means. There's almost a reverence among the members about him because they know how it is on other committees."

Democratic members of Ways and Means are no less unanimous in their agreement on Mills's fairness, the considerate way he treats all members, and that, above all, he directs the Committee's task operations with consensus uppermost in mind. Few members of either party would disagree with the Democrat who said, "He's evasive, aloof, coy and he's not a stern oak that stands in the wind and splits rather than bends. He'll bend in the wind." As for sensing the strength of the winds, another Democrat expressed a common view, "He has developed the ability, if two sides are opposed on some issue, to sense what may bring them together in an acceptable compromise." "He *leads* the Committee, he doesn't *drive* it," was a good summary statement of the general view of the way Mills runs the Committe, as was the same man's comment that the Chairman has enough skill as a leader to "retreat with dignity." "He counts the heads in the Committee and he counts the heads in the House, he's always counting." And, while counting, he is compromising. Questions about Mills drew the inevitable comparison, "Now you take Education and Labor, they never try for a consensus, they battle it out. But on Ways and Means we try to reach a consensus. . . . He always seeks a consensus and he's a genius at getting one on complex problems."

If, as one Democrat said, "Mills loves harmony," and will sometimes "abandon his position" to get it, it is also true, as another Democrat said, that the search for harmony is not the easiest way to proceed. "It's long, hard, tedious work, but he seeks a consensus." In the course of this work the Chairman guides but does not continually dominate the Committee's discussion. He does participate more than other members but much of his participation involves commenting on the comments of others, raising searching questions if not objections about various ideas, and, most important, stepping in to legitimize a position which the active members have arrived at under his guidance, not under his urging. This kind of leadership requires a flexible approach to controversies, and an inclination to accommodate the opposing views of the members. In this regard, the comment of an HEW official is instructive,

> Mills is an eminently successful opportunist. He does not announce his position and force it through. He sits and listens to the members and knows what will go. I'd say 80 percent of it is consensus, 20 percent Mills, but certainly not 50 percent Mills.

It could be argued, of course, that this is not real leadership, that all Mills does is sense what the members will accept, fix his position accordingly, and take a firm stand in favor of a sure thing. But this interpretation—which is sometimes made—seriously distorts a complex form of leadership because it does not conform to one aspect of leadership: getting other people to accept one's position. Leadership, as Simmel says, always involves a certain amount of followmanship. On this point, Gouldner argues that one of the most important elements of leadership is the ability to legitimate decisions,

> It is not . . . the individual who first develops an idea or makes a suggestion (not the man 'ahead of his time') who is necessarily a leader, in the sense proposed. The leader would be, rather, that individual who is able by his support or espousement of the proposal to legitimate it. He transforms it into something to which group members are obliged to orient themselves.[14]

There is no question but that Gouldner's description of legitimacy is precisely the kind of leadership Mills exercises in the Ways and Means Committee. Simply because it does not involve early commitments on proposals and dramatic efforts to convince others of the soundness of his position, is no reason to discount the importance of Mills's style of leadership for the policy decisions made by the Committee.

Perhaps the major obstacle to easy and unqualified generalizations about the scope of Mills's leadership is that one of the prerequisites for consensus-seeking leadership is the ability not only to be flexible on policy but to keep one's position unclear to others. On many issues Mills is inscrutable to the members, they don't know if he has a position or, if he does, what it is. A Democrat praised Mills in these words, "I always said if he were a gambler he'd be the world's best poker player. He plays his cards close up. He'd sit there and you'd never know what card he had until he showed it—and maybe not then!"

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[14] Alvin W. Gouldner, *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), p. 19.

The leadership of the Chairman is, then, a process in which Mills "leads but he does it by compromising." Committee members see Mills as the legitimate leader of the Committee, as the central figure on the Committee, as the man who gives the Committee direction and who shapes the decisions of the Committee. But they also see him as a shaper of decisions, not a dictator. *To them he is an extremely skillful leader who responds to them in such a way that his conclusions, drawn from their discussion, become their conclusions.* It appears to matter little to them if in the abstract, before the Committee goes to work, Mills would favor or oppose many of the proposals made to the Committee. On many questions they do not know where he stands and, in any event, there is no such thing as leadership in the abstract. Leadership is part and parcel of the group process and in this process the members concur that Mills is a leader without parallel. One of the primary reasons Mills holds this position is that regardless of what his initial views "really" are he will be responsive to the views of the members, and the members know it.

By stepping in at the right time and suggesting that a particular line of action may be acceptable to the members, and thereby resolving whatever tensions arise, he is seen by the members as "powerful," "smart," "expert," "clever," and a "good synthesizer," qualities that are associated with instrumental leadership, and as "fair," "considerate," "pleasant," "patient," and the "peacemaker," qualities that go with affective leadership.

In concluding this initial look at the way in which Mills runs Ways and Means it is well to remember that in some ways the Committee is jointly directed. Mills and Byrnes together, not just Mills alone, are responsible for the way the Committee goes about its business. Although Mills is the most salient member of the Committee a great many of the policy decisions taken by the Committee (e.g., excise tax reduction and the scope of medicare in 1965) can be traced to Mills and Byrnes. If Mills and Byrnes disagreed over the way the Committee should function the amount of conflict in the Committee would be appreciably higher than it is. As implied, the Chairman and the ranking Republican are agreed on the nature of the Committee's job and how it should be done, if not on all major policy questions.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the Mills-Byrnes relationship to Ways and Means. The Democrats were more inclined to reserve Committee leadership to Mills than the Republicans, but the fact that the Republicans feel that Mills and Byrnes together are the leaders of the Committee helps explain the nature of partisanship in the Committee. Far from being cut off from influence in the Committee the Republicans feel that because of Mills and Byrnes they have as much if not more say than the Democrats. One Republican observed that the Committee under Byrnes would be about the same as it is under Mills. Asked why, he said, "Because we Republicans get so much in now."

Mills's efforts to reach consensus are often directed primarily at Byrnes and the Republicans. Although only two Democrats assigned task leadership to Mills and Byrnes they were two of the most perceptive Democrats interviewed. One was asked why he replied Mills and Byrnes to the problem-solving question, and he answered, "Because they have locked arms on everything, that's why." The second Democrat said, "They get together once in a while but it's not like a group of corporations conspiring to fix prices. With them it's a conspiracy with no conspiring." He explained that, having worked together long enough to know each other's position almost automatically, they take the consensus of the Committee together. This man feels—with strong reasons—that when Mills moves toward a decision, he has communicated, explicitly or implicitly, with Byrnes, and that much of what Mills does is in fact a joint proposal by Mills and Byrnes.

Mills's Perception of His Job

Up to now the analysis of Mills has been based on how the members of the Committee see and respond to his leadership in the Committee. Little has been said about the way Mills himself sees the Committee and its tasks. As expected, there is a close fit between the way Mills sees the Committee's job and defines his role as chairman and the perceptions of the other members of the Committee. To put the matter briefly, Mills thinks that the Committee, in addition to reporting technically sound bills, should report bills which can pass the House, and the best means of insuring passage in the House is through compromise in the Committee. His reputation and that of his committee are at stake every time a Ways and Means bill comes before the House, and if there is one thing Mills tries hard to avoid it is defeat in the House.

Mills believes that part of the Committee's job is to examine carefully all of the policy proposals it actively considers. Given the complexity of tax law and fiscal policy, and the need to protect the actuarial soundness of the social security system, he makes sure that the Committee is painstakingly thorough in the mark up stage of the legislative process, that it studies the alternatives before reaching conclusions, and that it proceeds cautiously so as to lessen the chances of adversely affecting the economic status of the country, corporations, or individuals. It is up to the Committee to perfect bills before sending them to the House for final approval, and he sees no sense in spending two or three days on the House floor amending Ways and Means bills. Hence the argument that bills reported by the Way and Means Comittee are so "intricate" and "complex," reported only after weeks of concentrated study, that no floor amendments should even be considered unless they are first approved by the Committee.

A workmanlike job on the legislation, however, is only half the task. The other half is to get enough votes in the Committee and in the House to pass the Committee's product. "As I see it," Mills has said, "our job is to work over a bill until our technical staff tells us it is ready and until I have reason to believe that it is going to get enough support to pass. Many of our bills must be brought out under a closed rule, and to get and keep a closed rule you must have a widely acceptable bill. It's as simple as that."[15]

Six years later, in another interview, Mills revealed that his conception of the Committee's job had not changed. "I was always taught by Mr. Rayburn that our whole system was to settle disputes within the committees. It's a waste of time to bring out a bill if you can't pass it. I just don't like to have a record vote for the sake of having a vote."[16]

If Mill's main objective is to report sound, passable legislation the means to this end are clear. In 1967 the Chairman said that reports of his consensus-seeking were highly exaggerated. Perhaps so. But during the course of his remarks he revealed that consensus-seeking is exactly what he does in the Committee. Mills's world is a very practical one in which compromise is the most widely-accepted form of decision-making, and the perfect compromise is a consensus. As the Chairman remarked on the practical nature of the Committee's work,

> Oh yes, there is no place for just the idealist because we're dealing with very practical matters. We're living in a very practical world, we have to find practical answers; generally those answers have to be a compromise of the judgment of the 25 men on the committee, and the 435 members of the House, the members of the Finance Committee and the hundred members of the Senate. So it's a very practical world in which we live and a very practical . . . area within which we operate in the Ways and Means Committee.[17]

Moreover, Mills observed that, in his opinion, reaching a consensus in Ways and Means is not a mysterious skill which only a few can understand: you sit, listen and, in the end, compromise.

> Oh to get a consensus, I think of the Ways and Means Committee or of any other group is a relatively easy matter. If you sit and listen long enough, you don't have to talk, you can pretty well find out what the 25 members are thinking about, what their primary interests are with respect to the particular issue, how they would like the legislation dressed a little differently from the way it's introduced maybe. What particular provision might satisfy a group of the members, another provision that might satisfy another group. It's the easiest thing in the world, I think, to get a consensus.[18]

It need hardly be said, as Mills himself observed, that not everything connected with a particular piece of legislation can be compromised. "But there're so many areas of any bill that are less important than the main issue of the bill that there's always a way to change some little method of doing something."[19] And, underlying this approach to the legislative process in Ways and Means, is the following belief: "I think if I can get a vast majority of the membership of the Ways and Means Committee to agree upon something, that I've got a vast majority of the

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[15] Quoted in Charles B. Seib, "Steering Wheel of the House," *New York Times Magazine,* March 18, 1962, p. 146.

[16] Duscha, *op. cit.,* p. 76.

[17] "Interview with Congressman Wilbur Mills," for "Operation Government," Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, October 11, 1967, p. 3. I am indebted to Stephen Horn of the Brookings Institution for a copy of the transcript.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 4.

House agreed upon the same thing. Because our committee is a cross section of the membership of the House. Just as it is a cross section of the people of the United States."[20]

Mills's theory about the Committee as a microcosm of the House has yet to be tested, but at present the importance of his conception of legislation is that it leads him to look for a "vast majority" of the votes in the Committee. As a result, Ways and Means bills, in the words of an HEW specialist, are all "negotiated items so they aren't so partisan. Mills will work it around so that 80 percent of the Committee will support it." A Treasury Department official agrees, "Sometimes he'll give up and settle things by party votes but he prefers not to do this." A member of the Committee's staff has the impression that Mills is "happiest when all 25 members agree and the House is unanimous." To achieve this end Mills will, in this man's opinion, "take a tentative position and then if he sees that the Committee is not likely to go along he'll make it clear that this isn't really what he wants anyway." Not surprisingly, the staff man also believes that the Chairman "has the most acute antennae of anyone I've ever seen. He can gauge the sentiment of the House and the Committee extremely well." Why all this? "He doesn't like to lose." At the risk of belaboring the point, one more view—from another HEW employee—will be cited:

> Mills wants more than anything not to have a minority report. He wants at least 20 votes and one way he does it is drop out anything controversial. I don't mean just major policy questions that may be controversial but anything. If they come across a provision and some member raises an objection, he'll drop it out. They go through it once, make tentative decisions, again, and drop out anything controversial. If Burke were chairman it might be different but Mills is amazing. If he started by saying I'm for the Administration position then all the Republicans would gang up, but he doesn't do it like this.

Because Mills is the chairman of an enormously important committee, and because he has acquired a position of legitimate leadership to go with his formal status, many people in the Washington community enjoy trying to explain why Mills leads the Committee as he does. Some dismiss him as a man who has a built-in aversion to taking chances, others see him as a man who does not have strong feelings about any policy in particular and so is willing to hold back until the feelings of others make victory certain if policy is formulated according to the least common denominator. Mills's admirers—most notably all the members of the Committee save one—see him as "the most capable man in the House of Representatives." His detractors, like one House liberal, explain his influence in the House as a "myth that he always has his Committee under control," and argue that even if he does it is because he has no real competition for leadership in the Committee.

Amidst the conflicting opinions of Mills and the reasons which ostensibly explain why he is influential, none is more common than the observation that he will do practically anything to avoid losing a bill on the floor of the House. Several members of the Committee noted that Mills lost one of the first major bills he brought to the floor and this loss is supposed to have had a permanent effect on the Chairman. It made him cautious.

But this explanation ignores the possibility that Mills might have expected—indeed planned—his first defeat. Mills claims that his first so-called defeat was in fact part of the strategy he used to pass a controversial unemployment compensation bill.[21] By bringing a two-part bill to the floor Mills contends that he was willing to sacrifice one part in order to get the other passed. The controversial matter thus acted as a lightning rod, drawing criticism away from the other section which, on its own, would have had trouble in the House. A recommittal motion extracted the controversial title and the bill itself was passed. If this is true Mills's humilating loss was in truth a clever—if little-known—victory.

It would be naive not to admit the possibility that Mills's explanation of his first defeat might be a post hoc rationalization (at least one reporter who was on the scene in 1958 thinks it is), but whether it is fact or fiction is, for our purposes, irrelevant. Even if the Chairman's first loss had no lasting impact on him, as it probably did not, his behavior since 1958, and his view that policy disputes should be resolved in the Committee, make it highly probable that the tenuousness of power in the House, which is less often stressed than the concentration of power in the committee chairman, is an important constraint on how he conducts the Committee. Mills is probably well aware that underneath the "cocoon of good feeling" which envelops House members the House is sentimental, even maudlin, about everything but who has power. His reputation in the House is on the line every time he commits himself to the passage of a bill and, although one defeat is not necessarily disastrous, a few defeats and it rapidly becomes known that he has lost his grip. To guard against this Mills tries for support from both sides of the Committee table. Although he can win with just the 15 Democrats behind him it is much more comfortable to have bipartisan support. In any event, his leadership is conducive to the maintenance of harmony in the Committee and to the completion of a quality job on the complex legislation considered by the Committee. When rough spots appear in the interaction of members he tries to soothe them just as he tries to iron out rough spots in the bills. Whether Mills is conscious of it or not, this is what he does and this is why his leadership is effective.

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

II. MILLS: INFLUENCE AND EXCHANGE

Influence, not power, is the concept to use in thinking about the leadership of individuals such as Chairman Mills. Power means many different things to many people but intuitively it conjures up the notion that individual A who "has" power, can through the expression of his will, activate obligations on the part of B which stimulate B to do something he would not otherwise do.[22] Despite the general agreement that power is a relational or transactional concept, of some presumed utility for describing and analyzing political relations, the tendency to speak of it as a commodity which some persons have and others do not will not die. So too with influence, another relational concept, which for purposes of shorthand is spoken of in commodity terms when, in fact, it refers to relationships among people. Thus it should be kept in mind that in using the term influence in connection with Mills all that is meant is a relationship between him and the other members of the Committee, not something he has and they do not. This, of course, is in keeping with the notion of leadership used in Part I.

The reason why influence is a better concept to use in analyzing Mills than power is not that it has fewer theoretical problems. Nor is it that it is easier to devise an operational definition of influence, and measure it, than of power. The main reason is that the theoretical and empirical meaning of influence is much closer to the kind of relationship between Mills and the Committee than the meaning usually given to power. Influence, as Parsons points out, may be distinguished from power in the sense that influence is, in essence, a means of *persuasion* which involves giving reasons or justifications for doing certain things and avoiding others, whereas power may be taken to mean the communication of decisions which activate obligations.[23] Power has a much more direct connotation than influence. When one thinks about power between A and B there is a tendency to view the relationship as unidirectional, $A \rightarrow B$; with influence, the relationship is more apt to be seen as a mutual process of stimulation, $A \leftrightarrow B$. The essence of a consensus-seeking form of leadership, the kind practiced by Mills, is mutual dependence, a relationship between Mills and the Committee which involves the flow of influence from the Committee to Mills just as much as the flow from Mills to the Committee.

Interestingly enough, two Committee members, in response to a question about Mills's power in the House, drew their own distinctions between power and influence. Most of the members of the Committee were content to talk in terms of power but these two members argued that Mills is best thought of in terms of influence, and it is safe to assume that the rest of the Committee would agree with their formulation of the distinction. The first member, reacting as though using the term power in connection with Mills was somehow unrealistic, said,

> Power—you mean influence? In the sense of influence? I agree with that. He's considerate. He's as considerate of the most junior member as he is of the most senior. That's why he's 'powerful.' In the Committee, too, it all starts in the Committee. I don't think Mills is the wizard he's made out to be, it takes him time, he doesn't always see the full meaning of what you're doing. But he does, finally, through hard work.

The second member, also a Democrat, compared Mills, the influential Chairman, to Carl Vinson, the powerful former chairman of Armed Services, as follows:

> I wouldn't use the term powerful, I'd say influential. There's a difference. I'll compare him with . . . Carl Vinson. Carl had power and he used it, he wasn't afraid to use it. Mills is different. He has influence. I don't mean influence in the sense you peddle influence. It isn't you do this for me or on a committee assignment. . . . It isn't this way with Mills. He can always bring you together. He has such great respect and influence.

In further elaboration of the differences between influence and power Parsons, in response to a critique by Coleman, insisted on the utility of the distinction, adding that influence is backed by: (1) arguments; and (2) giving or withholding of approval or disapproval. Power, on the other hand, is a way of activating obligations backed by the threat of negative sanctions.[24] This distinction between the bases of influence and power is useful, but it is still too nebulous for purposes of analyzing the Ways and Means Committee. The difference between a negative sanction and withholding social approval, for example, is not too clear, and in any event it is possible to think of a more detailed typology of the bases of influence than Parsons' two-part breakdown. Focusing on, in Coleman's words, "the investments that a person makes in another which permits the other to have influence on him,"[25] draws attention away from the influencer to the influenced, and with this focus we will discuss five bases of Mills's influence. The five bases of influence are adapted from French and Raven's useful classification of the bases of power, as follows:

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[22] This definition of power is, of course, taken from the definitions of Parsons, Dahl and Catlin. See Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 27 (Spring, 1963), 37–62; Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science,* 2 (July, 1957), 201–215; G. E. G. Catlin, *The Science and Method of Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), pp. 222–223.

[23] Parsons, *ibid.,* p. 48.

1. *Expertise:* based on Mills's knowledge of the subject matter.
2. *Legitimacy:* based on Mills's rights as the formal leader of the Committee.
3. *Rewards:* based on what Mills can do for the members in a positive way.
4. *Reference:* based on the identification of others with Mills.
5. *Sanctions:* based on what Mills can do, in a negative way, to promote compliance with his objectives.[26]

1. *Expertise.* As befits a leader whose style is that of persuasion—giving "facts" from which others can draw their own conclusions—Mills, as he is seen by the members, has great expertise in the abstruse areas considered by the Committee. When asked to explain Mills's influence in the Committee no reason was given as often as the Chairman's knowledge of the subject matter, and its only serious rival in importance was his fairness. The evidence gathered from the members illustrates perfectly Blau's comment that, "A person whose demands on others are fair and modest relative to the great contribution he makes to their welfare . . . earns their approval."[27]

Mills has earned the approval of the Committee members on his hard work and his mastery of the subjects coming before the Committee. Moreover, by becoming an expert Mills has reduced the cost of Committee membership to others. Those members who are unsure of the answers to complex questions can rely on his judgment, safe in the feeling that he knows what he is talking about, and those members who do not care to immerse themselves in technical complexities can let him do it, confident that he knows what he is doing. By acquiring some degree of expertise the Chairman has allowed other members "to perform rewarding activities with less effort, less anxiety, or in less time—in general, at lower cost.[28] And by lowering costs to others Mills has raised his own influence.

A Republican member of the Committee articulated the theme that the members feel secure with Mills because of his expertise. "His knowledge, the fact that he does his homework, is in the back of why they feel safe, why he gives them security." Referring to the complexity of the subject matter, he said, "They know he won't lead them into anything, and there's a lot of things to get into in these things." "He knows the bills thoroughly," a second Republican observed. Mills "knows what he's talking about," said another, and three of his colleagues agreed:

> Mills is preeminent. He's a real student. I don't know what the Democrats will do when he goes. He was the real leader before he became chairman

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[24] For Coleman's critique see James S. Coleman, "Comment on 'On the Concept of Influence,'" *ibid.*, pp. 63–82. For Parsons' rejoinder see *ibid.*, pp. 87–92.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 67.

[26] John R. P. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven, "The Bases of Social Power," *Group Dynamics*, eds. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson & Co., 1960), pp. 612–621. These may not be the only bases of power which can be distinguished but they are more inclusive than other typologies, such as Weber's threefold classification of authority. For Weber's treatment of charismatic, rational-legal, and traditional authority see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, ed. Talcott Parsons, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Macmillan Co., Free Press, 1964), pp. 328–363. I have substituted the term sanctions for Raven and French's "coercive" power because of the connotation of the latter, and their third base of power, legitimacy, is considerably different from the way it is used here. By legitimate power they mean internalized values which dictate that someone has a right to influence someone else. As used here legitimacy refers more to the decisions Mills can make because he is Chairman, and how these decisions affect his influence.

[27] Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 201.

[28] Thibaut and Kelley, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

> because he studies so much. Leadership depends on hard work and knowledge.
>
> He knows the tax code inside and out and he knows what Ways and Means has done for the last twenty years. He can cite and does cite section after section of the code.
>
> He's so single-minded, never goes out, no social life or cocktail parties. He's thoroughly absorbed, goes home and thinks about the legislation.

Democratic members of the Committee are as impressed—if not more so—with the Chairman's ability as the Republicans. They too see him as a man who has put years into the study of Ways and Means business ("work is his hobby"), knows more than they do ("take the experts, the specialists who have spent 40 years in the subject, apart"), has great natural ability ("best mind on the Committee"), understands the material ("isn't anything in taxes he fails to understand or fails to relate to what has gone before and tie it into today"), and who, with all of this, is fair and considerate in his relations with them. A Democrat summed up the general opinion, "He's an astounding man."[29]

The above odes to Mills's expertise and ability, qualified by only a few members who attributed Mills's influence more to hard work than to great native intelligence ("he's a plodder") help explain why he has great influence with the Committee members. Some of them see in his expertise great value to them. "He sort of quarterbacks it and lets me off. Takes the burden off me." But just as important as the general benefits they derive from his knowledge is the fact that he is inclined to use his knowledge not as a barrier to their policy objectives but as a guide to finding acceptable compromises. He is perceived as an expert who sometimes argues persuasively against proposals but also as a pragmatist who more often hits upon, as one member put it, the "honorable agreement." When he does this the members, more often than not, will settle for the compromise he offers as the best they are likely to get.

2. *Legitimacy.* Committee chairman are not ipso facto leaders in Congress, but they can become leaders if they have certain kinds of skills, and certain kinds of followers. The kinds of men on Ways and Means are men oriented toward bargaining, accommodation, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the subordination of specific policy objectives to the maintenance of the power and prestige of their Committee. They are men who actively strive for legislation but who operate on the principle that the legislative process makes one fundamental demand, patience. The question now before us is, what does it take to exert influence in a decision-making system composed of men who are, in theory, peers, and who must make important decisions while they are engaged in close, long-term relationships with one another?

Seniority is one answer the members of Congress have given to this question. Seniority is nothing more than a norm which organizes the decision-making process, giving to the senior members the right to make certain decisions which structure the legislative process. The list is familiar: control of the legislative agenda, appointment of junior members to subcommittees, organizational questions such as whether or not to have subcommittees, how many subcommittees there should be, management of the committee staff, the right of recognition of members who desire to speak, and general leadership in the shepherding of bills through the House. But none of these rights guarantees influence to the senior leaders. They are resources to be used in meeting the demands of the members or in reducing the costs of committee membership to them, and only if they are used in this way will there be a relationship between seniority and influence.

Homans, in discussing the successful leader, illuminates the basic qualification that must be placed on the formal prerogatives of senior leaders in the House: "If his chief external job is to be successful, his chief internal one is to be just. 'He's fair,' are the words in the mouths of his followers from which all other praises spring."[30] The successful committee chairman in the House is the just chairman in the committee, justice meaning in this case distributive justice, a favorable balance between rewards and costs (inducements and contributions) for the members resulting from the actions of the chairman. If the chairman so uses his prerogatives he enhances his influence with the members. If, however, the costs of the way he performs his leadership functions exceed the benefits to the members he may be able to implement his will for a time but his influence with the members will decrease, and if it decreases to a certain point the members, as they have done in some committees, may strip him of all but the gavel.

Put baldly, the argument applied to the Ways and Means Committee is that the rights granted to Mills because he is chairman are sources of influence because he exercises them in such a way that the members approve of his leadership. By so doing Mills is seen by the members as a chairman who makes important contributions to their welfare and, in Blau's words, "their common approval of his fairness, reinforced by their consensus concerning the respect his abilities deserve, generate group pressures that enforce compliance with his directives."[31]

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[29] Similar comments were received from staff members and executive branch specialists. The following is typical: "He has a memory like an elephant, never forgets a thing, and he can tell you more about the welfare administration than most people in this building."

[30] George C. Homans, *Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), p. 295.

"He has the ability and he's very fair," was the judgment on Mills by one Republican, and no one interviewed for this study disagreed. Even the one member who was highly critical of Mills said, "He is considerate of the fellow members, no one is more considerate. Don't get me wrong—I have to say his good points. He knows his stuff." A Democrat declared, "He is fair. He doesn't ride roughshod over anyone, although it has happened—it's been known to happen. But it's rare that he's roughshod." According to a Republican, "If I have an idea he's always ready to hear it out, to listen, and if he doesn't agree he says so and we go from there." This man compared Mills to another chairman,

> If Wilbur said what the hell there's 15 votes why not vote it through, don't waste all this time, then of course it'd be different. Jere Cooper was this way. Hell, he'd get a social security bill one day and report it the next.

Another Republican noted that Mills does not have to call bills up if he does not want to, and there is little the Republicans could do to force him to act. "I think it's a tribute to him that he lets them be aired." This man also related how one of his early experiences on the Committee bound him to Mills,

> Inside [Ways and Means] complete fairness so I feel attached to him. I remember when I was lowest man on the totem pole and I had some interrogation I wanted to do and there were a couple of secretaries there but it was late, 5:00 or 5:30. He said we'll come back in the morning the next day to hear Mr. ...., and they had to come back. I appreciate that.

"The Chairman," said a junior Democrat, "always allows everyone to get his questions in." If anything, Mills runs the Committee meetings in such a loose way that his patience with some members sometimes aggravates—while it impresses—other members. A Democrat, for instance, said,

> He'll listen forever. We have one member . . . who can never get enough information. I once said we'd need a building as large as the Rayburn Building to store all the information he wants. He's always asking for more information and Mills gets him more, more, more, more, more and more. He's a fine chairman. I don't think you'll find anyone who wouldn't say that about him.

The man who said Mills never rides roughshod over anyone summed up: "The overriding thing is his patience. He just keeps going and going and going and he *outlasts* everyone else. This is the most important thing. He is fair."

Viewed from this perspective, the contribution of his legitimate prerogatives to Mills's influence is not that he has certain rights but that he uses them to win approval from the members. The question of the staff is a good example. As one of the more perceptive members put it, "Sure all the members have the staff but they are his men first—the Chairman's men. *And the reason they are is that he does the work.*" The staff gives Mills's needs precedence over other members' needs but they are available to the other members and most of the members are quite satisfied with the staff. A few think the Committee could use more staff but there is no widespread demand for more and, if there were, the Chairman would probably be receptive to hiring more people. The point is that an expert staff in the hands of an inexpert chairman can be a liability instead of an asset, and the reason the staff professionals are seen as the "Chairman's men" on Ways and Means is not that he is chairman but that he is the kind of chairman he is. The other members do not begrudge him the staff because they know that he puts more into the Committee than they do and consequently has more need of the staff.

Another good example is the Chairman's decision not to use subcommittees for legislative purposes. Committee members prefer to work without subcommittees but it is no doubt true that the absence of subcommittees makes for a highly centralized operation in the Committee, an operation centered around Mills. As a Democrat said, "This means that he is there with five or six members who would normally be a subcommittee and he is chairman of all the subcommittees." But the main significance of conducting the Committee's legislative business in plenary session is that although it makes for high centralization the members do not mind. In fact, with Mills as the center they prefer it to the normal subcommittee arrangement. No doubt the members realize that this style of operation increases the opportunities for the Chairman to influence their decisions but the Chairman's influence is precisely what they like about the Committee. "If we had a new chairman we might have subcommittees," a Democrat commented, "someone who wanted to delegate. But as long as Mills wants all the responsibility we're willing to let him have it. We don't have white hats as I told you. A lot of the bills are tough." A second Democrat, when it was suggested that perhaps one reason Mills does not establish subcommittees is that it might lessen his control on the Committee, gave the revealing reply that, "No, Wilbur just isn't that kind of person. He's too big for that. I think the reason is just because it'd be hard to get the members interested enough to attend." And a senior Democrat said that if he were chairman he would *have* to have subcommittees because he could not be as central a figure in the Committee as Mills: "I'd have to have two or three members around me. I don't have the ability or the interest to do it like Mills. I might need two or three subcommittees." For this man, were he to become chairman, the establishment of subcommittees would be a sign of weakness and the need for decentralization, not a decision by which he could enhance his own influence. To save some influence he would have to use his authority to share the potential for influence with others. For Mills, the authority of the chairmanship is used to buttress the centralization of the Committee, to centralize the resources of influence, and no one seems to mind.

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[31] Blau, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

In considering legitimacy as a base of influence for the Chairman it is important to remember than many of the mundane functions of the Chairman which may increase his ability to persuade the members on certain questions fall within what Barnard calls the "zone of indifference."[32] For a member like Thomas B. Curtis (who left the Committee in 1968) the zone was very narrow and he constantly supervised Mills to make sure that the Committee was, by his standards, well run, an oversight function which on occasion irritated the Chairman. For other members, however, the zone of indifference is comparatively large and may include everything but how to cast votes in the final stages of the Committee process. On many questions the members are content to rely on Mills. Ranking the tedious Committee meetings low on their list of priorities, these members open up a wide area in which Mills can make decisions in a relatively unrestrained way. Mills, characteristically, has a good feel for the boundaries of his autonomous zone and when he receives requests from members which fall within it, such as having someone in particular testify before the Committee, he accedes and thus insures the continuation of his general control over such matters. It is conceivable, indeed likely, that decisions such as allowing executive department representatives to participate in the executive sessions of the Committee affect the decisions of the Committee, and may affect them in ways desired by Mills, but few members care deeply about such matters. For the most part, the members are willing to let Mills run the Committee because on many questions of procedure he consults them and on nearly everything he runs the Committee, with or without consultations, to their satisfaction. By so doing, Mills maximizes the influence potential of his formal powers while minimizing the complaints that are sometimes heard about other committee chairmen in the House. Thus he is considered by one member (and nearly all) as "the best damn chairman in the House, best I've seen in all my years in the legislature."

3. *Rewards*. Bargaining, regardless of what form it takes (logrolling, side payments, splitting the difference), is peculiarly suited to a decision-making system in which every man has some influence, no man and no group of men has undivided control over important resources of influence, and in which men who are in a formal sense equals must bring a common interest out of a diversity and conflict of interests. Such a system is built for bargaining, as those who built it—with their concern over factions—no doubt realized. And such a system, if it is to function smoothly, requires agreement on one fundamental norm: the duty to reciprocate assistance or rewards received from others.

Most of the exchanges that take place in Congress are subtle exchanges to which political scientists and others have given inelegant names: logrolling, *quid pro quo*, and back-scratching. Normally there is little need for the members to spell out what is expected when one gives or receives assistance. "He keeps his word" is high praise in Congress but the word, if the relationship is good, need not be spoken. Most of the bargaining in Congress is, in short, implicit.

To become an influential leader in such a system requires much more than seniority. Influence in Congress is earned, not bestowed. Those men whose influence transcends their own vote have made use of whatever limited formal advantages they are given plus—and this is the vital factor—their skill at exchanging benefits with their colleagues. No one, neither the Speaker nor the most influential committee chairman, commands; he negotiates.

Compared with leaders of many organizations, committee chairmen have few material incentives or rewards with which to negotiate.[33] A committee member's salary, for example, is not dependent upon how well he performs in the committee, his attendance record at committee meetings, or the number of hours he spends each week on committee business. Nor does the chairman have control over other common rewards, such as stock options, insurance plans, paid vacations, and the like. He may, of course, allocate committee funds so some members can travel to boring conferences in exciting places but in the case of the Ways and Means Committee the Chairman is notoriously frugal on such matters. How, then, does Mills, by using the limited rewards and favors at his disposal, induce the members to make contributions to the Committee's work and to his own objectives?[34]

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[32] Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 167–70.

Before discussing Mills's use of rewards it should be noted that by constantly guarding the Committee's reputation in the House he is in effect protecting one of the most significant rewards the members have. Like leaders of all groups the Chairman relates the organization to others and this function is particularly important in the House where the tendency is strong for committees to be equated with and judged in terms of the chairman.[35] If the Ways and Means Committee ranks high in the House it is partly because of Mills and his leadership.

To some people decision-making through bargaining and exchange of favors has pejorative connotations. It contrasts with making decisions according to a normative "rational" model: Step 1: problem; Step 2: weigh pros and cons of alternatives; Step 3: study merits; Step 4: make decision. Congressmen are no less sensitive to the pejorative aspects of exchange than other decision-makers; indeed, given the persistence of the rumor that legislatures are bastions of logrolling, congressmen are probably more likely than others to deny or discount the importance of the exchanges that occur. This makes gathering of evidence on exchange in Congress difficult. Bargaining is an intensely personal relationship among the members, one they are reluctant to discuss with outsiders.

It is true, nonetheless, that bargains, implicit or explicit, are made in Congress, and that exchanges of rewards and favors are inevitably associated with the decision-making process.

But going beyond the assertion that men such as Mills use rewards and favors to build good relationships with other members, though necessary, is not easy. With the difficulties clearly in mind, it was decided to attack the problem by asking the members of the Committee, point-blank, how they stood with Mills on the exchange of rewards and favors. It was clear that Mills was the source of at least some rewards for the members, in addition to the rewarding aspects of his leadership discussed above, and it was felt that Mills probably did more for the members than he requested of them. If true, this is another reason why the members are inclined to respond favorably to his leads and, though not the only reason for his influence, is a reason.

Accordingly, 18 members of the Committee (ten Democrats and eight Republicans) were asked the following question:

> In the normal course of passing legislation Mills has the opportunity of doing a number of things for the members. He also calls on members to do things for him occasionally. In your relations with Mills how do you stand: would you say you have done more for him, he has done more for you, or are you about even?

Since no political scientist had ever reported the results in such a question, or probably even asked about exchanges in such a direct way, it was not known what to expect. The results, despite the good reasons for going after such information in a more subtle way, were better than expected. The question had the merit of posing the issue starkly and forcing the members to confront it explicitly, perhaps for the first time. The results, of course, have to be handled with care but I deem them of sufficient validity and interest to warrant reporting here. By the time I asked the question most of the members were aware that I had done a good deal of research on the Committee, rapport had been established with most of them, and though a few appeared to be taken aback no one seemed to take offense that such a question would be asked.

Table 2 presents the responses. As expected, most of the members replied that in their opinion Mills has done more for them than they

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[33] See Barnard's discussion of incentives, *ibid.* pp. 139–149.

[34] Parsons uses the term sanction to include rewards and punishments. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (eds.), *Toward a General Theory of Action* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), p. 191. Rewards and sanctions are distinguished here because the former increase the atrtactiveness of the giver, while the latter decrease his attractiveness. On this point see French and Raven, *op. cit.*, p. 615.

[35] On the importance of this function in a very different setting see William Foote Whyte, "Corner Boys: A Study in Clique Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology,* 46 (March, 1941), p. 661.

TABLE 2. MEMBERS' ESTIMATES OF THEIR BARGAINING POSITION WITH THE CHAIRMAN

Responses	Democrats	Republicans
1. Mills has done more for me.	2	5
2. It doesn't work that way.	4	2
3. We are about even.	3	1
4. I've done more for him.	1	0

have for him, a close second was the response that it does not work that way in the Committee, four members felt they are about even with the Chairman, and only one man felt the balance favored Mills. As we shall see, this man's reply was one of the most interesting received.

As was not expected, but perhaps should have been, the Republican members of the Committee feel more in Mill's debt than the Democrats, a finding which supports the rather common Republican observation that Mills tends to take the Committee Democrats for granted while he pays relatively more attention to the minority members. More than half of the Republicans who were asked the question, and fully half of the ten Republicans on the Committee, said that Mills has done more for them than vice versa. Only two of the ten Democrats replied in kind.

Two Republicans who said Mills has done *much* more for them than they have reciprocated revealed how they felt about Mills in the process, and why it is that on some questions they are likely to be influenced by him. The first Republican stressed Mills's loyalty to the members of the Committee, regardless of party affiliation. "If I want a letter any time for my campaign, support for reelection, he'll give it. A picture with him—any time. He's loyal with his members and I appreciate this." He also discounted his ability to repay the Chairman: "He's a hundred thousand watts and I can't light that candle." When asked if he ever used a letter from Mills in his campaign he said no, but that he has used a picture of himself with the Chairman. Moreover, he thinks the picture has helped him,

> I think it helps you that the Chairman hasn't put you in the isolation box. I'd love to have him come out to my district and give a speech. Not an endorsement, just a speech. I'd love to show him to my businessmen. Why, he'd draw a crowd twice as big as I do. I think he's the top fiscal brain in the country.

The second Republican has had Mills out to his district for a speech. Some local people contacted him about inviting Mills and he took the matter up with the Chairman. His approach to Mills was impersonal: he told the Chairman that he knew how busy he was and would understand if he could not take time to make the trip, but that these people did want him to come, so, if possible, it would be a nice thing to do for them. Mills made the request very personal by asking the man, "Do *you* want me to do it?" The member, a bit reluctantly, said yes. Mills did him the favor.

But this is not the end of the exchange between Mills and the Republican, it is the beginning. The Republican member and Mills both know, undoubtedly, that repayment of the favor will not involve defecting from the Republican side on a major party issue. It may not involve anything specific at all for, as the member said, "Wilbur Mills is not the kind to ask you on specifics." It is important to understand that the second step in the exchange is implicit, vague, and if Mills ever directly asks the man for assistance on something neither one will have to recall the Chairman's trip. All the trip did was lay the foundation for future exchanges and, since Mills did the first favor, its value may never be completely exhausted.

Similar favors were mentioned by other Republicans but more revealing than a catalogue of the little rewards Mills gives the Republicans is that the two Republicans who said it does not work that way in Ways and Means meant that their relationship with Mills is based more firmly than an emphasis on reciprocation of benefits would allow. Both men admitted that they have received kindnesses from the Chairman but that this plays a minor part in their relationship. A senior Republican thought the question was a good one but had difficulty answering it,

> It's a good question but I don't know. . . . I never think in terms of due bills and maybe this is more applicable to the fellows farther down the table. When you get to the top you want to avoid due bills. I don't think anyone keeps a ledger. I certainly wouldn't want to get into a position of owing the Chairman something for what he's done because I'd never know what it would be I'd have to pay off on. We cooperate but it's not on that basis. . . . What most of the fellows want he can't give them, they're so big, so I don't know how much of this there is, actually.

His junior colleague also discounted the importance of favors in accounting for Mills's influence. He argued that if Mills can convince him, fine, but if he cannot he will not follow the Chairman.

> Doesn't operate that way. I suppose it's an unwritten rule. . . . You see in the press about member's bills but it's not as easy as the Chairman saying Jim's a nice fellow let's give him this. It takes unanimous consent, one objection is usually enough, and for most of them the departments are agreed. They have to be good little bills. I suppose Mills by objecting has control over all of them. I can honestly say Wilbur Mills has never asked me for a vote on anything. It doesn't operate that way. If he can convince me, fine, but I haven't seen much of the other generally. I'm a representative of my people and he's a representative of his, and we look at the merit.

A final subtlety that came out of the interviews with the Republican members is that Mills is so cooperative and helpful with the members that they impose their own limits on what they ask of him. The Chairman's willingness to do favors for them is its own control on what they request. "In fact," said one Republican, "he's so cooperative and agreeable that you, I do at any rate, hold off on taking advantage, don't want to ask too much. If it's something big but not quite right yet I'll hold back; something small, I'll go to him and he'll say remind me to bring that up." Like others, this man has received praise from Mills which he has used in his campaign for reelection.

Democratic responses to the reward question, as indicated, were much more in the direction of discounting the importance of favors than the Republicans. Two of the Democrats, however, did say that Mills has given them more than he has received. One of them cited three bills which were passed with Mills's help and, he felt, because of Mills's help. The other said, "He's never refused me on anything—any reasonable request I've had—*and I've never asked for anything unreasonable*." He feels that he has repaid Mills by, among other things, speaking for Committee bills on the floor where his reputation as a conservative Democrat might help get some southern votes, but in the light of the Chairman's own influence among the southerners he feels that his efforts may be a little redundant.

One important point needs to be made about the Democratic responses: although it is true that the Democrats are less apt to say that Mills has done more for them, they feel that, (a) he has done a lot for them; and/or (b) if they ever need his help he will very likely give it. Five of the seven Democrats whose answers fell in categories two and three made one or the other comment, or both. The other two claimed that in Ways and Means merit alone determined all the outcomes.

To digress for a moment, one member who denied the importance of the *quid pro quo* in Ways and Means stressed the importance of group-identity in the Committee. "You have to understand that we are 25 men in very close relationship. We have rapport with each other. It isn't *quid pro quo*. We do things for each other but it's not on a *quid pro quo* basis." What this member seems to be saying is that the predominant form of exchange in the Committee is implicit, as it no doubt is, but this does not mean that exchanges do not take place. Indeed, it might be argued that in a cohesive group exchange will probably always be implicit and, if the members ever reach the point where transactions are overt, the group is probably in the process of disintegrating. That Committee members help one another without a signed contract is evidence of a highly integrated group, not a group without exchanges occurring among the members.

Returning to Mills's exchange relationship with the members, it bears noting that he interacts with the members in such a way that they sometimes feel indebted to him without quite knowing why, and without being conscious of what is exchanged between them. A Democrat who answered "about even" reflected on his relationship to the Chairman in a way that merits close attention,

> I've probably done things for him but I'm not aware of any. I'm not conscious of it. It's not a transferral of mortgages with Mills. There are a lot of mortgages around here, all of a sudden the paper is presented and the mortgage falls due. But not with Mills. I suppose I've done things for him but I can't remember any. That's the kind of man he is. No reasonable request of mine has been turned down.

His relationship with Mills, in short, is much more nebulous than one based on an explicit series of exchanges, but, for this reason, he is probably that much closer to the Chairman.

Yet the vagueness of the exchanges should not be overdone. There was nothing unclear or imprecise in the statement of the Democrat who said, "It's pretty much a one-way street. Me to Mills rather than Mills to me." What is most interesting of all—and this serves as a warning against the proposition that an influential man is one who makes debtors out of others through the skillful use of rewards—is that this man, far from feeling that he had a claim on Mills, was, of all the members interviewed, probably the most likely to be influenced by Mills. The symbolism he used to describe his situation was extreme but revealing: "It's like being allowed to touch the hem of the Lord's gown. That's how it was with me." This statement, which was the epitome of respect for Mills, was made after the man said,

> Mills is autocratic as hell, but he doesn't make you feel that he is. He'll give you just enough things, let you ask enough questions, so he'll have you. This is what he does: you have something you want, you bring it to him, you bring the people who are on your back to him, and after making you sweat he'll let it in. And then he has command of you from then on. I always thought of myself as one of his boys. He's aloof but he'll bring you in.

Asked by the member for support on a proposal, Mills, after an appropriate wait, gave his support, gained the man's backing, and, by not alienating the member, kept his backing until it would be useful to his own purposes. With this member Mills probably never had to ask for assistance; the member no doubt looked for ways of helping the Chairman.

At one end of the continuum Mills may do no more for a member than agree to spend a few minutes listening to someone who has asked a member to set up a meeting with him. This costs Mills time if not agreement with the supplicant's proposals but it allows the member who acts as the middleman to impress those who have access to him, and it makes him indebted to the Chairman. Mills listens patiently to the interest group representative and the representative, informed beforehand by the Committee member not to expect Mills to give any unequivocal reaction, leaves content with having had the opportunity to state his case where it counts. To the uninitiated lobbyist this can be a disconcerting experience. One former lobbyist found Mills "always cooperative, courteous, but you could never get Wilbur Mills to take a stand. If you didn't know him well you could go out of his office thinking he agreed with you and then realize later that he didn't really say that after all." But, at the very least, the interested party has had a hearing and a memo to a client which begins with, "Today I had a chat with Chairman Mills . . . ," is an accomplishment. At election time, when he is confronted by the congressman with, "Remember that chat you had with Wilbur . . . ," he is likely to respond. In between these events, the chances are good that Mills has put his arm around the member's shoulder and without reference to past favors asked if he couldn't possibly see his way clear to doing this or that, thus closing the circle of exchanges which makes up a large part of congressional life.

At the other end of the continuum, Mills may commit himself to the inclusion of some member's proposal in a Ways and Means bill and expend a great deal of energy in getting it enacted into law. The members know that because of his influence in the Committee his backing or at least his benevolent neutrality are important for them to implement their ideas. Mills rewards the members every time he actively supports and makes his own one of their suggestions.

The Chairman's reward base is not confined solely to assisting members meet the substantive demands of their constituents and friends. As the occupant of the formal position of leadership on the Committee he can make decisions which determine how the Committee functions, discussed above as his legitimate power, but he can also use his formal powers as rewards for the members. Too much should not be made of the little favors the Chairman does for members, but they should not be dismissed as irrelevant either. As a Democrat said, with some exaggeration, "Members have bills they want passed, members they want to get on committees, provisions they want enacted, hearings they want held—these are the little intangibles that make him powerful."

Consider, for example, his control over such procedural matters as hearings and witnesses. It is not accidental that members commonly have the opportunity to deliver a flowery introduction for a prominent constituent. And, should a member get into a tight spot with a witness, Mills will often help extricate him. In both of these ways Mills utilizes the public hearings to improve his relations with the members.

In addition to the hearings Mills controls the terms of the House floor debate on the Committee's bills. Committee members have first call on debate time although there is usually sufficient time for all members who really want to speak on the floor to do so. If he wants to he can shift the spotlight from himself to other members by letting them handle time on the floor while he does other things.[36] He may even let a member's name appear on the Committee report and permit him to floor manage a bill, as Eugene Keogh (D., N.Y.) did on a bill he pushed for years, H. R. 10.[37]

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[36] This happened to Dan Rostenkowski during the 1965 debate on excise taxes when he happened to be close to Mills when the Chairman wanted to leave the microphone. See *Congressional Record,* July 2, 1965 (daily edition), p. 11891. Rostenkowski was pleased.

[37] House, Committee on Ways and Means, *Contributions by Self-Employed Individuals to Pension Plans, etc.,* 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, H. Rept, 1557 to accompany H. R. 10. *Congressional Record,* June 6, 1966 (daily edition), pp. 11672–82.

Another tactic the Chairman uses on the floor is the public acknowledgement of the great contribution some members of the Committee have made to the legislation being considered. This inducement, which Mills dispenses on a bipartisan basis,[38] is so much a part of the floor ceremony by now that it is doubtful if anyone gives it a second thought, but it is precisely the commonness of the practice that tells much about how Mills operates. It is, simply, something one expects from him. The point is, however, that the same expectation is not universally associated with committee chairmen.

A related example of the Chairman's reward power is that he will help the members defend their record on the Committee if an opponent tries to use it against him. A staff man recounted how some disparaging remarks he made about a member's attendance and participation in the Committee were used by the member's opponent. Mills wrote a letter testifying to the attacked member's service on the Committee and thereby helped blunt the force of the charge. By thus protecting the members from criticism he gains their favor (and, it might be noted, removes one more stimulus for them to attend the meetings).

Taken singly, none of the above favors is of great consequence. The members are right: no one but those concerned have an interest in little things such as members' bills. But without exaggerating the importance of favors and rewards to Mills's influence in the Committee it can be said that many members benefit from their relationship with him and that the members, especially Republicans, believe that they get more from Mills than they return. Mills does not have a large number of valuable rewards to offer the members in return for their help, but by making use of what he has he establishes positive relationships with most of the members. When he suggests a compromise in the Committee, when he requests some assistance in passing a bill in the House, when he needs a minor adjustment in the social security law to help a lady in Arkansas, when he wants a freshman from Arkansas appointed to the Appropriations Committee—all of which have happened—the response of the Committee members is likely to be favorable because of all the favors he has done for them. For as one member said regarding the committee assignment, once Mills let it be known he wanted it for his man "you might as well not even have a vote, no one is going to vote against him on this kind of thing. He doesn't ask that much. . . ."

4. *Reference.* A fourth source of influence for the Chairman, one which probably stems from the above three, is that most of the members of the Committee, if not all, identify with him. The members feel a sense of oneness with him, they like being closely associated with him, they care about their relationship with him, and they are influenced by him. The Chairman, by treating the members with respect, by being fair, by being knowledgeable in the subject matter, and by being receptive to their demands and needs, has ingratiated himself with them. Consequently, when a member disagrees with Mills he does it in such a way that the disagreement does not strain their relationship and, if possible, he prefers to agree with the Chairman more often than not.

The reference factor appeared in the interviews in different ways. One member, a Republican recently appointed to the Committee, commented that Mills treats the members so well—unlike some chairmen he has heard about—that the members feel drawn to him even though they may oppose him on certain issues. In his own case, he mentioned that one of the reasons he attends the lengthy Committee meetings is because of Mills: "I feel compelled to go because he's there and if he does it. . . ." He also observed that Democratic attendance is not too good, "But Mills is there, he's conscientious." A Democrat, when asked if anyone had given him any advice as a newcomer to the Committee, said yes, but perhaps more important, "Unconsciously you sit there, watch Mills, and you start following him—that's all." A few members were asked if they would tell a newcomer to the Committee to emulate anyone, and the answers were predictable:

> Mills. He's quite a guy and a new member should watch the Chairman closely and get to know him well.
>
> I'd tell them to emulate Byrnes and Curtis. They are real students and they have done their homework. Mills too. Wilbur is a real student. He's not arbitrary but he's got respect and he's effective.
>
> Mills. No one else.

Another member talked disparagingly about those members who take pains to get close to Mills, who praise him all the time, who want, in his imagery, to "get close to the throne." This man does not do this because he finds it "repulsive." But in 1967 when Mills received a lot of publicity in connection with the tax surcharge issue the member visited his district and received an unusual amount of attention because of his membership on Ways and Means. He returned and told the Chairman, "Wilbur, you've made a great man out of me." That this member cares about his relationship with Mills was manifest in a story he told about what happened after he put something in the *Congressional Record* critical of a bill the Committee had reported. Mills "called me to task on this and I learned a lesson early." He assured the Chairman the material was not meant as a personal criticism of him and that, on the contrary, he had always tried to be one of Mill's "biggest public supporters." A similar kind of thing happened to a second member who, informed by a staff man that Mills thought something he had said was critical of the way the Committee was run, informed the go-between that the statement in question was directed at the Administration, not at the Chairman. It is not known if the word ever got back to Mills but the incident does show that this member, like his chastised colleague, is sensitive to his relationship with the Chairman.

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[38] In 1965 Mills lauded Joel Broyhill's contribution to the medicare bill. Broyhill, who was strongly criticized for leaving the District and Post Office committees for Ways and Means, might not have found it necessary to use Mills's statement in his campaign, but he could have if he wanted to. *Congressional Record,* April 7, 1965 (daily edition), p. 6959.

The above evidence indicates that Mills has great influence with the members of the Committee. The members themselves see him as a master at influencing them and others. But if this is true it should be recognized that Mills is not a master puppeteer. He deals with men who have all kinds of interests and are subjected to all sorts of competing demands and it sometimes happens that these demands pull them in ways contrary to the Chairman's direction. To a large extent, his influence lies in his skill at aligning his demands on the members with the other demands made upon them. In this process, his aforementioned proclivity to compromise, to bring opposing sides together, and to negotiate settlements of disputes, are of prime significance.

Yet it is equally true that although nonconformity with Mills's decisions may turn out to be a necessity, once one has been drawn close to Mills it is an unpleasant necessity; if at all possible, the member is apt to agree with Mills and to behave in ways approved by Mills. This intricate process reaches its height when the member relieves his inner tension by explaining to Mills why he cannot go along with him and the Chairman, who probably has enough votes anyway, casually dismisses the incident as of no importance to their future, and firmly-rooted, relations. By so doing the Chairman maintains—indeed adds to—his base of influence with the members.

5. *Sanctions.* "You talk about a chairman who uses his power ruthlessly, you're not talking about Wilbur Mills." This comment, by a Democrat, illustrates what is by now abundantly clear: the influence of Mills in the legislative process is not based on the sanctions that he, as the Committee Chairman, could use. Sanctions are defined as actions designed to bring about results through non-physical coercion or force and hence, in contrast to rewards, generate negative affect on the part of other members of a group.[39]

The mark of Mills's leadership is that in doing the job as he defines it he relies on rewards, favors, expertise, persuasion, negotiation, and bargaining, not on coercing the members by using the sanctions that are available to him.

Unlike some committee chairmen, such as Graham Barden of North Carolina who chaired the Education and Labor Committee for eight years, Mills has not used his authority as chairman in such a way as to provoke extreme hostility—mixed with grudging respect—from the members. Mills's objective has been to get legislation out of his Committee with enough support behind it to pass in the House. Barden's objective was to kill and, failing that, delay as long as possible federal aid to education, and his behavior as chairman reflected his perception of the Education and Labor Committee's job.[40]

With fundamentally different objectives Mills and Barden typify fundamentally different styles of leadership in the House. To marshall a majority Mills allows members and witnesses to speak at length; to prevent a majority from coalescing Barden permitted and encouraged the filibuster. To mark up legislation Mills holds the Committee to a stiff regimen; to thwart legislation Barden called meetings irregularly and established ad hoc subcommittees which he controlled. To proceed with speed Mills actively seeks a quorum; to procrastinate Barden banged the gavel and adjourned when a quorum was not immediately present. To ease the burdens of formulating legislation Mills surrounds the Committee with expert help; to heighten these burdens Barden kept the staff weak. To promote a workmanlike atmosphere in the Committee Mill seeks consensus; to promote confusion Barden sowed dissensus. And, finally, to pass the bill Mills carefully maps the House terrain; to defeat the bill Barden allocated disproportionate time to opponents and once, near the end of the proceedings, threw the House into a frenzy by resigning as floor manager.

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[39] See French and Raven's treatment of coercive power, *op. cit.*, pp. 614–615.

[40] The comments on Barden are based on Fenno's analysis of him, Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House of Representatives and Federal Aid to Education," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, eds. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), pp. 209–212.

At one time or another Mills has used many of the tactics employed by Barden, but with basically different objectives. Extended public hearings have delayed legislation but in the meanwhile Mills has quietly sought a reconciliation of demands with the objective of passing some form of the legislation. Confronted by resistance to a compromise on federal unemployment compensation standards in 1966 he, on at least one occasion and to the chagrin of no one, adjourned the Committee for lack of a quorum with 12 members present whereas, if time were of the essence, the 13th member probably could have been found. Like Barden, Mills has relied on Republicans to defeat certain measures over the protest of a majority of Democrats on the Committee (e.g., medicare) but he has not done this so often that the members criticize him for being a Republican in Democratic disguise, as they did with Barden. And, perhaps of greatest significance, Mills has never brought his opposition to the House floor and attempted to defeat the bill by parliamentary legerdemain; as a matter of fact, bills he opposes do not come to the House floor.

Stark is the contrast between Barden and Mills, therefore, even when, objectively, their tactics seem the same. For Barden, federal aid to education was an issue on which he was willing to sink, and go down with, the ship; for Mills, there has never been a no-holds-barred issue on which he has risked everything. The only bill before the Ways and Means Committee which bears a strong resemblance to federal aid to education is medicare and even here Mills, characteristically, had informed Speaker McCormack and through him the White House that given enough time he would be able to work something out.[41]

Thus Mills, in seeking a consensus, relies on four of the five bases of influence: expertise, legitimacy, rewards and reference. In the Committee's deliberations he will, if possible, stay in the background by letting the active members, with some coaxing, hit upon the compromise through their own efforts but, since the Quaker-like sense of the meeting may evade them, he will often articulate it and when he does the Committee has made a "decision," always tentative depending upon further developments. The low amount of negative affect expressed toward the Chairman indicates that his style of leadership is approved of by the members, and their agreement on the way he influences them through four of the five bases of influence helps explain why, when he intervenes in the discussion, his suggestions often constitute a Committee decision.

III. MILLS: THE SWING VOTE

When Mills persuades the members of the Committee to make certain decisions it may be on the basis of his expertise, or his influence may be based on the way he has handled interpersonal relations in the Committee, or it may be because the members are indifferent on the outcomes. But then again it may be none of these. It may be a simple matter of arithmetical influence: he, for all the reasons discussed above, has the votes. The Chairman's influence in the Committee is on some issues closely related to his position as the crucial swing vote between the coalitions that appear most often on Ways and Means issues. If the parties split cleanly Mills and the 14 Democrats beat the Republicans 15–10. If an issue divides the Committee along liberal-conservative lines Mills and 12 Democrats can beat the Republicans and two conservative Democrats 13–12; or, in some cases, Mills and two conservative Democrats plus the Republicans can defeat the 12 Democrats 13–12. Mills, as a moderate on policy questions, straddles the coalitions in Ways and Means and, because he does, it is a rare coalition that sees him on the losing side. For many years two conservative Democrats, A. Sydney Herlong of Florida (who left the Committee in 1968) and John Watts of Kentucky, played leading roles in the coalition make-up of the Committee. Both men were close to Mills and if the other Democrats on the Committee banded together into a 12-vote bloc they still lost 13–12 without the Chairman. With the Chairman, the 12 Democrats won by the same margin. The pivot was the Chairman.

Evidence for the nature of coalitions in the Committee comes both from interviews and votes which have occurred in the Committee. Since most issues are resolved without votes (a "consensus" is reached), partly because the shape of the blocs is relatively easy to predict, there are not many recorded votes to consider. But some have been collected and they substantiate, with exceptions, the results of the interviews.

An HEW official sees Mills in this way: "If he took an all-out Democratic or Administration line he could steamroller it through, but he's more conservative than the Administration, he doesn't do this." One of his colleagues in the Department sees the importance of Mill's coalition position to his influence in the Committee even more clearly,

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[41] Theodore C. Sorensen, *Kennedy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 343.

> It's not only that he's prestigeful, its not only that he's chairman. It's that Mills stands at the center of the Committee and when he accepts something it doesn't get enacted just because he says 'poof,' but because he's at the center. He's generally more moderate than the Republicans and he's more conservative than the Democrats, so the Republicans know they can get just about what he accepts and same with the Democrats. If you sell Mills you've got it is both true and a truism. It's not just his personality, it's the nature of things in that Committee.

Liberal Democrats on the Committee are potentially a sizable bloc of votes but, with one or two exceptions, they are liberals who are unlikely to split off into a discordant minority and attempt to reverse Committee decisions on the House floor. They are aware of the political realities in the Committee but, given the style of Mills's leadership, they are not closed off from influence in the Committee, which is one more reason they do not usually attempt to overturn the Chairman on the floor. One liberal Democrat, a typical non-crusader with a 100 percent rating by the Americans for Democratic Action, understands the Chairman's "problem" in these terms: "Two or three of us on the Committee don't always get everything to our liking—liberals—but we understand his problem. I think the worst thing in the world for him would be to get defeated on a proposition on the floor. We understand his situation so it doesn't cause any problems—we can't win, we know it." He explained that if the Committee reported a bill by one vote the bill would have trouble passing the House so, although the Committee liberals may not be fully satisfied with the Mills consensus, they support it anyway. This Democrat's approach to liberal questions was well illustrated by a story he told about Aime Forand's unsuccessful efforts to get medicare reported by the Committee. According to his man, Forand got so upset with Mills that he planned to force the issue to a vote in the Committee even though everyone knew the Forand bill did not have a chance. This man, no less ardent in his desire for medicare than Forand, felt that Forand was unwise to press so hard for a lost cause.

Another liberal Democrat confirmed the futility of having votes in the Committee because of Mills's strategic position, but a Democrat who also classified himself as a liberal, and who feels that Ways and Means is "two-thirds conservative, probably always will be," feels that despite their minority status they can have an effect on the legislation under a chairman like Mills:

> We liberals, though a small band, have an impact. I remember when aid to dependent children came up and they were going to cut it off at five children. I told them they had just declared war, it was an act of war in my district, and if they wanted a revolution they'd go ahead with it. I got so mad I walked out—but Mills said, 'Oh come on back, let's talk about it'—that's what he says. I killed that proposal. . . . I was ready to take it to the floor, and they knew I would too, the bastards. They changed it.

With the presence of some conservative Democrats on the Committee, and with the possibility of a stray Republican vote or two, poaching by Mills and Byrnes is a familiar part of the coalition-building process in Ways and Means. Both party groups have defectors except on the most basic party issues (e.g., debt bills, reporting medicare, major revenue bills). A Democrat noted, "The Republicans can reach right across and get Herlong and Watts anytime they want them. Mills is a swinger." It is not that easy for the Republicans (or for Mills) and the Democrats most likely to defect often stay with Mills, but the minority is aware of their potential, if success is less than complete. A Republican told how it works,

> It's not the sort of thing you do formally. You don't sit down with them and say if we do this . . . it's not any kind of logrolling operation. But yes we have done this. You anticipate, sometimes you get it from how the hearings are going, and we may leave something out in hope of getting some of them. I thought we had Sydney [Herlong] on that provision you remember that tied the tax cut to some sort of expenditure control—he had introduced it. I talked with Sydney about it but Mills got to him and talked him out of it—even made a speech on the floor. Mills can do this sort of thing.

Forty record votes in the Committee have been collected since Mills became chairman in 1958,[42] and the results confirm the dominant position of the Chairman in the Committee. These votes are not comprehensive because more votes were taken in the Committee than were reported. It must be noted, too, that many important issues never come to a vote in the Committee. For example, in 1964 Cecil King did not force medicare to a vote because he knew it would lose.

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[42] The forty votes include votes reported in the *Congressional Record*, *Congressional Quarterly*, an unpublished doctoral dissertation on the 1964 Revenue Act written by Everett Cataldo, the public press, and, in some cases, by private sources.

Of the 40 votes, the Chairman has been on the losing side only seven times: a 1959 bill dealing with interest rates, a 1961 bill regarding tax treatment of the self-employed, a 1962 vote on unemployment insurance, two votes during the consideration of the tax reduction bill in 1963, a social security vote in 1964, and a 1966 vote on providing federal standards for unemployment compensation programs. Based on available data, therefore, Mills's reputation as a winner in the Committee is deserved.

It is impossible to know whether Mills, had he made an all-out effort on the seven votes he lost in the Committee, could have won, but regardless of the circumstances surrounding these votes the fact remains that he was on the losing side. He can be and has been beaten in the Committee, more often than in the House, and, in the light of his reputation as an invincible chairman, a look at his losses is in order.

Votes in 1963, 1964, and 1966 are particularly revealing. In 1963 the Administration, as part of its tax cut and tax reform proposal, suggested that Congress repeal the four percent stock dividend credit and $100 exclusion. Under existing law, long subject to criticism by tax reformers, a person with dividend income from domestic corporations could exclude from his income the first $50 of dividends received and take four percent credit against dividend income over $50. This provision, worth $460 million a year in tax revenue, was put to vote in the Committee, and the Administration lost. By an 11–14 vote, with four Democrats joining the ten Republicans—and with Mills on the minority side both times—the Committee rejected outright repeal and a compromise plan to repeal the credit but keep the exclusion. Then, by a 13–12 vote, with only Herlong and Watts voting with the Republicans, Ways and Means adopted a compromise which repealed the four percent credit but doubled the $50 exclusion. Evidently Mills could not persuade enough Democrats to move very far toward the Administration proposal, but he could get 12 of them part of the way.

The next year Mills was on the losing side of a vote which some people believed would have killed medicare under social security. Mills, Herlong and Watts joined the Republicans on a motion to increase social security benefits by six percent, thereby raising social security taxes so high that it would have been difficult to fund medicare without an unacceptable increase in the tax. The Republican plan lost on a 12–12 vote when, with one Democrat absent, Bruce Alger voted with the pro-Administration majority because he could not vote for such an increase in benefits. Were it not for this anomaly, Mills's side would have won.

The most recent defeat for Mills came in 1966 on an extremely controversial issue, the establishment of Federal standards for minimum state payments for unemployment compensation. Backed by organized labor, a plan acceptable to the Administration was defeated in the Committee when five Democrats, four of them conservatives, voted with the Committee's eight Republicans (the ratio had been changed in 1965) to kill the plan 13–11. One Democrat was absent but Mills could hold only ten of his party colleagues on this issue. Thus even with a 17–8 majority in 1966 it was possible for the Chairman to lose on a key vote. After the vote the Committee proceeded to write a bill which could pass the House but, as Mills accurately predicted, "won't please either the White House or organized labor."[43]

Seven losses are not much to work with but it may be noted in passing that, as expected, if Mills is on the losing side it is most often because enough Democrats have defected to the Republicans to decide the issue. Five of the seven losses fall in this category. On the two remaining losses Mills did not take enough Democrats with him to win on one vote (1964 social security) and on the other he was hopelessly in the minority with four Republicans. On the basis of available data, therefore, it can be said that for the Ways and Means Committee the primary job of the Chairman on votes is to contain Democratic defections, not take Democrats with him to defeat the Democratic majority through a bipartisan coalition (this has happened, but only twice). It bears repeating, however, that the ability of Mills to defeat the Democrats by voting with the Republicans has acted as a deterrent to pressing issues to votes, and on the vital question of medicare it was such a coalition that kept the bill in the Committee for several years.

This analysis of voting in the Committee treats Mills as a swing vote, but vote patterns alone do not show a causal relationship between the way he votes and the votes of the other members. We are justified in treating his votes as of special significance to the Committee only because of the findings reported in the first two parts of this study, plus the perceptions of many observers that he does in fact stand at the center of coalitions in the Committee. From the mere fact that two Democrats voted "present" on the Republican amendment in 1963 to cut taxes only if the budget was no more than $98 billion in FY 1965, and the debt no more than $303 billion, for example, we cannot conclude that Mills influenced them. It is obvious that such a conclusion cannot be inferred from the vote despite the additional fact that this key amendment lost by only one vote (11–12). But everything that is known about the inner workings of the Committee suggests this conclusion and, in the absence of contrary evidence, the leap from the votes to Mills's influence does not appear to be unwarranted. Many other influences are at work in these votes but the Chairman is most certainly one of the factors, and from the interviews conducted, he is one of the most significant.

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[43] Quoted in "Jobless Aid Plan Facing Reversal." *New York Times,* May 13, 1966, p. 21.

IV. CONCLUSION

An intensive look has been taken at the Chairman of Ways and Means because, in the eyes of the members and in the eyes of those associated with the Committee, he is the central figure around whom much of the Committee's life revolves. Contrary to the impression one sometimes receives from newspaper stories about the "all-powerful" Chairman Mills, he is perhaps as responsive to the Committee as the Committee is to him. Great influence with the members he no doubt has, but it is influence earned by the way he approaches his job and develops its potential. Ways and Means is highly centralized under Mills but the Committee's policy decisions emerge from an exhaustive—and collegial—process. The decisions of the Committee are shaped and articulated by Mills, but if his word comes close to being law in the Committee it is because he has listened well to the words of others, particularly to the ranking Republican, John Byrnes. The fact that Mills legitimates Committee decisions in no way lessens his leadership of the Committee, but it is a particular kind of leadership, a kind very likely to be effective given the nature of the group he leads.

Mills's influence in the Committee is also attributable to his pivotal position in the blocs that form on policy questions in the Committee. The Chairman, known as a leader who keeps his position, if he has one, to himself, has good reason to be cautious on the controversies surrounding Ways and Means. By letting others commit themselves before he does he follows a winning strategy which has paid rich dividends: he never loses, except once in a while. And because he leads the members as he does he can sometimes persuade enough of them to help him win by voting present, by voting with him, or by not voting at all.

It remains to be seen whether the analytical framework used in studying the leadership of Mills, the variables which are important in understanding him, and the five bases of influence discussed in connection with his influence will be useful in future research on leadership in Congress. Yet it appears clear that an understanding of the legislative process—including the outputs of that process—requires attention to individual leaders, their followers, and how the two interact. This study is intended as a step in that direction.

CITIZEN DEMANDS AND THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM*

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Political scientists interested in non-Communist systems have paid considerable attention to demands (expressions of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to particular subject matters should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so)[1] coming from the intra-societal (domestic) environments of these political systems. The importance of intra-societal demands, including citizen demands, for non-Communist systems is well established. Researchers interested in the Soviet political system have paid relatively little attention to intra-societal demands, especially demands coming from those whom David Easton would call citizen gatekeepers, i.e., citizens who convert their wants into demands by articulating them.[2]

The reasons for the neglect of research in this area are obvious enough. Quite apart from the problem of gathering useful data, there exists the question of whether demands from the intra-societal environment, and in particular citizen demands, are really important for a "totalitarian" system. Nothing like the politically autonomous interest groups of the Western democracies exist in the Soviet Union. Whatever demands come from the intra-societal environment are therefore largely grassroots demands from the populace, and there is reason to doubt that Soviet authorities feel compelled to heed such demands when formulating policy. Lenin's assertion that the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat was clearly a rejection of the idea that the masses should direct the Party. His successors have continued to assert that the Party leads the masses, and not the masses the Party. Stalin argued:

> The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think. . . . The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class; it must lead the proletariat, and not follow in the tail of the spontaneous movement.[3]

The 1961 Party Program clearly reasserted the doctrine of the primacy of the Party as the guiding force in society.

> The period of full-scale communist construction is characterized by a *further enhancement of the role and importance of the Communist Party* as the leading and guiding force of Soviet society.[4]

The directing element of the Party is much narrower than its total membership. Although Western scholars' estimates vary from under 1,000 to several thousand, they agree that the number of persons who really count in the formulation of policy in the Soviet Union is small.[5] Furthermore, Soviet leaders have promoted not merely programs that were clearly contrary to the wishes of important segments of the general populace—collectivization—but also programs contrary to the wishes of segments of the elite—Khrushchev's bifurcation of the Party.

I. SOME HYPOTHESES CONCERNING DEMANDS OF SOVIET CITIZENS

The existence of an apparently limited political community, the lack of independent associational interest groups, the leadership's apparent

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[1] I will use the term "demand" only in this restricted sense. For a full discussion of the concept see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), Part II.

[2] For a discussion of citizen gatekeepers see Easton, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94.

[3] J. V. Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," *Problems of Leninism* (New York: International Publishers 1928), p. 73, as quoted in Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 137.

[4] Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, reproduced from a supplement of *New Times* (No. 48), 29 November, 1961, in Leonard Schapiro (ed.), *The U.S.S.R. and the Future* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1963), p. 310. Emphasis in the original.

[5] Compare Merle Fainsod, *op. cit.*, p. 205; Derek J. R. Scott, *Russian Political Institutions* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 54; and Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin Since Stalin*, trans. Elizabeth Wiskemann and Marion Jackson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 11–15. See also John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), Chapters I and II.

contempt for mass opinion, the marked centralization of decision-making all suggest that demands from what Easton calls the intra-societal environment are far less important in the Soviet system than in the Western democracies, and even in many of the non-democratic but non-Communist states.

Certainly much of the work of Soviet-area specialists supports Easton's contention that although "there is still room for articulation of political demands" within totalitarian systems despite "the severe restrictions upon popular participation,"[6] the number and variety of gatekeepers—those who convert wants into demands by articulating them—is so restricted that input overload is not "likely to occur or even threaten."[7] He contrasts "modern totalitarian or dictatorial systems" with democracies, which, "within the limits imposed by other aspects of the political culture," encourage every citizen to participate in the system by tending his own gate, that is, by converting his own wants into demands by directing statements concerning the allocation of values to authorities.[8]

The hypotheses that in the Soviet Union (1) citizens are not encouraged to tend their own gates; (2) the number of gatekeepers is so restricted that input overload is unlikely to occur or even threaten; (3) demands from the intra-societal environment, and in particular citizen demands, are of little importance, seem tenable. I will try to show that these hypotheses, if not false, are true only in a very limited sense. In the course of my argument I also will attempt to clarify the way in which these demands are processed, and indicate some of the problems that arise in conjunction with their processing.

II. SOVIET CITIZEN GATEKEEPERS AND THEIR DEMANDS

Evidence that Soviet citizens tend their own gates and that higher officials require local officials to pay attention to the resulting citizen demands has existed ever since Merle Fainsod published his study of the Smolensk Province Party Archives in 1958.[9] In his chapter on the right of petition he noted that this right existed prior to World War II and that the citizens of Smolensk Province vigorously exercised it.[10] Fainsod also noted that citizen petitions had at least two functional consequences. First, the petitions (demands in Easton's terminology) served to expose and, therefore, inhibit misconduct at the lower administrative levels. Second, they tended to diffuse popular discontent and direct it from the center to local officials.[11]

The inaccessibility of Party archives, other than the captured Smolensk Archives, makes a replication of Fainsod's study impossible. Nevertheless, data available for Moscow and Leningrad clearly show that Soviet urban citizens in the 1950's and 1960's continued to make their demands known to local authorities, just as their rural counterparts had done during the pre-war period in Smolensk Province. By the 1960's thousands of citizen demands were pouring into the city raion (borough)[12] agencies and organs, either directly from the citizens or via higher officials who simply sent any demands within the jurisdiction of a raion to that raion in the individual raw form in which the citizen had submitted it.

Whatever the route of the demands, the

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[6] Easton, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 93

[8] *Ibid*, pp. 93–95.

[9] These archives were captured first by the German army during World War II and subsequently by U.S. forces. They are the only party archives open to non-Communist scholars.

[10] Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), Chapter XX.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 408.

[12] Moscow and Leningrad are divided into a number of raions (city boroughs). Each raion has its "popularly" elected legislative assembly (soviet); executive committee (borough council), which is "elected" by the soviet; and numerous governmental administrative agencies. According to the legal theory of dual subordination, the raion soviet is subordinate to its electors and the "popularly" elected city soviet. The raion city executive committee is subordinate to its soviet and the city executive committee, and the raion administrative agencies are subordinate to their executive committee and the corresponding city administrative agency. Similar dual subordination exists for city organs and agencies, the next higher level for Moscow and Leningrad being the RSFSR.

In each raion there is a raion party organization consisting of the large raion party committee (raikom), which is "elected" by the larger raion party conference; the bureau of the raikom, which is "elected" by the raikom; and the party administrative agencies. The raion party organizations are subordinate to the city party organization, which also have a conference, city party committee (gorkom), bureau, and administrative agencies.

At each level the governmental organs and agencies are subordinate to their appropriate party organs and agencies. Candidates to governmental offices are selected, or at least approved, by the appropriate party organizations and by higher state organs and agencies. Party officials must be approved by higher party organizations.

number was astounding. In the first four months of 1962 some 11,803 citizen demands poured into the offices of the Kirov raion of Moscow.[13] In the first half of 1963 officials of a single raion in Leningrad received over 15,000 letters and visits from the populace involving demands of various sorts.[14]

The demands themselves cover nearly the entire range of activities under the jurisdiction of the city governmental apparatus. The citizens complain about the quality of new construction; request additional housing space; and complain about the slowness of housing repairs and their quality. They make demands concerning the quality, assortment and availability of goods in stores and shops and the location of retail outlets and restaurants. They complain about the quality of service in retail outlets, restaurants, and consumer service facilities. They complain about taxi service; they make demands concerning mass transportation facilities. They express their concern about health facilities, about poor street lighting, about unkept parks, about cultural facilities, and about the condition of streets and sidewalks. They complain about the behavior of officials, and they complain about the activities of their neighbors. The regime that has undertaken, with great pride and deliberate purpose, more activities than any in modern history is confronted with demands covering a wider range of subjects than any regime in history.

The vast majority of citizen demands, whatever their topic, have certain common characteristics. They are specific demands from individual citizens involving limited and usually individual or neighborhood needs and wants. They are, in other words, raw demands. Because large autonomous interest groups, which exist in other modern societies are not permitted in the Soviet Union, these raw demands must be processed within the political system without the benefit of any prior efforts to sort, combine and consolidate them into general proposals for political action, but more about this later.

Most of the demands examined in this study are also apparently spontaneous and processed within the governmental apparatus. This obviously is not true of all demands. Fainsod's Smolensk study revealed that during the 1920's and 1930's some processing of citizen demands also went on within the party apparatus. No doubt it still does, although the inaccessibility of party records makes impossible a detailed discussion of party processing for any later period.

I can, however, state that the Party does play a considerable role in the processing of demands included within the electoral mandates, which are lists of demands that are binding, at least formally, on the local governmental officials to whom they are addressed. Furthermore, these demands often are not spontaneous.

To be included within an electoral mandate, a demand must be presented in a particular manner and meet certain criteria. It must be presented in a meeting called either to nominate deputies to the soviets or to present candidates for deputy seats to the electorate; it must be discussed by those present at the meeting with respect to its expediency and practicality; it must be adopted by a majority vote; it should involve matters of common concern to the electors; and it should be substantial enough to require inclusion in the plan for fulfillment.[15]

At the proper meeting a citizen may offer a demand for inclusion in the mandate, but frequently demands offered have been discussed first in the organs of public and voluntary associations.[16] These organs, of course, are dominated by party members. Furthermore, subjecting the proposed demands to public discussion may eliminate some of them. Discussions at public meetings are often rather open, vigorous and frank; but whether any resolution opposed by the party group present at such meetings stands any chance of being adopted is doubtful. The influence of the Party on the mandate has been clearly indicated by two Soviet jurists who state that the Central Committee considers the mandate an important means by which the

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[13] Decision of the Moscow Executive Committee of 29 June 1962 in *Biulleten' ispolnitel'nogo komiteta Moskovskogo gorodskogo Soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia (Bulletin of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet of Working People's Deputies)*, No. 15 (August, 1962), p. 9. Hereafter this publication will be referred to as *M.B.*

[14] Decision of the Leningrad Executive Committee of 7 August 1963 in *Biulleten' isopolnitel'nogo komiteta Leningradskogo gorodskogo Soveta deputatov trudiaschikhsia (Bulletin of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Soviet of Working People's Deputies)*, No. 18 (September, 1963), p. 1. Hereafter this publication will be referred to as *L.B.*

[15] G. V. Barabashev and K. F. Sheremet, *Sovetskoe Stroitel'stvo* (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1965), pp. 374–375. See also I. A. Azovkin, R. A. Saforov and Iu A. Tikhomirov, "Deiatel'nost' deputatov mestnykh Sovetov v izribatel'nom okruge i na proizvodstve,' *Mestnye Sovety na sovremennom etape* (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), pp. 285–287.

[16] Barabashev and Sheremet, *op. cit.*, pp. 375–376.

Party sets tasks for the organs of state authority.[17]

III. FAILURES IN HANDLING CITIZEN DEMANDS

The thousands of raw demands pouring into the system create serious problems for local officials, especially the raion officials. They are in close contact with the populace and receive the major portion of citizen demands. The failure of hard-pressed raion officials to respond to many of the demands encourages citizens to route them through higher authorities in the hope that demands so routed have a better chance of attracting the attention of lower officials. Even so, a response is by no means certain. Between 1958 and 1960, 40 per cent of the demands received by officials of the Sokol'nicheskyi raion in Moscow had been sent via higher authorities, many of them, according to the city executive committee, for the second time. Of these 50 per cent had not been disposed of within the required 20-day period.[18]

The failure of officials to fulfill citizen demands extends even to those legally binding demands included in the electoral mandate. Although their own record is not flawless, city officials often criticize raion officials for failures in this area. Many things go wrong. Sometimes officials simply ignore certain items in mandate, failing even to discuss them. Sometimes officials sacrifice items in a mandate in order to fulfill more important items in the plan. The plan has its priorities; and whatever standing mandate items may have in law, many of them do not enjoy much priority in the plan. Sometimes local executive committees fail to set a specific date for the fulfillment of some mandate demands, thereby making control over fulfillment difficult. Other times the executive committees find themselves without the resources needed to fulfill a mandate.[19]

Although the decrees of the raion soviets and city executive committees clearly show that local officials, especially raion officials, have trouble coping with the flow of citizen demands, little or no effort is made to stem the flow. On the contrary, evidence indicates that higher officials may view large number of demands flowing into the raions with enthusiasm. In 1962 the Moscow city executive stated it considered a large number of citizen demands on raion officials as desirable insofar as the demands indicated increased citizen activism. In the same decree the executive committee also stated it viewed large numbers of such demands as evidence of the raion officials' neglect of citizen needs.[20] Apparently, the city officials view a high volume of demands as a negative indicator for the performance of raion officials and a positive indicator for the existence of citizen support. This makes some sense. Certainly, an unusually high level of demands in one raion might indicate poor performance by raion officials, but at the same time indicate that citizens have confidence in the system's ability to satisfy their needs and wants.

Within the past decade the difficulties of the raion officials may have been aggravated by the demand of higher authorities that the raion officials adopt practices likely to increase both their work load and the flow of citizen demands. For example, city officials urged raion executive committees to hold "circuit" meetings at places where citizens work or live in order to facilitate citizen participation in the discussion of raion problems. They also urged raion officials to send out advance publicity on sessions of the raion soviets in order to give the citizens an opportunity to send in complaints and suggestions concerning questions on the agenda. The raion officials were supposed to consider these for inclusion in the draft resolutions submitted for adoption by the raion soviet. Authorities also ordered raion executive committee officers and raion agency heads to make periodic reports at public meetings and to use the meetings as opportunities to gather additional citizen demands. The city officials and higher authorities claimed these practices brought officials into closer contact with the masses and improved their understanding of the masses' needs. The reluctance of some raion officials to adopt such practices suggests that they were not unaware that adoption would increase their work loads at a time when they were already having problems handling citizen demands.

IV. THE PERSISTENCE OF THE THREAT OF INPUT OVERLOAD

The city and raion officials have only a limited ability to reduce the threat of input overload by correcting the conditions that give rise to the deluge of citizen demands. If the demands concern such limited problems as a specific street in poor repair, a dirty park, poor street lighting in a certain neighborhood, etc., the local officials can often effectively reduce the input load by correcting the conditions that give rise to the demands. Such corrective action ordinarily involves only the proper allocation and distribution of available resources, and this is within the capabilities of local officials.

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 374.

[18] Decision of the Moscow Executive Committee of 5 February 1960 in *M.B.*, No. 6 (March, 1960), p. 10.

[19] For a discussion of some of the difficulties that arise concerning the fulfillment of the electoral mandate see E. Sovershaeva (Senior instructor of the Leningrad Organization-Instructor Department) "O rabote po vypolneniiu nakazov izbiratelei," in *L.B.*, No. 12 (June, 1963), pp. 13–15.

[20] Decision of the Moscow Executive Committee of 29 June 1962 in *M.B.*, No. 15 (August, 1962), p. 9.

When demands arise from conditions created by centrally determined investment and allocation priorities or certain basic characteristics of the economy, local officials can do little. For example, city officials can do something about demands concerning the poor quality of food in restaurants insofar as its quality depends on preparation and handling. They can satisfy the demands of citizens in a particular neighborhood for a restaurant in that neighborhood by using some of the limited resources available for such purposes to build a restaurant in that part of the city. However, they can do nothing to reduce effectively the flow of demands resulting from the general lack of restaurants or other service facilities because this lack results from investment decisions falling outside their jurisdiction.

In such cases city officials can fight for their share of a small pie; they can lend what support they can to whatever reforms are being discussed at higher levels; they can reassure the citizen that they are aware of the problems and are trying to do something to ameliorate the general conditions; and in individual cases they can provide some material relief. But the officials cannot change the basic conditions; consequently, they can do little that might reduce the input of demands resulting from those conditions.

As a result, many of the demands voiced by citizens in 1968 were the same as the demands voiced years earlier. This is occasionally revealed in local decisions. Thus, in 1963 the Leningrad soviet noted improvement in the work of service enterprises between 1958 and 1963, and pointed with considerable pride to expanded facilities. In the same decision the soviet noted that complaints from citizens had also increased. The reason is to be found in the growth figures reported in the decision. The per capita volume of services had increased by only 1.3 per cent over the reported period.[21]

V. DISAPPROVED RESPONSES

Confronted with a difficult situation, the local officials resort to various disapproved tactics in an effort to conceal their failures in handling the deluge of citizen demands or to reduce it. Some simply falsify their reports by untruthfully claiming to handle properly a substantial proportion of received demands. Some try to reduce the flow by curtailing reception hours for citizens wanting to make oral demands. Other officials bury the demands by sending complaints for verification to those very persons against whom the citizens lodged them. Still others simply ignore citizen demands. These tactics provide some temporary relief, but at the risk of censure from higher authorities.

The citizens' perception of the inability of local officials to meet many citizen demands causes citizens to turn to disapproved devices for the satisfaction of their wants and needs. This fosters the rise of various small "businessmen," whose activities are both illegal and ideologically objectionable. Whereas demands addressed to authorities provide the regime with information on popular attitudes and official performance and with an opportunity to build support, the disapproved devices provide neither. They do, however, provide satisfaction for the citizen.

The disapproved devices may also serve some of the needs of local officials. No way exists to discover the motives behind the local officials' toleration of disapproved devices, but that they tolerate them is beyond doubt. The toleration may be indicative of actual corruption or simply a desire not to harass unnecessarily local citizens. Local officials also may tolerate formally disapproved devices because they see them as reducing their input load by providing an alternative way of satisfying citizen needs and wants.

Disapproved devices take various forms, some of which are serious from the regime's standpoint. There is the hardly concealed black market in currency and clothing illegally but rather openly purchased from foreign tourists. There is even a black market operation in public housing. A "businessman" may turn a profit by registering, quite properly, for new housing on the grounds that his current housing space is inadequate. When he receives new housing, he then exchanges it with another citizen for less desirable housing plus an additional material consideration. Again lacking adequate housing space, he places his name back on the list for new housing. Other devices are less ambitious, but no less illegal. Both private automobile owners and drivers of state owned trucks provide taxi service. Other citizens illegally make and sell consumer items or offer services for a fee.

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[21] Decision of the Leningrad City Soviet of 24 June 1963 in *L.B.*, No. 14 (July, 1963), pp. 1–2. As a result of an increase of 4.3 times in dry cleaning capacity between 1959 and 1961, the people of Leningrad could have their dry cleaning orders filled within twenty days in 1961. This was a considerable improvement over the sixty day period of 1959. However, according to the decision of the city soviet, demands in this area were still not being met. See the decision of the Leningrad City Soviet of 11 December 1961 in *L.B.*, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 4.

The local official tolerating any of these activities runs a risk of being reported. Rather than use these devices, some citizens report to higher authorities both the person engaging in an illegal activity and the local officials tolerating it. Some of the reports may result from personal animosities; but the regime's considerable efforts to build socialist consciousness must have some effect, and some of the reports are surely motivated by a genuine sense of civic duty. Nevertheless, local officials sometimes ignore citizen complaints concerning illegal activities until investigations by higher authorities force them to act.[22]

Although the use of disapproved devices by citizens and the collusion of local officials pose serious problems for those seeking to impose the official norms, these problems should not be permitted to obscure the possible, if unintentional, beneficial consequences for the regime. If the regime successfully suppressed these practices, which so clearly violate officially prescribed norms, and if, as a result, citizens and local officials could no longer resort to them to satisfy their felt needs and wants, the level of popular dissatisfaction with the political leadership, its policies and the institutional structure it has established might sharply increase.

Propaganda and coercion may contribute to mass conformity to officially prescribed norms. However, the regime's willingness to tolerate (within limits) citizen gatekeepers and its inability to close off all officially disapproved means by which citizens can obtain satisfaction of needs and wants the regime is unable or unwilling to satisfy, may, by making life more tolerable, be no less important for the maintenance of popular acceptance or acquiescence in the system. Ironically, the use of disapproved devices by citizens, may, by reducing dissatisfaction, make less likely any challenge of what the ruling oligarchy regards as a legitimate right: namely, the right to impose on the people policies that the oligarchy allegedly believes to be in the best interest of the people, even when the people disagree.

VI. APPROVED RESPONSES

There are approved means for reducing the demand input load. City officials may properly refer many of the demands they receive to raion officials for final action; but the raion officials are not so fortunate. They can refer some to public or voluntary associations such as the trade unions, the parents' committees attached to schools, apartment house committees, shoppers' councils, etc. These organizations may also directly absorb a certain number of demands. The trade unions devote some attention to working conditions and safety standards at places of employment. Parents' committees provide some material aid to children of needy families.

However, the ability of these organizations to handle or absorb demands is not very great. In fact, the small local voluntary associations—the parents' committees, apartment house committees, shoppers' councils, etc.—are likely to add to the flow of demands on raion officials. These groups are valuable primarily because they involve citizens in civic work, which helps build civic pride and support, and because they provide free labor for small civic projects such as clean-up and shrubbery planting campaigns. To a considerable degree, the effectiveness of the volunteer organizations depends on the amount of organizational aid the local officials are willing to give them. Therefore, the organizations are as likely to increase the work load of local officials as they are to reduce it. Some volunteer groups have become moribund for the lack of such aid, which suggests that some local officials may find the groups require more time and work than they are worth.

Although higher officials look with disfavor on the enlargement of paid raion staffs and forbid, without perfect success,[23] any unauthorized increases, they have encouraged local agencies to organize volunteer staffs. In 1961 the chairman of the executive committee of Moscow's Leningrad raion reported positively on the use of volunteers. His report also indicated the severe shortage of paid staff members at the raion level.

He reported that in 1948 the raion Cultural Department's staff consisted of the head of the department and one inspector for libraries. At the time it had under its jurisdiction one movie theater, two clubs and two libraries. By 1961 it had under its jurisdiction fifteen libraries, twelve clubs, two houses of culture, sixty-five red corners, ten movie theaters, four music schools and six book stores. Its staff still consisted of the head of the department and one inspector for libraries. According to the chairman the work of the department improved greatly with the help of a twenty-nine member voluntary group composed of pensioners, housewives and workers from the various raion cultural institutions.[24] The executive committee chairman reported similar benefits from the use of volunteers in other departments. In the raion Department for the Allocation of Housing Space, an area of some sensitivity, he reported that the number of citizen demands answered in a period longer than twenty days declined from 750 in 1958, when there were no volunteers, to around a dozen in 1960. The volume of demands pouring into this one department was enormous, numbering some 14,000 in 1959.[25]

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[22] See decision of the Moscow Executive Committee of 18 December 1962 in *M.B.*, No. 2 (January, 1963), pp. 19–21.

[23] Decision of Moscow Executive Committee of 7 January 1964 in *M.B.*, No. 2 (January, 1964), pp. 13–14.

Even though this was probably an exceptional success story, it does suggest the magnitude of the problem that confronts the raion officials. Volunteers would seem to promise some relief, and participation may provide the additional bonus of increased support. How much relief volunteers provide is a question that cannot be answered, but the following points should be noted in addition to the above report.

First, a number of raions were slow to adopt the practice of using volunteers, despite criticism from above concerning the quality of their work in handling citizen demands, and despite prodding from above to seek a remedy through the use of volunteers. This refusal to use volunteers simply may indicate organizational inertia. It also may indicate that the creation of effective volunteer staffs required a considerable amount of work by already busy paid staff members, and that all such experiments were not as successful as the one in the Leningrad raion. Furthermore, the Leningrad city executive committee warned that the use of volunteer staffs to check on the fulfillment of decisions did not relieve raion officials of responsibility for the quality of work in their raions,[26] thereby suggesting that the quality of volunteer work was not always high and that raion officials tried to hide behind volunteers in an effort to evade responsibility for shortcomings. Finally, I was told that by 1965 there was some problem in maintaining public enthusiasm for volunteer work, some of which was not voluntary in the strictest sense of the word. Pseudo-volunteer participation is unlikely either to provide efficient help or build support.

In addition to the use of volunteers, city officials have urged the raion officials to reduce the red tape and paper shuffling that so often accompanies the handling of citizen demands. The available data indicate that many raion officials quite needlessly add to their own burdens. In February of 1963 the Moscow city executive committee noted that despite a 1960 decision ordering raion officials to cease demanding numerous unnecessary forms, certificates, and notarized documents from citizens before undertaking such routine administrative matters as changes in residence, school registration and the issuance of passports, the practice continued, especially in Kuybyshev, Sverdlov and Timiriazev raions. The demand for notarized documents was so great that in a 21-month period one notary office in one of the raions notarized over 625,000 documents. The housing exploitation office of the Sverdlov raion had demanded and received in a single year over 75,000 certificates of various sorts from the citizenry. In the same raion a citizen wishing to acquire better housing had to present not only various forms, certificates and documents, including a personal financial report, but also fill out a seven-page questionnaire containing nearly 200 questions.[27] In view of the small size of the raion staffs such figures are astounding. The executive committee decision gives no indication of why the raion officials persisted in the use of procedures that increased their own work load despite contrary orders from higher authorities. Such procedures apparently had been standard at an earlier date. Perhaps some raion officials believed a large amount of documentation provided them with a ready defense against charges from above that they were giving housing or other material goods or services to unqualified applicants.

VII. THE USE OF DEPUTIES

Higher officials have encouraged raion officials to work with the deputies "popularly elected" to the soviets and to weld them into an effective work force. This also may increase the work load of raion officials. The effective use of deputies requires considerable organizational work and other aid from the raion executive committees and their administrative agencies.[28] Furthermore, one of the major jobs of the local deputy is to transmit his constituents' demands to the local officials. Therefore, an effective deputy can add significantly to the total input of citizen demands.

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[24] A. Ia. Goncharov, "O praktike vovlecheniia obshchestvennosti v rabotu Leningradskogo raionnogo Soveta g. Moskvy," *Ot sotsialisticheskoi gosudarstvennosti k kommunisticheskomu samoupravleniiu,* pp. 298–299.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 295.

[26] See unsigned article, "O rabote obshchestvennykh otdelov po konotroliu ispolneniia reshenii," in *L.B.,* No. 10 (May, 1962), p. 13.

[27] Decision of the Moscow Executive Committee of 21 February 1963 in *M.B.,* No. 4 (February 1963), pp. 23–24. See also decision of Leningrad Executive Committee of 25 March 1960 in *L.B.,* No. 9 (May, 1960), pp. 3–6.

On the other hand, the deputy can also relieve the local officials of some of their burdens by undertaking the initial investigation of demands, and the verification of the fulfillment of official decisions concerning them. Deputies also can organize the citizenry to work for the satisfaction of their own demands on a self-help basis. This activity is very helpful to local officials when they find themselves in the awkward position of not having the resources to meet citizen demands, especially the legally binding ones included in the electoral mandate. For example, deputies in one raion, faced with the prospect of having to tell their constituents that the raion had no resources to build a shop that had been included in the mandate, organized the citizens, issued appeals to enterprises for material aid, and led the citizens in the construction of the shop.[29]

The deputy does not confine his activities to the electoral mandate. He is expected to hold office hours in public places for the collection of demands from his constituents. He must periodically report to them on his work and hear their demands at public meetings. He also receives numerous letters from constituents. The citizen demands may involve matters of concern to the entire district, such as those pertaining to the quality of food in local restaurants, the need for new shops, or the lack of adequate cultural and recreational facilities. Other demands may be highly personal and relate to such matters as the enrollment of children in special schools, or disputes with neighbors, or even trouble within the family. No problem is supposed to be too personal or too small to take to the deputy.[30] He is supposed to take the same interest in the personal affairs of his constituents as the old ward politician did in American cities. The reason is probably the same in both cases. Personal attention builds popularity and support for the administration. Once the deputy receives a demand, he should investigate it, present it to local authorities if it has merit, and make certain that the citizen gets some sort of response from the officials, even if only a verbal one.

VIII. DESIRABLE AND UNDESIRABLE CITIZEN DEMANDS

The demands discussed up to this point have been ones that the authorities, at least the higher authorities, regard as desirable and think should be given some measure of gratification, either material or psychic. The authorities undoubtedly regard many of them as legitimate and routine claims for goods or services—housing, housing repairs, pensions, etc.—to which the claimants are officially entitled. Authorities may find other demands desirable because they provide feedback on regime policies, reveal popular attitudes, or provide information on the performance of lower level functionaries. The authorities may value some merely as acceptable means for people to vent their frustrations.

Certainly, local officials who try to suppress or conceal demands of this sort run the risk of censure from above. The higher authorities' obvious desire that desirable demands receive some type of satisfaction is understandable. By satisfying the demands the authorities build support and cultivate in the minds of the citizens the belief that their demands are efficacious. This sense of efficacy itself may lead to greater support, and it almost certainly encourages citizens to submit additional desirable demands. This provides additional opportunities to build support and assures the continued flow of needed information to the authorities. The very fact that the citizens use official channels, rather than the disapproved but available means, to satisfy their needs and wants is itself an indication of support.

Undoubtedly, the authorities do not regard as desirable all citizen demands flowing into the system. The sources used in this study contain no information on whatever directives may exist concerning the handling of undesirable citizen demands. Consequently, any discussion of undesirable demands must be speculative.

Soviet citizens are more or less aware of the extent to which the regime is willing to act at a given time to meet certain kinds of demands. Whatever shortcomings the Soviet mass media may have as general news sources, they quite carefully provide information concerning official policy lines on the various subjects for which established policy lines exist. Research on Western political systems has shown that political participation is related to a sense of efficacy. No way exists to verify this hypothesis in the Soviet Union; but it seems reasonable to assume that there, too, active participation such as stating demands will vary according to the citizen's perception of the efficacy of his actions.

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[28] See decision of the Leningrad Executive Committee of 4 June 1956 in *Sbornik reshenii i rasporiazhenii ispolnitelnogo komiteta Leningradskogo gorodskogo Soveta* (Leningrad, 1958), pp. 5–10. See also decision of Moscow Executive Committee of 12 October in *M.B.*, No. 20 (October, 1965), pp. 1–5.

[29] A. Zhuravlev (Chairman of the Petroslaviansk Settlement Executive Committee), "Metodom narodnoi stroiki" in *L.B.*, No. 16 (August, 1963), pp. 21–22.

[30] *Vechernii Leningrad,* 26 November, 1964, p. 1.

The authorities may try to discourage some demands by simply ignoring them, but the Soviet press provides clear evidence that the authorities also actively try to discourage certain demands. A mild form of negative response is the article reporting that certain nameless individuals hold an unacceptable view. Other articles will single out particular individuals. Sometimes the press will publish a letter (selected from among the thousands the Soviet press receives daily) containing a disapproved demand and follow it with critical commentary. Mass media content of this sort must inhibit persons considering making similar demands.

In his study of the Smolensk Archives, Fainsod noted that citizen petitions expressing deep hostility to the regime were simply referred to the police for action. As a result, by the mid-thirties, such petitions nearly disappeared from the archives.[31] The sources used in this study do not enable me to determine whether such petitions existed in the 1950's and 1960's, but I can state that the Soviet citizen knows that the careless expression of certain opinions may arouse police interest. This is not to say that the citizen never expresses such opinions; but he does so cautiously, being selective about to whom and where he expresses them.

The norms governing acceptable demand expression, although not nearly as restrictive and inhibiting as some in the West seem to think, effectively restrict the citizen's expression of demands. His awareness of these limitations has the effect of reducing the number of demand inputs flowing into the system and, even more important, of restricting their content. The regime is thus protected from the possible consequences of a divisive public debate on basic policy questions.

IX. THE LIMITED IMPACT OF CITIZEN DEMANDS ON OFFICIAL DISCUSSION

The impact of citizen demands, or more precisely the impact of the data that results from the aggregation of citizen demands by local officials, on the deliberations of local decision-makers is difficult to determine because of the lack of access to the minutes of the most important local decision-making bodies: the city executive committee and the bureau of the city party committee. Nevertheless, a few observations, based on the local press reports of meetings of the full city party committees of Moscow and Leningrad from 1953 to 1967, are possible.

These reports have certain shortcomings. They are not verbatim accounts, but extended summaries. No way exists to determine the effects of censorship on the reports. Nevertheless, the reports are extensive summaries, attributing specific remarks to specific speakers. The speakers themselves constitute a fair cross section of that part of the local elite with an interest in the matter under discussion. Finally, the press reports provide the only accessible source of information on the deliberations of the local elite.[32]

The city party committees discussed various topics, among which were the state of housing construction, consumer goods production, and the state of retailing and various consumer and communal services. These were areas of governmental activity that gave rise to numerous citizen demands. During the course of these meetings, speakers sometimes stated that citizen needs, wants, complaints, or requests in some area were not being met. However, the speakers usually attributed the failure to meet citizen demands to the poor performance of some particular agency, institution, enterprise, or branch of the economy and never to centrally established policies and priorities. In other words, speakers occasionally used aggregated data on citizen demands to raise more general demands, but the more general demands themselves were limited. Speakers used the citizen demands as an indicator of how well some agency, institution, or branch of the economy satisfied the needs or demands of the populace within the limits set by centrally established policies and priorities.

Even this limited use of citizen demands has not been common. The members of the local elite are subject to various pressures; but of these pressures, the pressure of public opinion is not among the strongest. As a result the local elite is not very responsive to it. The Party leads the masses, not the masses the Party. The aggregated data on citizen demands are treated like any other aggregated data on performance. The information provides an opportunity to act and is taken into account, but it provides no compulsion to act. Indeed, aggregated data on unmarketable stocks of consumer goods may seem more compelling than aggregated data on consumer complaints about goods purchased.

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[31] Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule,* pp. 378–379.

[32] For examples of such discussions see: *Vecherniaia Moskva,* May 30, 1956, p. 2; December 9, 1960, p. 1; and *Leningradskaia Pravda,* February 28, 1961, p. 1; April 25, 1961, p. 1.

The speakers from the various agencies, institutes, and organizations have their own particular demands to promote. They are spokesmen not for the citizenry, but for some segment of the governmental, party, or economic apparatuses; and they usually use aggregated data on citizen demands only when the data supports their own particular perceived interests.

To assert that the party and governmental officials have no regard for public opinion or the welfare of the citizenry would be incorrect; but even the highest ranking city officials—the secretaries of the city party committee—have only a limited ability to cope with the more general problems implicit in the aggregated citizen demands. They can provide some satisfaction for the demands by calling on the government agencies fulfilling the housing construction program to build better housing. They can call on enterprises to produce more and better consumer goods. They can support the requests of the city construction agency, the city trade agency, or the city consumer services agency for more resources. The city party officials' demands directed to the center are, no doubt, often influential because of their political standing in the system. However, even they can call only for the most efficient use of available resources to attain centrally determined goals; goals that might or might not be consistent with the satisfaction of citizen demands.

X. THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMAND PROCESSING

The lack of any autonomous groups in the intra-societal environment capable of aggregating and processing the specific raw citizen demands into a program for political action that can serve as an alternative to the one advanced by the ruling oligarchy weakens the impact of citizen demands on official deliberations and policy making. In the Soviet Union the raw citizen demands are processed entirely within the political system. This imposes a burden on officials, but it also assures the leadership a greater amount of decision-making autonomy by sharply reducing the pressures of public opinion. At the same time it assures the leaders opportunities for building support and a flow of needed information.

This deserves further elaboration.[33] One may argue that in any society the political system's institutional structure, the composition of the political leadership and public policies generate frustration, anxiety and dissatisfaction among the people. The people respond in various ways, among which is the articulation of demands by individual citizens. In many societies this is followed by a collective redefinition of demands by various organizations involved in the political process. Many of these organizations are independent of the regime and some stand outside the political system, although linked to it. Thus political parties, both those participating in the government and those in opposition, pressure groups, and other organizations take raw citizen demands along with other materials and aggregate and process them into alternative programs and policies. This leads to activities, protests and movements seeking to implement new policies, to capture and even to modify or overthrow the existing institutional structure for political decision-making. The result is civil debate and conflict. Citizen demands do not merely offer rulers useful information and opportunities to build support, but generate additional strain within the society and pressure for changes in public policy, leadership composition, and institutional structure.

In the Soviet Union the process is short-circuited at a critical point. Strains are generated; frustration, anxiety and dissatisfaction within the general populace exist; and citizens do articulate demands. However, these demands feed directly into the political system to be processed by members of the governmental and party apparatuses serving the ruling oligarchy. The lower level officials process and make use of citizen demands in ways that are useful to themselves, but they cannot, according to the norms they observe in self-interest and which they probably regard as legitimate, process the citizen demands into more general proposals that challenge the existing institutional structure, the policies and priorities of the leaders—unless given a signal that discussion of such matters is desired by the leaders—or the composition of leadership. In fact, established norms prohibit even the leading members of the politburo from freely appealing to the public or groups for support on controversial matters.[34] Consequently, the potential of citizen demands for generating additional strains and pressures for change is sharply reduced. On the other hand, the toleration and encouragement of citizen gatekeepers provide the officials and ruling oligarchs with opportunities to build support and a flow of information useful in adapting the system's structure and policies in ways the *leadership* believes appropriate, plus a means of reducing the erosion of support that may result from policies adopted and pursued with little regard for public opinion.

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[33] The following discussion is based on an adaption of a "Simplified Systematic View of the 'Collective Behavior' Approach to a Theory of Institutionalism" presented by Walter Buckley, *Sociology and Modern Systems Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 138.

[34] For a discussion of this point in the context of high level disputes over agricultural policy see Sidney I. Ploss, *Conflict and Decision Making in Soviet Russia, A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953–1963* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 84.

XI. CONCLUSION

Soviet citizens clearly tend their own gates and the quantity of citizen demands is sufficient to pose a serious threat of input overload at the lower administrative levels. The attempt to distinguish the Soviet political system from those of Western democracies on the basis of the absence of numerous citizen gatekeepers in the former and their existence in the latter is erroneous. Distinctions must be based on the kinds of demands that may be raised by these gatekeepers; the absence in the Soviet Union of institutions independent of the regime that can aggregate these demands; and the impossibility in the Soviet Union of using demands to create an alternative program to that advanced by the ruling oligarchy.

Citizen gatekeepers may be either an inevitable consequence of democracy or a necessary condition for it; but they are not a sufficient condition. In the absence of other democratic institutions, they may serve the interests of a dictatorship as well as they have ever served the interests of a democratic regime. They provide both with needed information and opportunities to build support.

This support may be built very cheaply. Not all demands need be given actual material satisfaction. The mere acceptance of a demand by local officials, some expression or indication of interest and concern (even if this amounts to nothing more than helpless thrashing about), can create support. The citizen is able to vent his grievances and make his wishes known. He may derive some release of hostility merely from seeing the discomfort of local officials as they struggle to meet his demands and suffer the criticism of higher authorities. Even this useless effort may make the regime seem more human and interested in the welfare of the ordinary citizen. The more limited, the more private the demand and the more personal its handling by local officials, perhaps the greater the support generated for the regime, even though the regime persists in the policies that created the conditions that gave rise to the demand.

THE ELECTORAL POLITICS OF GAULLISTS IN THE FOURTH FRENCH REPUBLIC: IDEOLOGY OR CONSTITUENCY INTEREST?

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The complex relationship between a deputy's Parliamentary voting record and his behavior in electoral politics in his constituency has rarely been traced in French political studies in a precise quantitative manner.[1] One would like to contrast the extent to which both the deputy's Parliamentary voting record and his choices regarding coalitions in local politics depend upon his personal ideology with the extent to which the same behavior depends upon the political characteristics of his constituency. Even though ideological cleavages may exist across constituencies themselves, finding behavioral outcomes related to constituency characteristics could suggest that the deputy is motivated by his desire to be reelected.

Studies that attempt a systematic analysis of deputies' behavior are few, despite Lerner's early exploration of the relationship between constituency characteristics and voting on the European Defense Community (EDC) issue.[2] Recently, MacRae, in his volume on Fourth Republic Parliaments, has clearly emphasized the primacy of ideology, particularly with respect to the voting patterns that resulted in unstable governments. More specifically, MacRae gives an ideological interpretation to his finding that intra-party voting divisions can be accounted for by issue-related scales.[3]

MacRae also tries to relate Parliamentary behavior to analyses of voting behavior in the constituencies. In general, however, his analysis, relegated to one brief chapter dealing with "Assembly Votes and the Constituencies," appears to have been incomplete.

For example, MacRae treats the Gaullist R.P.F. in the constituencies in less than a page. He states "we should expect the constituency relations of the Gaullists, as inferred from their scale positions after they began dividing on roll calls, to have been loose."[4] On the contrary, one of MacRae's Gaullist scales is in fact strongly related to an important extra-Parliamentary coalition behavior variable. Insofar as MacRae argues that "Among the many factors that contributed to these divisions [read different positions on the scales], ideology seems to have predominated,"[5] one might conclude that this finding supports the hypothesis that deputies' behavior in the Fourth Republic had a heavy ideological base and that the perceptions of other writers that politics is largely a "game" are exaggerated.[6] Alternatively, one might argue that both Parliamentary voting behavior and coalition behavior have a joint common determinant in the deputies' interest in reelection. We will in fact go on to show that coalition variables can be explicated just as well by models of pure political opportunism with regard to (1) the deputies' interest in possible winning coalitions in their constituencies and (2) the availability of appropriate coalition partners. Thus, for the specific case considered here, a "game" explanation of Fourth Republic politics seems just as valid as the ideological explanation at the present state of research. (With regard to "explanations," in a statistical sense we can only test whether behavior is independent of constituency characteristics. Factors other than personal ideology might well explain variations not explained by the constituency characteristics.)

Before proceeding with the empirical results, it will be useful to make explicit three different models of deputy behavior. MacRae's concept of Gaullist behavior is that "the Gaullist movement was ideological, and the most enthusiastic Gaullists took their stands [which might apply to coalitions as well as roll-call voting] as a

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[1] The relationship between U.S. Congressional voting behavior and constituency variables (attitudinal or socioeconomic) has been explored with positive findings by Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this Review, (March 1963), 45–56, and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Inter-Party Constituency Differences and Congressional Voting Behavior," *Ibid.*, 57–61. These studies cite the earlier literature.

[2] Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.), *France Defeats E.D.C.* (New York: Praeger, 1958). The work was originally published in French as *La Querelle de la C.D.E.* (Cahiers de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Colin, Paris, 1956).

[3] Duncan MacRae, Jr., *Parliament, Parties, and Society in France 1946–58* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), pp. 8–9, 67, 176–77, 214, 329.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 299.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[6] See, for example, Nathan Leites, *On the Game of Politics in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

THREE MODELS OF GAULLIST DEPUTY BEHAVIOR

A. Pure (MacRae) Ideological


Political Socialization, etc.
Personal Ideology of Candidate
Roll-Call Behavior
Coalition Behavior
Ideology of District
Past Constituency Voting Outcomes
Past party activities, economic interest, etc.

B. Opportunistic


Political Socialization, etc.
Personal Ideology of Candidate
Coalition Behavior
Ideology of District
Past Constituency Voting Outcomes
Opportunistic Calculations
Past party activities, economic interest, etc.
Roll-Call Behavior

C. Congruent Ideological


Political Socialization, etc.
Personal Ideology of Candidate
Roll-Call Behavior
Coalition Behavior
Selection & Election
Ideology of District
Past Constituency Voting Outcomes
Past party activities, economic interest, etc.

FIG. 1

matter of personal conviction rather than because they came from "Gaullist districts"—or conformed to them.[7] Hence, as shown in Figure 1A, past constituency voting behavior ought not to be related to either roll-call voting or coalition choices.

In Figure 1B, an alternative model is presented. This model, which may be termed the opportunistic model, posits the deputy as a calculating individual who simultaneously adjusts his roll-call behavior, his coalition behavior, and his personal ideology so that they might all be congruent with his constituency. (Of course, the opportunistic calculations may be influenced by goals such as cabinet status as well as the goal of being reelected). That is, opportunism is a behavior pattern with emphasis upon direct concerns with reelection. In this case, past constituency voting behavior ought to be related to both roll-call voting and coalition choices.

However, the same prediction could be made for the model of Figure 10, which can be termed the "congruent ideological" model. In this case, as in the MacRae model, the deputy would develop ideological convictions independently of constituency voting behavior. These convictions constitute a belief system, a program for future behavior. Those individuals with like convictions ought to have similar roll-call voting patterns regardless of any constituency interest. (The Communist Party accepts this premise and the converse that identical voting implies identical individuals convictions.) They ought to have a common frame of reference for coalition building that extends beyond opportunism. Nonetheless, a deputy could choose to stand for election in a district that was ideologically congruent with his personal ideology. Thus his roll-call choices and coalition choices would, while proceeding out of personal conviction, be related to constituency voting behavior. Although the empirical analysis for 1956 does lead to the rejection of the MacRae model, it does not lead to a clear choice between the other two models since it was not possible to operationalize the intervening variables.

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[7] MacRae, *op. cit.,* p. 299. See also pp. 142–143.

Of course, one is not bound to a choice between opportunistic models and congruent ideological models. Elements of both may be at work. Moreover, one must recognize the possibility that roll-call votes can exercise an influence on the calculating process, as shown by the dashed arrow in Figure 1B.

In 1951, the deputies had to vote upon the electoral law immediately prior to the election. Deputies voting against the coalition system might wish to remain consistent with their roll-call choice and not engage in coalitions when circumstances were otherwise favorable. This possibility will be considered for the 1951 elections. Our analysis for these elections will develop only weak support for the congruent ideological model while opportunistic considerations will provide a necessary if not sufficient condition for Gaullist coalition formation. Since the data show stronger connections for 1956, it is perhaps best to begin with the later year.

I. THE 1956 ELECTIONS

For the 1956 election, we focus upon the choice of *apparentement* coalitions by the Gaullist *Républicains-Sociaux*. The electoral law permitted parties to preserve their identity while making coalitions. Any coalition, or *apparentement* as they were termed in France, operated as a simulated single list in the proportional representation system. Any *apparentement* that won 50% of the votes in the constituency won all the seats of that constituency.[8]

In the 1956 elections, one can distinguish four basic types of coalition choices. First there was the possibility of engaging in no coalition. Secondly, the Gaullists could affiliate themselves with other parties on the political Right (i.e. parties other than the Communists, Poujadists, and Republican Front parties). When they actually engaged in *apparentements*, this was their modal choice. The third possibility was to participate in coalitions whose other members were part of the Mendesist Republic Front. This means lists sponsored by the Socialists, the Radical-Socialists (but not R.G.R.), the U.D.S.R. (a small left of center post-war group headed by a Fourth Republic premier, René Pleven, and De Gaulle's opponent in the 1965 Presidential elections, François Mitterand), the *Jeune République* (largely intellectuals, a forerunner of the present political clubs), and *Redressement Economique et Sociale* (a group of Left Catholics). Finally, the Gaullists could participate in the rare coalitions that straddled both Republican Front and Rightist parties.

The *Républicains-Sociaux* are an interesting group to study with respect to coalition choices not only from the historical viewpoint that many of these candidates later went on to become leading figures in the Fifth Republic, but also for the particular situation that confronted the *Républicains-Sociaux* in 1956. Because the Gaullists have always protested against being assigned a position in the traditional Left-Right continuum of French politics, one could expect to find them somewhat unwilling to accept the simple Left-Right split between the Republican Front and the other parties that was sparked by conflict over the *loi Barangé*, a measure to aid parochial schools passed in 1951, and crystallized by conflict between two Radical prime ministers, Pierre Mendès-France and Edgar Faure. As Williams observes, "The campaign offered the voter the clearest choice since the war. *Apparentements* were made between Socialist and 'Republican Front' Radicals and between M.R.P., Conservatives, and Radical dissidents; the R.S. (Gaullists) were divided."[9] The divisions among the Gaullists concerning their participation in the Republican Front have generally been exaggerated.[10] Only two incumbent Gaullists, Krieger in Moselle and Bricout in Aisne, participated in coalitions in which the only other partners were

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[8] A complete exposition of the electoral system is available in Peter Campbell, *French Electoral Systems and Elections* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. xvi.

[9] Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-War France: Parties and the Constitution in the Fourth Republic* (London: Longmans, Green, Second Edition, 1958), p. xvi.

[10] For example, Williams, *op. cit.*, p. xxii, cites that M. Chaban-Delmas joined the Republican Front. But there was no Republican Front *apparentement* in M. Chaban-Delmas' district. Other "Mendesist" Gaullists had similar behavior. Williams' analysis is also found in his revised and extended work, *Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic* (London: Longmans, 1964), pp. 47–48, 136.

Republican Front parties; and Bricout's coalition only went as far as the Radicals. Gaullist lists without incumbents joined the Republican Front in only seven of the 95 *apparentement* constituencies. All of these (Bouches-du-Rhône—1er, Haute-Garonne, Indre, Lot-et-Garonne, Haute-Marne, Pyrénées-Orientales, and Yonne) were districts in which the Right could not have expected to win under the criterion advanced below. Consequently, basically the Gaullists had a choice between participating in Right coalitions or not joining any coalition.

1. *Parliamentary voting and coalition behavior*. One might easily hypothesize that the decision of a Gaullist to participate or not in a coalition would be related to his political opinion or ideology. After all, the Gaullists had originally been heavily opposed to the *apparentement* system when it was voted in 1951.[11] Insofar as the *apparentement* system remained an important symbol of the hated Fourth Republic, one could expect that the purest of the Gaullists would resist the temptation to enter such a system and the less pure would be more prone to enter into coalitions.

Our analysis is confined to a group of relatively pure or "hard-core" Gaullists, those who not only remained in the U.R.A.S. after the more "opportunistic" members had formed the A.R.S. but also adhered to the *Républicains-Sociaux* at the end of the legislature.

The purity of a deputy's Gaullism can perhaps be measured by his vote on measures of relevance to the Gaullist movement. MacRae gives the position of the Gaullist (U.R.A.S.) deputies in the Second Legislature on two scales.[12] The first of these scales concerns economic matters. It does not give a good differentiation of coalition behavior. The second scale concerns the deputies' attitudes towards German rearmament and voting on this issue does have a strong relationship with coalition behavior. This might be expected, for, while the Gaullists were not strongly differentiated from Fourth Republic governments on economic matters, they tended to deviate strongly with respect to foreign policy. Not conforming to the General's position on foreign policy was critical. The Gaullists had, in 1954, played a key role in defeating the European Defense Community in the French Parliament. The Western nations replaced the European Defense Treaty with the Paris Accords which carried out German rearmament through German membership in NATO. Votes on the Paris Agreements comprise most of the items on MacRae's Germany scale.

Although MacRae's scale has four levels, a simple dichotomization of the scale is sufficient to discriminate coalition behavior. Gaullist deputies were thus categorized into two groups. The anti-German rearmament group produced negative votes on five motions concerning the Paris Agreements, including final passage.[13] The pro-Germany group voted these motions. General De Gaulle's strong opposition to German arms would indicate that the "anti-Germans" are to be considered the pure Gaullists who would not be willing to participate in coalitions.[14] A preliminary indication that the "anti-Germans" are in fact the pure Gaullists comes from the fact that both the General's brother, Pierre De Gaulle, and brother-in-law, Jacques Vendroux, belonged to the "anti-Germans." (However, the General's "Mendesist" nephew Diomede Catroux was "pro-German.") Jacques Soustelle, the only original founder of De Gaulle's post-war party, the R.P.F., standing for reelection, was also "anti-German."[15]

The test of the relationship between position on the Germany issue and coalition behavior was made in the following manner. First, Gaullist *apparentement* participation in every district where an incumbent Gaullist deputy stood for reelection was classified into the four coalition categories described above. Then, each district was categorized as being "pro-German" or "anti-German" according to the position of its highest listed Gaullist incumbent standing for reelection. (There was one incumbent, M. Bourgeois, who could not be scaled by MacRae. The position of his *co-listier*, M. Ritzenthaler, was used.) The results are shown in Table 1. Of the 19 "anti-German" districts only six show coalitions and only four had coalitions with the Right. In contrast, the "pro-German" districts show almost precisely the reverse behavior. Ten show coalition with the Right and only one has no coalition at all. (Comparing only Right coalition districts to no coalition districts shows a Q coefficient of .94).[16] After excluding the four districts where other than Right *appar-*

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[11] However, some R.P.F. members individually favored joining coalitions. See Christian Purtschet, *Le Reassemblement du Peuple Français* (Editions Cujas, Paris, 1965), pp. 310–311.

[12] MacRae, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 140.

[14] The positions of various Gaullists are discussed in Stanley Hoffmann, "Les Oraisons Funèbres," in Lerner and Aron, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–87 (French edition).

[15] Purtschet, *op. cit.*, p. 67, lists the founders.

[16] The Q coefficient is used here largely for reasons of comparability with the MacRae study. Other measures of association might be appropri-

entements took place (as is done throughout the paper), there are only five deviant cases. It would indeed seem that MacRae's "anti-Germans" are those who refused coalitions in 1956.

2. *"Opportunistic" Coalition Behavior.* Nonetheless, there is an alternative explanation of the coalition behavior. The present writer has worked for some time with models of coalitions in which coalition behavior was seen to be a function of party membership and the distribution of political forces in the constituency. No attempt is made to take into account ideological differentiation within the parties.[17]

From the "opportunistic" viewpoint of these models, the Gaullists ought to become part of right-based coalitions where the Right could in fact win a majority of the vote in the election. Of course, they might not become a part of the coalition if the other parties could form a majority without them, but this condition would hold in only a small number of districts.

The most obvious calculation of districts with a potential Right majority would simply be to total up the votes from the *previous* election, held in 1951. Where the Right totalled over 50%, one would postdict that the Gaullists would join a coalition. A uniform calculation of this type was made. For all districts, based on the 1956 split between the Mendesist Republican Front Radical-Socialists and Edgar Faure's R.G.R., the Right was defined as follows: R.P.F., *Modérés,* M.R.P., joint lists of Radicals and *Modérés,* R.G.R. in districts where a Radical-Socialist list also existed, R.G.R.I.F., and other Right parties.[18] Tabulating this variable against the coalition outcomes yields a positive relationship (Q = .78). In only one of the nine districts where the Right would lose did the Gaullists make Right-based coalitions, while they did so in 13 of the 22 districts where they could win. Nevertheless, this relationship is weaker than the one found from the scale variable. Comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows there are four more deviant cases in the latter case.

TABLE 1. 1956 ELECTION DEPUTY'S SCALE POSITION AND COALITION BEHAVIOR-CONSTITUENCIES WITH INCUMBENT GAULLIST CANDIDATES

Coalition Entered by Gaullist	Head of Gaullist List "Pro-German"	 "Anti-German"	
Republican Front	1	1	2
Republican Front and Right	1	1	2
None	1	12	13
Right	10	4	14
Total	13	18	31

However, clearly a more sophisticated "opportunistic" calculation could be made. The R.P.F. in 1951 was a "flash" movement attracting substantial support from uncommitted voters and habitual "left" voters. By 1956, the *Républicains-Sociaux* were much weaker than the R.P.F. and a reasonable expectation would have been that this uncommitted and left support had dissipated. Thus, the politicians might have discounted the R.P.F. vote in their 1956 calculations.

The discounting can be simulated by adding only a fraction of the R.P.F. vote to the remaining right vote in calculating a majority. By running a number of simulations in which this fraction varies, one can find that fraction(s) which minimizes the number of deviant cases; one can also test the sensitivity of the postdiction to the discount factor.

The best fit occurs with 74% of the R.P.F.'s 1951 total added to the vote of the other Right

TABLE 2. 1956 ELECTION POSSIBLE WINNING COALITIONS AND COALITION BEHAVIOR-CONSTITUENCIES WITH INCUMBENT GAULLIST CANDIDATE R.P.F. 1951 VOTE WEIGHTED AT 1.0

Coalition Entered by Gaullist	Right Coalition Would Win	 Lose	 Total
Republican Front	1	1	2
Republican Front and Right	0	2	2
None	8	5	13
Right	13	1	14
Total	22	9	31

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ate were the data to be used for non-descriptive purposes.

[17] See Howard Rosenthal, "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulation," in William Copline (ed.), *Simulation and the Study of Politics* (Chicago: Markham Press, 1968) and "Size and Winning Coalitions in the Fourth French Republic" in Sven Groennings et al. (eds.), *The Study of Political Coalitions* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

[18] Election statistics from *Les Élections Legislatives du 17 Juin, 1951,* (La Documentation Française, Paris, 1955).

parties. The tabulation produced from this simulation (Table 3) shows as strong a relationship with coalition formation as does the scale variable (Q = .91). There are five deviant cases in both situations. Moreover, any value (see Figure 2) of the fraction between 60% and 90% would have given no more than seven deviant cases as against the minimum of five. Hence, we conclude that while the postdiction is definitely improved by introducing some discount of the R.P.F. vote, any reasonable value would have worked well!

Confidence in the necessity of introducing a discount on the R.P.F. vote in the calculation of constituency structure is increased by the demonstration that the discount model is superior to an alternative model. The alternative model is that the politicians simply biased the earlier calculation of the Rightist vote upwards or downwards. This can be simulated by multiplying the Rightist vote by a number greater than one for upward bias, a number less than one for downward bias. Figure 2 shows that this model never yields fewer than eight deviant cases and is much less stable than the discount model. Hence, the importance of discounting the R.P.F. vote.

In addition to these two models, a posterior model was also examined in which the 1956 vote for the Right plus a fraction of the Poujadist vote was used as indicating a potential Right majority. This also shows a positive relationship, but, as Figure 2 indicates, not so strong a relationship as the prior model.

Finally, it may be asked why no results have been presented for simple dichotomizations of the percentage of the Right vote in 1951. The reason is that such dichotomizations are equivalent to the simulation involving a biased Right vote. For example, predicting a coalition in districts where the Right vote multiplied by .8 is greater than 50% is equivalent to predicting a coalition in districts where the Right won over 40% of the vote. However, we have preferred to state relationships in terms of the majority figure, since the majority concept is clearly related to coalition theory.

TABLE 3. 1956 ELECTION
POSSIBLE WINNING COALITIONS AND COALITION BEHAVIOR-CONSTITUENCIES WITH INCUMBENT GAULLIST CANDIDATE. R.P.F. 1951 VOTE WEIGHTED AT .74

Coalition Entered by Gaullist	Right Coalition Would		
	Win	Lose	Total
Republican Front	1*	1	2
Republican Front and Right	0	2	2
None	2	11	13
Right	11	3	14
Total	14	17	31

* Majority Right Coalition Without Gaullist.

The utilization made here of the majority concept is undoubtedly overly simple as it has been assumed that the discount factor was constant across districts. But information as to the "leftism" of R.P.F. voter support across districts should only serve to improve the model.

The finding that both the voting record variable and the constituency interest variable discriminate coalition behavior could only result if in fact districts where the Right could win usually were districts that produced pro-Germans (in 10 out of 14 cases) and districts where the Right could not win were almost always districts that produced anti-Germans (in 14 out of 17 cases). (The Q coefficient for the Right win-No Right win dichotomy vs. the Pro-German–Anti-German dichotomy is .84). Thus, for the Gaullists, we have a very close relationship between constituency structure and Parliamentary voting behavior on the Germany issue. This relationship is much weaker if the R.P.F. vote is not discounted.

Further indication that the R.P.F. discount measure of Rightist strength could have been used to predict the Parliamentary behavior of Gaullist deputies is that there is an expected, if weak, positive association between voting on the Right in MacRae's "economic" scale and representing a district where the Right could win (Q = .59).[19] Since this scale refers largely to taxation policy rather than general left-right views, the low level of association is perhaps not surprising. Unfortunately, the association of the R.P.F. discount measure with other scales could not be checked as MacRae did not indicate the deputies' scale positions on these scales.[20]

One could also expect constituency structure to be most influential for those deputies who in fact stood an objective chance of reelection. Now the U.R.A.S. deputies scaled by MacRae but not heretofore included in this analysis

[19] Scale categories "0" and "1" were counted as "Right"; "2," "3," and "4" as "Left." See MacRae, *op. cit.*, pp. 140, 194.

[20] Although Professor MacRae has kindly made his data tapes available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, at this writing the author has not reprocessed these tapes to compute the additional scores.

INCORRECT POSTDICTIONS OF GAULLIST COALITION BEHAVIOR FROM VARIOUS SIMULATIONS



FIG. 2

Note: At a Weighting Factor of 1.0, the Right Bias and RPF Discount models are equivalent.

are deputies who either did not stand for reelection or ran in a list position behind that of another *Républicains-Sociaux* deputy. In the latter case, the decline in Gaullist electoral fortunes meant that such deputies stood virtually no chance of being reelected. The corresponding Q coefficient for the remaining U.R.A.S. deputies on the Germany issue is .75, against .84 for the highest-placed deputies. This difference is small but in the expected direction.

3. *Constituency structure in districts without incumbents.* While it is not possible to extend the analysis based on roll-calls concerning German rearmament to districts which had no incumbent Gaullist deputy, we can extend the analysis of constituency structure to the remaining districts. This analysis will further suggest that constituency structure is most influential in situations where there is a real possibility of winning a seat. First, it is necessary to dispose of 28 districts in which the Gaullists presented no list (or had lists that obtained no votes) and of course could not participate in coalitions. Even if lists had existed in these districts Gaullists would rarely have been important coalition partners since most of these districts were in areas of Gaullist weakness. Thus, 16 of the 28 constituencies were constituencies in which the Republican parties had formed majority *apparentements* in 1951. Three more, Bouches-du-Rhône (2), Corrèze and Isère were heavily Leftist with high Communist polls; the Communists obtained 34% of the vote or better in all three districts in the previous election of 1951. In nine districts, including six not previously accounted for, when the Gaullists split up during the Second Legislature, all those elected on the R.P.F lists in 1951 deserted the movement and placed their lot with the *Modéré* A.R.S. group. (The Gaullists never entered a coalition in districts in which all the R.P.F. incumbents shifted to A.R.S.) Thus only three of these districts that

did not have a Gaullist list might have been somewhat favorable to Gaullism.

Eliminating these 28 districts in addition to the 31 districts that had incumbent Gaullists leaves a residual 36 districts with Gaullist lists without incumbent Gaullist deputies. The relevant cross tabulation (for the R.P.F. discount model at .74) is shown in Table 4. First of all, this table is consistent with the hypothesis that the Gaullists only entered Republican Front coalitions or coalitions that straddled the Left-Right divide when a Right winning coalition was not possible. It also confirms that there was a greater tendency to produce coalitions with the Right in districts where the Right could in fact win, although this tendency was weaker than in districts with incumbent Gaullist deputies. (The comparable Q coefficient is only .47. However, the Q coefficient for the case where the Right coalitions are compared to the totality of the other three categories is .62).

The weaker relationship found in districts without incumbent Gaullist deputies could be related to the fact that, in areas without incumbent Gaullists, the Gaullists were less visible and less likely to be sought as coalition partners by the other Right parties. In two of the four districts where the Gaullists did not enter a coalition where the Right "could" win, the other parties could evidently dispose of the Gaullists since they formed a winning *apparentement* in those districts. (These districts were Orne and Vendée.) This exclusion is thoroughly compatible with current coalition theory following Riker's size principle.[21] (Removing these two cases then leads to a Q coefficient of .69.) Similarly, one of the deviant cases in districts with incumbent deputies can also be reconciled by the size principle. This is the Moselle where Krieger's Gaullist list joined a Leftist *apparentement* in a district where a Rightist *apparentement* had the majority.

TABLE 4. 1956 ELECTION
POSSIBLE WINNING COALITION AND COALITION BEHAVIOR-CONSTITUENCIES WITHOUT INCUMBENT GAULLIST CANDIDATE. R.P.F. 1951 VOTE WEIGHTED AT .74

Coalition Entered by Gaullist	Right Coalition Would		
	Win	Lose	Total
Republican Front	0	7	7
Republican Front and Right	0	2	2
None	4*	11	15
Right	6	6	12
	—	—	—
Total	10	26	36

* 2 of 4 contain majority Right coalitions without Gaullists.

Perhaps even more so than size considerations, direct cases of political conflict appear to have had an influence upon coalition entry of non-incumbent *Républicains-Sociaux* lists. Eight of the thirty-six non-incumbent districts are districts where all the former R.P.F. deputies running for reelection had deserted to A.R.S. and other groups. Removing these eight districts from the computations yields a Q of .81 when Right coalitions are contrasted with no coalitions and .88 when Right coalitions are contrasted with the totality of the other three categories.

II. THE 1951 ELECTION

In contrast to the 1956 situation, neither roll-call information nor constituency information can be used to discriminate the coalition behavior of *incumbent* Gaullist deputies in 1951. For despite the fact that the Gaullists concluded 13 *apparentements,* no *apparentements* were recorded in the 19 districts where an incumbent Gaullist stood for reelection as the head of a list (although one incumbent, M. Montillot in Haute-Saône, was the second man on a list in a coalition district).[22] Yet those *apparentements* concluded were profitable; the Gaullists gained five seats over what they would have won without the *apparentements.*[23] Some party members believed that had the Gaullists actively pursued a coalition policy in 1951 they would have been able to come to power in 1951 rather than in 1958.[24] Why the reluctance of the incumbents?

1. *Roll-call vote and coalition choice.* The avoidance of *apparentements* by the incumbents does not appear to have its roots in a common ideological orientation. In the First Legislature, while eight of these men had been classified by MacRae as belonging to the Right, five others were drawn from the Radicals, with the remaining six coming from splinter groups not scaled by MacRae, five of these coming from the *Ré-*

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[21] William Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[22] Candidates running on homogeneous R.P.F. lists have always been treated as Gaullists. In the case of joint lists, a classification was made on the basis of whether the deputy joined the R.P.F. Assembly group after the election. (All heads of joint lists were elected.)

[23] On the assumption that the votes by party would not have been changed.

[24] Purtschet, *op. cit.,* p. 280.

publicains Popularies Indépendants and one from the *Action Démocratique et Sociale*.

The heterogeneity found in the First Legislature is repeated in the Second. Six of the incumbents had been defeated for reelection. Of the remaining thirteen, four joined the right wing of the R.P.F. in splintering into the A.R.S. Of the nine remaining U.R.A.S. members, four were anti-German, five pro-German. They also failed to cluster on the economic scale. Thus the incumbent Gaullist heads, all of whom failed to join *apparentements*, did not vote similarly on roll-calls that divided the Gaullists.

Should similar roll-call voting be expected if the coalition behavior was ideologically motivated? The *apparentement* system was opposed by the Gaullist leadership not only because of its intent of reducing Gaullist representation but also because it was an institution and symbol of the Fourth Republic. In turn, the behavior pattern for Gaullists called for opposing the Republic at every opportunity.[25] Thus one would expect, on an ideological basis, the coalition joiners to be the weak-hearted Gaullists, those who later on wound up in the A.R.S. or were classified as pro-Germany on the Germany scale or "right" on the economic scale. Those who did not join coalitions should tend to be "anti-Germans" and "left" on economic matters.

It has thus been shown that the incumbents, in contrast to the ideological expectation, did not form a group of hard-core Gaullists in the Second Legislature. One may argue that they failed to join coalitions since they did not want to incur voter displeasure for having participated in coalitions they voted against. Or, alternatively, one may, as is done below, find an alternative explanation in the characteristics of their constituencies. But it will first be necessary to explore the Parliamentary behavior of non-incumbents.

Did those heads of lists elected after having joined an *apparentement* fulfill the ideological expectation that they would be among the less loyal Gaullists in the Second Legislature? Of the 10 elected heads of lists, only three defected to the A.R.S., yielding a defection rate equivalent to that observed for the non-coalition building incumbents. Of the seven U.R.A.S. deputies, three were anti-German, four pro-German. There was also no clustering on the economic scale.

The *apparentement* makers can be compared with another group, the 27 non-incumbent heads who were elected without *apparentements* (from districts where *apparentements* were permitted) in 1951. Of those deputies that could be scaled, 11 were anti-German as against only five pro-Germans (again no clustering was found on the economic scale). This suggests that among non-incumbents, those who did not make coalitions tended to be loyal Gaullists. But in the relevant computational comparison between non-incumbent joiners and non-joiners, the measure of association is fairly weak ($Q = .42$). Furthermore, the non-joiners had a rate of defection similar to that of the joiners. Seven of the 27 joined the A.R.S., one joined P.C.D., and one was not a member of any group at the end of the Second Legislature. On the basis of the above results, it does not seem possible to make a case for ideological coherence in coalition decision-making.

2. *Modéré incumbents: a necessary condition.* Since neither roll-call voting nor Parliamentary group membership give a clear discrimination of coalition behavior, it remains to work through an opportunistic calculation. Inspection of the R.P.F. *apparentements* indicates that in no case did the R.P.F. conclude an *apparentement* that did not include a Modéré partner. This is true even when Radicals and/or M.R.P. were part of the *apparentement*. Inclusion of the Modérés in any R.P.F. alliance may have been necessary for the R.P.F. to retain the support of conservative voters. The Modérés may also have been necessary brokers between the R.P.F. and other partners, particularly M.R.P. where there had been strong opposition over the electoral law, foreign policy, and other matters. Consequently, it is appropriate to ask what circumstances may have facilitated a Modéré-R.P.F. alliance. The presence of a Modéré incumbent running for reelection, either as a Gaullist or a Modéré, ought to have been important, for the incumbency would indicate (1) the availability of a prominent politician to conduct negotiations (interview materials indicate the primordial role of incumbents in coalition negotiations[26]); (2) the availability of a large enough package of votes to generate payoffs to the coalition.

In fact, the indicator of Modéré incumbency has a reasonably strong relationship with the coalition outcomes. (Members of the U.D.I., R.I., P.R.L., and *Action Paysanne* Parliamentary groups were treated as Modérés.) Only 2 of the 13 R.P.F. coalitions occurred in districts without Modéré incumbents, suggesting that the presence of such an incumbent can be regarded as a necessary condition for a R.P.F. alliance. Significantly, the two deviant cases (Nièvre and Pyrénées-Orientales) represent, in terms of total vote, the two smallest R.P.F. coalitions. Both coalitions were with the miniscule Taxpayers (*Contribuables*) party; in both cases the partner added only 7% of the vote to the R.P.F. total. The overall relationship, represented in Table 5, shows a Q-coefficient of .76.

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[25] *Ibid., passim.*

[26] Interviews conducted by the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP) for research directed by the author and Guy Michelat.

The foregoing relationship, which once again links a constituency characteristic to coalition behavior, holds at the .79 level if districts with R.P.F. incumbents as heads of list are removed. And, to draw the relevant comparison with the earlier exploration of ideological relationships, a .76 Q-coefficient results if the comparison is further limited, as in Table 6, to districts in which the Gaullists won at least one seat.

(The posterior dichotomy R.P.F. seat vs. no R.P.F. seat has a Q of .75 with the coalition variable. The dichotomy of blocked (districts where in 1946 Communists plus Socialists totalled over 50% of the vote) vs. non-blocked yields a Q of .55.)

The role of Modéré incumbency may also hold a key to the behavior of the non-joining R.P.F. incumbents. Of these nineteen heads of list, nine came from districts without a Modéré incumbent. Thus, their behavior could be explained without any reference to preserving consistency with the roll-call vote on the electoral law. (In passing, it can be noted that these nine men did not appear to select their districts on the basis of ideological congruence—two were "anti-Germans," three "pro-Germans," two A.R.S., and two were not reelected.) What, however, of the ten men who did run in Modéré districts? Again there is an alternative to the roll-call consistency explanation, at least for seven of the ten districts. In these districts, the Modéré incumbents were all members of R.P.F. sponsored lists. In such a circumstance, it would be reasonable to assume that there would have been greater difficulty in negotiating a coalition. (Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that a similar condition occurred in two of the coalition constituencies.) Thus there may be some basis for the suggestion that coalition behavior on the part of Gaullist incumbents was linked to constituency factors as well as to the need to be consistent with the roll-call vote on the electoral law.

TABLE 5. 1951 ELECTION
MODERE INCUMBENCIES AND R.P.F.
COALITION BEHAVIOR

Gaullists In *Apparentement*	Modéré Incumbent Yes	No	Total
Yes	11	2	13
No	35	47	82
Total	46	49	95

TABLE 6. 1951 ELECTION
MODERE INCUMBENCIES AND R.P.F. COALITION
BEHAVIOR-DISTRICTS WHERE R.P.F. WON
AT LEAST ONE SEAT

Gaullists In *Apparentement*	Modéré Incumbent Yes	No	Total
Yes	9	1	10
No	15	12	27
Total	24	13	37

Now it would be hard to conclude that Gaullists preferred coalitions in Modéré districts on the basis of personal ideology. It can be assumed that Modérés, incumbent or not, represent similar ideological alternatives. Nonetheless, a relevant question is whether the incumbent Modérés in the coalition districts can be differentiated ideologically from the other incumbent Modérés. However, no clustering was found, with respect to both Parliamentary group membership and the two scales MacRae presents for the Right in the First Legislature. Thus, for 1951, MacRae's treatment of the roll-call data yields no important linkages to R.P.F. coalition behavior. But since Modéré incumbency yields only a necessary condition for R.P.F. coalitions, one can ask, but not answer, if the final determinants of R.P.F. coalitions reside in undiscovered ideological or calculating factors or simply in personal quarrels and other local idiosyncracies.

III. COMPARISON OF THE OPPORTUNISM MODELS

For 1951, opportunities for coalition formation were viewed as coming from incumbency locations while in 1956 a size calculation was made. Could one not have applied a version of the 1951 model to 1956 and vice-versa?

For 1956, the *Républicains-Sociaux* never formed coalitions without either Radicals or Modérés. In districts with *Républicains-Sociaux* incumbents, there were too few Radical incumbents to permit an evaluation of Radical incumbency influence. Modéré incumbency showed no relationship ($Q = .11$) to coalition formulation.

In non-incumbent districts, with the eight defector districts again excluded, there is a positive association ($Q = .50$ for Right vs. no coalitions, and $Q = .67$ for Right vs. all other categories), but a much weaker one than that found for the size calculation.

A size calculation could also be made for 1951. One calculation would be to estimate that the R.P.F. would tend to form coalitions where the Communists (regular and Trotskyist) plus the Socialists totaled less than 50% in 1946. Such a computation leads to a moderate Q of .55. Another suggestion would be that the R.P.F. would join coalitions where the "center" (S.F.I.O., Radicals, and M.R.P.) parties did not carry greater than half the votes in 1946. This leads to a Q of .70. However, this model is very unstable. Any discounting, either of the total or of the M.R.P. vote alone, lowers Q quite rapidly. On the other hand, it can be argued that the 1946 election was not as good a source of information for the 1951 election as 1951 was for 1956. For example, in 1946, the Right had no representation at all in many constituencies. Therefore, better information gathered, say, from intervening local elections, might lead to a valid size calculation.

One must, nevertheless, conclude at present that the two models are not interchangeable. The facility of a size calculation in 1956 is suggested by Williams' comment, cited earlier, that 1956 offered a clear choice, a polarization between the Republican Front and the Right. In 1951, such an easy computation was not available and, furthermore, information about the distribution of voting strength may have been relatively poor. In such a case, incumbencies rather than votes would become the key behavioral indicators.

IV. CONCLUSION

To compare the usefulness of the constituency interest model to the roll-call voting record model for predictive purposes, for 1951, the available roll-call data had virtually no pay-off. For 1956, it can be seen that any reasonable discount figure in the opportunism model would have worked well. In contrast, to use a scale for predictive purposes, one would have had to have been able to specify which votes were significant and what the relevant dichotomizations should be. Furthermore, the fact that the Gaullists participated in three non-Right coalitions in districts where the Right would lose is quite consistent with opportunism. Krieger's behavior in Moselle can also be termed opportunistic since he had been refused admission to the Right coalition.[27] In terms of opportunism, it seems reasonable to move to the Left when you cannot win with the Right. On the other hand, it is more difficult to see why those with a "Right" position on the Germany issue would take a "Left" coalition posture, and these cases of participation in non-Right coalitions are left unexplained by the Germany scale model.

It would consequently appear that the explanation of coalition behavior on the simple basis of political opportunity ought to be taken seriously. Nonetheless, it is clear that we cannot entirely reject the hypothesis of the "congruent ideology" model.[28] The paucity of deviant cases excludes an examination of partial relationships. Is it the case that the "anti-Germans" simply select to run in districts in which the Right cannot win? On the surface, this proposition may seem ridiculous, but one would have to admit that on a matter so important to the General as the Paris Agreements, the votes of Jacques Vendroux and Pierre De Gaulle were not likely to have been dictated by constituency interests. And, in districts where the Gaullists entered Right coalitions even though the Right could not win, there are some indications that ideology played a role. For example, in Tarn-et-Garonne, it appears that the Gaullists were originally prepared to enter a Left coalition but finally entered a Right coalition after the key political figure in the department, the Radical deputy and editor of the *Dépeche du Midi,* Jean Baylet, wanted the Gaullists to sign a paper endorsing the lay position on the famous *question*

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[27] Williams, *Politics, op. cit.,* p. xxii, n. 19, implies that Krieger had in fact tried to join with the Right and was rebuffed. Also, Williams would not count Bricout's alliance as Leftist. We have done so since we always consider homogeneous Radical-Socialist lists as Republican Front lists in order to have consistent classifications.

[28] It has been shown here that constituency characteristics are at least as strongly related to electoral coalition decisions as are intra-party voting decisions. It has also been shown that intra-party voting is related to constituency characteristics. But insofar as the "economic" scale is less strongly tied to the constituencies than the "Germany" scale (.52 vs. .84) and since MacRae suggests that the "economic" scale is more closely linked to cabinet stability, we must entertain the hypothesis that ideology is more strongly related to cabinet coalition decisions than to electoral coalition decisions especially since cabinet decisions are more removed from the voter than electoral coalition decisions. In this case there would be room for both MacRae's "ideological" hypothesis and the present "opportunistic" hypothesis. See MacRae, *op. cit.,* pp. 140–142.

scolaire.[29] In general, however, the proposition that constituency interests dominated voting in the Assembly seems more tenable. Those districts where the Right cannot win are, by the other side of the coin, largely Leftist. They were thus less likely to be dominated by a rigid anti-Communism that could be used to rationalize German rearmament in a country that had been invaded by German arms three times in a century. (The R.P.F.'s virulent anti-Communism attracted many of the less stalwart Gaullists.)[30] In the case where constituency interests do in fact dominate voting in the Assembly, politics in France may well be a game. Even if French politics are not, in the interior of the Assembly, the narrow psychological game portrayed by Leites, at the exterior, there may be a pure political game of adapting one's position to winning electoral contests.[31] Consideration of what is necessary to win in a constituency may then dictate the deputies' decisions in the Legislature. From direct interviewing, it is known that at least the deputies' coalition decisions were influenced by what was necessary to win. Deputies claim not having made certain coalitions that they would have themselves preferred ideologically but which would not have been *"compris"* by their electors. Likewise, they frequently may have voted in the *Assemblée* in ways that would have been *"compris"* at home.[32]

The foregoing considerations may permit some reconciliation between the "ideological" and "gaming" interpretations of French politics Let us assume that ideology was important to voters and militants. But also assume that the politicians were interested in getting reelected and in other ego-related goals such as achieving positions of power. In this case, politicians and politics could, as indicated on Figure 1B, become ideological while remaining self-oriented. As such part of the "game" of unseating cabinets could center upon "ideological issues." The ideologies expounded are then not the mirror of the soul's conviction but of its ambition. The closeness of the associations between the constituency variables and both the voting record variable and the coalition variables are strong enough to present an alternative explanation to the emphasis placed by MacRae upon the personal ideologies of the Gaullist deputies.

While MacRae found that Parliamentary voting patterns clustered about issues, he only briefly considered the extent to which these issues represented constituency interests. One difficulty in his analysis concerned a choice of variables. While this paper has used variables directly related to the chance of being reelected, MacRae largely relied upon socioeconomic measures and measures similar to the measure of Rightist vote with no bias. These measures (and the one used here) fail to capture the situation where a deputy can base his reelection upon supporting minority positions on issues critical to the minority. They also fail to capture the fact that a deputy needed only a coalition of a subset of the voters and not even a majority of the voters to gain reelection.[33] Hence, opportunistic voting may be even more prevalent than shown in this essay.

Gaullists as a group nevertheless had a distinct set of political preferences. They differed sharply from, say, the M.R.P.; yet they frequently competed with the M.R.P. for the same clientele. There is no intention here to obscure such ideological differences as existed between the Gaullists and the M.R.P. These differences are important. But within these differences, there is room for maneuver, which is the basis for the intra-party cleavages that interested MacRae. This room for maneuver is undoubtedly also the origin of the gaming conclusions of Leites' succinct psychological analysis. What has been indicated here is the possibility that these cleavages in fact reflect a "gaming" or "self-oriented" situation insofar as positions are dictated by constituency characteristics. The pure Gaullists then would be those whose constituencies permitted them to be so. *Politique d'abord.*

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[29] See n. 26.

[30] Purtschet, *op. cit.*, pp. 176, 180, 280, 298, 314, 328.

[31] Initially a number of deputies who *personally* favored the Paris Agreements voted against them, undoubtedly for *electoral* reasons, because they felt that the Agreements had enough votes to pass without their votes. Consequently, the Agreements were initially defeated and had to be reconsidered. See Leites, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

[32] See n. 26.

[33] A manifestation of subset tactics is witnessed by the finding that on roll-call votes deputies from different parties in a given district "tended to take positions inversely related to one another." MacRae, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

MAJORITY DECISION-MAKING WITH PARTIAL UNIDIMENSIONALITY*

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A major dilemma for majority decision-making occurs when the summation of transitive individual preference orderings results in an intransitive social ordering. The problems posed by this phenomenon, which is known as the paradox of voting, can be seen in the following standard example.

> Suppose there are three individuals, one with each of the following preference orders of three alternatives: *ABC, BCA, CAB*. Under majority rule, *A* would defeat *B*, *B* would defeat *C*, and *C* would defeat *A*, so there is no majority winner.

Most voting procedures, of course, yield a unique result whether or not the paradox occurs. But from this example it is apparent that when the paradox does occur, a majority of the voters prefer an alternative other than the one which is selected. Moreover, if a typical voting procedure is used, which of the alternatives is selected depends on the order in which the alternatives are voted on.[1] Clearly these results have important implications, whether one is concerned with normative questions about majority rule or with the practical politics of legislative decision-making.

In the burgeoning literature on the voting paradox, surely one of the most impressive and well-known findings is Black's and Arrow's demonstration that the paradox cannot occur if the set of individual preference orderings is single-peaked.[2] Since single-peakedness implies that the individuals and alternatives can be arrayed on a single dimension, their finding has a meaningful substantive interpretation. Namely, complete agreement on a dimension for judging the alternatives ensures that majority voting will yield a transitive social ordering of the alternatives.[3]

Note, however, that the preference ordering of *every* individual must be single-peaked for Black's and Arrow's result to hold. Empirically this is most unlikely to happen. Even excluding multidimensional judgments, other factors such as lack of information about, misperception of, and similarity of alternatives as well as simply error make it almost certain that one or more preference orderings will not meet the necessary conditions. Hence, for all its elegance, Black's and Arrow's finding is of limited value in explaining the frequency of occurrence of the paradox.[4]

Intuitively it is reasonable to suppose that the theorems of Black and Arrow can be refined by thinking of the paradox in probabilistic rather than categorical terms. For example, while we know that the paradox *can* occur if one out of 999 preference orderings is not single-peaked, it seems very unlikely that it will in fact

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* I would like to thank Herbert Weisberg, whose continued collaboration helped stimulate this research. I also wish to thank James Callan for technical help. The University of Rochester Computing Center provided computer time.

[1] Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 39–40.

[2] Black, *op. cit.*, Chap. IV; Kenneth J. Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1963), pp. 74–80. A set of preference orderings is single-peaked if there is an ordering of the alternatives on the abscissa such that when utility or degree of preference is indicated by the ordinate, each preference ordering can be represented by a curve which changes its direction at most once, from up to down (i.e. has at most one peak).

[3] For most political scientists, the major work relying on the assumption of unidimensionality is Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957). In Downs' spatial analysis voters and parties unanimously view the electoral struggle in terms of a single ideological dimension. They do not, of course, agree on which party is best, but they do share a common dimension or continuum on which to judge the alternatives. Downs' work has often been criticized because unidimensionality is assumed. In a sense, I am making the same criticism of one aspect of Black's and Arrow's work, but I am also proceeding (a little way) with the analysis after dropping the criticized assumption.

[4] More general criteria than single-peakedness will also prevent the occurrence of the paradox. However, as with single-peakedness, every individual's preference ordering must satisfy the criteria. In addition, the more general conditions lack a meaningful substantive interpretation. See Amartya K. Sen, "A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions," *Econometrica*, 34 (1966), 491–499, and the references cited therein.

occur. At least it seems less likely than if 50 or 150 or 250 of the rank orders are not single-peaked. Indeed, the likelihood of the paradox would seem to increase as the proportion of single-peaked preference orderings decreases.

We are led to ask, then, what the probability of the paradox is, given that a certain proportion of the rank orders satisfy single-peaked criteria. The answer to this question for the three-alternative case provides the basis for this paper. The findings will suggest, first of all, why the paradox does not occur in many social situations. Secondly, they will suggest the type of situation in which the paradox is most likely to occur in reality. The discussion is limited to the three-alternative case because the calculations for n-alternatives have thus far proved intractable. Extension of the general ideas to the n-alternative case can probably be made.

The methods used here were developed by the application of Coombs' unfolding technique.[5] Although they could be translated into the more familiar language of single-peaked preference orderings, it seems profitable to introduce Coombs' ideas and techniques to researchers interested in the voting paradox and in collective choice more generally. Not only do they provide more convenient procedures for analyzing rank order data; they also ground these procedures in a psychological theory of preferential choice. A brief summary of the most relevant aspects of Coombs' work is provided before our own findings are displayed.

Unfolding Technique. The unfolding technique is a procedure for determining from a set of individual preference orderings the dimension(s) on which the choices were based. The basic assumptions of the theory of preferential choice underlying the technique are as follows. Each individual and each alternative (called stimuli in the original exposition) may be represented by a point in n-dimensional space. The "individual points," called ideal points, represent the best possible alternative from the point of view of each individual. Each individual's preference ordering of the alternatives (stimuli) from most to least preferred is given by the rank order of the absolute distances of the stimulus points from his ideal point, the nearest being the most preferred. For convenience, the preference orderings are called *I scales*.

A special situation, the unidimensional case, exists when all individuals and alternatives can be represented on a single dimension, called a *J scale*.[6] This is obviously a highly restrictive case, but it is of crucial importance in considering problems of majority decision. This is because there is a precise correspondence between the criteria of unidimensionality and single-peakedness. That is, single-peaked curves "correspond in unfolding theory to the case in which the preference orderings of the individuals all unfold into a common qualitative *J* scale." Thus Black's and Arrow's theorems can be stated in terms of unfolding theory. In Coombs' words, "If a set of individual preference orderings satisfies a common qualitative *J* scale, . . . majority decision necessarily yields a transitive ordering of alternatives."[7]

Using the unfolding technique, one can readily determine whether a common *J* scale exists, and if so, what the order of the alternatives is on this dimension. For a variety of reasons noted above, such a solution seldom exists. In this situation one can find instead the *dominant J* scale, that is, the ordering of the alternatives along a single dimension which satisfies the largest proportion of the preference orderings. The probability of the voting paradox as this proportion varies is what we now wish to find.

THE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY OF THE PARADOX OF VOTING

Let us begin by making explicit the assumptions on which our analysis is based. These conditions are taken, with slight changes in notation, from an earlier publication.[8] The assumptions are similar to those found in most work on the paradox, and they do simplify the analysis. However, they are not inherent limitations in the analysis below, and an effort to relax them might be profitable.

Consider three alternatives, A, B, C. Let m individuals rank the alternatives. We assume the following:

I. For all pairs of alternatives such as A and B, $A \gg B$ (read: A is ranked above B) or $B \gg A$; that is indifference between alternatives is not permitted.

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[5] Clyde H. Coombs, *A Theory of Data* (New York: Wiley, 1964), Chaps. 5–7.

[6] Coombs distinguishes a *quantitative J* scale, on which the spacing as well as the order of alternatives is determined, from a *qualitative J* scale, on which the order of alternatives but not their spacing has been determined. We will only be concerned with the latter type.

[7] Coombs, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

[8] Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, "A Mathematical Solution for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting," *Behavioral Science*, 13 (1968), 317–323.

II. For each individual the rank order is transitive; e.g., if $A \gtrdot B$, and $B \gtrdot C$, then $A \gtrdot C$.

III. In voting on a pair of alternatives, each individual votes for the alternative which stands higher in his rank order.

A social ordering is determined by simple majority voting between all pairs of alternatives. In order to avoid ties in the social ordering, we also assume that:

IV. The number of individuals is odd.

Individual preference orderings are indicated by a series of letters. For example, if $A \gtrdot B$, $B \gtrdot C$ (and $A \gtrdot C$), this is indicated simply as *ABC*.

In order to determine the probability of the paradox given that a certain proportion of the individuals have preference orderings (*I* scales) satisfying a common *J* scale, it is relevant to ask first whether that proportion can vary over the entire range of 0% to 100%. Are there instances in which the preference orderings of no more than 10%, 25% or 50% of the individuals can be derived from a common dimension? It turns out that with three alternatives, the preference orderings of at least $[2m/3]$ of the individuals necessarily satisfy a common qualitative *J* scale, where $[2m/3]$ is the smallest integer $\geqq 2m/3$. For example, if 99 individuals each rank three alternatives, at least 66 of their rank orders are satisfied by a common *J* scale—no matter how the orderings were arrived at! This can be demonstrated as follows.[9]

With three alternatives there are $3!=6$ rank orders: *ABC*, *ACB*, *BAC*, *BCA*, *CAB*, *CBA*. Any of these six orderings constitutes a *J* scale. However, three of the orderings are mirror images of the others and will therefore satisfy the same rank orders. Hence there are only three distinct *J* scales: (*ABC*), (*BCA*), and (*CAB*), where the parentheses indicate that either end of the ordering may be considered the "left" end. Each *J* scale satisfies four of the six *I* scales, as shown below:

J scale	(*ABC*)	(*BCA*)	(*CAB*)
I scales satisfying the *J* scale	*ABC* *BAC* *BCA* *CBA*	*BCA* *CBA* *CAB* *ACB*	*CAB* *ACB* *ABC* *BAC*

Note that pairs of *I* scales—*ABC* and *BAC*, *BCA* and *CBA*, *CAB* and *ACB*—always occur together. If one of the pair is satisfied by a *J* scale, the other is too. Here we need not distinguish individual members of the pair. Essentially, then, we have only three sets of *I* scales, as follows:

J scale	(*ABC*)	(*BCA*)	(*CAB*)
Sets of *I* scales satisfying the *J* scale	I II	II III	III I

where Set I = (*ABC*, *BAC*), Set II = (*BCA*, *CBA*), and Set III = (*CAB*, *ACB*).

It is apparent that any two of the three sets of *I* scales satisfy a common *J* scale. Thus to find the dimension satisfying the largest number of individual preference orderings, we simply identify the *J* scale which satisfies the sets containing the largest and second largest numbers of individuals. (The proportion of the m individuals having *I* scales in either of the two largest sets will be denoted by x/m. In other words, x/m is the *maximum* proportion of individuals whose preference orderings satisfy a common *J* scale.) These two sets will always contain the preference orderings of at least 2/3 of the individuals. This follows immediately from the partition of m individuals into three disjoint sets. The smallest set(s) can never have more than 1/3 of the individuals, so that the two remaining sets have at least 2/3 of them. In fact, exactly 2/3 of the preference orderings satisfy a common *J* scale only if m is a multiple of three, and each set contains exactly $m/3$ individuals.

Our task now is to find the probability of the voting paradox given that x/m preference orderings satisfy a common *J* scale, where $x/m \geqq 2/3$. In order to do this, some assumption must be made about the initial probabilities of each rank order. Unfortunately, the final result—the probability of the paradox—varies from 0 to 1 as the underlying assumptions are varied. However, almost all previous work on the paradox has been based on the "equally-likely" assumption, and as a didactic device it is quite useful. In addition, it allows a direct comparison of our present results with total probabilities calculated earlier.[10]

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[9] In general, given m alternatives, the minimum proportion of *I* scales satisfying a common qualitative *J* scale is $[2^{n-1}/n!]$. To show this requires a more general proof, which is not useful for the present analysis.

[10] Probabilities of the paradox for various numbers of individuals and alternatives are given in Colin D. Campbell and Gordon Tullock, "A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities," *The Economic Journal*, 75 (1965), 853–856;

The equally-likely assumption normally specifies that the probability of each rank order is equal, or one-sixth in the three-alternative case. Here, however, we are dealing with two disjoint groups of individuals—x with preference orderings satisfied by a common J scale and m-x with preference orderings not satisfied by that J scale. Hence, for calculating conditional probabilities, the equally-likely assumption must be modified to mean that $p=1/4$ for each of the four I scales which satisfy the common J scale and $p=1/2$ for each of the remaining two I scales.[11]

A computer program was written by Herbert Weisberg and the author to calculate the desired values. For a given m, the program generated all possible distributions of individuals among the six possible rank orders. For each distribution the program determined: 1) the probability of the distribution based on the equally-likely assumption (as normally interpreted), 2) whether the paradox occurred, 3) how many individuals' preference orderings satisfied a common J scale (x/m). With this information it was possible to determine directly the probability of the paradox for the given number of individuals, the probability that x/m preference orderings satisfy a common J scale, and (assuming the modified equally-likely assumption) the probability of the paradox given that x/m preference orderings satisfy a common J scale.

By generating every distribution of m individuals among the six rank orders, this program used the most direct approach possible. However, since the number of distributions of m individuals among six rank orders increases extremely rapidly as m increases, the program is limited practically by the amount of computational time required; it is used here for

TABLE 1. CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF THE PARADOX OF VOTING, WITH THREE ALTERNATIVES AND EQUALLY-LIKELY RANK ORDERS

Number of Individuals	Number of Individuals whose Preference Orderings Satisfy a Common Qualitative *J* Scale																				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
1	0*																				
3	—**	.250	0																		
5	—	—	—	.112	0																
7	—	—	—	—	.188	.039	0														
9	—	—	—	—	—	.250	.102	.017	0												
11	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.168	.045	.008	0										
13	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.214	.089	.022	.003	0								
15	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.250	.142	.045	.012	.002	0						
17	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.192	.077	.024	.006	.001	0				
19	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.226	.119	.042	.013	.003	.000+	0		
21	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	.250	.165	.068	.024	.007	.001	.000+	0

* The entries are the probabilities of the paradox of voting under the given conditions.

** These conditions cannot hold, since it is shown in the text that at least $[2m/3]$ of the I scales always satisfy a common qualitative J scale.

Frank Demeyer, and Charles R. Plott, "The Probability of a Cyclical Majority," *Econometrica*, forthcoming; Mark B. Garman, and Morton I. Kamien, "The Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations," *Behavioral Science* 13 (1968), 306–316; David Klahr, "A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 384–390; Niemi and Weisberg, *op. cit.*; John E. Pomeranz and Roman L. Weil, Jr., "Calculation of Cyclical Majority Probabilities," unpublished paper, University of Chicago.

[11] In our earlier paper, questions were raised about the interpretation of the initial probability assumptions. These questions are fully applicable here. See Niemi and Weisberg, *op. cit.*, fn. 6. It should be added that instances in which the paradox is contrived are not adequately accounted for by a probabilistic model.



FIG. 1. Probabilities of the Paradox of Voting by Percentage of Individuals whose preference orderings satisfy a common *J* scale

* For $m=45$, actual probabilities were calculated only until 36 (80%) preference orderings satisfied a common *J* scale, after this point a dotted line is used. For $m=95$, probabilities were calculated for 64, 66, 68, 70 and 72 preference orderings satisfying a common *J* scale as explained in the Appendix.

only up to 21 individuals. To overcome this limitation, another program was written to provide the supplementary calculations described below.

The conditional probabilities of the paradox of voting, based on the assumption of equally-likely rank orders, are given in Table 1 for $m=1$ to $m=21$. (The conditional probabilities for larger m will be considered presently.) It is apparent, first of all, that with three alternatives and the equally-likely assumption, the conditional probability of the voting paradox is never more than .25. And that probability obtains only when the lowest possible proportion of individuals have preference orderings satisfying a common *J* scale. It is also obvious that for a fixed number of individuals, the probability of the paradox decreases monotonically as the proportion of preference orderings satisfying a common *J* scale increases. The rate of decrease is high at first, and then is very low as perfect unidimensionality is approached. The 0's along the diagonal indicate, of course, that the paradox cannot occur if all of the preference orderings satisfy a common dimension.

Figure 1 shows the conditional probabilities of the paradox graphed against the proportion of preference orderings satisfying a common *J* scale. The smooth curves are drawn to identify the points associated with each value of m. With small m, of course, only a few percentages have corresponding integer fractions and only those points can be "translated" into numbers of individuals. As m increases the points for a given value of m approximate a smooth curve. Thus the curves which are drawn in suggest the general form which the probability values take for larger m.

The probability values for $m=45$ and $m=95$

were calculated by a computer program written for this purpose. The procedure on which it is based is described in detail in the Appendix. We also show in the Appendix that as m approaches infinity, the probability of the paradox is .25 when exactly 2/3 of the preference orderings satisfy a common J scale; for any percentage larger than 2/3, the probability of the paradox approaches as close to 0 as desired (except for 100%, where the probability is 0). Thus, as m approaches infinity, the curve of conditional probabilities approaches the lines $x=2/3$, $y=0$.

From the shape of the curves in Figure 1, it is clear that the probability of the paradox depends both on the proportion of individuals with preference orderings which satisfy a common J scale (x/m) and on the number of individuals involved (m). Thus we are led to an entirely unexpected conclusion: Holding constant the proportion of individuals whose preference orderings satisfy a common J scale, the probability of the paradox of voting decreases as the number of individuals increases. This means, for example, that if about 70% of the preference orderings satisfy unidimensional criteria, the occurrence of the paradox (under the given assumptions) is relatively likely if the population is small, but is very unlikely if the population is large. For all values of m, however, the probability of the paradox decreases rapidly at first, so that unless m is very small, the paradox is unlikely if even 75–80% of the preference orderings satisfy a common J scale. For very large groups of individuals, as much as 70% agreement on an underlying dimension is sufficient to make the paradox a rare occurrence.

Before discussing the implications of these findings for majority decision-making, I should indicate the relationship between these conditional probabilities and the total probabilities given in an earlier paper.[12] As noted above, we were able to calculate the probability, for $m=1$ to $m=21$, that exactly x/m of the preference orderings satisfy a common J scale, for each value of x such that $x/m \geq 2/3$. These values are presented in Table 2. They show that by chance a relatively low proportion of the individuals are likely to have preference orderings satisfying a common J scale. Thus, while the conditional probability of the paradox is near zero for moderate to large m and 70–75% of the preference orderings satisfying a common J scale, the likelihood of getting less than this degree of unidimensionality by chance is sufficiently large so that the total probability of

TABLE 2. PROBABILITY THAT A GIVEN NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS HAVE PREFERENCE ORDERINGS SATISFYING A COMMON QUALITATIVE J SCALE, WITH THREE ALTERNATIVES AND EQUALLY-LIKELY RANK ORDERS

	Number of Individuals whose Preference Orderings Satisfy a Common Qualitative J Scale																				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
Number of Individuals 1	1																				
3	0	.222	.778																		
5	0	0	0	.617	.383																
7	0	0	0	0	.288	.538	.174														
9	0	0	0	0	0	.085	.499	.337	.078												
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.352	.425	.188	.035										
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.170	.426	.289	.100	.015								
15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.053	.358	.366	.178	.039	.007						
17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.247	.372	.250	.103	.026	.003				
19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.120	.343	.303	.162	.058	.013	.001		
21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.038	.278	.328	.218	.100	.032	.006	.001

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[12] Niemi and Weisberg, *op. cit.*

the paradox does not vanish but actually increases slightly as m increases.[13]

IMPLICATIONS FOR MAJORITY DECISION-MAKING

We noted at the outset that simply majority voting necessarily yields a transitive social ordering if *all* of the individual preference orderings are satisfied by a common dimension. However, it was also observed that complete unidimensionality is most unlikely empirically, so that the theorem of Black and Arrow provides little help in explaining the actual frequency of occurrence of the paradox. In this paper we have shown—for three alternatives and equally-likely rank orders—that even a moderate degree of unidimensionality makes it unlikely that the paradox will prevent a transitive majority decision. Depending on the size of the group, the paradox will infrequently occur if only 75% or 70% or even fewer of the individuals adopt a common standard (dimension) of judgment.

The present findings, then, highlight the role of all those factors which contribute to the widespread adoption of a common standard of judgment. Systems of political parties are perhaps the most commonly-cited factor. The two-party system is especially useful for this purpose, not only because the number of alternatives is sometimes limited to two (making the paradox impossible), but because judgments among several alternatives, such as presidential candidates within one party, are often structured along a dimension on which the parties are arrayed. Shared standards of judgment may also be fostered by socialization processes which tend to enforce a similarity of outlook. Elite socialization in particular may contribute to similar frames of reference among special subgroups of the population, such as legislators or business associates. Recruitment of individuals from homogeneous sources also encourages a uniform outlook by taking advantage of prior socialization. Discussion and other forms of interaction often structure the situation by formulating or clarifying the principal issue involved in a dispute. Similarly, interpreting particular issues in a broader context, such as the perennial conflict between the political "left" and "right," can provide a common dimension for judging otherwise isolated topics.

The important point, however, is that none of these factors, either alone or in combination, needs to accomplish the nearly impossible task of creating unanimous agreement on standards of judgment. The paradox can be very satisfactorily avoided if common frames of reference are widespread but far less than unanimous. Thus the extension in probability terms of Black's and Arrow's original theorem moves us a step closer to understanding the determinants of transitive social orderings based on majority decisions.

Our findings also give us a clue about where to look in the real world for intransitive social orderings. On the one hand, it is relatively fruitless to search for intransitivities where most individual preference orderings can be derived from a single dimension. An empirical example given by David illustrates this situation.[14] David used a simple classroom experiment to derive preference orderings of students for three alternatives dealing with federal aid to schools. Of the total of 69 students, 67 (97.1%) had preference orderings satisfying a common J scale, making the probability of an intransitivity virtually zero under the model used in this paper.

On the positive side, our findings suggest that intransitivities are most likely to occur in unstructured situations, where there are no common guidelines for judging the alternatives, or in situations involving multiple dimensions. For example, intransitivities might be found relatively often when new issues must be resolved. Until discussion creates some consensus or places new issues in the context of earlier disputes, preference orderings may reflect little agreement on the criteria for judging the alternatives. Similarly, the paradox probably occurs more often in *ad hoc* groups, which are less likely to be influenced by the socialization, selection, and discussion factors which contribute to greater uniformity of judgmental criteria. Such groups might be newly formed ones, groups which meet infrequently and irregularly, or groups which purposely bring together many diverse elements. In elections, the paradox may occur most frequently when parties are absent or when the parties vary along two or more major dimensions. Only in situations such as these is the proportion of preference orderings satisfying a common J scale likely to be small enough to allow frequent intransitivities.

Note, finally, that the paradox is most likely if unstructured situations or multi-dimensional structures can be found among small groups of people. This does not mean, of course, that the paradox occurs most often among small groups, since agreement on standards of judgment might be reached most easily in such groups. But small groups which are plagued by lack of agreement about how to judge issues are also likely to be visited more frequently by intransitive majority decisions.

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[13] One can find the total probability of the paradox (within rounding error) by multiplying the corresponding terms in Tables 1 and 2. For example, for $m=3$, $.250\ (.222)+0(.778)=.0555$.

[14] Paul T. David, "Experimental Approaches to Vote-Counting Theory in Nominating Choice," this REVIEW, 56 (1962) 673–676.

APPENDIX

As indicated in the text, the computer time required to generate all possible distributions of m individuals among six rank orders increases rapidly as m increases. Here we demonstrate and justify another routine for calculating conditional probabilities of the paradox. This method was used to calculate the probabilities given in Figure 1 for $m=45$ and $m=95$. We will also use the procedure to show the shape of the curve in Figure 1 as $m \rightarrow \infty$.

We are given that x out of m individuals have preference orderings satisfying a common J scale, where $2/3 \leqq x/m \leqq 1$. The x individuals are distributed between the two sets of rank orders which satisfy the J scale. The smaller set contains no more than $x/2$ and no less than m-x individuals.[15] We can suppose, without loss of generality (see below), that the common J scale is ABC, and that Set I (defined in the text) contains at least as many preference orderings as Set II. This situation can be illustrated as follows:

All distributions of m individuals satisfying the above conditions

		Number of Individuals			
I scales satisfying the J scale	ABC BAC	$2x-m$	$2x-m-1$	$2x-m-2$	$[x/2]$*
	BCA CBA	$m-x$	$m-x+1$	$m-x+2$ · · ·	$x-[x/2]$
I scales not satisfying the J scale	ACB CAB	$m-x$	$m-x$	$m-x$	$m-x$
		(1)	(2)	(3) · · · ·	(T)

*This means the smallest integer $\geqq x/2$.

For the individuals whose preference orderings satisfy the common J scale, we assume that $\Pr\{ABC\}=\Pr\{BAC\}=\Pr\{BCA\}=\Pr\{CBA\}=1/4$. This means, of course, that $\Pr\{\text{Set I}\}=\Pr\{\text{Set II}\}=1/2$. It also means that $\Pr\{ABC\}=\Pr\{BAC\}=1/2$ given that the individual is in Set I, and $\Pr\{BCA\}=\Pr\{CBA\}=1/2$ given that the individual is in Set II. For the individuals whose preference orderings do not satisfy the common J scale, we assume that $\Pr\{ACB\}=\Pr\{CAB\}=1/2$.

On the basis of these assumptions, we are now able to calculate, for each distribution $(1), \ldots, (T), \Pr\{A>B\}, \Pr\{B>C\}, \Pr\{A>C\}$ and their complements. For example, take distribution (1). If $A>B$ in the social ordering, at least $[(m+1)/2]-(m\text{-}x)$ of the individuals in Set I must have the rank order ABC. This follows immediately from observing that $(m+1)/2$ is a simple majority, that $A>B$ for the m-x individuals in Set III, and that ABC is the only other rank order in which $A>B$. Similarly, if $B>C$, at least $[(m+1)/2]-(2x\text{-}m)$ of the individuals in Set II must have the rank order BCA; if $A>C$, at least $[(m+1)/2]-(2x\text{-}m)$ of the individuals in Set III must have the rank order ACB.

Continuing the example of distribution (1), we now have $\Pr\{A>B\}=\Pr\{ABC \geqq [(m+1)/2]-(m\text{-}x)\}$, where the right hand side of the expression indicates the probability that at least $[(m+1)/2]-(m\text{-}x)$ individuals have rank order ABC. Similar expressions can be written for $\Pr\{B>C\}$ and $\Pr\{A>C\}$. These probabilities can be calculated using the binomial probability distribution. When available, they can be obtained directly from tables of the cumulative binomial distribution. Since $\Pr\{A>B\}$, $\Pr\{B>C\}$, and $\Pr\{A>C\}$ are independent of one another, we can write:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\Pr\{A>B,\ B>C,\ C>A\} \\
&\qquad = \Pr\{A>B\}\cdot\Pr\{B>C\}\cdot\Pr\{C>A\} \qquad (1)\\
&\Pr\{A>C,\ C>B,\ B>A\} \\
&\qquad = \Pr\{A>C\}\cdot\Pr\{C>B\}\cdot\Pr\{B>A\}
\end{aligned}
$$

Since these are the only possible intransitivities with three alternatives, we have now indicated how to calculate the probability of the paradox for distribution (1). Similar reasoning applies to distributions (2), . . . , (T).

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[15] The smaller set obviously cannot contain more than half of the preference orderings which satisfy the common J scale. On the other hand, suppose it contained only $m-x-y$ I scales. Then the other two sets satisfy a common J scale, and they contain $m-(m-x-y)=x+y$ individuals. But this is contrary to the assumption that only x preference orderings satisfy a common J scale.

Now let us consider all possible distributions of m individuals among Sets I, II, and III (given that there are $m-x$ in one set). Every possible partition of m individuals (e.g., $m-x$ in one set, $m-x+y$ in another set, and $2x-m-y$ in the third set) is represented by one of the (T) distributions. Moreover, it can be shown that the probability of the paradox is identical when the partition of individuals into sets is the same, regardless of what the J scale is or which set is the largest. Thus we have shown how to calculate the probability of the paradox for each of the (T) partitions of m individuals into the three sets.

However, the number of distributions represented by each partition is not the same. Specifically, one distribution is represented if each set has the same number of individuals. If Set I and Set II, or Set I and Set III or Set II and Set III have equal numbers of individuals, three distributions are represented (i.e., any of the three sets can be the odd size set). If all three sets are of unequal size, six distributions are represented. Hence in order to use distributions (1), . . . , (T) to represent all possible distributions of m individuals among three sets, we need to assign a coefficient of 1, 3, or 6 to each distribution (1), . . . , (T) to denote the number of all possible distributions which it represents.

Now we need to calculate the probability of the (T) partitions of m individuals into Sets I, II, and III (represented by distributions (1), . . . , (T) and their coefficients). The number of individuals in one set is fixed at $m-x$. The binomial probability distribution gives us the probability of every possible distribution of the remaining x individuals into two disjoint sets. Here, however, only those distributions represented by the (T) distributions of individuals into Sets I and II are permissible. For each of these distributions, we multiply the binomial probability by the corresponding coefficient. The resulting figure is divided by the sum of the figures for all (T) distributions. This yields the probability of each of the (T) partitions of m individuals into Sets I, II, and III.

Finally, the probability of each partition must be multiplied by the probability of the paradox given that partition. Summing the result across all (T) partitions yields the probability of the paradox given that x of m individuals satisfy a common J scale.

The probabilities displayed in Figure 1 for $m=45$ and $m=95$ were calculated using the above procedure. A short computer program was written to perform the arithmetic calculations. The necessary binomial probabilities for $m=45$ were seven-digit values taken from tables compiled by the National Bureau of Standards.[16] For $m=95$, $\Pr\{A \gtrdot B\}$, $\Pr\{B \gtrdot C\}$, and $\Pr\{A \gtrdot C\}$ were taken from the above source. To determine the probabilities of the (T) partitions, individual terms were calculated from the five-digit values given by the Harvard University Computation Laboratory or were taken from the six-digit values given by Romig.[17] For convenience only the values indicated in the footnote to Figure 1 were used.

Conditional Probabilities as $m\rightarrow\infty$. The procedure just described can be used to show the shape of the curve of conditional probabilities as $m\rightarrow\infty$. Consider first the probability of the paradox when exactly 2/3 of the individuals have preference orderings satisfying a common dimension. Let $m=3x$, and $2x$ of the preference orderings satisfy a common J scale.[18] The situation can be illustrated as follows:

		Number of individuals	
I scales satisfying the *J* scale	ABC BAC	x	$\Pr\{A \gtrdot B\} = \Pr\left\{ABC \geqq \frac{3x+1}{2} - x\right\} = \Pr\left\{ABC \geqq \frac{x+1}{2}\right\}$
	BCA CBA	x	$\Pr\{B \gtrdot C\} = \Pr\left\{BCA \geqq \frac{3x+1}{2} - x\right\} = \Pr\left\{BCA \geqq \frac{x+1}{2}\right\}$
I scales not satisfying the *J* scale	ACB CAB	x	$\Pr\{A \gtrdot C\} = \Pr\left\{ACB \geqq \frac{3x+1}{2} - x\right\} = \Pr\left\{ACB \geqq \frac{x+1}{2}\right\}$

Since $\Pr\{ABC\}=1/2$ for the individuals in Set I and x is an odd number (so that there cannot be exactly $x/2$ individuals with preference order ABC), $\Pr\{A>B\}=1/2$; also $\Pr\{B>A\}=1/2$. Similarly, $\Pr\{B>C\}=\Pr\{C>B\}=1/2$ and $\Pr\{A>C\}=\Pr\{C>A\}=1/2$. Then, Pr{A

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[16] *Tables of the Binomial Probability Distribution*, Appl. Math. Series 6 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949).

[17] *Tables of the Cumulative Binomial Probability Distribution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955). Harry G. Romig, *50–100 Bimonial Tables* (New York: Wiley, 1953).

[18] The proof in this paragraph—i.e. when exactly 2/3 of the preference orderings satisfy a common J scale—holds for every value of m which is a multiple of three (and an odd number).

$\succ B,\ B \succ C,\ C \succ A\} = \Pr\{A \succ C,\ C \succ B,\ B \succ A\} = (1/2)^3 = 1/8$. Hence the probability of the paradox is $1/8 + 1/8 = 1/4$.

Now let us show that for a fixed proportion, x/m, of the preference orderings satisfying a common J scale, where $2/3 < x/m < 1$, the probability of the paradox approaches 0 as $m \to \infty$. We are given that x of the individuals have preference orderings satisfying a common J scale. The probability that any one of these x individuals is in Set I corresponds to a Bernoulli trial with $p = 1/2$. From the law of large numbers we know that as x (the number of trials) approaches infinity, the probability approaches 1 that the proportion of individuals in Set I differs from the probability of Set I by no more than an arbitrary number ϵ_1.[19] That is, if $\Pr\{\text{Set I}\} = 1/2$, the number of individuals in Set I will be as close to $x/2$ as we desire, for sufficiently large x. Thus, as x (and m) $\to \infty$, we can assume that the distribution of individuals is as close to the following as we desire:

		Number of individuals
I scales satisfying the *J* scale	ABC BAC	$x/2$
	BCA CBA	$x/2$
I scales not satisfying the *J* scale	ACB CAB	$m-x$

Note that:

$$\Pr\{A \succ B\} = \Pr\left\{ABC \geqq \frac{m+1}{2} - (m-x)\right\} = \Pr\left\{ABC \geqq x - \frac{m}{2} + \frac{1}{2}\right\}. \qquad (2)$$

Since the individuals who have preference ordering ABC must come from the $x/2$ individuals in Set I, we can rewrite (2) as:

$$\Pr\{A \succ B\} = \Pr\left\{\frac{ABC}{x/2} \geqq \frac{x - \frac{m}{2} + \frac{1}{2}}{x/2}\right\} = \Pr\left\{\frac{ABC}{x/2} \geqq 2 - \frac{m}{x} + \frac{1}{x}\right\},$$

and

$$\lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\{A \succ B\} = \lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\left\{\frac{ABC}{x/2} \geqq 2 - \frac{m}{x}\right\}.$$

Now we know that $1 < m/x < 3/2$. Let m/x take on any value in this range. Then $.5 < 2 - m/x < 1$, or $2 - m/x = .5 + \epsilon_2$, where $0 < \epsilon_2 < .5$. Applying the law of large numbers as before, we know that if $\Pr\{ABC\} = 1/2$ for the individuals in Set I and $x \to \infty$, the proportion of individuals with rank order ABC differs from $1/2$ by less than an arbitrarily small number ϵ_3. Now for any given ϵ_2, x can be made large enough that ϵ_3 is smaller than ϵ_2. Thus

$$\lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\{A \succ B\} = \lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\left\{\frac{ABC}{x/2} \geqq .5 + \epsilon_2\right\} = 0.$$

Using the same line of reasoning we have:

$$\Pr\{B \succ C\} = \Pr\left\{BCA \geqq \frac{m+1}{2} - \frac{x}{2}\right\} = \Pr\left\{\frac{BCA}{x/2} \geqq \frac{\frac{m - x + 1}{2}}{x/2}\right\} = \Pr\left\{\frac{BCA}{x/2} \geqq \frac{m}{x} - 1 + \frac{1}{x}\right\}.$$

Also,

$$\lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\{B \succ C\} = \lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\left\{\frac{BCA}{x/2} \geqq \frac{m}{x} - 1\right\}.$$

The range of m/x is the same as before. For any value of m/x in this range, $0 < m/x - 1 < .5$, or $m/x - 1 = .5 - \epsilon_4$, where $0 < \epsilon_4 < .5$. By the same reasoning as above we have:

$$\lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\{B \succ C\} = \lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\left\{\frac{BCA}{x/2} \geqq .5 - \epsilon_4\right\} = 1$$

It follows that

$$\lim_{x\to\infty} \Pr\{C \succ B\} = 0.$$

We have now shown that in the limit, one factor of both equations of (1) approaches zero. Thus, for all values of x/m such that $2/3 < x/m < 1$, the probability of the paradox approaches zero as x (and m) $\to \infty$.

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[19] William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications*, 2nd ed., Vol. 1 (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 141.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: AN EXPLANATION OF VOTING DEFECTION*

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This paper proposes and tests a modest theory of voting defection, the act of voting contrary to party identification. The relevance of voting defection to popular control of government is clear. Except for the infrequent elections that Key calls "critical,"[1] the identification of people with their parties is very stable over time. The percentage of Democrats and Republicans in the electorate changed only slightly in the four presidential elections from 1952 to 1964.[2] Short term shifts in public attitudes, then, are reflected not in shifts in the distribution of party identification, but in the degree that people vote in accordance with their identification. When they are disenchanted with the President, defection will be high among members of the opposition party and low among members of the party in office. In 1952 people were weary of the Korean War; this weariness was apparent in the massive numbers of Democrats who thought Eisenhower a man capable of ending the conflict and who backed up their convictions with Republican votes.[3] In short, in the rate of defection we have a mirror that reflects popular discontent with the politics of the President. My present concern is to explore some personal attributes of the voters who make up this critical electorate, to augment the propositions surrounding party identification with one explanation of why it is that people vote contrary to their party allegiance.

I. POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS AND CROSS-PRESSURES

In a theory of electoral behavior, we would expect to give a large place to political attitudes. In terms of the immediacy of their impact upon behavior, political attitudes lie close to the voting act. Variables farther back in the causal network relate to voting primarily through the intervening variables of political attitudes. Thus, these attitudes have a high predictive quality.[4]

In *The Voter Decides*, the first major Michigan study, political attitudes are organized under three main heads: attitudes toward parties, candidates, and policies. These factors are explored as they affect both participation at the polls and choice of candidates.[5] The later Michigan studies have not preserved the simplicity of *The Voter Decides'* trichotomy. Rather, a variety of political attitudes are grouped together. One cluster of six attitudes is consistently associated with electoral choice.[6]

But the factors which affect an individual's vote do not always impel him in the same direction. Frequently, these forces are in conflict. From this observation comes the concept of cross-pressures, formulated originally by Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet in their study of the 1940 Presidential campaign.[7] The Lazarsfeld

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[1] V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (Feb., 1955), 3–18. The notion of critical elections has been broadened to include a whole typology of elections. See Angus Campbell, "A Classification of the Presidential Elections," in Angus Campbell *et al., Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 63–77.

[2] Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in Campbell, *ibid.*, p. 13.

[3] The images of the parties and candidates in the 1952 election are discussed in Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Co., 1954), pp. 41–68.

[4] This argument, of course, is the one made in Angus Campbell *et al., The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), chapter 2.

[5] Campbell, *The Voter Decides.*

[6] Since the 1952 election the multiple correlations of these predictors have varied between .72 and .75. See Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 19–28.

[7] Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 56. For a discussion of cross-pressures that places the concept into balance theory, see Ithiel de

study uses cross-pressures primarily as an explanation of the time of voting decision during the campaign and of the level of political interest.[8] In *Voting*, the impact of cross-pressures is extended to the stability of vote intention during the campaign, its relation to the selective perception of political events, and to participation at the polls.[9] A major concern of *The Voter Decides* is cross-pressures—the consistency and conflict of political orientations and their impact on candidate preference and participation.[10]

With the development of the concept of party identification in the Michigan studies, we also see the impact of cross-pressures on voting in accordance with party affiliation. Indeed, cross-pressure remains one of the few concepts used to explain voting defection.

> . . . the influence of party identification on perceptions of political objects is so great that only rarely will the individual develop a set of attitude forces that conflicts with this allegiance. But when other antecedent factors lead to evaluations of the elements of politics that strongly contradict the individual's party identification, we anticipate that behavior will conform to these evaluations rather than to party allegiance.[11]

That people develop political attitudes which conflict with party identification should not startle us. Party identification is usually acquired early in life—well before more specific attitudes about policies or candidates.[12] Further, this identification is usually the most enduring of our political beliefs. Our more specific political values are vulnerable to change, to the influence of new peer groups created by social or geographical mobility. At some point the estrangement of political beliefs from party allegiance may become so great that consistency is regained by switching party allegiance. We can get a glimpse of this process in the South today. But even in the South, where mobility and the revolution in civil rights are straining traditional ties, identification with the Democratic Party remains strong.[13]

Following *The Voter Decides,* political orientations are here subsumed under three inclusive heads: images of parties, images of candidates, and policy beliefs. Each of a voter's attitudinal orientations is measured in terms of its compatibility with his party identification. For example, a pro-Republican candidate preference combined with a pro-Democratic party identification is classified as low candidate compatibility. Low compatibility is the adopted definition of cross-pressures. Similarly, indices of Party Compatibility and Policy Compatibility are constructed for each identifier.[14] The following hypothesis is to be tested.

> H 1. Taken singly, each index of compatibility relates monotonically to voting defection—the higher the compatibility, the less the likelihood of defection.

The question remains as to how these indices will interact statistically in their effect upon voting defection.[15] It seems likely that there will be a tendency for attitudes that move the voter in the same direction to reinforce one another.[16] For example, if a voter has unfavorable views toward both his party's candidate and the policies he associates with his party, he may defect in rates above what one would predict from simply summing the independent effects of each of his political attitudes. Thus, the following hypothesis.

> H 2. Taken *together, certain combinations of the* indices are mutually reinforcing. Voters whose indices consistently reveal high compatibility with party identification defect less than an additive model would predict. Conversely, voters with consistently incompati-

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Sola Pool, Robert Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections* (Rev. ed.; Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 9–15.

[8] Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–64.

[9] Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 129–32, 230–31, and 283–84.

[10] Campbell, *The Voter Decides,* p. 87.

[11] Campbell, *The American Voter,* p. 141. The prediction is successfully tested, p. 142.

[12] Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 46.

[13] Philip Converse, "On the Possibility of Major Political Realignment in the South," in Campbell, *Elections and the Political Order,* pp. 212–244.

[14] A section on specific measurement procedures follows.

[15] Statistical interaction is a change in the relationship between two variables over a range of a third. If the relationship is constant, it is said to be additive. See the Appendix for a lengthy discussion of the meaning of interaction and a method of measuring it.

[16] For an explicit statement of the proposition of interaction among attitudes, see Milton Rokeach and Gilbert Rothman, "The Principle of Belief Congruence and the Congruity Principle as Models of Cognitive Interaction," *Psychological Review,* 72 (Jan., 1965), 128–142.

> ble indices defect more than an additive model would predict. Inconsistent indices combine additively.

II. STATUS INCONSISTENCY AND MOBILITY

We have to this point discussed the consequences of political orientations and cross-pressures for voting defection. Working back into the theory, we would like explanations of these intermediate variables. How, in other words, do orientations become incompatible with party identification? For possible answers, we explore status inconsistency and mobility.

Much has been made in recent years of the implications of a multi-dimensional status structure. A man's position in the eyes of others may be determined by several of his characteristics: his ethnic background, income, education, and occupation. Often he moves up and down his individual status ladders at different rates. For some the result is a high position on one status dimension and, concomitantly, a low position on another. This condition is called variously status inconsistency, status discrepancy, and low status crystallization. The effects of status inconsistency may be conceptualized as interaction: certain combinations of status positions affect other variables in ways not predictable by a knowledge of the positions viewed independently.[17]

Lipset and Bendix have theorized on the impact of status inconsistency upon cross-pressures. They state that "The mobile individual, who is in many ways a marginal man, retaining old ties and experiences, is more likely to be subjected to cross-pressure than the nonmobile person."[18] Here, they are speaking of the status discrepant individual. One such tie to the past may be party identification, a loyalty increasingly strained by attitudes formed in new situations.

The relationship of inconsistency to cross-pressures is supported by other literature. Several studies link status inconsistency with political attitudes of the left and the right. Lenski and, to a lesser extent, Kelly and Chambliss present evidence of an association of discrepancy with economic or welfare liberalism.[19] Goffman finds inconsistency associated with a desire for a change in the distribution of power in American society.[20]

Other research binds discrepancy to right-wing extremism. The notion of status politics, the subject of Daniel Bell and others in *The Radical Right,* is grounded to status inconsistency.[21] The research of Rush supports the radical right hypothesis.[22] Kelley and Chambliss reveal associations between inconsistency and unfavorable attitudes toward civil rights and civil liberties.

In short, status inconsistency is associated with extreme attitudes of the right and the left, attitudes which can come into conflict with durable party loyalties. This conflict should be manifest especially in the degree to which a voter's party identification is compatible with his image of the parties and with the policies he associates with them.

> H 3. Status inconsistency increases political cross-pressures above the level an additive model would predict.

The same rationale which argues that status inconsistency produces cross-pressures applies to mobility as well. One might reasonably expect inter-generational mobility to be related to cross-pressures. Given the tendency to inherit party affiliation from parents and given the durability of party affiliation, one would predict the grown son of a Democratic skilled worker to be a Democrat also. If, however, the son were a professional man, his association with peer groups likely to hold Republican attitudes could create cross-pressures for the professional man. In statistical terminology, here again is an argument for the existence of interaction. When a person occupies a very different position in the status game than his father did, he may suffer a level of political cross-pressures substantially above what we would predict from a knowledge of the separate effects of the status levels of the father and son.[23] In fact, the sole impact of generational statuses is likely to be interactive, for there is little reason to suspect an additive relationship between the statuses and cross-pressures.

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[17] This does not mean that empirically one's method of analysis will always reveal an inconsistency effect as statistical interaction. The Appendix discusses the method of analysis.

[18] Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 69.

[19] Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-Vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review,* 19 (Aug., 1954), 405–413. See also Gerhard Lenski, "Status Consistency and the Vote: A Four Nation Test," *American Sociological Review,* 32 (April, 1967), 298–301. K. Dennis Kelly and William J. Chambliss, "Status Consistency and Political Attitudes," *American Sociological Review,* 31 (June, 1966), 375–382. For a dissenting view, see William F. Kenkel, "The Relationship Between Status Consistency and Politico-Economic Attitudes," *American Sociological Review,* 21 (June, 1956), 365–368.

[20] Irwin W. Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," *American Sociological Review* 22 (June, 1957), 275–281.

[21] Daniel Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right* (Anchor Books ed.; Garden City: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964), pp. 39–61, 63–80, and 259–312.

[22] Gary B. Rush, "Status Consistency and Right-Wing Extremism," *American Sociological Review,* 32 (Feb., 1967), 86–92.

H 4. Inter-generational mobility increases political cross-pressures above the level an additive model would predict.[24]

Finally, geographical mobility may tear at the ties of a man to old loyalties. If a man grew up in, say, a predominantly Democratic area and later moved to a predominantly Republican area, his exposure to the political attitudes of new peer groups might place strains upon the party loyalty he had previously acquired.

H 5. Geographical mobility increases political cross-pressures above the level an additive model would predict.

III. MEASURES OF THE VARIABLES AND SOURCE OF THE DATA

Space does not permit an elaborate description and evaluation of the measures of the concepts previously defined. For that the reader is referred to the longer work from which this article is taken.[25] However, a brief explanation of the more complicated measures is in order. We may begin with voting defection.

It seems obvious that the defection of a strong partisan is of greater significance than that of a weak identifier. A measure of defection should reflect differences in the sum of the forces necessary to push a man to vote contrary to his party identification. This sum is gauged in the following manner. Since the 1952 election, the Survey Research Center has asked a standard set of questions designed to measure a man's long term attitudinal attachment to his party. The questions yield an index ranging from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican. To create a measure of defection, the average percentage of defections over the three elections since 1956 may be used as an indicator of the strength of the forces necessary to pull a voter away from his party. The formula $D = 2(P - 50)$ estimates this force, where D is the defection score and P is the average categoric percentage of non-defectors.[26] For example, if a Strong Democrat defects, he is given a score of 80, because the average percentage of Demo-

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[23] For example, Blau notes that mobility affects a whole range of behavior, including voting. ". . . the upwardly mobile are more likely to vote Republican than people who have remained workers and less likely to do so than those who have originated in the middle class," Peter M. Blau, "Social Mobility and Interpersonal Relations," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (June, 1956), 291. Presuming that there is not a commensurate change in the disposition among the mobile to switch party identification, then the mobile would be more likely to be numbered among the defectors that the non-mobile.

[24] Analogously, to the degree that a man gains or loses in the status race during his mature years, attitudes formed in one social situation are likely to conflict with attitudes formed in another. Thus, if adequate measures were available in the SRC data, we would also test the hypothesis that intra-generational mobility increases cross-pressures.

[25] Richard W. Boyd, *A Theory of Voting Defection: Attitudinal Cross-Pressures and Political Alienation* (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Government, Indiana University, 1967), pp. 35–43.

[26] The three elections are chosen because they are recent and because they cover the elections which serve as the tests of the hypotheses. The debt that this measure of voting defection owes to the concept of the normal vote should be obvious. See Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," *op. cit.* In brief, the rationale for the averaging procedure is the assumption that across elections the balance of partisan forces changes, not the pressure required to make a voter defect. What is being assumed, then, is that individuals have threshold points beyond which they cannot resist partisan forces counter to their identification. Furthermore, all men within a given category of identifiers have approximately the same threshold point; i.e., they have a similar degree of allegiance to their party. Different percentages of defectors over different elections are assumed to reflect changes in the strength of the attacks that partisan forces mount against men's threshold points. While men may change their identification, the threshold remains the same—for the category which they leave and for the one into which they move. Within any given category the reason some defect while others do not is simply that some individuals are exposed to more intense partisan forces running counter to their identification than are others. Using the average of the three elections for the measure keeps this threshold point constant and allows the partisan forces of the day to change.

The formula $D = 2(P - 50)$ is itself somewhat arbitrary. The multiplication by 2 allows the theoretical range of the variable to extend from 0 to 1. The multiplication has no effect on the analysis.

FIG. 1. The Presumed Causal Order of the Concepts in the Theory



cratic votes among Strong Democrats is 90 percent. If he does not defect, his score is zero. A Weak Democratic defector receives a lesser score of 44. Republican identifiers are similarly scored. Independents and non-voters are excluded definitionally from the analysis.[27]

The Index of Party Compatibility is adapted from one used by Matthews and Prothro.[28] As many as five responses are coded to each of the questions, "Is there anything in particular that you (don't like) (like) about the (Democratic) (Republican) party?" A maximum of 20 responses, then, is coded for the set. Each favorable remark about the Democratic party or unfavorable remark about the Republican party is scored +1. Each favorable remark about the Republican party or unfavorable remark about the Democratic party is scored −1. To determine the degree of compatibility with party identification, the total score of each Republican is multiplied by −1. Eleven is added to all scores to yield a positive index ranging from 1 to 21. Similarly, Indices of Candidate Compatibility and Policy Compatibility are created from the respondents' views on the candidates and the issues. The issues selected (9 in 1956 and 1960, 10 in 1964) cover the three fields of domestic, foreign, and civil rights policy.[29] The issue index measures only those policy beliefs that are perceived by each respondent to have partisan implications.

There is no need to discuss the measures of status and mobility at length here, for such a description appears in the appendix. Each measurement is straightforward. All four of the dimensions of status that appear in the literature on status inconsistency are included. These are occupational prestige, racial-ethnic prestige, income, and education.

The hypotheses are tested on Survey Research Center data obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. This secondary analysis includes the three Presidential elections of 1956, 1960, and 1964. Thus, the hypotheses are exposed to a set of elections which differ in outcome and political environment. If uniformity is found over these three elections, we can have substantial confidence in the generality of these propositions.

IV. THE TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES

The first hypothesis makes a statement about the effects of cross-pressures upon voting defection. Again, cross-pressures are defined in terms of the degree to which a man's attitudes toward the parties, the candidates, and the policies he associates with the parties are compatible with his party identification. Low scores on any of the three indices of compatibility are said to reflect the voter's state of political cross-pressure.

H 1. Taken singly, each index of compatibility relates monotonically to voting defection—the higher the compatibility, the less the likelihood of defection.

The data amply support the first hypothesis. Table 1 lists the mean voting defection scores for each category of each index of compatibility.

As Table 1 shows, the defection rate drops off sharply as one moves from the categories of low compatibility with party affiliation to those of high compatibility with party affiliation. This is true for every election for each of the party, candidate, and policy indices.

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[27] Independent Republicans and Independent Democrats are excluded along with Independents.

[28] Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "The Concept of Party Image and its Importance for the Southern Electorate," in M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 159.

[29] It does not matter whether or not all these questions elicit responses which fall upon a single liberal-conservative continuum. All that is important is that the questions probe beliefs that are relevant to the voting decision. To the extent that issues ever affect electoral outcome, the questions that make up this index are important questions.

The amount of variance in voting defection accounted for by each of the indices is presented in Table 2. The entry in each cell is the unbiased correlation ratio, an estimate of the percentage of variance in a dependent variable explained by an independent variable.[30]

TABLE 1. MEAN DEFECTION SCORE WITHIN CATEGORIES OF COMPATIBILITY FOR 1956, 1960, AND 1964[a]

Index of Compatibility	Category of Compatibility		
	Low	Medium	High
1956			
Party	25.14[b] (74)[c]	10.09 (447)	5.18 (435)
Candidate	29.73 (158)	7.36 (425)	2.12 (373)
Policy	29.61 (93)	9.82 (455)	3.42 (408)
1960			
Party	31.78 (82)	9.41 (495)	2.02 (522)
Candidate	28.83 (162)	7.17 (448)	0.90 (489)
Policy	27.16 (134)	7.07 (613)	0.97 (352)
1964			
Party	37.60 (86)	10.14 (452)	2.29 (349)
Candidate	41.35 (145)	6.16 (308)	1.67 (434)
Policy	25.22 (185)	9.21 (351)	2.04 (351)

[a] The grand mean defection score for 1956 is 9.02; for 1960, 7.57; for 1964, 9.17.

[b] The entry is the mean defection score for a specific category of compatibility for a specific index for a single year. The higher the score, the greater the defection.

[c] The number within the parentheses is the number of respondents upon which the cell mean is based. In all cases, the category of low compatibility includes all respondents below the theoretical zero point of the index.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATES OF VARIANCE IN DEFECTION EXPLAINED BY INDICES OF COMPATIBILITY

Index of Compatibility	1956	1960	1964
Party	.058	.155	.187
Candidate	.196	.255	.386
Policy	.118	.158	.141

As the cell frequencies in Table 1 reveal, in 1956 and 1960 the largest numbers of voters are cross-pressured in their orientations toward the candidates. Table 2 supports the importance of attitudes toward the candidates. In every election, the Index of Candidate Compatibility explains the most variance in voting defection. The correlation ratio for this index increases each election to a high of .386 in 1964. In 1964, numerous voters had misgivings about the candidacies of both Johnson and Goldwater.[31]

In the two-way analyses of variance (where one variable is controlled for the effects of another), orientations toward the candidates consistently cut into the variance explained by party orientation. An example is Table 3. The marginal means of the two indices are fairly

TABLE 3. MEAN DEFECTION SCORES WITHIN CATEGORIES OF PARTY AND CANDIDATE COMPATIBILITY IN 1964

Index of Party Compatibility	Index of Candidate Compatibility			
	Low	Medium	High	Marginal Mean
Low	50.36[a] (55)[b]	20.89 (18)	6.77 (13)	37.60 (86)
Medium	36.67 (78)	7.46 (196)	1.46 (178)	10.14 (452)
High	30.50 (12)	0.62 (94)	1.55 (243)	2.29 (349)
Marginal Mean	41.35 (145)	6.16 (308)	1.67 (434)	9.71 (887)

[a] Mean Defection Score.

[b] Cell Frequency.

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[30] For a description of the unbiased correlation ratio, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960), p. 267. These ratios are based on a series of one-way analyses of variance. The estimate of the percentage of variance explained is obtained by multiplying the ratio by 100. For example, party compatibility explains 5.8 percent of the variance in voting defection in 1956.

[31] We might note in this regard the rather low amount of variance in defection explained by policy compatibility in 1964 relative to candidate and party compatibility. Perhaps the direct impact of issues upon voting in 1964 was not as great as is popularly supposed.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATES OF VARIANCE IN DEFECTION EXPLAINED BY EACH INDEX OF COMPATIBILITY, CONTROLLING FOR ANOTHER INDEX FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1956, 1960, AND 1964[a]

Year Control Index	Independent Index		
	Party	Candidate	Policy
1956			
Party		.152	.076
Candidate	.014[b]		.038
Policy	.016	.116	
1960			
Party		.119	.088
Candidate	.050		.064
Policy	.085	.131	
1964			
Party		.224	.060
Candidate	.025		.024
Policy	.106	.268	

[a] The estimate of variance explained by the interaction of the two indices is not included in these totals.

[b] The entry is the unbiased correlation ratio (adjusted for unequal cell sizes). The ratio is taken from Hays, who calls the measure the estimated omega squared. William L. Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston), pp. 406–407. These ratios are adjusted for unequal cell sizes, on the basis of a rationale presented in the Appendix. For the adjustment procedure, see B. J. Winer, *Statistical Principles in Experimental Design* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962), pp. 224–227.

similar. The influence of party compatibility appears to be almost as great as that of candidate compatibility. The cross-classification tells a different story, however. The mean defection scores drop more precipitously within categories of party compatibility (looking across the rows) than within categories of candidate compatibility (looking down the columns). Thus, within levels of candidate compatibility, the impact of party compatibility upon defection is substantially less than when the influence of party compatibility is explored independently of the candidate index. That candidate compatibility soaks up much of the variance explained by party compatibility is evident by a comparison of unbiased correlation ratios for Table 3. Uncontrolled, party compatibility explains 18.7 percent of the variance in defection. Controlled for candidate compatibility, party compatibility explains only 2.5 percent. In comparison, candidate compatibility, uncontrolled, explains 38.6 percent of the variance in defection. Controlled for party compatibility, candidate compatibility still explains 22.4 percent of the variance in defection. Table 4 gives a breakdown of the results of the two-way analyses of variance for all indices and all years.

Thus, attitudes toward the candidates are the major statistical explanation of voting defection. The statistical importance of the candidate orientation may reflect in part an ability among voters to articulate attitudes toward candidates more easily than attitudes toward parties and policies. To state likes or dislikes about parties and policies may require a more sophisticated or abstract set of political concepts than those required to state preferences between candidates. Alternatively, disenchantment with a party or its policies may be displaced upon the candidates as visible symbols of the parties. In any case, our attitudes toward the candidates have a significant impact upon our loyalty to the parties they lead.

Having accepted the first hypothesis, we turn now to a test of the second. It concerns the interrelationships of the indices of compatibility in their effect upon voting defection. Interaction is predicted for individuals who are simultaneously high or low on each of two indices of compatibility. Specifically, the hypothesis reads as follows.

H 2′. Taken together, certain combinations of the indices are mutually reinforcing. Voters whose indices consistently reveal high compatibility with party identification defect less than an additive model would predict. Conversely, voters with consistently incompatible indices defect more than an additive model would predict. Inconsistent indices combine additively.

This is a hypothesis one would like to reject. It is a statement of the existence of interaction, and both theory and statistics deal fitfully with interaction. The world of additive relationships is a simpler world. If additive generalizations do not distort a description of the world too much, additive propositions are preferable to interactive ones.

The amount of variance in voting defection explained by the interaction of the indices of compatibility is small. There are three pairwise comparisons between the three indices in each of the three election years.[32] The range for the nine estimates of variance attributable to interaction is .003 to .022. At maximum, then, only 2.2 percent of the variance in voting defection is explained by interaction among two of the indices. The range of the nine F ratios is 1.834 to 9.773.[33] Six of the nine F ratios are statistically significant above .01.

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[32] In any year the three pairs are party and candidate, party and policy, and candidate and policy.

Despite their statistical significance, the magnitude of the F ratios is not great. Were it not for the consistent pattern of the interaction, the hypothesis of interaction could be rejected in favor of an additive proposition. But there is a pattern to the interaction, a pattern which holds for each pair of indices for each election year. Of the nine tables of pairwise cross-classifications, only one cell of one table departs from the pattern. The pattern (outlined below) involves three cells in each table for a total of 27 separate predictions. The predictions hold in 26 of 27 instances.[34]

The pattern itself differs somewhat from the one predicted in the second hypothesis. (Thus, the 27 predictions above are post-facto observations.) Hypothesis 2 correctly states that individuals who hold two orientations that are both incompatible with their party identification defect more than one would predict from just adding together the separate effects of the two orientations; rather the orientations have a reinforcing impact upon one another, and, thus, combine interactively to produce an additional probability of defection. There are no exceptions to this prediction in any of the three elections. (As the appendix argues, the deviation of the means predicted by an additive model from the observed means is an estimate of the interaction effect for each cell.)

On the other hand, the hypothesis predicts that individuals who hold inconsistent orientations—e.g., a candidate orientation of high compatibility and a policy orientation of low compatibility—conform to an additive model. In fact, voters with inconsistent orientations defect less than the additive model predicts. Table 5 shows

TABLE 5. THE INTERACTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CANDIDATE COMPATIBILITY, POLICY COMPATIBILITY, AND VOTING DEFECTION IN THE 1960 ELECTION

Index of Candidate Compatibility	Index of Policy Compatibility					
	Means Predicted by an Additive Model[a]			Observed Means		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Low	38.53[b]	24.42	20.77[d]	44.25 (56)[c]	23.65 (85)	8.67[d] (21)
Medium	20.56	6.45	2.79	20.81 (52)	6.95 (283)	1.42 (113)
High	15.89[d]	1.78	−1.88	3.08[d] (26)	1.46 (245)	0.00 (218)
Deviations of Predicted from Observed Means						
Low	5.72	−0.78	−12.10[d]			
Medium	0.25	0.50	−1.38			
High	−12.81[d]	−0.31	1.88			

[a] The prediction equation is

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = -1.88+22.65C_1+4.67C_2+17.77P_1+3.66P_2$$

[b] The entry is the mean defection score, here predicted by an additive model.

[c] The number of respondents upon which the cell mean is based.

[d] Cells of inconsistent orientations.

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[33] The F ratio for interaction is the interaction mean squares divided by the total mean squares.

[34] When one is testing a proposition about interaction in specific cells, measures of association or F tests should not be a final determinant of acceptance or rejection in any case. These measures of association and F tests are not specific to certain cells. The impact of interaction in one cell is diluted by additivity in another. Thus, the variance explained by interaction may be small in spite of a large impact upon individuals in the interaction cell. This dilution is especially critical when, as is often the case, relatively few people occupy the cell manifesting the interaction effect. For this reason, we assign as much importance to a pattern the interaction displays as to either the variance the interaction explains or its statistical significance.

that if we simply add together the effects of a low Index of Candidate Compatibility and a high Index of Policy Compatibility, we would predict a defection score of 20.77. The observed mean defection score for voters with this combination of orientations is a much lower mean of 8.67. Table 6 presents a slightly abbreviated version of Table 5 for all pairs of indices for every year. In all, there are nine such tables of pairwise comparisons—three tables for each of the three elections. The 18 extremely inconsistent cells from the nine tables are relevant to the test of the combination of inconsistent orientations. In only one of 18 cells is the observed mean defection score not lower than the score predicted by an additive model. What seems to be occurring, then, is a smothering effect of one orientation upon another. A position of high compatibility on one orientation more than offsets a low position on another. When one orientation smothers or countervails another, allegiance to party in voting is greater than one would predict on the basis of the separate effects of the two orientations.

In brief, interaction exists, but it is not the interaction predicted by the second hypothesis. For future tests, we alter the hypothesis to read as follows.

H 2.′ Taken together, certain combintaions of the indices of compatibility combine interactively. Voters whose political orientations reveal low compatibility with party identification defect more than an additive model predicts. Voters who occupy inconsistent positions on two indices defect less than an additive model predicts. All other combinations conform to an additive model.

To this point we have examined cross-pressures as a cause—their additive and interactive impact upon voting defection. We must now ask an additional question, the question of how cross-pressures arise. Earlier, we argued that rates of social mobility provide one explanation of voters acquiring political attitudes which conflict with party allegiance. People at times come to occupy different positions on different status hierarchies. This inconsistency is a source of anxiety and frustration, conditions which can lead to extreme and salient political attitudes. Since attitudes such as these have sources and supports apart from party identification, the hypothesis predicts that these attitudes often conflict with party identification. The effect of status inconsistency, then, is cross-pressure, the incompatibility of political orientations with party allegiance.

H 3. Status inconsistency increases political cross-pressures above the level an additive model would predict.

The data give no support to the hypothesis that status inconsistency increases cross-pressures, no support relative to any of the three indices of compatibility for any pair of the four dimensions of status.[35] Table 7 is a typical example of the lack of a relationship between status inconsistency and cross-pressures.

If the interaction hypothesis were true, in the inconsistent cells the observed mean Index of Candidate Compatibility would be lower than the predicted mean, yielding a negative mean deviation. While one cell mean deviation is negative, the other is positive. The magnitude of the deviations are in both cases small. This is the typical pattern.[36]

Table 7 indicates another finding consistent in the data. There is no additive relationship between the dimensions of status and political cross-pressures. Income, education, occupational prestige, racial-ethnicity, all are unrelated to a disposition to hold political attitudes contrary to party identification.

The importance of status inconsistency in current sociological theory justifies a pause to consider why it proved so impotent an explanation in this particular case. Any of the following four conclusions may be justified. 1) We might simply say that no one has ever demonstrated that status inconsistency is, empirically, a powerful concept. For example, Jackson and Burke explained only about 2 percent of the variance in symptoms of stress with status inconsistency.[37] In short, we could conclude that we have been seduced by the theoretical attraction of a concept which at this point should be discarded. I, personally, am hesitant to do this, simply because the concept still makes substantial intuitive sense to me. Certainly, alternative conclusions are possible. 2) For example, we might conclude that the concept was related to an inappropriate dependent variable. That is, we might say that, while status inconsistency does produce extreme political attitudes, it does not

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[35] The four dimensions of status upon which Hypothesis 3 is tested are racial-ethnic prestige, occupational prestige, family income, and education.

[36] Because the tables yield negative results they are omitted. They do appear in Boyd, *op. cit.*, Appendix C.

[37] Elton F. Jackson and Peter J. Burke, "Status and Symptoms of Stress: Additive and Interaction Effects," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (Aug., 1965), 556–564. See also Elton F. Jackson, "Status Consistency and Symptoms of Stress," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (Aug., 1962), 469–480.

TABLE 6. INTERACTION AMONG THE INDICES OF COMPATIBILITY AND VOTING DEFECTION.
DEVIATIONS OF PREDICTED FROM OBSERVED MEANS IN 1956, 1960, 1964

1956

		Candidate			*Policy*	
Party	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Low	2.62[a]	1.28	−11.59	4.00	0.90	−13.61
Medium	0.96	0.42	−1.32	−1.89	0.24	0.14
High	−3.42	−0.88	1.30	−1.95	−0.52	0.53

1. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=0.86+10.73P_1+2.69P_2+25.22C_1+4.27C_2$
2. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=2.03+11.58P_1+2.87P_2+22.52I_1+5.37I_2$

		Policy	
Candidate	Low	Medium	High
Low	5.53	−1.22	−5.38
Medium	−2.94	1.21	−1.24
High	−16.78	−1.44	1.50

1. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=0.49+22.63C_1+3.50C_2+16.30I_1+3.46I_2$

1960

		Candidate			*Policy*	
Party	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Low	3.73	−3.91	−7.78	2.18	0.50	−13.31
Medium	1.45	1.44	−2.81	5.05	0.18	−3.06
High	−9.17	−1.36	1.71	−9.51	−0.30	2.02

1. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=-0.89+18.67P_1+4.30P_2+22.18C_1+4.55C_2$
2. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=-1.47+23.07P_1+5.88P_2+20.28I_1+3.95I_2$

		Policy	
Candidate	Low	Medium	High
Low	5.72	−0.78	−12.10
Medium	0.25	0.51	−1.38
High	−12.81	−0.31	1.88

1. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=-1.88+22.65C_1+4.67C_2+17.77I_1+3.66I_1$

1964

		Candidate			*Policy*	
Party	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
Low	1.17	2.38	−8.25	3.49	−5.86	6.46
Medium	−0.23	1.24	−1.27	1.45	1.16	−2.65
High	−3.85	−3.05	1.37	−6.79	−0.45	1.73

1. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=0.18+14.84P_1+2.55P_2+34.17C_1+3.49C_2$
2. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=-0.87+28.41P_1+5.86P_2+16.02I_1+3.79I_2$

		Policy	
Candidate	Low	Medium	High
Low	3.54	−0.21	−17.58
Medium	−0.70	0.70	−0.73
High	−4.31	−0.71	1.26

1. $\hat{Y}_{ij}=-0.19+35.49C_1+3.19C_2+10.34I_1+2.12I_2$

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[a] The entry is the deviation of the mean predicted by an additive model from the observed mean. From this entry and the prediction equation, predicted and observed means can be reconstructed.

[b] Prediction equations for an additive model. The higher the mean, the greater the defection. In the equation, "*I*" stands for the policy index.

TABLE 7. MEAN CANDIDATE COMPATIBILITY SCORES FOR COMBINATIONS OF RACIAL-ETHNIC STATUS AND INCOME IN THE 1964 ELECTION

Racial-Ethnic Status	Income					
	Observed Means			Deviation of Predicted from Observed Means[a]		
	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
High	13.39[b] (64)[c]	12.43 (91)	12.94 (87)	0.29[b]	−0.46	0.27
Medium	13.23 (64)	13.73 (120)	13.04 (149)	−0.36	0.35	−0.13
Low	13.83 (64)	13.53 (74)	13.26[b] (84)	0.08	−0.00	−0.06[b]

[a] Means are predicted by the equation

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = 13.32 - .64R_1 - .15R_2 + .43I_1 + .21I_2$$

[b] Inconsistent Statuses.

[c] Cell frequencies.

act upon these attitudes in such a way as to create a discrepancy between these attitudes and party identification. The status inconsistent person might be more inclined than others to change his identification to coincide with his attitudes, because political attitudes are more salient for him than the average individual. 3) We might also conclude that some of the measures of status are wrongly applied to national populations. It is one thing, one might say, to rank all of the people in regard to income or education. It is quite another thing to attempt to construct an index of race-ethnicity that is equally applicable to all sections of the country. Being a Jew in New York simply does not affect the life-style of a person like being a Jew in, say, Plainview, Texas. Since some of the more interesting findings in the work of Lenski and of Jackson and Burke do relate to the dimension of race-ethnicity, we might infer that this particular dimension of status should only be applied to populations that live in homogeneous sub-cultures. 4) Finally, we might conclude that status inconsistency is more applicable to some political strata than others. That is, it may be that status inconsistency has its major impact on a small number of real political activists, rather than to a population of rank-and-file voters. Here, we might point to the political careers of highly educated members of various minority groups. In sum, there are a number of refinements we might make in our theories of status inconsistency that argue against its wholesale rejection. The fourth alternative seems especially plausible to me.

In addition to status inconsistency, we have other possible explanations of political cross-pressures. Earlier, I argued the reasonableness of Hypothesis 4.

H 4. Inter-generational mobility increases political cross-pressures above the level an additive model would predict.

A test does not, however, bear out the hypothesis that inter-generational mobility creates cross-pressures. When father's occupational prestige and respondent's social class when growing up are cross-classified, in turn, against the respondent's present occupation and income, in no case does a relationship between inter-generational mobility and political cross-pressures appear.

As a final test, the relationship between geographical mobility and cross-pressures is explored.

H 5. Geographical mobility increases political cross-pressures above the level an additive model would predict.

Two indicators of geographical mobility are available in the SRC election studies. The first is a question asking the length of time the respondent has lived at his present residence. The second indicator is a comparison of the area of the nation in which the respondent grew up with the area in which the respondent lived at the time of the election interview. Neither of these measures of geographical mobility bears any relation to the disposition to hold political attitudes conflicting with party identification. All indices of compatibility in all years conform to the pattern of Table 8.

If Table 8 is collapsed, the mean compatibility score is actually *lower* for those who reside in the area where they grew up than the mean score for those who have moved away. This result holds for each index in each election, although in no case is the magnitude of the difference great.[38]

V. SUMMARY

1. Cross-pressures relate monotonically to voting defection—the greater the cross-pressures, the greater the likelihood of defection. The degree of cross-pressure is measured by three indices of compatibility, which, in turn, are measures of the extent to which a man's political beliefs support his party identification. A person may hold attitudes about a) the political parties, b) the nominees of those parties, and c) the policies he associates with the parties. If any of these sets of attitudes is in conflict with his party identification, the person is defined as being politically cross-pressured in regard to that attitude. The greater the cross-pressures, the more likely he is to defect, to vote against the candidate of his party.

Cross-pressures are not a wide-spread occurrence. Party identification is a cognitive anchor for our political attitudes. The member of a party is prone to look with approval upon his own party's conduct and to be suspicious of the conduct of the other. He has nice things to say about his party's candidate; he wonders about the other man. He has his notions about public policy, and he sees a difference between the parties in their support of his notions. In short, the influence of party identification upon political attitudes is great. As a rule, the individual holds attitudes that support his identification. To hold such attitudes is usually sufficient to prevent an individual from defecting.

At times, however, forces arise which move some men to acquire attitudes that conflict with their party identification. When they do, these political attitudes tend to prevail over this identification. The greater the conflict between a person's political attitudes and his party identification, the more likely he is to vote for the candidate of the opposing party.

2. The three sets of political attitudes combine interactively in their impact upon the voting act. For example, a man may have unfavorable attitudes toward both the candidate of his party and the policies he associates with his party. Alternatively, he may be favorable in regard to one attitude (such as the candidate of his party), but unfavorable in regard to another (say, his perception of his party's policies). If a voter's political orientations consistently conflict with his party identification, he defects in rates that are higher than one would predict simply from adding together the separate effects of each of the orientations. Orientations that consistently conflict with party identification, then, reinforce one another in their impact on his vote.

Interaction is also manifest when a voter has one favorable and one unfavorable orientation at the same time. In this case the favorable or compatible orientation smothers the impact of the incompatible orientation. The attitudes of such a voter push him in opposite directions, and he defects less than one would predict merely from adding together the separate effects of the two orientations. All other combinations of political orientations conform to an additive model. That is, for all other combinations of pairs of political attitudes, our prediction regarding the likelihood of defection is most accurate when we simply add together the separate impact of each of the two attitudes.

While cross-pressures prove to be an important source of voting defection, the causes of cross-pressures remain unknown. Status inconsistency was wrongly hypothesized as a cause. Alternative explorations of inter-generational status mobility and geographical mobility also failed as explanations of cross-pressures.

In closing, we might speculate upon the relevance of the cross-pressure findings to campaign strategies. The simple and obvious advice is to run attractive candidates. In each of the three elections, attitudes toward the candidates explain the most variance in voting defection. The 1956 and 1964 elections testify to the impact of the candidates. In these two elections a substantial proportion of the electorate seemed at-

TABLE 8. MEAN POLICY COMPATIBILITY SCORES FOR COMBINATIONS OF GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY IN THE 1964 ELECTION

Area Where Respondent Now Lives	Area Where Respondent Grew Up			
	Northeast	Midwest	South	West
Northeast	*12.53*[a] (177)[b]	14.40 (5)	12.42 (12)	0.00 (0)
Midwest	12.00 (10)	*12.35* (210)	14.00 (34)	13.00 (1)
South	12.83 (18)	14.00 (15)	*12.73* (231)	14.20 (5)
West	11.25 (4)	12.94 (32)	14.70 (23)	*13.59* (82)

[a] The cell entry is the observed mean Index of Policy Compatibility. The higher the mean, the higher the degree of compatibility. The consistent cells are italicized.

[b] Cell frequencies.

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[38] The same is also true for the relationship of mobility to voting defection in the three elections. The non-mobile defect more than the mobile in all three elections, though, again the magnitude of the differences is not great.

tracted to the victorious candidate and repelled by the other. In spite of the fact that he represented a minority, the difference in the appeal of Stevenson and Eisenhower alone was probably sufficient to elect Eisenhower in 1956. In 1964, of course, the Goldwater candidacy produced an overwhelming majority for Johnson.

The importance of issues is more problematic than the importance of candidates. In the 1956 and 1960 elections, attitudes towards the policies that the public associated with the parties ranked second to candidate appeal in impact upon defection.[39] If not as much as candidates, issues do influence the outcome of elections. The impact of issues is problematic because issues seem to have significance beyond any one campaign. That is, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that candidates affect the outcome of specific elections, while issues and their relation to historical events affect the distribution of party identification. The minority does not seek just an occasional victory. Rather, it hopes to realign party allegiance, to become the majority party. To affect a realignment, a President from a minority party may have to identify his administration with attacks on problems the public deems critical.[40] This Eisenhower did not do, and his administration left the distribution of party identification unaltered. In regard to campaign strategy, it would not seem necessary for the candidate of a minority party to emphasize the critical issue or issues in the campaign of his initial victory. But in the course of his administration, he must identify his regime with these critical issues. Undoubtedly, then, future campaigns would be fought on these issues. In short, the impact of a candidate is substantial but of short duration. The impact of issues, while rarely great at any single moment, accumulates over a period of time. Overall, issues may outweigh candidates in affecting the outcome of elections, for issues have the capacity to alter the greatest single determinant of a vote, party identification.

APPENDIX

THE CONCEPT OF STATISTICAL INTERACTION

In the theory presented in this paper, several of the relationships share a problem of analysis: The independent variables (the presumed causes) are said to combine *interactively* in their impact upon the dependent variable (the presumed effect). Since the exact meaning of statistical interaction is often misunderstood, a brief explanation of the term is perhaps in order.

In normal English usage interaction simply means factors mutually related. This is not its statistical meaning. *Multicollinearity*, the condition of highly related independent variables, is the statistical term that is closest to the English sense of interaction. *Statistical interaction* is a *change* in the relationship between two variables over different levels of a third. The way in which independent variables combine in their effect upon the dependent variable becomes an important datum. If statistical interaction is absent (i.e., if the relationship is *additive*), the relationship between two variables remains *constant* over various categories of the third variable. For example, economic status varies directly with conservatism on welfare issues. But the relationship between welfare conservatism and status may change over different categories of religion. That is, the relationship may be more pronounced with Protestants than, say, Jews. Religion and status, then, combine interactively in their impact upon welfare conservatism.

Multicollinearity and interaction are independent phenomena. As Figure 2 indicates, all combinations of interaction and multicollinearity are possible.[41]

The importance of interaction must not be underestimated. In the first place, there is every reason to think that the world is more complex than additive models suggest.[42] In the second, interaction submits but grudgingly to present

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[39] See Table 4. In the 1964 election, however, the rank-order of the importance of the three sets of orientations as judged by their ability to statistically explain voting defection was candidate, party, and policy orientation. The impact of party attitudes is not discussed in relation to its possible impact upon campaign strategy, because there seems little a party could do directly to alter its image with the public. Changes in attitudes toward the parties probably result from candidates and issues.

[40] Quite likely, the type of issue necessary to affect a realignment is a "position issue" rather than a "valence issue." For the distinction between the two, see Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," in Campbell, *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 171–172.

[41] For an illuminating discussion of the subject, complete with graphic examples, see James N. Morgan and John A. Sonquist, "Problems in the Analysis of Survey Data, and a Proposal," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 58 (June, 1963), 415–434.

[42] For just a few of the many examples of social phenomena explicitly or implicitly conceptualized in terms of interaction, see the following article and the notes cited therein. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Status Inconsistency, Social Mobility, Status Integration and Structural Effects," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (Oct., 1967), 790–801.

FIG. 2. Statistical Interaction and Multicollinearity

		In their impact upon a dependent variable, the independent variables may combine	
		Additively	Interactively
The independent variables may be	Related (Multicollinearity)	Possible	Possible
	Unrelated	Possible	Possible

statistical methods. For example, an ordinary multiple or partial correlation coefficient is a weighted average of the relationship between two variables over the range of a third.[43] Such a coefficient assumes this relationship to be constant. If it is not constant, one cannot speak with fidelity to the world of the relationship between, say, A and Y, B controlled.[44] One may physically control for B, but this procedure may suffer a loss of cases. (Of course, it is possible to recover the loss of cases by averaging the measures of association from the individual contingency tables produced by the control from B. However, this procedure presumes that each of the measures is approximately the same, i.e., that there is not interaction.)

One means of handling statistical interaction is analysis of variance. Analysis of variance meets several needs in the tests of the hypotheses in this paper. First, the procedure yields estimates of the total amount of variance in the dependent variable attributable to the additive and interactive effects of the independent variables.

Second, the statistical technique is able to accept unequal cell frequencies. In analysis of variance, specific methods differ, depending on whether cell frequencies are equal, proportionate (which requires the independent variables to be uncorrelated), or disproportionate.[45] If the cell sizes are disproportionate one has to decide whether or not the inequality of cell sizes results from happenstance or from a correspondence of the sample to the population from which the data was drawn. If the latter is true, and it is in my case, then a least squares solution to the problem of unequal cell sizes is probably appropriate.[46]

Third, if one's hypotheses predict that interaction will occur in specific cells, then the technique must be able to locate the cells in which the interaction occurs. Following the lead of Duncan,[47] Jackson and Burke[48] and Treiman[49] have developed one least squares procedure that estimates the specific location of interaction. This procedure utilizes a dummy weighting technique whereby each category of variable A becomes a separate variable A_1, A_2, A_3, etc. For every individual the dummy variables have a value of either 0 or 1 depending on whether or not he falls into that category.[50] Below is an equation of this type specifying an additive model.

$$\hat{Y}_{ij} = a + b_1A_1 + b_2A_2 + b_3B_1 + b_4B_2$$

This is to say that the prediction of a dependent variable score ($\hat{Y}_{ij}$) may be computed from a knowledge of three components: one common to all individuals (a); another common to individuals sharing an attribute (A_i); and a final one common to those sharing a second attribute (B_j). Figure 3 is a graphic form of the equation.

One can see from Figure 3 why it is not necessary to include categories A_3 and B_3 in the equa-

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[43] Blalock, *Social Statistics*. p. 332.

[44] As in the case of interaction, problems also crop up when multicollinearity is present. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Correlated Independent Variables: The Problem of Multicollinearity," *Social Forces*, 42 (Dec., 1963), 233–237.

[45] The remainder of the discussion applies only to multiple-way analysis of variance. One-way analysis of variance, which is used to test some hypotheses, does not require an adjustment of unequal cell sizes.

[46] Winer, *Statistical Principles in Experimental Design*, p. 224. The method has been around a long time. See F. Yates, "The Analysis of Multiple Classifications with Unequal Numbers in the Different Classes," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 29 (March, 1934), 51–66.

[47] Otis Dudley Duncan, "Residential Areas and Differential Fertility," *Eugenics Quarterly*, 11 (June, 1964), 82–89.

[48] Elton F. Jackson and Peter J. Burke, *loc. cit.*

[49] Donald J. Treiman, "Status Discrepancy and Prejudice," *American Journal of Sociology*, 71 (May, 1966), 651–664.

[50] Daniel B. Suits, "Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 52 (Dec., 1957), 548–551.

FIG. 3. A Graphic Representation of an Additive Equation

	B_1	B_2	B_3
A_1	$\hat{Y}_{11}=a+A_1+B_1$	$\hat{Y}_{12}=a+A_1+B_2$	$\hat{Y}_{13}=a+A_1$
A_2	$\hat{Y}_{21}=a+A_2+B_1$	$\hat{Y}_{22}=a+A_2+B_2$	$\hat{Y}_{23}=\mathrm{a}+A_2$
A_3	$\hat{Y}_{31}=a+B_1$	$\hat{Y}_{32}=a+B_2$	$\hat{Y}_{33}=a$

tion. The model uses these categories for the constant a. (If we had followed the procedure of Kempthorne and others of setting the constant equal to the grand mean, then a term for A_3 and B_3 would have been included.[51])

Once the regression coefficients in the equation are solved, the differences between the observed cell mean and the mean predicted by the additive equation is an *estimate* of the interaction effect for that cell.[52] If interaction exists, by including an appropriate interaction term in the equation, e.g., $b_5A_1B_3$, differences between the observed and the predicted means are reduced. In this manner one specifies a *form* the interaction may be taking, in this example a multiplicative effect for individuals concomitantly in category A_1 and in category B_3.[53]

To be sure, the knotty problems of statistical inference appear with the use of the least squares method just as with other methods. Several factors other than a status inconsistency effect or a mobility effect can produce statistical interaction. With no claim of being exhaustive, Blalock has noted eight alternative explanations for interaction grouped under the headings of sampling error, measurement error, and specification error.[54] This is just to emphasize that the analyst must always be on guard against the possibility that his results are dependent on (to quote another) "statistico-empiricalistic factors and anti-factors." Conversely, it is also true that an interactive world can produce additive statistics under certain limited conditions. For example, if there are, say, mobility effects in opposite corners of a table that affect the dependent variable in

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[51] Oscar Kempthorne, *The Design and Analysis of Experiments* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952), pp. 79–87; George W. Snedecor, *Statistical Methods Applied to Experiments in Agriculture and Biology* (5th ed.; Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press, 1956), pp. 338–391; and R. L. Anderson and T. A. Bancroft, *Statistical Theory in Research* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952), pp. 278–284.

[52] The assumptions which permit the determination of the coefficients are the following: (1) The sum of squares due to interaction shall be minimized.

$$\sum \sum n_{ij}(\overline{AB}_{ij} - a - A_i - B_j)^2 = \text{minimum}$$

(2) The sum of the interaction terms (the deviations from an additive model), weighted by the cell frequencies, shall sum to zero over each row and each column.

$$\sum n_{j\cdot}A_i = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \sum n_{\cdot j}B_j = 0$$

In short, the additive pattern in each table is defined as that pattern which minimizes the sum of squares attributable to interaction. The only difference between the procedure used in this paper and the more familiar method of analysis of variance is that, in this procedure, the distribution of cell frequencies is allowed for theoretical reasons to influence the estimates of interaction. The program that computed the coefficients and the adjusted sums of squares was written jointly by C. Richard Hofstetter of Ohio State University and this author.

[53] The use of a least squares technique to estimate the location of interaction is not uncontroversial. In the first place, so long as one's cell means conform to an additive model, the pattern of cell frequencies has no effect on the size of the regression coefficients. However, if one's cell means do *not* conform to an additive model, the pattern of cell frequencies will affect the coefficients and, thus, the magnitude of the deviations from an additive model. Furthermore, because the technique is based on least squares, the largest deviations will tend to be found in the cells with the smallest cell sizes. To guard against the possibility that my results are an artifact of the method I used, I also ran the analysis, substituting equal cell sizes while retaining the original cell means. The same results obtained. In the second hypothesis, the direction of the deviations in the 27 critical cells remained the same in every instance. The size of the deviations did not vary greatly from those in Table 6.

[54] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., "Tests of Status Inconsistency Theory: A Note of Caution," *Pacific Sociological Review*, 10 (Fall, 1967), 69–74.

FIG. 4. An Additive and an Interactive Equation Both Producing Additive Cell Means

	B_1	B_2
A_1	00	30
A_2	10	40

1. Additive equation:
   $\hat{Y}_{ij} = 0A_1 + 10A_2 + 0B_1 + 30B_2$
2. Interactive equation:
   $\hat{Y}_{ij} = 0A_1 + 20A_2 + 0B_1 + 20B_2 + 10A_1B_2 - 10A_2B_1$

opposite directions, the data can be quite consistent with an additive model.[55] In Figure 4 it may be seen that both the additive and the interactive equation produce the same pattern of cell means. Fortunately, opposite effects in opposing cells do not seem to be a likely complication in the hypotheses presented in this paper.

Analysis of variance requires that the dependent variable have an interval level of measurement. Except for education and income, this is true of no variable in this study. All other measurements meet ordinal assumptions. In this case it seems preferable to sacrifice strict adherence to assumptions for the power of the variance technique. Given our interest in measuring interaction, the alternative is no analysis.[56]

In addition, the sampling design of all three studies is a clustered design. In tests of significance, this design violates the assumption of a simple random sample. Also, the 1960 election is a weighted sample, with some respondents appearing as many as four times. Taking these individuals out would destroy the sampling design, but leaving them in violates the assumption of uncorrelated error terms in analysis of variance. Because of the clustered design and because of the weighted sample in 1960, we should be cautious in interpreting measures of statistical significance. Thus, all measures of significance reported here are viewed as estimates of the figures that a simple random sample would yield.

Finally, regression analysis can be misleading if substantial multicollinearity exists. To the degree that the independent variables are intercorrelated, sampling and measurement error begin to dominate the estimates of the regression coefficients.[57] As a check upon the amount of multicollinearity among the cross-pressure indices, each of the three indices was run against the other in an ordinary linear regression program. For the three elections, the range of the resulting product moment correlations was .34 to .52. While these figures did not seem excessively high, the precaution was taken to run the three indices against the dependent variable, voting defection, in a multiple regression program (the BMD 03R).[58] This program computed the standard error of the regression coefficients associated with each of the indices. Had multicollinearity been a problem, the standard errors would have been large enough that the coefficients would not obtain statistical significance. However, of the nine coefficients (three coefficients for three years), all were significant at the .01 level. A final bit of evidence against the charge that the results are unduly affected by sampling (as opposed to measurement) error is the fact that the findings are consistent over each of three elections. This consistency would be unlikely if the analysis were really dominated by random error.

THE MEASUREMENT OF THE STATUS VARIABLES

1. Occupational Prestige. The ranking of occupations follows those categories established in the ICPR codebooks.[59] These categories are consistent with those used by others who have ranked occupational groups according to their prestige.[60] These categories are collapsed into three groups:

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[55] See the following works by Blalock, "Review Symposium," *American Sociological Review,* 33 (April, 1968), 296–297. "Status Inconsistency and Interaction: Some Alternate Models," *The American Journal of Sociology,* 73 (Nov., 1967), 305–315. "The Identification Problem and Theory Building: The Case of Status Inconsistency," *American Sociological Review,* 31 (Feb., 1966), 52–61.

[56] A few attempts have been made to partition chi-square into additive and interactive effects as in analysis of variance, but the technique seems as yet undeveloped. For example, diochotomization of the dependent variable is required. K. V. Wilson, "A Distribution-Free Test of Analysis of Variance Hypotheses," *Psychological Bulletin,* 53 (1965), 96–101.

[57] J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1963), pp. 201–207.

[58] W. J. Dixon (ed.), *Biomedical Computer Programs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 258–275.

[59] ICPR Codebooks, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Occupation Code.

[60] For example, see Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 471. See also Albert J. Reiss, Jr., *Occupations and Social Status* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 109–161 and Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige

a. Professionals, etc.; self-employed businessmen
b. Clerical and sales; skilled workers and craftsmen
c. Farmers; semi-skilled workers; service workers; and unskilled laborers.

All respondents are classified according to the occupation of the head of the household. The retired and the unemployed are assigned to their former occupations.

2. Racial-ethnic Prestige. Respondents are ranked according to the categories used by Jackson in his study of status inconsistency and psychological stress.[61] The basis of the ranking is both race and the birthplace of the respondent and his family.

a. Old English or Old American
b. Northern European
c. Southern and Eastern European, Jew, and Non-caucasian.

Race and religion have priority in the rankings. This is, non-caucasians and Jews are automatically assigned to the third category. If the respondent is foreign-born, he is assigned to the category of the country of his birth. If not, if his father is foreign born, the respondent is classified according to the country of the birth of his father. If his father was also native-born, the respondent is classified according to the statement of the country from which his family originally came. If the respondent doesn't know, he is omitted from the analysis. In the 1956 study, the question regarding the origin of the family is absent. Respondents are classified on the basis of the country of his own birth, his father's birth, or his father's father's birth.[62] A large number of respondents are not classifiable under this scheme. The respondent whose family had been in the country long enough to escape classification on the basis of his father's father being native born is classified as Old American.

3. Income. Respondents are ranked according to the income of the whole family.[63] It is this figure than the income of the respondent or the head of the family alone that determines a respondent's life style. The income is trichotomized into approximately equal thirds in the analysis.

4. Education. Education is measured in terms of the number of grades completed, including college.[64] The scale is collapsed into three categories. Following the procedure of Lenski and Jackson, slightly different rankings are established for people above and below the age of 45. The reason, as Jackson states, is that "an older person would not be expected to have as much education as a younger person of the same occupational and ethnic rank."[65] For the older respondents the following categories are set:

a. College education and attended college
b. High school graduate and attended high school—with or without other non-college training
c. Eight years of school or less.

To adjust for age, a respondent under 45 years of age who attended high school only and had no non-college training is assigned to the third category.

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in the United States, 1925–63," *American Journal of Sociology,* 70 (Nov., 1964), 286–302.

[61] Jackson, *loc cit.* For 1964, see ICPR Codebook, Deck 7, Col. 12, Deck 8, Col. 33, Deck 9, Cols. 11–13, 15–17, 21.

[62] For 1956, *ibid.,* Deck 6, Cols. 10, 20–22, 25, Deck 5, Col. 27.

[63] For 1964, *ibid.,* Deck 9, Col. 44.

[64] For 1964, *ibid.,* Deck 7, Cols., 27–28.

[65] Jackson, *loc. cit.*

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY AND PARTY LOYALTY: THE ELECTORAL RELEVANCE OF CANDIDATE DECISION-MAKING IN THE 1964 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The analyst of campaign strategy in American elections is usually confronted by the apparent impossibility of demonstrating that campaign behavior actually matters.[1] Although candidates possess numerous options in strategy and tactics, it is clear that incumbent members of the majority party (commonly joint phenomena) usually win and opposition candidates of the minority party usually lose.[2] Lewis Froman has even argued that ". . . the behavior of the candidates during the campaign is one of the least influential factors in determining electoral outcomes."[3]

The effects, if any, of campaign behavior are the residue to be examined after the partisan distribution of the electorate, the nature of the times, the power of incumbency and any number of variables beyond the ready control of the candidates themselves have been employed to explain or predict the popular vote distribution. The perceived general ineffectiveness of candidate strategy and tactics is usually explained by the low public saliency of the typical election contest, in which most voters are unlikely to be aware even of the names of the candidates, much less their policy positions or, presumably, any other of their behaviors.[4]

But this circumstance may change when "ordinary" election contests are connected to contests of much higher saliency, especially that for the Presidency. It is at this time, at least, when the strategic decisions and behaviors of certain classes of candidates may attract the attention of voters otherwise preoccupied with that more dramatic battle for power.

For example, a recurring, if seldom widespread, phenomenon of Presidential-year campaigns has been the avoidance or refusal of some candidates to endorse their party's nominee for President. This deviation from the customary forms of campaign behavior—a crime occasionally punished[5]—presumably occurs because the candidate believes his behavior on this question is of importance to some flexible and observant

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* I am grateful to Russell Slade, who collected the data upon which this article is based, and to Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes for their comments on an earlier draft.

[1] Cf. Stimson Bullitt, "Because no one knows what works in a campaign, money is spent beyond the point of diminishing returns. . . No one dares to omit any approach. Every cartridge must be fired because among the multitude of blanks one may be a bullet," in *To Be A Politician* (Garden City, N.Y., 1961), p. 72; Charles F. Cnudde, ". . . political scientists know little about how the campaign affects the vote, or in fact whether it influences it at all," in a book review in this REVIEW, 62 (1968) p. 1365; John W. Kingdon, "Right or wrong, most candidates believe that campaigns affect election outcomes," in *Candidates For Office: Beliefs and Strategies,* (New York, 1968) p. 109. There is, however, some evidence that party *organizations* may, by their efforts, affect the vote. See, e.g., Phillips Cutright and Peter Rossi, "Grass Roots Politicians and the Vote," *American Sociological Review,* 23 (1958), 171–179; Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 25 (1961), 1–24; William J. Crotty, "The Party Organization and its Activities," in Crotty (ed.), *Approaches To The Study of Party Organizations* (Boston, 1968), pp. 247–306, esp. pp. 277–286.

[2] See Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign in Congressional Politics," in M. Kent Jennings and L Harmon Ziegler (eds.), *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp. 21–41, esp. pp. 23–24; Milton C. Cummings, *Congressmen and the Electorate* (Washington, 1966), *passim.*

[3] Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics," in Jennings and Zeigler, *op. cit.,* pp. 1–20, at p. 4. See also, Charles O. Jones, "The Role of the Campaign . . . ," in *ibid,* pp. 33–34. Cf. Froman, *Congressmen And Their Constituencies* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 50–59.

[4] Warren Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW (1963), 45–56; Stokes and Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 26 (1962), 531–546.

[5] E.g., in 1965, the House Democratic caucus stripped John Bell Williams and Albert Watson of their committee seniority because they openly supported the candidacy of the Republican Presidential nominee, Barry Goldwater. In 1969, John Rarick received the same punishment (from an unusual second caucus) for endorsing the third party candidacy of George Wallace.

portion of his electorate. Moreover, the infrequency of party punishment of disloyal candidates may be at least partly an unspoken acknowledgment of the necessity or at least comprehensibility of such action. The question then must be asked whether party loyalty may be so systematically costly as to *justify* evasion or violation of that norm.

I assume that a Congressional candidate will risk the consequences of disloyalty (which may include formal punishment, ostracism and alienation or disaffection of existing or potential support groups—in or out of the constituency) only in order to avoid the loss of votes consequent upon his being identified with his party's presidential candidate by his electorate.[6] If such behavior has any systematic effect, it must be that those legislative candidates most closely identified with their party's Presidential candidate will achieve (or suffer) the latter's electoral fate in a direct relationship to that identification.

In the United States, the clarity and ubiquity of behavior necessary to test such a proposition is a rare occurrence. When, as is usually the case, all or nearly all legislative candidates are decently loyal to their ticket, the necessary data are absent, by definition. In 1964, however, the conditions were met to an extent seldom before encountered. The Republican Party nominated Barry Goldwater, a conservative ideologue, for President. He was, moreover, a man with a clear and consistent public record and one whose electoral prospects were poor enough to prompt a wide variety of intra-party campaign behaviors, ranging from absolute endorsement and continuous support—the ideal application of the loyalty norm—to outright rejection and repudiation.[7]

The gross costs of the Goldwater candidacy are well known. He received 38.7% of the national two-party vote and, as part of a general Republican debacle, 39 of the 159 Republican Congressmen running for re-election were defeated. I hypothesize that the relationship between the Presidential vote and the patterns of first differences in the Congressional vote (i.e., between 1964 and 1962), across districts, is dependent upon the supportive association between Republican Congressmen and their party's Presidential candidate. Hence, where such support can be demonstrated, I predict a high positive correlation between the Presidential vote and changes in the Congressional vote. I will use the movement of the vote for Congress between 1962 and 1964 as the best available measure of the short-term forces swaying the electorate in these districts in the latter year. If the Congressman can dissociate himself from the Presidential contest, the correlation should diminish, approaching—in the ideal case of non-support—statistical (and empirical) independence. Thus, the absolutely loyal would be tied directly to the coattails of the head of their ticket while the variation in the results for those candidates intent on strategic maximization would tend to be unrelated to the vote for the Presidential candidate. The null hypothesis would imply that variation in this aspect of campaign behavior had no discernible effect on either voting trends or outcomes.[8]

II. THE EFFECTS OF LOYALTY

The techniques of expression or evasion of party loyalty take many forms. A candidate may identify himself with a slate or head of his ticket willingly and consistently; he may offer honest support but attempt to "run on [his] own record;" offer *pro-forma* support—occasionally or once—and then proceed to differentiate himself as much as possible; simply ignore his running-mates; judiciously praise *competing* candidates; publicly withhold endorsement; or repudiate a partisan colleague's candidacy. (These behaviors are not always mutually exclusive nor is this list necessarily inclusive: it is fixed only by the limits of political inventiveness.) The subtlety and ambiguity of the intermediate behaviors, as well as the unavailability of the type of information which might permit refinement of such categories, necessitate the use of a more limited discrimination among degrees of support. Happily, the results of the analysis lend support to the belief that my classification of candidates by the degree of their support for Goldwater was not in fact compromised by excessive errors.

I have divided incumbent Republican Congressional candidates in 1964 into two groups: signers and non-signers of a public pre-convention endorsement of Senator Goldwater's candidacy.[9] I assume that the signers were that set of Congressmen most willing to be publicly identified with Senator Goldwater and that this behavior was merely an early example of a consistent equivalent set which occurred later in the campaign. It is they, contrasted with the more behaviorally heterogeneous non-signers, whose vote change patterns should vary directly with the Goldwater vote.

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[6] His personal motives may in fact vary but are here assumed to be exclusively fear of defeat.

[7] Among those who publicly refused their support—at the very least—were such Congressional party colleagues as Senators Scott, Javits and Keating and Congressmen Lindsay, Tupper, Fulton and Halpern.

[8] These hypotheses also permit, simultaneously, a test of the existence and direction of the coattails effect. In the absence of survey data one can only infer, as I do here, that it is a *Presidential* rather than a *Congressional* Coattail effect that is involved. See Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 19 (Winter, 1955–56), 353–368.

This proposition is confirmed. Among the signers the correlation between the presidential vote and changes of the congressional vote is +0.49. In view of the many purely local influences on Congressional races, the correlation is impressive. Moreover, there are technical reasons for believing that it understates the true impact which the presidential contest had on the signers' changing fortunes at the polls.[10]

For the 109 non-signers,[11] the presumed hope for an "independent" electoral judgment was achieved, in the aggregate. The correlation coefficient was −0.01. That is, variation in the Goldwater vote is uncorrelated with and explains *none* of the variance in the vote differences between 1964 and 1962 for the non-signing Republicans.

The possibility remains, however, that these findings reflect other immediate stimuli or structural influences upon voting behavior. For example, there exists some evidence indicating that party column ballots tend to discourage split-ticket voting and that this phenomenon is, by comparison, encouraged by the office-bloc ticket.[12] It is thus possible, in principle, that candidates whose vote change tended to parallel the trend of the Goldwater vote were disproportionately likely to represent districts in party-column states and that independence of that trend occurred generally where the office-bloc ballot was employed.

The addition of controls for ballot form elicits clear results (see Table 1). Where signers ran in Party Column states, the correlation coefficient between the Goldwater vote and Congressional vote-change rises to +0.60. For the matching non-signers, the relationship remains almost perfectly independent (r = +0.002). But for signers appearing on office Bloc ballots, the correlation coefficient decreases to +0.22, while for the equivalent set of nonsigners, the relationship is again one of independence (r = −0.05).

TABLE 1. THE EFFECT OF BALLOT FORM AND SUPPORT FOR GOLDWATER ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE GOLDWATER VOTE AND CONGRESSIONAL VOTE-CHANGE

	Signers		Non-signers		Totals	
	r	(n)	r	(n)	r	(n)
Party Column	.60	(33)	.00	(68)	.17	(101)
Office Bloc	.22	(16)	−.05	(41)	−.03	(57)
Totals	.49	(49)	−.01	(109)		

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[9] The endorsement, published in the *New York Times,* June 17, 1964, was signed by 54 Republican Congressmen, 49 of whom were candidates for re-election. It read, in part, "We are convinced that the nomination of . . . Barry Goldwater . . . will result in substantial increases in Republican membership in both Houses of Congress."

[10] Since the redistricting of seats between 1960 and 1962 (and the abnormality of the 1960 presidential election) prevents the use of *changes* of the presidential vote to measure the forces distinctive to 1964, the presidential measure entered in the correlation reflects traditional levels of party strength in the several districts as well as the influence of Goldwater's candidacy and other circumstances specific to 1964. Such an extraneous traditional component tends to reduce any non-vanishing correlation below the level which would be obtained were it possible to correlate changes of the congressional vote with *changes* of the presidential vote.

[11] Representative Sylvio Conte (Mass. 1) is excluded from this analysis, since he gained both Republican *and* Democratic nominations and received 100% of the 2-party vote in his district. Conte was one of those who repudiated Goldwater's nomination, but his inclusion would add spurious strength to the second hypothesis, since his vote could not be other than independent of Goldwater's.

[12] See V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics Parties and Pressure Groups* (New York, 4th edition, 1958), p. 609n, 691–695; Angus Campbell and Warren Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," this REVIEW, 60 (1957), 293–312. See also Jack L. Walker, "Ballot Forms and Voter Fatigue," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 10 (1966), 448–463.



FIG. 1. Mean District Vote Percentage on Party Column Ballots for Republican Congressmen and Barry Goldwater, 1964, by Support for Goldwater.

Thus, the Party Column ballot had the effect of strengthening the relationship between the Goldwater vote and Congressional vote-change, but *only* for the group of early Goldwater supporters. The Office Bloc ballot, by contrast, permitted Congressmen to remain largely independent of the trend of the Goldwater vote.

It is in Party Column states where the divergent campaign strategies of Republican incumbents led to now predictably divergent results. The signers of the Goldwater endorsement were able to maintain, on the average, only a +7.7% margin over the Arizona Senator.[13] Among non-signers, the slippage was +16.2% (see Figure 1).

Faced with an even lower Goldwater vote, typically, than were their signing colleagues, the non-signers not only obtained a higher mean vote percentage, but also tended to suffer smaller losses, compared with 1962,[14] against a stronger tide. Their vote changed, on the average, by −5.3% while the mean change among signers was −6.8%.[15]

The political arithmetic becomes crucial when strategic vulnerability is linked to electoral marginality. Although, as would be expected, the overwhelming majority of defeats were sustained by Republicans occupying marginal seats (those who won with less than 60% of the vote in 1962),[16] the Party Column signers bore a disproportionate share of the burden (see Table 2). Comprising 30% of all marginal Congressmen, they suffered 47% of the losses; making up 35% of such candidates on Party Column ballots, they suffered 56% of the defeats.

There is also, in these figures, a touch of pa-

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[13] The "power of incumbency" thesis has never been better demonstrated. Only one Republican Congressmen, Bruce Alger (Texas 5), trailed Goldwater.

[14] Calculations for Congressmen Clausen and Clawson (Calif 1 and 23) are based on the results of Special Elections in 1963.

[15] Whereas strategic difference explains systematic differences on Party Column ballots, the same operation accounts in gross terms for differences on Office Bloc tickets. Here, the mean slippage for signers and non-signers was +9.7% and +17.9%, respectively, and mean vote-change was —4.4% and —2.2%. The original hypothesis thus holds, but only between groups and without explaining internal variation among signers.

[16] Although 55% is commonly employed as the border between marginality and safety, in 1964 relative safety for incumbent Republicans existed on the positive side of 60% rather than 55%.

TABLE 2. MARGINALITY, SAFETY AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF LOSSES IN 1964

Vote in 1962

		<60%			60%+			Totals		
		%	(n)	(Losses)	%	(n)	(Losses)	%	(n)	(Losses)
Signers	PC	72	(24)	(14)	28	(9)	(2)	100	(33)	(16)
Non-Signers	PC	50	(34)	(11)	50	(34)	(5)	100	(68)	(16)
Signers	OB	44	(7)	(1)	56	(9)	(—)	100	(16)	(1)
Non-Signers	OB	39	(16)	(4)	61	(25)	(2)	100	(41)	(6)

thos. Those Congressmen holding marginal seats in Party Column states, and therefore *least* able to pay the penalty which endorsing Goldwater was likely to exact, were *more* likely to be among those endorsers. Forty-one per cent of these marginal Congressmen signed the Goldwater endorsement; only 21% of the safe ones took that risk. The tendency of these signers to hold marginal seats means that their higher *rate* of loss yielded even more actual numbers of signers who were put out of the House.

In short, since the presidential race went strongly against the Republicans in most districts, the displacement of popular hostility to Goldwater onto the Congressmen who supported him most strongly cost the party a good many seats. Among Congressmen who had won with less than 60% of the vote two years before, the proportion defeated in 1964 was well over half again greater among signers than non-signers (48% *versus* 30%). Among such Congressmen whose states employed the Party Column ballot, that proportion of defeats was nearly twice as great (58% *versus* 32%). This contrast is lent added significance by the fact that signers were notably more likely to hold marginal seats; the price was greatest for those who were, on the average, least able to pay it.[17]

III. DISCUSSION

The belief that campaign behavior is of exceedingly small importance in determining electoral outcomes is grounded primarily in the discovery that factors beyond the control of the candidates, such as incumbency, the partisan distribution of the electorate and general economic and social conditions tend to determine the results. The absence of a literature describing systematic or even widespread, if dissimilar, deviations from this standard expectation has merely served to reinforce its acceptability.

Yet, in at least one election year, 1964, a large number of incumbent Republican Congressmen were confronted by a strategic campaign choice—whether, when and how to endorse the Presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater. The nature of the decision taken had demonstrable and often crucial effects on the proportion of the vote they themselves received in their districts.

Those Congressmen who offered early and absolute support for the then certain head of their ticket were destined, most clearly when running on Party Column ballots, to be firmly bound to his coattails on election day. Those who refused, qualified or simply withheld until a later date their support for Goldwater's candidacy tended, in the aggregate, to be judged by their constituents on the basis of other considerations or to be rewarded, in varying degree, for their "independent" behavior.

These findings should be most disturbing to some theorists, both positive and normative, of party behavior. For certain varieties of positive theory, they underscore the limits to the empirical usefulness of models that assume that party leaders always act in common. Anthony Downs, for example, assumes that parties are internally unified and forbids *by axiom* any attempt by a party member ". . . to benefit himself at the expense of any other member of his own party team."[18] An awareness that political leaders (i.e., politicians) act for private motives ought to prompt an extension of models of rational behavior, just as an awareness that public authority is wielded for private motives led Downs, Buchanan, Tullock and other economists to become interested in politics in the first place.

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[17] It is possible to suggest that the differences found between signers and non-signers arise from the fact that 1964 was a bad year for conservatives, which signers tended to be and Goldwater was. It is necessary to point out that such a hypothesis will not account for the lack of correlation between the Goldwater vote and the changes of support for non-signers, unless they are all uniformly unconservative (while signers are of varying degrees of conservatism, a strange notion). As it happens, the conservatism of signers—or of all Congressmen is unrelated to the change of their support between 1962 and 1964. Employing Congressmens' scores on a measure combining Congressional Quarterly's Conservative Coalition and Federal Role Indexes, the correlation coefficient between relative conservatism in roll-call voting behavior and change of support is —0.08 among signers, —0.11 among non-signers and —0.20 among all Congressmen.

The normative theorists of party government must in turn wrestle with the likely results had all Republican Congressmen put the party's welfare before their own. *That* cohesive and disciplined legislative party, responsible to the party platform[19] and loyal to the Presidential candidate who presumably embodies it, would have been far more vulnerable to defeat than in fact they were. The trends illustrated above and the demonstrated unpopularity of Goldwater in the electorate[20] leave little doubt that the Republican Party in the House would have been little more than a corporal's guard. It is difficult to believe that this is what the party reformers envisioned as the second responsible party.

There is, quite clearly, a sense in which it was both rational *and* responsible for Republican candidates in 1964 to dissociate themselves from the ticket and cut the party's grievous losses in Congress. It was, by some standards, inelegant of them to do so but, for politicians who must live in this world, the assumptions of political modelers need be of no concern—only the reverse is true—and the prescriptions of normative system-builders may be, certainly at the personal level, absolutely dangerous.

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[18] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957), p. 30.

[19] See, e.g., The Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," this REVIEW, 44 (1950, Supplement), pp. 21, 47, 48, 53, and 61; James M. Burns, *The Deadlock of Democracy*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963). The broader assumptions underlying and the prospective consequences of the recommended reforms are discussed critically in Julius Turner, "Responsible Parties: A Dissent from the Floor," this REVIEW, 45 (1951), 143–152; Austin Ranney, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary," in *ibid,* 488–499. See also, Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System,* (New York, 1956), pp. 527–533; and Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections* (New York, Second Edition, 1968), pp. 218–228, 250–268.

[20] Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), pp. 19–28, esp. pp. 22–23.

THE DESIRED POLITICAL ENTROPY

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I. INTRODUCTION

In an article published in the December 30, 1967 issue of the Dutch weekly magazine *Vrij Nederland*, Mr. Frans Grosfeld suggested the following modification of the procedure of parliamentary representation of political parties. Instead of the conventional method of allocating to each party a number of representatives proportional to the number of votes cast for the party, he proposed to allocate a number of representatives which is proportional to the square of the number of votes. Thus, when there are n parties and when $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ are the proportions of the total number of votes obtained by these parties, the idea is to allocate a fraction q_i of the representatives to the ith party determined by

$$(1.1) \qquad q_i = p_i^2 / \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j^2 \qquad i = 1, \cdots, n$$

Mr. Grosfeld made this suggestion for the Dutch political system, because in his view n is so large and even the largest p_i belongs to a minority party, so that on many occasions several months of negotiations were necessary to obtain a coalition cabinet of one form or another. By squaring the p_i's one obtains much larger relative differences between the larger and the smaller parties, and one party or a pair of politically related parties then has a much better chance of obtaining a parliamentary majority. Also, the system (1.1) provides an incentive for parties to merge, which contributes to a reduction of the degree to which the country is politically divided. This system should be contrasted with another system which is applied on a rather large scale, viz., that of declining any seat to those parties whose p_i is less than a pre-assigned fraction θ (for example, $\theta = .03$). The fractions in the parliament are then:

$$(1.2) \qquad \begin{array}{ll} q_i = 0 & \text{if } p_i < \theta \\ \quad\; p_i/(1 - A) & \text{if } p_i \geq \theta \end{array}$$

where $A = \sum p_j$, the summation being extended over those values of the subscript j for which $p_j < \theta$.[1] The cut-off system (1.2) also discriminates against small parties, but the system (1.1) proceeds in a more continuous manner.

It is interesting in this connection that the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS) faces a similar problem but in precisely the opposite direction. The problem is that the national member societies are of very unequal size, so that IFORS could be dominated more or less permanently by the societies of one or two countries if proportional representation based on national membership were applied. To prevent this, a rule has been adopted which gives each member society a number of votes proportional to the square root of the number of members:

$$(1.3) \qquad q_i = p_i^{1/2} / \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j^{1/2} \qquad i = 1, \cdots, n$$

where n is the number of member societies, p_i the ith society's share of total membership, and q_i its share in the IFORS voting procedure. Thus, if the ith society has four times as many members as the jth, the number of its votes is only twice as large.

The system of ratios squared (1.1) and the square-root system (1.3) are both special cases of

$$(1.4) \qquad q_i = p_i^{\alpha} / \sum_{j=1}^{n} p_j^{\alpha} \qquad i = 1, \cdots, n$$

A specification $\alpha > 1$ serves to raise the size of the larger groups and to reduce that of the smaller groups, whereas $\alpha < 1$ has the opposite effect. The latter variant is sometimes used to protect geographical minorities. The IFORS case is one example; the U.S. Senate is another, since it gives equal representation to all 50 states independent of their population. Thus, if p_i stands for the number of voters of the ith state measured as a fraction of the national total and q_i for the proportion of Senators allocated to this state (1/50), (1.4) applies to this case when we specify $\alpha = 0$.

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[1] Since the number of representatives allocated to each party must be a nonnegative integer, the actual q_i's will be slightly different from those defined in (1.1) and (1.2). This feature will be disregarded in the present note, but it should be stressed that the criterion used in Section 2—the minimization of the information expectation defined in eq. (2.4)—can be used to handle this problem. The approach is then to minimize the information expectation subject to the constraint that each q_i be a nonnegative multiple of $1/N$, where N is the total number of parliamentary seats.

There are thus several examples of the representation system (1.4): $\alpha=0$ (U.S. Senate), $\alpha=\frac{1}{2}$ (IFORS), $\alpha=1$ (proportional representation), and $\alpha=2$ (Mr. Grosfeld's proposal).[2] This makes the system (1.4) interesting by itself, but it is clear that this particular one-parameter family is only one choice out of many. In this note I shall show that the family of representation systems (1.4) has certain optimal properties. In Section 2 I shall derive this family by means of a constrained optimization technique based on some elementary concepts from information theory. In Section 3 I will derive the same family from some simple axioms, after which some concluding remarks follow in Section 4.

II. AN INFORMATIONAL APPROACH

There can be no doubt that the representation system $q_i=p_i$ is the simplest and most straightforward, and the reason for choosing a different system is basically the same in all cases discussed above: One is dissatisfied with the degree to which the total representation is divided into parts, and the "dividedness" is either regarded as too large, in which case one would like to reduce it (by choosing $\alpha>1$ in the system (1.4)), or it is regarded as too small. Therefore, what is needed in the first place is a measure which describes the degree to which the total is subdivided. A natural and well-known measure, based on concepts from information theory, is the *entropy*.[3] For the fractions $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ the entropy is defined as

$$H_p = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i \log p_i \tag{2.1}$$

which is nonnegative and which vanishes if and only if $p_i=1$ for some i (and hence $p_j=0$ for $j\neq i$). The maximum is $\log n$, which is attained when the p_i's are all equal to $1/n$. Thus, the entropy takes the smallest value when the scene is dominated completely by one group (which amounts to a minimum of "dividedness") and the largest value when all groups are of equal size; and this maximum, $\log n$, increases in turn when the number of groups (n) increases. We shall exclude the possibility that H_p is equal to either limit:

$$0 < H_p < \log n \tag{2.2}$$

If $H_p=0$, then some p_i is equal to one and all others are zero. Clearly, there exists no nonarbitrary way of assigning parliament seats to parties which did not receive any vote at all. If $H_p=\log n$, all n parties received the same number of votes, and there exists no reasonable way of allocating parliament seats to these parties on another than equal basis.

But if H_p satisfies the constraint (2.2), as is normally the case, one can conceive of a set of parliamentary fractions $q_1, \ldots, q_n$ whose entropy

$$H_q = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \log q_i \tag{2.3}$$

differs from H_p. Obviously, if we fix H_q at a pre-assigned level, we still have freedom as to the choice of $q_1, \ldots, q_n$ when $n\geq 2$,[4] and we would like to choose the q's as closely to the corresponding p's as is possible. Given that the informational concepts H_p and H_q are used to measure "dividedness," a natural way of specifying "as close as possible" is the following. Consider $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ as the prior probabilities of n events and imagine that a message arrives which indicates that the odds in favor of these events have changed to the extent that the new (posterior) probabilities are $q_1, \ldots, q_n$. The expected information of this message is defined in information theory as

$$I(q\colon p) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \log \frac{q_i}{p_i} \tag{2.4}$$

where q and p on the left stand for $q_1, \ldots, q_n$ and $p_1, \ldots, p_n$, respectively. The information expectation is never negative. It vanishes if and only if $p_i=q_i$ for each i, and it takes larger and larger values when the p's and q's are pairwise more different.[5]

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[2] Plus the case $\alpha=\infty$ (i.e., allocating all seats to the ruling party), a procedure used in some of the democratically less advanced countries.

[3] For a brief introduction to the informational concepts used in this section, see e.g. Chapters 1 and 2 of the author's *Economics and Information Theory* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, and Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1967). The idea of using the entropy for this particular purpose is due to Mr. B. M. S. van Praag of the Econometric Institute in Rotterdam.

[4] Even for $n=2$ the entropy does not determine the q's uniquely, because $(\theta, 1-\theta)$ and $(1-\theta, \theta)$ have the same entropy for any θ in the interval (0, 1). It is obvious, however, that the present discussion loses much of its interest when $n=2$ instead of $n>2$.

[5] This becomes particularly clear when $I(q:p)$ is expanded according to powers of $(q_i-p_i)/p_i$. If we use natural logarithms (which is done throughout this paper) and disregard third and higher powers, the result is

$$I(q\colon p) \approx \frac{1}{2}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{(q_i-p_i)^2}{p_i}$$

provided that the p's and q's are pairwise suffici-

The information expectation (2.4) is a measure of the degree to which we are surprised when we are informed that the prior probabilities $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ are replaced by the posterior probabilities $q_1, \ldots, q_n$. Interpret now the p_i's again as the proportions of the votes cast for the various parties and the q_i's as the corresponding proportions of parliamentary seats.[6] Obviously, the electorate ought to be surprised as little as possible. Consider then:

THEOREM 1. *Let $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ be the proportions of the total number of votes cast for the n parties and suppose that* (2.2) *is satisfied. Then the parliamentary representation $q_1, \ldots, q_n$ which minimizes the information expectation* (2.4) *subject to the entropy constraint* (2.3) *is given by eq.* (1.4), *where α is the solution of eq.* (2.11) *below. This solution exists and is unique for any preassigned value of the entropy H_q in the interval* (0, log n) *if exactly one party has the largest number of votes.*

The remainder of this section is concerned with the proof of this theorem. We note first that under condition (2.3) the information expectation (2.4) can be written as

$$I(q:p) = -H_q - \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \log p_i \tag{2.5}$$

so that we should minimize $-\sum q_i \log p_i$ subject to the constraints (2.3) and $\sum q_i = 1$. So we form the Lagrangian expression:

$$-\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \log p_i - \lambda\left(-\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \log q_i - H_q\right) - \mu\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i - 1\right) \tag{2.6}$$

where λ and μ are Lagrangian multipliers. We differentiate with respect to q_i and equate the result to zero:

$$-\log p_i + \lambda(1 + \log q_i) - \mu = 0 \qquad i = 1, \cdots, n \tag{2.7}$$

If $\lambda = 0$, this amounts to $\log p_i = -\mu$, which implies that all p_i's must be equal to $1/n$ and hence $H_p = \log n$. This, however, is excluded by (2.2). So $\lambda \neq 0$ and hence:

$$\log q_i = -1 + \frac{\mu}{\lambda} + \frac{1}{\lambda} \log p_i \qquad i = 1, \cdots, n \tag{2.8}$$

or equivalently:

$$q_i = \frac{p_i^{1/\lambda}}{C} \quad \text{where } C = e^{1-\mu/\lambda} \tag{2.9}$$

We now write $\alpha = 1/\lambda$, so that $q_i = p_i^\alpha / C$ in accordance with (1.4), and C obviously satisfies

$$C = \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha \tag{2.10}$$

in view of the sum constraint $\sum q_i = 1$.

Next substitute p_i^α / C for q_i in the entropy constraint (2.3):

$$H_q = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} (p_i^\alpha / C) \log (p_i^\alpha / C) = \frac{-\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha \log p_i^\alpha + \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha\right) \log \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha}$$

or

$$H_q = \log \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha - \frac{\alpha \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha \log p_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha} \tag{2.11}$$

For given $H_q, p_1, \ldots, p_n$ this is a nonlinear equation in α. The righthand side is equal to $\log n$ for $\alpha = 0$ and to zero in the limit for α increasing indefinitely, provided that one party has the largest p_i.[7] To prove that (2.11) gives a unique solution for any H_q between these limits it is sufficient to show that the righthand side is a monotonically decreasing function of α. So we consider its derivative with respect to α, which turns out to be:

$$\begin{aligned} & -\frac{\alpha \sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha (\log p_i)^2}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha} + \frac{\alpha\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha \log p_i\right)^2}{\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^\alpha\right)^2} \\ &= -\alpha \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i\left(\log p_i - \sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j \log p_j\right)^2 \end{aligned} \tag{2.12}$$

The expression on the second line is a multiple $-\alpha$ of the weighted variance of $\log p_1, \ldots, \log$

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ently close to each other (so that the expansions converge). The right-hand side of this approximation is proportional to a chi-square with the p's as theoretical probabilities and the q's as observed frequencies.

[6] To make the discussion more concrete, we will talk about parties and parliamentary seats rather than about both these and the geographic representations such as those of IFORS and the U.S. Senate.

[7] Write p_1 for the largest p_i, then q_1 converges to 1 as $\alpha \to \infty$, so that $H_q = 0$ in the limit. If $p_1 = p_2$ and if all other p_i's are smaller, then $q_1 = q_2 = \frac{1}{2}$ in the limit and hence $H_q > 0$ even when $\alpha = \infty$. In the case of a k-fold multiple maximum, $p_1 = \ldots = p_k > p_{k+1} \geq \ldots \geq p_n$, the interval for H_q mentioned in Theorem 1 should be confined to ($\log k$, $\log n$).

p_n with $q_1, \ldots, q_n$ as weights.[8] The derivative is therefore negative for all positive α except when the variance vanishes, and this variance vanishes only if $p_i = 1$ and hence $q_i = 1$ for some i ($H_p = 0$) or if $p_i = 1/n$ for each i ($H_p = \log n$).

III. AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH

In the system of proportional representation the number of parliamentary seats allocated to each party, measured as a fraction of the total number of seats, is determined uniquely by the number of party votes relative to the total number of votes. In fact, the rule is simply $q_i = p_i$, $i = 1, \ldots, n$. Other systems such as (1.4) do not have this property, but a weaker variant, which may be called the condition of *weak proportionality*, certainly seems reasonable. Consider any two parties i and j; then the number of parliamentary seats allocated to i relative to the number of seats allocated to j should be determined uniquely by the ratio of the number of votes cast for i to that cast for j, and the underlying relationship should be the same for all pairs (i, j) and it should be nondecreasing. This means:

$$(3.1) \qquad \frac{q_i}{q_j} = f\left(\frac{p_i}{p_j}\right) \qquad i, j = 1, \cdots, n$$

where $f(\ )$ is a nondecreasing function which takes positive values for all positive values of the argument.

Consider then any triple of parties, (i, j, k). We obviously have

$$(3.2) \qquad \frac{p_i}{p_k} = \frac{p_i}{p_j}\,\frac{p_j}{p_k} \qquad \frac{q_i}{q_k} = \frac{q_i}{q_j}\,\frac{q_j}{q_k}$$

which means $f(p_i/p_k) = f(p_i/p_j)f(p_j/p_k)$. Since this equation holds for any positive values of the arguments, we may write it as

$$(3.3) \qquad f(x)f(y) \equiv f(xy) \qquad x, y > 0$$

Write $\xi = \log x$ and $\eta = \log y$, so that

$$(3.4) \qquad \log f(x) \equiv \log f(e^{\xi}) \equiv \phi(\xi) \quad \text{say}$$

Taking logarithms on both sides of (3.3) we obtain

$$(3.5) \qquad \phi(\xi) + \phi(\eta) \equiv \phi(\xi + \eta) \qquad -\infty < \xi, \quad \eta < \infty$$

from which it follows immediately that, if $f(\ )$ and hence $\phi(\ )$ are continuous functions, $\phi(\xi)$ must be of the form $\alpha\xi$ for some constant α.[9] Hence:

$$(3.6) \qquad f(x) \equiv e^{\phi(\xi)} \equiv (e^{\xi})^{\alpha} \equiv x^{\alpha}$$

so that we obtain:

$$(3.7) \qquad \frac{q_i}{q_j} = \left(\frac{p_i}{p_j}\right)^{\alpha} \qquad i, j = 1, \cdots, n$$

This condition determines the ratios of all q's. Since they add up to one, they are thus individually determined and it is immediately obvious that they are of the form (1.4). The condition that $f(\ )$ be nondecreasing implies $\alpha \geq 0$. We have thus proved:

THEOREM 2. *Let* $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ *be the proportions of the total number of votes cast for the n parties and* $q_1, \ldots, q_n$ *the corresponding parliamentary representation. If weak proportionality is imposed in the sense of* (3.1), *where* $f(\ )$ *is a continuous nondecreasing function satisfying* $f(x) > 0$ *for any* $x > 0$, *then the* q's *are determined by the* p's *as described in eq.* (1.4) *for some* $\alpha \geq 0$.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The results obtained in the two previous sections indicate that, if one is dissatisfied with proportional representation, there are rather cogent reasons for choosing a member of the family (1.4). The next problem is then the specification of the parameter α. In Mr. Grosfeld's proposal the value 2 is chosen a priori, but it may be argued that the voters should have a say in the matter. In fact, a plea can be made for the idea that the citizens of a country should have the right to vote on the degree to which they will be politically divided in their own Parliament. This would give the voting procedure a two-dimensional character: Each citizen votes for the party of his preference, thus raising the corresponding p_i at the expense of all other p's, and he also votes for a particular numerical value of the parliamentary entropy,[10] thus indicating how in his view

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[8] By substituting $\log q_i$ for $\alpha \log p_i - \log C$ in the second line of (2.12) we obtain a result that can be written as follows:

$$\frac{\partial H_q}{\partial(\log \alpha)} = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i(-\log q_i - H_q)^2 \qquad \alpha > 0$$

which means that a small relative increase in α reduces the entropy H_q by k times this increase, where k is the variance of the distribution whose values are $-\log q_1, \ldots, -\log q_n$ and whose probabilities are $q_1, \ldots, q_n$. Obviously, the mean of this distribution is the entropy H_q.

[9] For details, see e.g. *Economics and Information Theory* (quoted in footnote 3), p. 7, or B. O. Koopman and G. E. Kimball, "Information Theory," Chapter 9 of *Notes on Operations Research 1959*, assembled by the Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: The Technology Press, M.I.T., 1959).

[10] This will of course require the teaching of logarithms at an early stage. Mathematics teachers should regard it as a challenge to teach a subject with immediate political science applications.

$p_1, \ldots, p_n$ should be transformed to the parliamentary fractions $q_1, \ldots, q_n$. In theory, there will be as many different desired entropy values as there are voters; an obvious choice is to substitute the median for H_q in the entropy constraint (2.3). One may also argue that the voters collectively decide on the fractions $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ and that, therefore, H_p is the implied desired entropy, which is normally different from the median of the "directly" desired entropies. This conflict can be resolved by substituting for H_q in (2.3) the average of H_p and the median desired entropy. Clearly, there are many possibilities.

It is also important to reflect on the degree of association between the two components of each citizen's vote. A priori, one may be inclined to speculate that, if a person votes for a large party, there is a large chance that he will vote for a small entropy. Specifically, let us arrange the parties according to decreasing size:

$$p_1 \geq p_2 \geq \cdots \geq p_n \tag{4.1}$$

and let us write π_i for the probability that the person votes for an entropy $<H_p$, given that his vote goes to the ith party. The above speculation in more specific form is then:

$$\pi_1 \geq \pi_2 \geq \cdots \geq \pi_n \tag{4.2}$$

The proportion of votes for an entropy $<H_p$ is then $\pi_1 p_1 + \ldots + \pi_n p_n$, which may be quite high because the p's and π's are positively correlated according to (4.1) and (4.2). Thus, the presumption indicates that there will normally be a tendency for the median desired entropy to be on the low side, which favors the largest party.

The underlying assumptions are questionable, however. First, there are many situations in which it is far from certain which party will be the largest. If i and j are the leading contenders, and if a voter favoring i tries to help this party by voting for a small entropy, his efforts will be in favor of j rather than i if p_j turns out to be larger than p_i. Second, even if a voter prefers a party which in his view will definitely be the largest, he may nevertheless be in favor of a fairly large parliamentary entropy when he is violently against the second-largest party and when he wants a coalition cabinet of his preferred party with one or two smaller parties. Voting for the parliamentary entropy requires that the citizen consider the political structure as a whole. This is an appeal to his intelligence, which has its merits in and by itself.

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

I had looked forward to reading Ernest A. Duff's and John F. McCamant's "Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America," in the December Review, since this is an area in which we are now in a position to make real progress, and since McCamant had previously written with some insight on political development theory as applied to Latin America. The article itself was a great disappointment, however, and I feel I should point out some of its limitations, because readers unfamiliar with Latin America, and impressed by the authors' tables and their "prediction" that revolution was imminent in Cuba in 1968, might otherwise be inclined to take the article's conclusions seriously.

As it happens, this is rather difficult to do, since major predictions made in it were being falsified even while the article was in press. A military *coup* imposed a dictatorship on Panama, rated by Duff and McCamant the second highest country in Latin America in system stability, and predicted to enjoy "continued democratic stability with minor difficulties;" Brazil, in which "a semi-democratic system should be able to survive the minor manifestations of discontent," experienced a shift within the ruling group which put an end to the "semi-democratic" facade and imposed a thoroughly repressive system.

If the other predictions made hold, it will be fortuitous. Some are clearly doomed on their face, such as that for the Dominican Republic: "The surface manifestations of discontent of 1965 will diminish. The military will continue to play a large political role but without need for extensive repression of political freedoms." And, notwithstanding last fall's demonstrations and their repression, Mexico remains a marvel of stability, even though Duff and McCamant only rated it 15th out of 20 countries.

This is not merely bad luck. The predictions are poor because there are several key weaknesses and discontinuities in the argument from which they are derived; weaknesses which, in fact, make it difficult to understand why the editor and the readers of the manuscript accepted it as it stands. These weaknesses go beyond mere factual inaccuracy, such as the nonsensical description of Ecuador as without institutionalized parties.

This is all highly unfortunate, because the basic theoretical premise of the article seems sound, that instability derives from an excess of demands, growing out of social mobilization, over satisfactions. But this sound beginning is vitiated by clumsiness in the construction and use of the two key indices. Despite the air of statistical exactness, this is still thumb-on-the-scale measurement. ("The authors decided that the political capabilities should be given equal weight to the environmental scores. The societal welfare minus social mobilization score was given twice the weight of the score on recent economic growth." p. 1130). In this kind of work, one is well advised either to maintain the chastity of one's numbers intact or alternatively to forgo using numbers altogether, and rely on judgment born of experience. *Demi-vierge* status is not viable.

More important, the measures used to construct the social welfare and social mobilization indices happen to measure fundamentally the same dimension—wealth—rather than two separate ones. Exasperatingly enough, the authors almost know this (". . . the correlation coefficient between the two indexes is .92." p. 1132). One can see this even *a priori:* the literacy rate measures social welfare, but newspaper circulation measures social mobilization. But we do have factor analysis to tell us to what extent measurements indicate separate dimensions, after all; thus the indicators best adapted to measuring a given dimension could have been discovered empirically. The authors' procedure is especially to be regretted, again, since they knew the danger they were running: "We restricted the two indexes as far as possible to criteria that were distinct." (p. 1132). They could have done this more effectively by consulting an indicator which they didn't use, the voting turnout figure, which happens to be the indicator of social mobilization least determined by the society's income level.

The upshot of all this is that the figures Duff and McCamant arrive at for the differential between welfare and mobilization are quite without significance. Despite their brave subsequent attempts at interpretation, which involve the injection of a little more subjectivity into the individual country profiles at the end of the article in the attempt to get them "right," these are therefore quite unreliable. Again, this is highly unfortunate, but also rather unnecessary, since an understanding of the stability picture in any one country, and estimates of future stability, are probably most reliably produced, without particular difficulty, by old Latin America hands who know the country in depth.

What we are really in need of, however, is not dubious predictions that are instantly falsified, but clarification of the relationships among social, economic, and political variables that lead to stability or instability. What should have been the starting point of the article became its conclusion. What should have been the conclusion was assumed away. Perhaps the APSR's manuscript readers will point some of these things out the next time an article like this is submitted, and we will all be better off.

MARTIN C. NEEDLER
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TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Needler's use of language distracts from a useful scholarly dialogue, but a few comments on his critique might help to bring the discussion back into perspective. He claims (1) that our predictions have been proved wrong, (2) that our social welfare-social mobilization differential is useless because both measure wealth, and (3) that "old Latin American hands" can better estimate future stability.

Our predictions have not been proved wrong by recent events. The coup in Panama did not manifest any basic system instability as shown by the relative absence of violence, repression or social controversy. Our information on Brazil is not complete, but the present regime is certainly not a "thoroughly repressive system" by Latin American standards, and it now manifests its moderate instability through coercion instead of inflationary monetary and fiscal policy. In the Dominican Republic, the surface manifestations of discontent have very significantly diminished, as we predicted. If we had been able to quantify the political party situation and included it in the final measurement, Mexico would be ranked somewhat above 15th, but at any rate the demonstrations of last summer as well as periodic outbreaks of rural violence do not indicate that it is a "marvel of stability."

Yes of course, social welfare and social mobilization are both related to wealth and are highly correlated, but what is more significant is that in a few countries welfare is relatively higher than mobilization and in a few others mobilization is relatively higher than welfare. In these six or eight countries the differential is important. A non-synchronic comparison would reveal far greater variation. All Latin American countries along with other countries which have begun their economic progress in this century are in a much more difficult situation than were those countries which began development in an earlier period. We hold that the social welfare-social mobilization differential is a large advance in precision over the widely accepted notion of the demonstration effect.

Are "old hands'" impressions still better than a more systematic approach? We have had considerable experience in a few countries, but we do not consider our own impressions of these countries adequate in making any firm conclusion about their stability. In any case the comparative study that specifies and operationalizes its variables has the advantage of furnishing a base from which better theory can be built. But whose predictions have been better than ours? No "old hand" predicted the Cuban revolution, and we have seen no better *ex post* explanation of it than ours. The ranking we achieved of Latin American political systems does to a great extent correspond to the manifestations of their system stability/instability. Previous studies, instead of showing the important differences between Latin American countries, tried to lump them all together as unstable when clearly not all of these countries are equally confronted with "chaos," "revolution," "the eleventh hour" and the like. The weighting of factors is a problem, as Professor Needler rightly points out, but we can only repeat what we said in the article: more sophisticated mathematical manipulation can be carried out only when we have an independent measure of the manifestations of system stability/instability. We are working on that measure now and plan to publish a more complete work which will overcome many of the weaknesses of the article (most of which Professor Needler missed).

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TO THE EDITOR:

In his recent lengthy article in the REVIEW (June '68) entitled "The House and the Federal Role . . ." Michael J. Shapiro developed an elaborate model to simulate voting in the Congress of the United States. We have no reason to question his model, nor even to question most of the methods and tests used to validate the effects of the model, but we do question his use of certain words and phrases that strongly imply a level of statistical proof which his own data do not support.

Perhaps our point can best be made by several quotations from the Shapiro article: "The *fact* that every alternative formulation of the model undertaken thus far has decreased some aspect of the model's performance lends evidence in support of the contention that the relatively good match obtained between the actual roll-call voting in the House . . . and in our simulation . . ." (p. 517, our emphasis). "The micro level performance or average percentage of representation correctly simulated by the 'just party' model is 78 as compared with the 84 percent obtained with the original model. *It is thus clear* . . . that party plays an important role in the performance of the simulation model, . . ." (p. 511, our emphasis). "The memory effect is thus *a slight aid* in the micro level performance . . . (p. 515, our emphasis). "In terms of the manner in which theories can be evaluated, this theoretical model has performed well on the basis of a prediction criterion." (p. 517, our emphasis).

At the risk of being accused of taking words and phrases out of context, we contend that the quoted statements give an illusion of confidence that highly acceptable tests of statistical significance simply do not bear out.

In order to check the effects of model formulations, we subjected Shapiro's data to analysis of variance to determine which formulations were more accurate predictors than others. The difference between "percent correct" of the model and the actual vote was used as the variable in the test of effects. Percentages were transformed by arcsin method.[1] The means thus found are expressed as geometric means in percentage terms. The particular technique of analysis of variance used in our test was that commonly known as "blocks design," a system developed to validate successive tests on a body of data.[2] One of the reasons for using this particular technique is Shapiro's own discussion of the correlation between effects on pages 508 (note 29) and 513.

The analysis of variance *demonstrates no significant* differences between model formulations —F-ratio is 1.45 with 6 and 120 degrees of freedom, $p > 0.5$—but does indicate a significant difference between the bills—F-ratio is 5.76 with 20 and 120 degrees of freedom, $p < .001$. The geometric mean for the various models is: Original model—84.1; Just Party—78.7; Without Party—80.0; Without Constituency—82.1; Without Region—82.7; Without Memory—83.6; and Without Communication—79.1. Geometric means of the individual bills range from a low of 58.8 to a high of 90.8 and a difference of means test among the means for the twenty-one bills shows significant differences (at $p = .05$) in almost one-half of the tests.

Our tests show that the model was significantly more accurate in its predictions on certain bills than on others. The data available to us do not permit any analysis of why this difference occurred but we suggest that Professor Shapiro examine into the question.

In summary, we are not challenging the Shapiro model but on the basis of the data presented in the REVIEW article we do not believe that he has proved his case. By quoting Pool, Abelson and Popkin on the problems of evaluating a complex simulation model (p. 510), Shapiro opens the question of validation to review. Our review suggests that validation has not been shown. Shapiro makes no exaggerated claims for his model, but his caveats do not, we think, totally excuse his failure to carry validation tests to a more acceptable level.

FRANK K. GIBSON
JAMES E. PRATHER
University of Georgia

TO THE EDITOR:

It is unfortunate that the concept of statistical significance, whose meaning relates quite unambiguously to problems of sampling error, has become an approbative term which many social scientists are eager to apply in varying and often inappropriate contexts. Gibson and Prather were unable to find a claim referring to "statistical proof" in my article (the "certain words and phrases" they cited were remarkably free of the language of statistical inference) because there was no appropriate way to consider the representatives, the roll-calls, or even the models tested in my study as samples. Thus the differences I found between my simulation model and each alternative formulation of it could not conceivably have been a result of sampling error. Each difference is a difference whose significance should be evaluated on the basis of its magnitude, not with respect to sampling distributions.

MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO
University of California, Berkeley

TO THE EDITOR:

Apparently the purpose of the exercise by Pulsipher and Weatherby "Malapportionment and Party Competition, and the Functional Distribution of Governmental Expenditures" (this REVIEW, December, 1968, pp. 1207–1219) was to show that ". . . apportionment patterns and levels of political competition are more potent influences than some of the recent literature . . . would lead one to believe" (p. 1218–19). Yet nowhere in the eight tables and assorted findings in the article does one find any evidence to support this conclusion.

Nowhere in the article do the authors assess the independent impact of their political variables on public spending, or compare the impact of political and socioeconomic variables. At no point do the authors specify the contributions of their malapportionment and party competition measures to the multiple R^2's for their expenditure measures. At no point do the authors compare the contributions of malapportionment and party competition with the contributions of their socio-economic variables to the multiple R^2's. All they do is discuss the significance of adding the variables in a multiple equation. A commonly acknowledged aspect of multiple regression equations is that one can produce a statistically significant result without making any real gain in predictive ability. (See, for example, William Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963, p. 536.) The elementary question to raise is what gain in R^2 occurs through the addition of party competition and malapportionment taken separately. These two authors do not tell us, nor do they consider only these two variables taken together. For all we know the social variables rather than political variables could have produced the main increases in R^2? The findings reported in Tables 3 and 5 certainly give indications that this is so.

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[1] George W. Snedecor and William G. Cochran, *Statistical Methods* (Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press, 1967), p. 327. This transformation is known more familiarly as angular transformation.

[2] For a full discussion of this technique see *ibid.*, pp. 299–301.

Moreover, there are a number of strictly technical aspects of their exercise that are difficult to comprehend. For example, are the numbers under the column heading "Constant" in Table 5 referring to the intercept value of Y when X is zero? If so, why are significance levels calculated for these values? Since the value of two intercorrelations determines the necessary lower limit for a third intercorrelation and this lower limit may be greater than zero, why determine whether all intercorrelations are zero? Finally, since a vector rather than individual variables were used, why calculate signifiance levels for each variable? It is relatively easy to obtain significance levels when *t* tests are run on a number of intercorrelations independently.

If the authors would compare the contribution of their malapportionment and party competition measures to the multiple R^2's, with the contributions of per capita income and their other social variables, by means of standardized *b* values or other commonly accepted techniques, they would very likely find that the contributions of these political variables are not as great as the contribution of socio-economic variables. Moreover, if they read with care the earlier works of Hofferbert, Dye, Dawson and Robinson, and others cited in their introduction, they would find that this is precisely what these earlier researchers said.

THOMAS R. DYE
JAMES W. DYSON
Florida State University

TO THE EDITOR:

Apparently the language of our "exercise" was not instructive enough to prevent some misunderstanding of its purpose—at least by Professors Dye and Dyson. The substantive section of their letter (the "nowhere-and-at-no-point" part) suggests a misconception which should be corrected.

Apparently Dye and Dyson interpreted our exercise as an attempt to ascertain whether economic and demographic differences between states were "more important" or "less important" than political differences with respect to "predicting" inter-state variations in expenditure patterns. "At no point" in our exercise do we imply that we were concerned with this question and frankly, we fail to understand why Dye and Dyson concluded that we were. Perhaps they were misled by the skeptical tone of the introduction to our exercise. This skepticism was directed, however, not at the importance of economic and demographic factors, but at what we feel is a *non sequitur* implicit in the *methodology* used by Dye, Hofferbert, and the others referred to in our introduction—namely, that if economic and demographic factors are "more important" than political factors, then political factors are unimportant. Perhaps our rhetoric would have been improved if we had been more explicit on this point, but we just don't find the burning of straw men a very exciting pastime.

As we clearly stated our objective was to "find those expenditure functions which are consistent with [our] hypotheses as we have interpreted them." It should be emphasized that if, as Dye and Dyson suggest, we were to calculate standardized beta values our testing procedure would produce exactly the same results as those in the original article. "Standardizing" regression coefficients changes neither their sign nor their significance level and these two characteristics were the criteria used to accept or reject the hypotheses with which we were concerned.

We are sorry that Dye and Dyson apparently experienced some difficulty in comprehending "a number of strictly technical aspects of [our] exercise." We think we can help them with both of those that they mention. Their first difficulty is comprehending why we included the significance level of the constant term of our regression equations in Table 6. The reason that this was done is that it was an output of the program we were using. It is a meaningful datum which can be used to make inferences. We did not make use of it in this exercise but we have in others. Its calculation and inclusion in the table has no effect upon our results. Apparently Dye and Dyson's second difficulty is the result of their misunderstanding of our use of the term "vector." We used this term in the way it is traditionally used in statistical analysis. The individual social and political variables are merely the components of the vector. We calculated the significance level of the vector and of each of its components because the testing procedure we used stipulated that both these values exceed a specified value.

ALLAN G. PULSIPHER
Southern Illinois University
JAMES L. WEATHERBY, JR.
University of Minnesota

TO THE EDITOR:

The practice of using a book review as a vehicle for the presentation of views on topics not necessarily concerned with the book being reviewed has been consecrated by immemorial practice. It is unfortunate perhaps in the light of the information explosion, but a fact of life nevertheless. The reviewer of my book *Governing the Commune of Veyrier: Politics in Swiss Local Government* (APSR, Vol. LXII, No. 4 [December, 1968], pp. 1374–1375) has gone too far, however.

According to the rules I cannot complain that he has used my small book as a vehicle for the presentation of highly debatable impressions of Swiss political life. Note for instance the shocking statement: ". . . Swiss politics are today dominated at every level by a concern with the maintenance of precarious religious, linguistic and political equilibria in the face of burgeoning Catholic birth rates and immigration by foreign workers . . ."

Under the rules of the game I probably do not even have the right to complain that despite the generous length of the review he missed completely the point of the book and the series of which it is a part. There was no intention to make my book a comparison of the Swiss local governments. It is, as amply pointed out in Professor Buechner's introduction, a descriptive case study of the administration (and politics) of a specific local government in Switzerland, nothing more. It is our feeling that at present there are too few case studies of local government. Only when we have collected enough such studies can a meaningful comparative study of local governments be made. We believe in starting at the beginning.

I do take strong objection, however, to the reviewer taking words out of context, that put the book in a completely false light. The keystone to the entire review is his statement that I chose the commune of Veyrier "as a 'political microcosm' of Switzerland (p. 23)." This statement is patently false. No such statement is made on page 23 or anywhere else in the text including Professor Buechner's Foreword. All that is said in page 23 is that: "In many respects the political party system in Veyrier is a microcosm of that found in the canton of Geneva and even of that in the nation as a whole." I then go on to spell out some of the similarities and the *differences* between the Veyrier political party system and the larger units. Using this misrepresentation as the key to his review, the reviewer then proceeds to make a number of criticisms. The criticisms are not necessarily criticisms of my book, however, and should be labeled as such in order not to give the reader of the review a completely false impression of what was attempted and what was accomplished.

GEORGE A. CODDING, JR.
University of Colorado

TO THE EDITOR:

It seems making altogether too much out of Professor Codding's modest little book to write a counter-critique of his critique of my review of his monograph. If he did not wish his book to be reviewed comparatively he perhaps should have chosen a less suggestive title than *Politics in Swiss Local Government,* he probably should have abstained from the controversial analogies hazarded from time to time in the text (the word 'microcosm,' whatever the context, remains provocative), and he certainly should have dissuaded John Buechner from introducing his book as "the first in a series of publications dealing with comparative public administration" in a Foreword which, while it does not contain Codding's phrase "descriptive case study," does employ the word comparative eleven times. His own rejoinder characterizes his approach as one of "spelling out some of the similarities and differences between the Veyrier political system and the larger units"; surely this is the very essence of comparative political analysis.

In any case, the point of my review was not to scold Professor Codding for failing to accomplish what he apparently did not intend to undertake, but simply to regret—in light of the undeserved negligence with which Switzerland has been treated by American political scientists—that the results of his careful research were so cautiously circumspect, and the scope and thrust of his generalizations so exceedingly limited.

BENJAMIN R. BARBER
University of Pennsylvania

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BOOK REVIEWS

Political Research and Political Theory. Ed. by Oliver Garceau. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 256. $7.95.)

The late V. O. Key in whose memory the essays in this volume were written was a "data man." One might expect, therefore, that his memory would be honored by writing and research in the empirical tradition that he did so much to advance, not by preaching but by practicing it. Yet, only two of the chapters, "Micro- and Macro-politics: Notes on Research Strategy," by Douglas Price, and "State Party Systems and Policy Outputs," by Duane Lockard, satisfy the criteria of an empirical politics that guided Key's own work. Incidentally, Price and Lockard are the youngest contributors to the volume. Two other essays, "The Concept of 'Party'," by Austin Ranney, and "The Comparison of Western Political Parties," by Leon D. Epstein, though more conceptual than empirical in content, are at least inspired by Key's work. And these two are, in age, the next youngest. I leave it to the reader to draw his own conclusions about Key's influence on contemporary political science.

Now, what bothers me about this volume is not what bothers most reviewers of symposia, namely, that they are more often than not grab-bags of unrelated, heterogeneous intellectual goodies. In fact, I like both grab-bags and goodies, and I enjoyed reading all the goodies in this particular grab-bag. What bothers me is that some of the distinguished authors here assembled know quite well what V. O. was all about and then proceed as if it made no difference. At least some admit their intellectual discomfort with uncanny candor. Avery Leiserson, for instance, informs us that "both in his professional work and personality, V. O. Key exhibited a 'briny irreverence' toward empiricist and rationalist pretensions alike, as well as to the moral agonizing of the value-oriented schools of political philosophy, that is a healthy antidote to premature integration in theory-building." (p. 24) But this understanding does not save Leiserson from the temptation of doing just what V. O. would not have done in a rather ethereal essay on "Empirical Approaches to Democratic Theory."

M. Brewster Smith, the only non-fraternity man in the volume, reports being "keenly aware of Key's rare talent for grasping the Elephant whole without recourse to such arid conceptual baggage. It was part of Key's artistry to keep much of his conceptual sophistication implicit, as he brought empirical analysis shrewdly to bear on theoretical and normative problems." (p. 79) But Smith's contribution, "Personality in Politics: A Conceptual Map, with Application to the Problem of Political Rationality," is a formidable excursion into the labyrinth of conceptual mishmash. What, let us wonder, would V. O. have thought about a paragraph like this?

> The remaining functional basis of attitudes, mediation of self-other relationships, is neutral in rationality from this processual perspective. The motivational agenda that it implies has nothing intrinsically to do with how the person appraises the bearing of a focal object or issue on his interests and values, but neither does it necessarily operate at cross-purposes with rational object appraisal, as is the case with externalization and ego defense. And we shall see that there are conditions under which it may lead to decisions which, as products, must be judged as rational. (p. 95)

Even Douglas Price seems uncomfortable. Referring to the second part of his piece that deals with the problems of relating individual, group and aggregate data, and reductionism, Price points out that "the latter two topics are doubtless rather more abstract and methodological than Key would be enthusiastic about." (p. 104) And Leon Epstein, in his gutsy article that suggests testing some of the hypotheses about American parties and elections in European nations, implies that V. O. might have taken a dim view of the enterprise: "Understandably, Key's criterion was simply what seemed relevant in the United States. His subject matter, after all, was virtually all American." (p. 168)

Equally bothersome to me is the editor's apparent assumption that the problem of the electorate's "rationality" was of enduring, pervasive and compassionate concern to Key, in commissioning two essays dealing with the question of rationality. *The Responsible Electorate,* though V. O.'s last work, was also his weakest work, and I doubt that he will be remembered for it rather than for *Southern Politics* or his influential textbook. That J. Roland Pennock, in "Political Philosophy and Political Science," and Frederick M. Watkins, in "Natural Law and the Problem of Value-Judgment," come out with opposite interpretations of Key's "philosophy" is not surprising. In opening his essay, Pennock asserts that Key's "posthumous book, *The Responsible Electorate,* underlines what all who were familiar with the man or his work well knew; that his concern for the scientific study of politics was paralleled by an equal concern for a particular set of political values, those we associate with liberal democratic institutions." (p. 39) But Watkins writes: "Political theory was a branch of political science in which V. O. Key, to judge at least by his publications, was not much interested. This was no personal idiosyncracy, but was typical of the times. . . . No man with the talents and interests of a V. O. Key could have been expected to pay more than passing attention to problems of this sort." (pp. 58–9)

Finally, it seems to me unfortunate that some of the authors dig up some of Key's most dubious epithets to make their own intellectual stance more palatable. For instance, Merle Fainsod, in "The Dynamics of One-Party Systems," finds comfort in Key's statement that "the aspirations which find their focus in one-party rule are rooted in deep-seated human drives." (p. 222) Even Duane Lockard repeats the bromide that research on the social determinants of voting "threatens to take the politics out of the study of electoral behavior," (p. 211) only to be contradicted by Smith to the effect that "social determination is by no means incompatible with political rationality." (p. 100) V. O., of course, rarely permitted himself to become the prisoner of his own cliches. Over the long haul, I think, he will not be remembered for his *obiter dicta* but for his formulation of novel, imaginative and empirically tested hypotheses about political behavior and processes.

All this is not to say that this is not a worthwhile compendium. On finishing it I asked myself, "of what use to me is a book like this?" The virtue of this book consists in one's seeing one's colleagues grapple "in public," as it were, with very private scholarly concerns. This is especially true of the essays by Leiserson, Price and Ranney which I found most interesting precisely because they remain "open-ended." Pennock and Watkins reassured me that, their own efforts notwithstanding, the fact-value problem is still pretty much where it was when I went to school. Price struggles with the unresolved problem of units and levels of analysis, and Lockard quantifies with a healthy respect for nonquantifiables. Fainsod makes a heroic effort to compare five probably non-comparable "cases" (not types, as he says) of one-party rule, and Epstein sticks his neck out by not indulging in the verbal gyrations of the functionalists. In short, we have a long way to go. Political scientists are still riding off in many directions, evidently on the assumption that if you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there.

HEINZ EULAU

Stanford University

TANU Yajenga Nchi, Political Development in Rural Tanzania. BY GORAN HYDÉN. (Lund, Sweden: Scandinavian University Books, 1968. Pp. 282.)

The title of this study reflects the fact that we are now faced with a "third wave" of political studies in Africa, and perhaps in other developing parts of the world, as well. It is fitting that concern with micropolitics in Tanzania should be heralded by a slogan, "TANU builds the country," in Swahili, the *lingua franca*. The author, a Swedish political scientist, also performs a much-needed service in the same vein, by supplying a Swahili summary at the end of his book. For it is among the villagers of the new states, the non-speakers of European languages, that investigators must seek better understanding of new political institutions and new directions in policy. The first "wave" of scholarship broke the paths and cleared the ground, so to speak. (Coleman, Apter, Morgenthau, Wallerstein and the three volumes edited by Carter), while the second posed several critical questions and began a process of re-assessment (Zolberg, Kilson, Sklar). Both "waves" proceeded largely at the elite, national, and even international level—macro-studies. The micro-studies are just beginning to emerge. Indeed Tanzania will be the first African state probably to be blanketed by studies of village politics after independence.

Mr. Hyden brings skills and ambition to his task, much to be admired. He knows Swahili, although he employed an interpreter in interviewing, he lived in Bukoba, the "metropolis" town for the five rural parishes he visited and investigated, he immersed himself in the local history, he developed and supervised an attitude survey in inauspicious surroundings, and he attempted to link his case study to extant hypotheses and approaches of contemporary students of political development. The result, however, is not woven together very well, although an overall design is apparent, derived from the Shils-Eisenstadt approach to political development in terms of center and periphery and from the analysis of developmental processes via a focus on system capabilities and political culture, worked out by Almond and Verba. (On page 22 Hyden offers us one of those marvelous diagrams which outlines everything going on in a political system.) In laying out the political history of Buhaya (the area of traditional habitation in question), in the report of the attitude survey, and in the sections testing and referring to more general hypotheses and analytical suggestions, one is reminded of a comment by A. J. P. Taylor on American Ph.D. theses: "so much raw meat, not enough cooking." Hyden writes clearly, but woodenly—of course, English is not his native language. He seems to have made a deliberate choice not to give us "the feel" of Buhaya. Certainly, manifestations of Tanzanian politics do not come alive in this rural north-west corner of the country, the way they do in the writings on Tanzania of several of the authors cited in the extensive notes and bibliography.

But Mr. Hyden's book is noteworthy for its devotion to incremental gains in political science, for the challenges it throws up to a number of grand generalizations about the nature of political development, and for his completely open and honest effort to do what has to be done if we are ever to know much about the political behavior of exotic peoples.

Basically, Mr. Hyden shows that TANU, the monopolistic party-government of Tanzania, has been an agency of political development, as far as the input side of the emergent political system is concerned. Although generalizations must be restricted to the linkages between this corner of the country and a national Tanzanian political system, it appears that the national government is increasing its capacities to deal with internal challenges. Among the Haya people a strong feeling of identity with the nation exists, the regime is regarded as legitimate, and elements of a participant culture are now recognizable. The relationship between the Haya and the Tanzanian nation seems to be illuminated by analyzing their political behavior in terms of a subject culture, retaining elements of weak parochialism and developing forces of participation. While there is some interesting corroborative evidence here, a reader might suspect that the frame of reference shaped the conclusions. Mr. Hyden is modest and attractively uninsistent, but his desire to incorporate wholly the threads of systems capability analysis sometimes obstructs a convincing conclusion, at least for me.

There are, however, other valuable aspects of the study. Although my presentation may telescope a somewhat more complicated argument, Mr. Hyden offers more evidence for the notion that parochialism *per se* need not undercut "nation-building." A degree of cultural fragmentation before serious social differentiation can even facilitate national assimilation, if a national mobilizing force, such as the monopolistic party, enters the scene at the "premature" moment. In other words, one can argue that cultural secularization proceeding out of phase, so to speak, with the forces of commercialism and social restratification, can yield raw material for the nationalizing of sentiment, if the effective instrument is wielded by nationalizing leaders. At a lower level, here is also an explanation for the success of TANU. It entered the picture before economic and social differentiation was very serious, so it was able to capitalize on inevitable discontents and transfer emergent loyalties.

Concerning the whole question of the putative gap between tradition and modernity, Mr. Hyden provides material for arguing in a different vein. At least for the Haya, the thinking of the young and the old on a variety of matters of political significance is not so far apart; nor are there such great differences between the political reasoning of villagers and the national spokesmen on certain questions of policy. Villagers are resistant to the build-up of extractive strength of the national government and are making demands for more rewards—and more obvious ones—but, as Mr. Hyden deftly shows, for certain poorer farmers, it is "rational" to oppose improvement schemes and the like until there is further progress on the welfare front.

Among a few other suggestive points, one stands out. The mass media do not seem to be the principal progenitor of increasing expectations of life. The evidence here, coupled with the quoted evidence of a similarly-focused short study based in Uganda, seriously challenges earlier hypotheses about the "passing of traditional society."

The overall picture, nevertheless, remains one of descriptive and analytical austerity, and needlessly so, since the author has published at least two articles on political behavior in Buhaya, which enrich our understanding of matters such as, the relationship of families of chieftainship to present-day politics, and some social variables in leadership recruitment and support for TANU. In the present study, a number of possibly revealing inquiries are left dangling. Why, for instance, was there no relationship between Haya in faraway towns to the emergence of a Haya "tribal" identity before the rise of nationalism? Other groups, such as the Chagga, displayed significant inter-connections between emigrant and local modernizers. Does it have something to do with the "consummatory" value system attributed by Hyden to the Haya? But if that is the case, and this relates to the Apter thesis of consummatory values hindering modernization, why is there not more difficulty in absorbing the Haya into national political patterns?

My point here is not to try to invalidate Mr. Hyden's arguments, because I don't think anyone can fully grapple with them without enrichment that he probably could have provided by broader discussion of the issues raised by his own evidence and deductions. I believe, for example, that he overestimates the mass character of TANU in the middle 1950's, and that he underestimates some of the coercive nature of "monopolitical" conditions in Tanzania today. Perhaps a broader-based discussion of politics in Buhaya at the time of the 1958 election and development of the problem of the political role of the Church, admittedly important, would have helped.

Whatever the omissions, this is a piece of basic and genuine research, and is much to be applauded.

HARVEY GLICKMAN

Haverford College

Legislative Issues in the Fifty States: A Comparative Analysis. BY WAYNE L. FRANCIS. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967. Pp. 129. $4.95.)

One should not be deceived by the brevity of this volume. In it Professor Francis has compressed an intricate report of research, substantial theoretical insight, and considerable methodological reflection. In its breadth of focus the study represents a notable departure from most legislative analysis and must occupy a central place in the growing body of genuinely comparative studies of American state politics.

In addition to its comparative focus, the study departs from most analyses of legislative behavior by training the lens on the policy issues of state legislative activity. Studies of roll-call behavior and most interview-based inquiries have usually concentrated on the *processes* of state legislatures rather than upon their *policies*. Professor Francis does not ignore processes, but rather he views them in terms of their consequences for specific areas of public policy.

The data for the study were obtained from questionnaires mailed to a 1,600 member sample of the more than 7,000 state legislators serving in 1963. Useable replies were received from 838 legislators. To the extent that the sample could be validated (in terms of partisan composition and balance between senates and houses) it conformed quite nicely to the actual composition of the universe of legislators. The author is sensitive to the limitations of his data base without being unduly inhibited by them. The extent to which readers may entertain doubts about the reliability of the information for descriptive purposes should not detract substantially from the contributions of the study to theory construction.

The respondents were asked to characterize "important issues" (of their own selection) in terms of several dimensions: *interest* on the part of significant actors (the governor, news media, pressure groups, etc.); types of *conflict* (partisan, factional, pressure group, regional); the *resources* involved (money, level of government, length of public commitment); the expected *impact* (on numbers of people, prior policies, and future commitments); and the fate of the issue (passed, amended, defeated). In effect, the book unfolds as an explication of the matrix of interrelationships formed by the legislators' perceptions of these dimensions of issue characteristics. If for no other reason, the volume would be worth careful examination for the interesting and imaginatively constructed indices used to measure these characteristics.

Another useful aspect of the book is the manner in which Professor Francis is able to differentiate between policy areas in terms of the characteristics or, if one likes, the *structures* of policy. Thus certain types of policy are marked by partisan conflict, e.g., election laws, labor issues, and land policy. Other types of policy are found more frequently to display intra-party factional conflict, e.g., liquor laws, constitutional revision, and agricultural policies. Although the findings and analysis suggest several interesting alterations in current knowledge of the various dimensions of legislative behavior, they are sufficiently consistent with the theory presented to bolster confidence in the reliability of the data and the soundness of the interpretation.

From one standpoint, the major qualification of the study is a matter of research design rather than of data. It has the shortcoming of nearly all legislative studies in that it tells us little of the relevance of the legislature, as such, vis-à-vis other policy-making instrumentalities. In an effort to identify the points of genesis of major issues, Professor Francis asked his respondents, "In your legislature, where would you say the most significant decisions are made?" The alternatives provided in the questionnaire included party caucus, floor, substantive committee, pre-legislative session, policy committee, governor's office, and "other." If one's concern is with the genesis of policy rather than with the infra-structure of legislatures, this mode of inquiry may unduly inflate the relative role of the legislature. First of all, the fact that legislators are the subjects being queried biases the responses in favor of legislatively related arenas of policy initiation. Secondly, the alternatives do not explicitly provide for assigning initiatory status to any of several extra-legislative instrumentalities such as the bureaucracy, interest groups, party mechanism, or the federal government.

The final chapter, "Some Tentative Theorizing on Legislative Policy-Making," moves the analysis into an integrated context. In the framework of coalitional theory, Professor Francis examines the determinants of partisan conflict, factional conflict, and policy success. In the course of this explication, he is able to offer some suggestive refinements of current comparative state studies as they concern the relevance of political system variables to policy content. His analysis suggests that we may find certain short-term (but all the same consequential) effects of such system characteristics as partisanship and competitiveness on the content and fate of public policy. If his suggestions are followed out in further research, there may yet be modest solace for those who are discomfited by studies such as Thomas R. Dye's *Politics, Economics, and the Public* which discount the relevance of political variables compared to socio-economic factors in policy determination.

Throughout this volume, Professor Francis assumes a high level of technical and methodological sophistication on the part of his readers. Those willing to stay with it will discover an on-going movement between theory, propositions, and data which provides a rich and challenging context for each subsection. One is continually prodded to think at least two or three steps beyond the data at hand. This process has the advantage of providing the reader with a sustained sense of the import and empirical relevance of that with which he is confronted. The price is paid in occasional inundation by hypotheses and sub-hypotheses. Comprehension, however, is facilitated by useful summaries at the end of each chapter. The book does not make for easy reading. It is devoid of rhetorical frills. Six words are never used where three will do. But despite its astringency, this volume must be considered both a significant contribution to our understanding of legislative policy-making and a stimulating guide to further inquiry.

Richard I. Hofferbert
Cornell University

Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. By Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966. Pp. 348.)

This book is an elaboration of the structure-function paradigm first applied in 1960 by Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman to the study of non-Western politics. In this latest formulation, Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., postulate three levels of functions performed by all political systems: 1) system capabilities, 2) conversion functions, and 3) system maintenance and adaptive functions. System capabilities are the set of all relationships of a political system with its environment; they are the "outputs" and include extraction, regulation, distribution, symbolic output, and responsive capability.

Conversion functions operate prior to system capabilities, converting inputs into outputs, demands and supports into capabilities. They include articulation of interests and demands, aggregation of interests into policy alternatives, conversion of policy alternatives into authoritative rules, application of rules, adjudication of rules, and political communications.

System maintenance and adaptive functions include political socialization and recruitment, the mechanisms by which the political system adjusts itself to varying inputs and demands from the surrounding environment.

These thirteen functional concepts are joined by another key concept: political culture. While political culture is not a function as such and not logically linked with the thirteen functions, its inclusion by the authors serves to remind the reader that attitudes and desires of individuals, either as single actors or as "the public," are still legitimate objects of study even for the student of system-level phenomena.

Equally as interesting as the postulation of thirteen political system functions is the authors' discussion of political development. Political development, Almond and Powell state, characterizes a political system undergoing structural differentiation, cultural secularization, and increased sub-system autonomy as it meets the problems of state-building, nation-building, participation, and distribution. By hypothesizing that structural differentiation and cultural secularization tend to covary, the authors are able to create a two-dimensional space with these two properties describing the vertical axis and sub-system autonomy describing the horizontal axis. On this space are arrayed a wide variety of political systems from primitive bands through bureaucratic empires to high autonomy democratic systems. In the accompanying text one finds a more detailed description of sixteen types of political systems grouped as primitive, traditional, and modern.

A useful feature of this scheme is that it accommodates totalitarian systems in the developmental context: while both democratic and totalitarian systems are high in structural differentiation and cultural secularization, the totalitarian system is distinguished from the democratic by its low level of sub-system autonomy.

Having attempted in 1967 to apply the Almond-Powell scheme to Hong Kong politics, this reviewer concludes that it is adequate as an inventory of significant descriptive topics but inadequate as a rigorous analytical framework. The scheme seems vulnerable to the following criticisms.

First, the thirteen functions and the two key concepts of political culture and development are not systematically related to one another.

The book falls easily into chapters on the functions and concepts, each of which can stand by itself, but the "Overview" fails to provide the logical cement to hold together the functions and concepts in an articulated, comprehensive theory.

Second, the thirteen functions are inadequately related to the notion of system survival. The authors do not satisfy the reader that each function is equally vital or that the number of functions could not be increased or decreased. Further, the authors avoid offering a definition of system survival, thus leaving the reader unable to varify the authors' assertion that the given thirteen functions—and no others—are necessary for system survival.

Third, given Almond and Powell's guidance the separation of a given function from the structure which performs it proves to be difficult in practice. This is not surprising in view of the fact that Almond, in arriving at his original list of functions, looked first at working institutions in Western nations and asked himself, "What functions do these structures perform?" With this starting point it is hard to abstract and discuss a function without reference to structures which perform it, for the structures are the concrete indicators by which the abstracted function is detected in the real world.

Fourth, the authors fail to provide accurate, unambiguous, and parsimonious specifications of the dimensions of each postulated function and concept. For example, they describe political culture in terms of types of orientations, intensity of orientations, directions of orientations, frequency of orientations, objects of orientations, congruence of orientations with structures, degree of secularization, and so on. Do these dimensions, already so numerous as to be cumbersome, exhaust the possibilities?

Fifth and finally, the authors supply too few demonstrations of how their concepts could be operationalized for use in empirical research. This reviewer relied on his intuition in operationalizing such concepts as degree of cultural secularization and mood of political communications, receiving little guidance from the creators of the scheme.

To be fair, one must see the above criticisms in light of Almond's 1965 caveat that his scheme is

> more than a classification of variables and less than a theory of political systems. . . . [It is] a proposed first step towards constructing a theory of the political system and of the development of political systems.

The Almond-Powell scheme is useful as a statement of ideals even though it falls short in application. It reminds researchers of the necessity to acknowledge the interrelatedness of political phenomena and to see particular phenomena in the context of the larger environment. And it draws attention to the non-Western and developmental political processes. For these reasons it deserves consideration . . . and invites improvement.

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Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–67. BY ADAM B. ULAM (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968. Pp. 775. $12.95.)

Since 1930 when Louis Fischer provided us with a full scale history of Soviet foreign policy no one has been bold enough to write an up-to-date treatment of the subject. And no wonder! Fifty years packed with events in many of which the Soviet Union played an important role; the absence of all but the meagerest Soviet documentation and an imperfect understanding of how Soviet internal policies relate to foreign policy—all seemed like insuperable obstacles. Mr. Ulam is to be admired for his courage and to be congratulated for the success with which he has carried off the undertaking. *Expansion and Coexistence* is comprehensive, based on a clearly articulated theoretical structure, and, what has become so rare, interesting to read.

Although the book is comprehensive it is not exhaustive. If Mr. Ulam had imposed the condition upon himself of reading everything relevant, he could not have completed the task and we should all be the poorer for it. On some matters others will inevitably disagree with Mr. Ulam's interpretations, but the basic structure of the book is sturdy and will survive the revisions to be produced by further research or new revelations. The book is solidly based on a theory about the relationship between ideology and national interest and the interrelationship between foreign and domestic policies. Mr. Ulam avoids the familiar but sterile opposition of national interest to ideology. Instead at appropriate points he describes the amalgam of belief, experience, acuteness and misperception which underlay Soviet calculations. For example, he describes quite convincingly how the destruction of the political system of Europe in World War I convinced the Bolsheviks that they could afford to be much more optimistic about the demise of capitalism than Marx had been. It was not necessary to wait for a proletariat superior in strength to achieve power. War could so shake the old society that a weak proletariat could take power as indeed they had in Russia. On another level, Mr. Ulam argues that the tactics dictated by Moscow to the German Communist Party before Hitler's accession to power derived from the Bolshevik's own experience when out of power. Since the Bolsheviks had reserved their hardest blows for the other parties on the left and had later come to power, the German communists should, they believed, obviously emulate that example. That men tend to universalize the applicability of their own successes is a familiar idea, and hardly peculiar to socialist societies but eminently serviceable nonetheless. Herein lies the power of Mr. Ulam's analysis. His Bolshevik sees the world through the lens of communist theory about the world (whose permutations over time are taken into account) and acts out of habit, hope and fear. Mr. Ulam's Soviet decision maker is very human and very convincing.

Mr. Ulam is also very good in dealing with the relationship between internal and external policy. At times, he argues, the threat from abroad is artificially inflated to justify a harsh policy at home. Mr. Ulam argues interestingly, and uniquely, if memory serves, that in 1945 and 1946, Stalin was quite relaxed about the danger from the West (*vide* radical demobilization) but was concerned about his ability to maintain control within the country without a reimposition of severe controls. Hence an artificial war psychology. The analogue is the artificial war scare of 1927 which was Stalin's preparation for the campaign of collectivization and industrialization. (p. 165) (Yet on p. 439 we read that the "Soviet leaders were on the point of convincing themselves that . . . Baldwin and Chamberlin were about to launch a new intervention in Russia." This is the only such slip I noted.)

It is precisely because Mr. Ulam has the advantage of the long view that he knows what is missing in periods where the documentation is poor. This makes it possible for him to avoid the crude errors that arise from focusing on a single period, and permits disciplined speculation at other times. Thus he rejects the question of who was "responsible" for the cold war. Given the state systems that then dominated the world, (pp. 398–399) it seems inescapable to Mr. Ulam that these systems came into conflict. What interests him is the particular nature of this conflict. His main thesis is that in the early period of the cold war Stalin was so conscious of his own weakness, that he presented a bristling front to his opponents which had the virtue of keeping them off balance but the defect of causing them to consolidate their forces. Mr. Ulam suggests that at particular points Stalin tried to signal an intention to parley but he was so afraid of revealing weakness and, thus, so indirect that the opponent missed the cue. On the other side, in one such instance in 1950 Acheson asked "for welcome and tangible proof that Soviet intentions have changed." "Thus," remarks Mr. Ulam, "near the end of his days, Stalin was called upon to perform a rite he had so often inflicted on others: confession and recantation." Mr. Ulam does not try to make the vulgar point that the cold war could have been liquidated if one or the other party had been psychologically more astute and forthcoming. His point is rather that differing perceptions and internal necessities created the modalities of the cold war which in turn was determined by a basic conflict of interests.

On only one major point does the reviewer differ with Mr. Ulam, namely, in his assumptions about the balance of military force between the Soviet Union and the United States. In my opinion, Mr. Ulam places the Soviet achievement of rough nuclear parity with the United States far too early. For example (p. 498) he firmly states that the Western position vis-à-vis Russia would never be as strong as it had been in 1950. As a matter of fact in 1950 it would have been at least several months before the United States could have bombed the Soviet Union very extensively with nuclear weapons. As subsequent congressional hearings revealed, the United States had very few nuclear weapons before the Korean War and very indifferent delivery vehicles. By the end of the Korean War part of the thirty-six billion dollar annual increase in the budget had gone into a nuclear arsenal *and* improved aircraft. Mr. Dulles's statement of the American capacity in January 1954 to bomb the Soviet Union massively and instantaneously was no less than the precise truth. Since the Soviet Union was not in a position to retaliate in kind until at least six or seven years later, the Soviet military theorists were quite naturally preoccupied with subject of surprise attack and active air defense.

But Mr. Ulam is correct when he writes that in the immediate post war years the United States exaggerated Soviet military strength and therefore her proclivity to make war. However, he anticipates the improvement in the relative position of the Soviet Union and thus distorts his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis. Mr. Ulam's reconstruction, which he describes with his customary discrimination about the basis of his judgments as "entirely conjectural" (p. 644) will probably cause more controversy than anything else in the book. Mr. Ulam's thesis briefly is that Khrushchev wanted a favorable resolution of the Berlin crisis and a guarantee against the West German acquisition of nuclear weapons. By offering to remove the missiles which had been installed in Cuba, he could gain these two objectives and proceed to a third on the basis of this victory; to persuade or force China to renounce nuclear weapons and make a general settlement with the United States. As usual Mr. Ulam has seized the right end of the stick. He demonstrates the utility of the concept of the triadic Soviet-Chinese-American relationship which is surely one of the keys to Soviet foreign policy in the sixties. Perhaps Mr. Khrushchev was sanguine enough to wave aside historical experience and to believe that a mere crisis rather than a war could produce such a global package deal. But Khrushchev knew, as Mr. Ulam does not, how poor the relative Soviet military position really was. For him the improvement of the military balance was a *sufficient* reason for the installation of intermediate range missiles in Cuba. Despite the missile gap talk of the election campaign of 1960, in 1962 the Soviet Union was still far behind the United States in intercontinental missiles. Of course, Khrushchev hoped and Mr. Kennedy feared that political changes would follow the shift in the strategic balance but the heavy pressure for the Soviet Union to get a short cut to "parity" was enough reason for the Cuban gamble.

Although every reader will have particular points of difference with Mr. Ulam, the whole can only excite admiration and, it is to be hoped, emulation.

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110 Livingston Street: Politics and Bureaucracy in the New York City Schools. BY DAVID ROGERS. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. 584. $8.95.)

Contemporary empirical research offers a choice between two general strategies. On the one hand, the investigator may test hypotheses, focus sharply, collect specified data, and concentrate on explanation, showing relationships among only a few aspects of several situations or systems. On the other hand, he may explore thoroughly, focus more diffusely, collect as much information as possible, and concentrate on description, illuminating many aspects of a single situation or system. David Rogers has chosen the latter strategy to examine politics and bureaucracy in the New York City school system and has demonstrated that the case study, however unfashionable and whatever its limitations, is still an extremely productive means of analysis. Given the nature of his objectives, the complexity of educational politics, and the inscrutability of the target, Rogers adopts an eclectic approach. Instead of pursuing one theoretical path, he concentrates on several sets of factors that shape the politics and administration of school desegration in the city and treats each of them from a different perspective. After years of personal observation and more than one thousand interviews, he analyzes a vast amount of information with great care and skill. The result is the most exhaustive and thoughtful study of school politics to date.

One of the author's principal concerns is describing the strategies, tactics, and effects of interest groups that pressure the school system. Examination of the activities of these groups reveals much about pluralism, factionalism, and stasis in New York. With regard to school desegregation, status-quo forces were advantaged. The neighborhood school movement had only to mobilize local support on a few occasions to exert a lasting impact on the anticipations and behavior of educational leaders. Civil rights organizations, by contrast, had to sustain grass roots support and press continuously. This was exceedingly difficult, because of a lack of unified leadership, overly complex goals, and a conflict strategy lacking appeal to a wider public. White liberal groups were ineffective. Their leaders, practicing traditional logic, were unable to conceive practical solutions and their members, threatened by Negro demands, were less than enthusiastic. The balance of group power was held by moderate organizations. But they were unwilling to risk sacrificing quality education for equal education, and consequently did little. This description of competition among, and within, groups in a pluralistic and politically fragmented city lends additional support to an important proposition concerning organizations. The more highly differentiated, and the more unstable, the social setting, the less salient it will be, and the less salient the setting, the more salient the organization itself.

If this is the case, then those within an organization retain significant discretion in the formulation and administration of policy. Describing the exercise of such discretion is the second principal concern of Rogers. There is a tendency among political scientists to concentrate on the adoption of policy, to the neglect of its execution. Yet, as Murray Edelman suggested several years ago, there are differences between the symbolic, nontangible values allocated by policy makers and the material, tangible values allocated by administrators. Rogers, in what I consider the most important part of his study, treats these differences in considerable detail. Despite advanced policy statements promulgated by the school board, implementation was customarily delayed or vetoed by professionals inside the system. Virtually every program adopted at the higher levels, the author frequently points out, failed as lower levels exercised their negative powers. Such subversion could occur repeatedly, mainly because of the rigidity and defensiveness of a bureaucracy in a system of arbitrary and chaotic centralization, undercontrol and decentralization by default, vertical and horizontal fragmentation, parochial codes and compulsive rule-following, and an extreme diffusion of effective power.

It is difficult to fault Rogers' descriptions of the New York City school system. But his evaluations are necessarily more controversial. One reason is that the wealth of reported information lends itself to somewhat varying interpretation, depending largely on one's professional judgments and social values. He is critical of the board of education for operating in isolation, urging that it become more responsive and permit the public greater power to set policies. Nevertheless, he takes the board to task for studying plans and holding public hearings, on the grounds that such delays reveal the board's own indecision and stimulate cross pressures. At one point, he suggests the utility of private discussions between the board and reform groups, rather than ceremonial public hearings held to give the appearance of consultation. At another, he criticizes the private nature of meetings between the school superintendent and civil rights groups, paying little attention to how their negotiations led to reformulations of a desegregation plan. Although he acknowledges the liberal intentions of most board members and presents arguments in their defense, the thrust of his evaluation is that they did very little to overcome opposition and even engendered it. Yet, another investigator, studying the same school system at about the same time, could evaluate things quite differently. "One fact is clear," Bert E. Swanson writes, "school officials are willing to try various methods and workable plans for integration" (*The Struggle for Equality*, p. 7). Certainly, school officials had options, but I disagree as to whether the board had more freedom to innovate than it cared to exercise. The board went as far and as fast as it reasonably could. In view of demographic factors and private economic decisions, the city's pluralism and political fragmentation, the always latent and occasionally active conservatism of neighborhood groups, and the strenuous opposition of the school bureaucracy, the board was actually more venturesome than might have been expected.

Still, the board has been less than successful in its attempts to innovate. How much less? One difficulty with the case study approach is that there are no convenient standards for evaluative use. In the New York City school system change has not been accomplished rapidly or easily, but some progress has been made. In addition to those subverted policies on which Rogers dwells, a number of other changes have been adopted and tried—the beginnings of a program-performance budget, the promotion of increasing numbers of Negroes to supervisory positions, a revision of the structure and procedure of the board of examiners, human relations training for school staff, greater stress on early-childhood programs, and curriculum revision. Do these changes, among others, denote some degree of effort and, if so, how much? Subjectively, the relevant question is whether more or less has been attempted than our social values dictate. The author's conclusion is that efforts have been minimal compared to the level of social needs and the legitimacy of civil rights demands. Objectively, the relevant question is whether more or less has been attempted in one school system than in others. The reviewer's guess is that efforts in New York have been considerable compared to those in most other cities.

It would be surprising if a reviewer's judgments consistently coincided with an author's. My few reservations are not meant to challenge the contributions of this remarkable work. The book adds to our theoretical and empirical knowledge of politics and bureaucracy, and for this I am personally indebted. It contributes to discussion and understanding of a major social problem, and for that we should all be grateful.

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The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure. By Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 410. $9.75.)

Anyone likely to read this review is probably familiar with the wider professional context of the book, such as Myres McDougal's other writings, the policy-oriented jurisprudence at Yale, and the fact that now, in the late 1960's, is the first time in the history of international law that governments are trying to lay down a worldwide set of rules for the making of treaties and for the handling of treaty-related problems. In 1966, the U.N. International Law Commission completed many years of work on the law of treaties and adopted a set of 75 Draft Articles (ILC Draft), submitting it to the U.N. General Assembly and thereby to all Member States. The ILC Draft impulsed a world-wide professional debate in governments, law schools, political science departments and relevant learned societies. The U.N. General Assembly convened a

Conference on the Law of Treaties to consider the ILC Draft. The first session of the Conference was held under U.N. auspices in Vienna in 1968. More than 100 States were represented by plenipotentiaries. The second and final session is scheduled there for 1969. The first-named author of the book, Myres McDougal, was a member of the United States Delegation to the 1968 Conference. He had previously served on the special study group on the law of treaties appointed by the American Society of International Law to feed academic opinion into the process by which the State Department formulated American policy toward the ILC Draft. And aside from its perfect timing in this whole context, the book also happens to be the first major monograph on treaty interpretation published in English since World War II. So, obviously, the setting could hardly be more appropriate.

For all these reasons, the book is a must for the specialist in international law, and it will stimulate professional thinking in several adjacent fields. It is an ambitious book, as the title correctly suggests. It aims far beyond the immediate prompting of the ILC Draft. It starts from scratch in asking what men mean when they say or think they "agree" on something. The search goes into fields as far apart from traditional legal research as neuro-psysiology, linguistics, semantics, non-verbal communication, game theory, symbolic logic and others. The book designs its own system of inquiry and defines its own terminology. It also covers relevant legal sources from the classic authors of the 17th and 18th centuries to the latest court decisions. Conclusions and policy recommendations tie in nicely with McDougal's general and well-known concept of "minimum world public order." In this context, minimum world public order calls for a system of interpretation that aims at finding what the book calls the "genuine shared expectations" of the parties to a given agreement. How should the interpreter find the genuine shared expectations? According to the book, no single source should be taken as exclusively authoritative, not even the treaty text itself. The text is important, certainly, but so are the preparatory work, ancillary negotiations, subsequent practice, and the whole legal-political ambience before, during and after the merging of two or more national policies in one legal instrument.

Certainly, it would be a better world if governments and courts were to interpret treaties by the rules which the book suggests. Cheating would be harder. Ambiguities would be rarer. International transactions would be more predictable. Global purposes would enter and pervade the system. But how do we get from here to there? Which is the cart and which is the horse? Is there not a threshold yet to cross *before* interpretation can do these things?

Most of us who are writing about international law face the threshold problem in one form or another. We want to look toward a better future and even move things in this direction, but we also want to remain relevant to the ugly present. Each of us mixes the dosages as best he can at any one time for any one topic. This book, in my view, assumes too much when it offers technical advice to States in how to get at the "genuine shared expectations" or the "real meaning" of treaties. Such advice necessarily assumes that States want the real meaning to appear. But what if they don't? What, in fact, if this is what States try to avoid just because they know there is political power in interpretation, and because this power increases with the obscurity of the meaning?

This should not belittle the importance of interpretation in general or the book in particular. Quite to the contrary. It would not belittle Chief Justice Marshall to remember that the United States Constitution came first and his interpretation came second. He, in turn, reminded his audience that it was a "constitution that we are expounding." But when we are thinking about world public order in the mid-20th century we should remember that it is *not* a constitution that we are expounding. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, world public order is an academic abstraction. As such it is useful. It helps us think. It is elegant. It satisfies a need for professional shorthand. We don't have to go through cumbersome qualifications in writing about the better world toward which international law points. But in all this we must beware of reification. Terms like "world public order" and "constitutive processes" may, through repetition, acquire a misleading semblance of reality. Of course, this was not the authors' intention. They themselves are aware of this danger, and say so (page 395):

> "We are under no illusion, of course, that establishment of appropriate goals for interpretation . . . will necessarily bring about the realization of a world public order of human dignity."

And yet the book as a whole leaves a much more optimistic impression. It is almost as if the authors were only paying occasional tribute to this aspect of reality, such as in the above quotation, but were otherwise satisfied with some assumptions about State behavior, especially the one that States really want to maximize predictability of treaty performance and hence stability of the international system.

The harsh fact of the matter, as I see it, is that predictability is only one side of the seesaw. The other side may be called flexibility. States want predictability for others, and flexibility for themselves. In my view, this have-and-eat-cake spirit pervades international law. Therein lies its central paradox, and its timeless fascination. It manifests itself wherever we probe deeply enough into the logic of international legal rules, for instance here in treaty interpretation. State practice shows this ambivalence. Predictability and flexibility are both desired, and yet mutually exclusive. As the one goes up, the other must go down. Therefore, there is no technical solution. The real question is political: how much predictability *at the expense* of how much flexibility? States do not ask how to maximize one, but how to optimize the mixture of both.

We are back at the cart-and-horse problem. States must first be willing to move toward greater predictability, and thereby to change the international system itself. Then (but only then) will the time have come for the experts to suggest instruments to move the State system from here to there, and thereby to change it. Many instruments are possible, and some may be better than others, but unless States are *willing to use* the instruments, it makes little difference how good any given instrument may be.

The book fails to face this basic problem squarely. Instead it tries to solve the problem by assuming it out of existence. The last paragraph of the book begins with this sentence:

> "Proper principles of interpretation, therefore, are indispensable instrumentalities of change in the direction of a more perfect public order."

This eventual reification of what started out as nothing but an assumption is, in my view, the major shortcoming of this otherwise excellent book.

Whether or not one agrees with the central thesis of the book, there is no question that it constitutes a major contribution to the current world-wide discussion on the law of treaties. There is virtually unlimited food for thought (and stimulation for further research) in the very sweep of its design and in the radical questions it raises about the act of agreeing and about the fact of agreement. Without any doubt, our profession has been enriched and our thinking has been invigorated by this book.

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Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System. By JAMES W. DAVIS, JR. AND KENNETH M. DOLBEARE. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. 276.)

Selective Service: Conflict and Compromise. By HARRY A. MARMION. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1968. Pp. 168.)

Despite a strong similarity in concluding recommendations, and presentation of some of the same government data, these two books represent a thoroughgoing contrast in approaching Selective Service policy.

The ultimate concern of Davis and Dolbeare is to display the potential of policy analysis for both value choices and empirical theory; their orientation is self-consciously professional. Selective Service thus becomes the vehicle for a variety of theoretical expeditions on several levels of analysis; and the vehicle is fueled by an equal variety of data-gathering techniques. Marmion, an executive of the American Council on Education, follows the issue-oriented approach to political choice: "My intention is to convey the excitement surrounding the draft debate [of 1967] as well as some of the frustration that results when one realizes that well-thought-out reforms are not being accepted." (p. x) Marmion's data are derived from previous writings on the subject and observation of Congressional hearings and debates. From almost any point of view, the contributions of the Davis and Dolbeare study are far greater.

Little Groups of Neighbors, at the simpler levels of analysis, deals with the questions of organization, variability in impact and individual attitudes raised publicly in regard to draft policy. In the process, the study effectively challenges both the system's characterization of itself as "little groups of neighbors" and its assertion that draft support rests on widespread support for decision-making by local boards. The data are tied together to form a different picture, in which deferment policy and organizational characteristics mesh to provide lowered military liability for those in higher socioeconomic strata "while conferring the management of deferments and inductions upon community influentials drawn from the same strata. . . . Small wonder that they then are willing to tolerate if not affirmatively support . . . [the system's] continuation." (p. 4)

The accumulated data then serve as a base from which Davis and Dolbeare embark on three separate quests for practical and theoretical significance. The first of these is an attempt to make draft policy recommendations in a professional capacity. The procedure involves, first, estimating future consequences of alternative policies in light of findings about the present system, and second, choosing among projected consequences on the basis of the nominal values of current policy—efficiency, equity and public support.

Second, the authors examine the Selective Service experience for gains in understanding conflict and convergence between citizen participation goals and organizational goals. Although concluding that conscription is an area in which the two sets of goals cannot be attained simultaneously, they offer a speculative set of conditions which might promote such convergence in some other areas.

Finally, Selective Service is placed in the descriptive context of the Eastonian "feedback loop" in order to estimate extent of support, feedback and possible change within the system. From this descriptive transfer Davis and Dolbeare derive a few tentative hypotheses relevant to systems theory itself.

All in all, *Little Groups of Neighbors* is an ambitious undertaking marked by a reasonably high level of success. In relation to their policy recommendation aim, the authors have done well in narrowing the available alternatives, and for the most part have resisted the temptation to overrun their data limitations in projecting policy consequences. The point on which their projections are most hesitant—public support—is also the one most open to question. If, as seems to be the case in *The American Soldier* studies, perceptions of unfairness are correlated with perceptions of deprivation relative to the experience *of one's friends and associates,* rather than to those of the whole population, draft randomization might actually increase bitterness among draftees and their families. In short, even high draft liability, if shared with most of one's friends, might be more tolerable than a random fate.

Any discussion of public support must also take into account distributions at different levels of political activity, as the authors themselves well realize. The problem is that values may also vary by these levels; and view of the draft among national policy-makers may be determined largely by values related not to efficiency, equity or general support, but to the costs of change for possible tradeoffs on other policies. Davis and Dolbeare recognize this in brief examples; there is also implicit recognition in their suggestion that goal attainment and adaptation to change may not be as central a motivation as systems theorists have thought. But the recognition does not eliminate the difficulties involved in choosing only three values upon which to base policy decisions.

The chapters presenting the researchers' search for theory in relation to participation and feedback are laudable both in content and in willingness to venture beyond the last table of cross-tabulations. In fact, the book as a whole stands as a splendid example of the inductive steps to theoretical development. At the same time, it demonstrates the limits of this process; for the last chapters, though theoretically the most significant, are also very brief. Davis and Dolbeare sought to display the *potential* of policy analysis for theory, and have done so admirably. Full development, however, depends equally on deductive reasoning, and that is not provided in *Little Groups of Neighbors.*

Without wishing to seem unduly critical of a highly instructive work, I would add a methodological note. A certain amount of naivete in data handling appears in several places in the work; for example, no measures of association are used, even in the case in which a scattergram is presented. Such omissions constitute a minor annoyance, but in one case failure to calculate percentages for a controlled variable from the correct base changes the results. The table is used to show that approval of local boards is a function of education; properly calculated, it makes clear that approval is instead a function of knowledge about the boards, consistent across all educational levels. In view of the positive relationship between such knowledge and occupational status, it may well be that the effect of occupation would wash out also. Either by itself or in conjunction with a knowledge-occupation check, the discovery requires some re-evaluation of contentions regarding the draft and local elites.

Marmion's study of the Selective Service has much less to recommend it; indeed, it illustrates perfectly why policy studies fell into disfavor among political scientists. It is composed of a short history of the draft; a critique of the present system; a series of arguments against alternatives to conscription, and an account of the passage of the 1967 Selective Service Act.

The Marmion study is rather less persuasive than that of Davis and Dolbeare from the point of view of policy recommendations; and it has no theoretical perspective beyond advocacy. Potentially, it could have pointed up the alternative values of policy-makers mentioned as a problem in *Little Groups of Neighbors;* or it could have provided additional understanding of legislative processes. In fact, it does neither. Nominally a study of conflict and compromise, it tells us very little about these vital political concepts. Mr. Marmion has produced a highly readable book, and an honest (if somewhat overheated) appraisal of draft policy alternatives. But it is not a work which will be of great interest to most political scientists.

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Economic Policy-Making and Development in Brazil, 1947–1964. By Nathaniel H. Leff. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968. Pp. 201. $7.95.)

Professor Leff has written a provocative, original and important study of Brazilian political and economic development. One of the central problems to which he addresses himself is: what do case studies of major economic policy decisions reveal about interest aggregation patterns?

Much of the literature on Brazilian development has argued that the President is unable to implement a coherent development policy because he is both pressured into yielding to a high level of demands and is checked by powerful veto groups. Leff argues, however, that the President has a substantial degree of freedom and that private-sector interest groups, whether domestic or foreign, did not in fact strongly influence the formulation of government economic policy. To support this thesis he offers a series of case studies of economic policy-making based on open-ended and anonymous interviews with former cabinet ministers, government experts (the técnicos), and representatives of interest groups that participated in the policy-making process.

In the case of the major export sector, the coffee planters, Leff argues that this interest group, traditionally assumed to have substantial political power, consistently failed to obtain their major policy goals in the period under examination. He demonstrates that they were unable to block the steady increase in the export taxation rate, which rose from 23% to 55% of the total value of coffee exports between 1954 and 1962. Similarly, demands by coffee interests that the protective tariffs for industrialists be kept low and that the dollar-cruzeiro exchange rate be undervalued were equally ineffective.

Leff similarly shows that despite the hypothesis that rapid industrialization has resulted in new political powers for the private-sector industrial interest groups, the public-sector's share of all Brazilian long-term investments actually doubled between the 1947–1949 period and 1958–1960. Even the Development Bank, originally set up as a major source of long-term financing for private industry, gave 84% of its total allocations to public-sector projects between 1952 and 1964.

From these and similar studies, Leff argues that not only has the power of interest groups been overestimated, but that the interest group approach to political analysis imparts a serious perceptual bias in a system where actors from the same "interest group" directly compete for preferential treatment and personal favors at the level of policy implementation, rather than aggregate their demands at the level of policy formulation.

Whereas most commentators have viewed this "clientelistic" style of politics as developmentally dysfunctional, Leff claims that the very weakness of interest groups has the functional effect of allowing the President and his expert advisors a "substantial degree of autonomy" to determine policy according to technical and national considerations. This reviewer would add, however, that the presence of strong interest group demands can also be a source of political *support* for governmental programs, and the absence of such demands a source of Presidential weakness rather than power. For example, largely because of their "clientelistic" nature, the peasant leagues and the trade unions were not able to effectively aggregate their demands and mobilize the support that President Goulart needed to make Congress accept his program of "Basic Reforms."

This reviewer also feels that the image of the "autonomy" of the President would have been further reduced if more consideration had been given to other sources of constraints on the President besides the relatively formal interest groups of the private-sector. For example, the limits imposed on the President by the decentralized public-sector agencies and large government corporations, owing to their high degree of revenue and budgeting independence, and their tradition of bureaucratic entrepreneurship and pressure group activities, needs more research. The fact that Populist Presidents felt that they had to avoid antagonizing mass opinion, not merely elite opinion or interest groups, was also an important factor in the rapid softening of initially firm stabilization policy-decisions to freeze wages or to eliminate subsidies of wheat and bus fares.

Given Leff's position that the Presidents in the period between 1955–1964 did not experience significant political obstacles to effective economic policy-making, what is his analysis of the constraints on the economy that reduced the very high growth rate of the 1950's to near stagnation by 1963–1964? This is another major theme of the book. While not disputing the fact that the growing political polarization and the constitutional crises contributed to inflation and to the 1964 coup, which installed the first military government in the twentieth century in Brazil, Leff argues that the basic cause of the economic slowdown was a constraint on imports due to export stagnation. Between 1948 and 1962, the volume of Brazilian exports increased by only 7%. Prices fell even more sharply, however, so that foreign exchange earnings actually declined. Thus while the GNP rose by 61% between 1954 and 1963, the capacity to import did not increase at all. Since Brazil's rapid industrial growth rate was largely the consequence of an import substitution process that was more import intensive in terms of raw materials and equipment than was realized at the time, Brazil's low capacity to import finally checked further development.

A common theme of development politics is the desire of developing countries to escape dependent or colonial economic status by creating modern industrial and service sectors. Less well documented, however, is the often unconscious hostility that exists towards the agricultural sector and specifically to traditional exports, which are seen as symbolic of dependent status. This hostility towards developing traditional areas of the economy frequently leads to serious underinvestment in and underutilization of resources that could help finance the desired diversification of the economy. In Argentina, for example, Díaz-Alejandro has shown that only 1% of the net increase in capital formation between 1927 and 1955 took place in the agricultural sector, and that this contributed to the 26% decline in the total quantum of exports between the 1925–1929 period and that of 1957–1961.

One of the strengths of Leff's book is his interesting discussion of the psychological and ideological origins of the export stagnation in Brazil and the bottleneck in foreign exchange that resulted from it.

On the basis of his own extensive interviews, Leff concludes that the Brazilian economic administrators had a "strong bias against exportation, either as a source of aggregate growth or as a means of dealing with the country's balance-of-payment problems." Part of this bias stemmed from their "exportable surplus" theory of trade which viewed exports as desirable only if the domestic market was completely supplied. Disregarding comparative advantage trade considerations, the exchange rate for exports was overvalued and export licenses were often denied. Another subjective consideration involved was the fear that expansion of exports would increase dependency on world trade and perpetuate an agrarian economy in Brazil. Leff argues convincingly that given the relatively high elasticity of supply, Brazil could have satisfied domestic demand while simultaneously expanding exports and then using the exchange earnings to help finance industrialization.

Leff also has valuable discussions of the causes of the influence of "técnicos" in the system, the Brazilian process of opinion formation, and the informational requirements of effective policy-making. In all, Leff has probed some of the more difficult and central questions about the Brazilian political and economic system. Despite some differences of opinion, this reviewer feels that more than any other recent book on Brazil, Leff has opened up new areas for research and forced a re-evaluation of some basic hypotheses.

ALFRED STEPAN

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The Third Reich of Dreams. With an Essay by Bruno Bettleheim. BY CHARLOTTE BERADT. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. 177. $4.95.)

This book deals with a crucial aspect of political life that has been too often ignored in political science—the intra-psychic mechanisms whereby individuals collaborate in their own control by a totalitarian regime. Analyzing the dreams of over 300 Germans who lived in Nazi Germany, Charlotte Beradt (a journalist and collector of these dreams between 1933 and 1939) shows how many individuals unconsciously made the regime more systematic in its terrorization than it actually had been. The dreams show how, "in their blind fear of the hunter, such people would assume his role and hunt themselves—how they inadvertently helped set and spring the traps into which they were meant to fall." (p. 50)

Beradt organizes her presentation of these dreams around their central themes. There was, for example, a widespread apprehension that nothing could be hidden from the government Thus one dreamer heard a loudspeaker blaring out a decree on the "Abolition of Walls"; another was detected in a thought associating Hitler with the devil by an electronic machine; others dreamt of Dutch ovens, mirrors and the like which recorded their private conversations or innermost thought for the benefit of the police. The dreams—replete with items such as a "Monitoring Office," or a "Regulation Prohibiting Residual Bourgeois Tendencies Among Municipal Employees," and "nose-suspects"—also showed a general anticipation of the bureaucratization of terror and the fear that one might become a suspect. Most significant was the inability of the dreamer to rebel, even in his sleep. One dreamer, e.g., carried out a contemplated letter of protest by putting a blank sheet of paper in an envelope; another faulted in the telling of a forbidden joke; one man dreamt in triangles, rectangles, and octagons, telling himself that it was forbidden to dream. Other dreamers were admired or sought after by Hitler, Goering, or Goebbels. Even among the

Jews—most of whom tried to cross borders or sail ships in their dreams—there were a few who tried to join in with the regime: e.g., one man dreamt that Hitler intervened on his behalf against the slurs of a lower official, saying, "Our Jews are not like that." Only one person in this entire group ever dared dream of an attempt on Hitler's life, and he was outside Germany at the time of the dream.

In seeing these dreams as specific adaptations to twentieth century totalitarianism and the Nazi regime in particular, Beradt needlessly limits their usefulness. As Bruno Bettleheim points out in an excellent essay accompanying this edition of the book (which was first published in Germany in 1966), the totalitarian regime does not mold a new human nature—rather it plays upon and exploits common psychic weaknesses. Arrogating to itself the paternal position, the dictatorial regime drives the subject back, unconsciously, to a state which all have known—the helplessness of infancy. Governmental authority then takes on for the subject individual the omnipotence, the omniscience of the original authority; and insofar as this authority thereby becomes inescapable, the boundaries between self and other are erased and the identity threatened. The result is a splintering of the ego.

In treating the regressive possibilities apparent in these dreams as a potential for all human beings under certain circumstances, Bettleheim gives Beradt's work a utility for the whole of political science that it would not otherwise have. Viewed in this light, the material gives support, e.g., to Lasswell's argument (in A. H. Stanton and S. E. Perry, *Personality and Political Crisis,* 1951) that governmental lies and other acts that undermine faith in the public authority and information sources may not result in a growing criticism of the government; rather, it is apt to lead to a widespread atrophy of the ego among the populace and the development of a public life which is characterized by the cue and the ratlike response, a clinging to the threatening but all-powerful authority.

If one were to employ the ordinary criteria for assessing the techniques of inquiry and validation used in this work, the author could be criticized on several counts. The choice of individuals for study was not systematic—Beradt (with the assistance of some friends, including one physician) simply interviewed those with whom she came into routine contact. Background characteristics were in no way controlled: she talked to her dressmaker, her aunt, the milkman, as they were available to her. Her sample was not representative of the German population: "yes men" and individuals who directly benefited from the regime were not interviewed. Nor was the authenticity of the dreams guaranteed through tapes or signed statements by their originators. (The dreams were recorded by Beradt, using code words for key items such as "Hitler" and "Party," then hidden in book bindings, and ultimately mailed out as letters to her friends throughout the world.)

Yet neither the subject matter nor the times would have permitted Beradt the usual research techniques. She had the courage and the intelligence to inquire into an extreme political situation in which she had been caught and her material seems to have been collected with as much imagination and care as was possible under the circumstances. To hold her to the usual standards of research would be to unduly restrict investigation in political science. It is in just these most difficult cases (methodologically speaking) of social crisis or political aberration that some of the most interesting political material becomes available. In varying the former "givens" of a political system, these circumstances make possible the investigation of the parameters of ordinary political life.

Two methodological criticisms can nevertheless be made. A more systematic presentation of the data she does have would make it possible for the reader to assess her interpretations of her data. Furthermore, a review of current research on dream interpretation and content (e.g., the works of E. Erickson, D. R. Hawkins, M. Ullman, K. Altshuler, P. Giovacchini) would have been useful. As it is, her decision to deal exclusively with the manifest content of dreams, and to treat them as relatively clear statements of current conflicts with the regime, while at the same time prophetic, raises some serious questions. As Bettleheim points out, the dreamer's insight into the inner nature of the totalitarian regime can only be explained in terms of certain tendencies present in him, tendencies due to unresolved conflicts arising out of his own experiences in infancy. Beradt's dreamers were torn, because of their own inner motivations, between affirming and denying Hitler's regime.

Despite these problems, this work provides some very significant data for the political scientist. When compared with other available studies on the dreams of resistance fighters (a few of which are given here) and those imprisoned in concentration camps (e.g., as reported by L. Bandura in 1948), further insight may be developed into those very central and too often ignored unconscious processes which tie rulers to ruled in a variety of political circumstances.

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Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the

Beliefs of an Elite. By James E. Scott. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 302. $8.75.)

Sociopolitical transition has provided the principal matrix for analyzing the formation of political beliefs in new nations. The book under review suggests that we should be giving more attention to the impact of economic growth.

Scott is concerned with how existential factors shape top officials' perceptions of nature, man and, peripherally, the political arena. "Ideology" here conforms to Robert Lane's notion of an overall pattern of beliefs held by an individual, a pattern usually more observable to the interviewer than to the respondent himself. To pursue the Malaysian ideologies Scott adopted Lane's technique of in-depth interviews, open-ended questioning, and a relatively small sample. During 1965–66 Scott held long interviews with seventeen top ranking civil servants holding positions of considerable responsibility in the Malaysian Federal Government. He supplemented this small sample with written questionnaires submitted to a larger group of civil servants.

Formal ideology, public and politicized, may or may not coincide with an individual's personal and perhaps latent ideology. The degree of coincidence between the two is Lane's central concern in *Political Ideology* (1962). Scott is less concerned with the "fit" between public and private ideologies in Malaysia. Malaysian political leaders themselves have always taken pride in their pragmatic eschewance of ideological enthusiasm, though in practice they have adopted many liberal democratic forms and procedures. Instead, Scott concentrates on the degree to which his respondents fit an abstract concept of democratic ideology, one which is considerably broader and more coherent than any Malaysian public orthodoxy. The book sidesteps the analytical trap into which so many western observers have fallen: measuring a society's political well-being in terms of its consensus on democratic norms. In fact, one of Scott's chief propositions is that deviation from democratic beliefs—which is common among these Malaysian officials—is not, *a priori,* evidence of systemic disfunctionality. Quite the contrary. In Malaysia or in any country which is economically poor, socially heterogeneous, and in the throes of unprecedented change such departures from democratic beliefs may be evidence of perceptual *realism,* a requisite for effective decision-making. On the other hand, despite Scott's obvious sensitivity to the pitfalls of western parochialism, structuring the analysis around a democratic scale in itself undermines his own intent. The seventeen civil servants do not come off as pathological, but they remain deviants nonetheless.

This book is less about Malaysia than about the process of belief formation. Scott singles out Edward Banfield's *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958) and Lucien Pye's *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (1962) as alternative explanations of this process. Between Pye's essentially psychoanalytic thesis of identity crisis and Banfield's environmental thesis of a poverty culture, he finds Banfield's more valid and useful and, one might venture, more optimistic. While Malaysian offficals are plagued by the conflicts so characteristic of societies undergoing accelerated social mobilization, their expression of fatalism and social distrust are not fully explained by identity crisis and its accompanying "ego weakness." Their conviction that the world is relatively immutable and that the ordinary man is driven by a Hobbesian self-interest also derives from their acute awareness of the external conditions. Thus their fatalism and social distrust is witness to their realism, not simply to their internal instability.

The external realities having the most profound impact of the respondents' perceptions and expectations—and dampening their enthusiasm for democratic politics—are 1) the peasant social base which, in the midst of urbanization and modernization, remains the core of contemporary Malaysian society, 2) the ethnic communalism which generates violence and mutual suspicion, and 3) the scarcity of material and capital resources necessary for growth. Of these three factors, Scott assigns greatest weight to the latter.

The basic belief shared by these ethnically diverse (Malay, Chinese, and Indian), British-trained, English-speaking, urbanized bureaucrats is that rewards are relatively fixed in quantity; consequently, men must compete for larger slices of what is, in Scott's words, a "constant pie." It is this seemingly inescapable scarcity which generates men's selfishness and warrants cynicism toward public spiritedness and preference for paternal authority.

Scarcity and the "constant pie" syndrome are salient in newly independent nations and in older but similarly poor nations (or parts of them) as well. The existential repressants of democratic beliefs should be as common to Banfield's Italian village and Oscar Lewis's Spanish Harlem as to Scott's Malaysia. Scott's hypothesis, then, has relevance for more than just the post-colonial societies. There is a real need for comparative analysis which bridges the new nation-old nation dichotomy, and Scott makes a contribution in his direction.

In a country study one is always torn between detail and generality. Excessive attention to national peculiarities limits its theoretical utility, while concentration on general traits shared with other countries risks glossing over variables which should be taken into account in subsequent comparative analysis. Despite Scott's Malaysian expertise, he pitches his study at so general a level as to leave certain important questions unanswered. For instance, what is the precise nature of scarcity in Malaysia? Even affluent societies have been unable to escape guns-versus-butter debates. Decision-makers' sensitivity to the restrictions of scarcity, in fact, may increase as development proceeds. And a second question: how has the Malaysian bureaucracy related these civil servants to the nation's poverty or scarcity? Scott discusses the ideological consequences of the respondents' British training, but he might have gone further in investigating the impact of the decision-making role itself on the bureaucrats' beliefs, particularly in light of the Malaysian government's emphasis on economic growth. One would expect officials under the Alliance regime to differ from ordinary peasants and from bureaucrats in less growth-oriented governments in their attitudes toward the expandibility of resources.

Scott's exploration into the interplay between beliefs regarding scarcity and growth suggests that we should be giving more attention to personal time perspectives as a variable in ideological formation, since skepticism or optimism about the expandability of resources hinges so largely on whether an individual has a short-range or long-range frame of reference. Scott posits the Pye and Banfield approaches as principal options in analyzing ideology in underdeveloped socieities. But a focus on the implications of personal time references may bring the psychoanalytical and environmental explanations much closer together.

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The Eclipse of Citizenship: Power and Participation in Contemporary Politics. BY ROBERT J. PRANGER. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968. Pp. 110. $2.95.)

Action, Symbolism, and Order: The Existential Dimensions of Politics in Modern Citizenship. BY ROBERT J. PRANGER. (Nashville: The Vanderbilt University Press, 1968. Pp. 225. $6.95.)

The first of these books is a clear, brief summary treatment of a large, important, and neglected subject, the philosophic theory of "democratic" citizenship. In that light, what the book gives us will be gratefully received. However, it is as inevitable that its shortcomings will be openly regretted.

The second of these two books, which treats mainly the fundamental defense of active citizenship in philosophic and/or psychological terms, goes far towards filling a gap left by the first but in ways so specialized as to be of probable interest only to some readers.

The first book steps off from a distinction between "the participation of citizens as an enterprise with values and distinctive forms of action" and, on the other hand, "the more ordinary struggle for power and authority usually associated with politics." (p. vii) This distinction becomes the basis for the book's two main, explicit arguments, the definition and description of "participatory" politics as a viable ideal and the definition and description of "power" politics, especially as revealed in the traditional "representative" democracies of Britain and America. The thesis is that the traditional representative democracy never did, and in recent decades, has increasingly failed to provide meaningful opportunities for "much spontaneous civic experience."

> The participatory spaces between authority and anarchy are neglected . . . Authority is promoted, maturity stymied. The adult citizen is almost dead, and with him will vanish the human being, autonomous and social, we in the Western political tradition have come to respect. (p. 102)

Behind these explicit arguments is another, less strongly stated but more general in its implications, and it sustains the whole book. This is the book's notion of what constitutes politics, or, better, political life. Whether done well or ill, political life, in this view, is a distinctively human process in which actors share membership in patterns of interaction and through these express to and with each other the hopes and fears of their communal life. The conception is spelled out in considerable detail, covering both objective and subjective aspects, and constitutes a distinctive and almost separable feature of the book.

It is a feature, of course, which is directly related to the book's other outstanding feature, its bias in favor of what in other circles these days is loosely referred to as "participatory democracy" (a phrase Professor Pranger abjures because its second term, "democracy," has come to cover a multitude of sins some of which he wishes to condemn). The two features complement each other admirably and together they result in a sharply defined restatement of an ancient political ideal which many praise and few practice. We should be grateful to have such a forceful and clear restatement at this time and can all hope that the book which contains it will have a wide readership among, especially, our students.

But it is still a *re*statement and it can be asked whether Professor Pranger's efforts have taken us much farther than where, for example, A. D. Lindsay left us with his *The Essentials of Democracy* published more than thirty years ago. Is "participatory politics," with its heavy methodological emphasis on politics as a process of communication, anything more than a new name for "government by discussion"?

For this reviewer, the advocacy of participatory democracy which began with T. H. Green, and came to the United States in the works of John Dewey, as Professor Pranger notes, still lacks an American prophet. To fill that role, more than restatements of the ideal are needed. In the light of that ideal, American democracy must be condemned, not cursorily, superficially, and generally, but specifically, fundamentally, and at length.

In this connection, Professor Pranger's book can be seen as suffering from a further limitation. He appears to subscribe to the view that America is a nation peculiarly free of ideology (p. 101). He also appears to subscribe to the ideal of participatory citizenship almost as an end or value unto itself. In both cases, his vision would seem to be too narrow. Our system of representative government in this country is an aspect of our national commitment to liberalism and could not and would not be otherwise sustained. To the same scale, a conception of a truly active citizenry in which, to use Professor Pranger's own phrasing, "the citizen's primary role is to create a politics, not to function as an appendage, or mere participant, for the structure of power" (p. 89), is but an aspect of a larger and more fully comprehensive political philosophy, and one of a profoundly socialistic and anti-liberal sort. Professor Pranger's opposition between "participatory" and "power" politics is thus but an aspect of a much larger collision between liberalism and socialism. The persistent failure of Americans to bring this collision at least into honest view constitutes what W. A. Williams has called our "great evasion," and Professor Pranger is no more guilty of perpetuating the fault than a host of others. But it is depressing to see the situation unrelieved, even in the face of an unusual opportunity for doing so.

The failure to extend the argument into its ideological dimensions is even more obvious in the second of Professor Pranger's volumes, but in view of what this book does do it would be unfair to harp on what it omits. What it does is to search through a vast philosophical literature, including most prominently the works of modern existentialists, for an argument for the ideal of active citizenship which can be grounded in the realities of human experience and not just in personal preference or national heritage. In its own terms, the search is wide ranging, for it attempts to enlist novelists, theologians, and philosophers into common cause with social scientists and to have all of them find a common theme which will join the vocation of citizenship to that of the whole man, that is, politics to "joy, sex, and sleep," a phrase borrowed from Lawrence Durrell.

The search is for something more than the assertion that through political activism with fellow citizens the individual can discover, both socially and psychologically, a personal fulfilment and sense of identity not otherwise available to him. It is for an absolute ground for such an assertion, however tentatively its final discovery may be expressed. But it will take a special kind of reader to wish to follow Professor Pranger through this search to the end. This is not because, or, as the case may be, in spite of the density of the argument and the frequency of the citations. It is rather because many readers will suspect from the outset that the search is self-defeating. Either we are committed to the ideals of citizenship or we are not, and to ask why, either way, is simply to push the argument, as it were, into another room. The search for the uncommitting commitment is a chimera which Professor Pranger is no more likely to pull to earth than was Sarte or Merleau-Ponty.

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The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations. EDITED BY JOHN K. FAIRBANK. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 416. $10.00.)

There is a great deal to commend this volume to political scientists. An encyclopedia of factual statements concerning China's external behavior, *The Chinese World Order* comes close to being unrivalled for its probing case studies and scope of presentation. Historian John Fairbank and twelve of his associates and former students have summarized their researches into Chinese policies toward Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, Vietnam, Inner and Central Asia, and the West. Several essays treat the best known operational modes of Chinese foreign relations, particularly trade, the tribute system, treaty relations, and the *chi-mi* or "loose rein" form of diplomacy. Since Professor Fairbank summarizes each essay in the introduction to the volume there is no need to repeat his excellent overview of the book's contents.

In theory, China's foreign policy-makers acted in accordance with a set of interlocking assumptions. As has been written many times before, these assumptions involved beliefs that the Chinese were naturally superior, that all outside "barbarians" were culturally inferior but differentially capable of harming China, that foreign states were ranked according to their potential threat and cultural affinity to China, and that states in each of three rankings or "zones" were considered equal among themselves by the Chinese. The three zones were a nearby Sinic or culturally Chinese zone, an Inner Asian zone where populations presented the dominant military danger to China, and an Outer zone. The Chinese world order thus revolved around China itself but was global in its extent. It was "unified and centralized in theory by the universal preeminence of the Son of Heaven," and drew on the political theory, kinship terminology and rituals used by the Chinese within their own land. According to Professor Fairbank this order has been passed on to the Nationalists and Communists and "bears upon Chinese policy thinking today."

The essays themselves thoroughly undermine the notion that one can meaningfully talk about "the Chinese world order" beyond the theoretical and psychological levels. The editor notes at the outset that this "order was a unified concept only at the Chinese end and only on the normative level, as an ideal pattern." Although one by one the authors struggle with the divergence between this ideal pattern and imperial practice, an essay by Wang Gungwu of the University of Malaya seems to cast doubt on the wisdom of continuing that struggle at all. Deceptively labelled a "background essay," Professor Wang's piece constitutes a fundamental criticism of the whole view that there was an all-embracing Chinese approach to world order from the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) onward. If I understand his argument correctly, Wang is saying *inter alia* that there might have been such an approach prior to the Mongol conquest in the 12th Century, but that the total subjugation of the Mainland by the armies of Genghiz Khan and his successors over a hundred-year period invalidated the above-noted assumptions of Chinese world order. Then after the defeat of the Mongols and the restoration of the all-Chinese Ming Dynasty, the Emperor's historians deliberately sought to erase the century of humiliation by an even stronger assertion of the vitality of the Chinese world order. When prophecy fails, the prophets march forth.

A few of the authors in this volume, particularly Professor Benjamin Schwartz, seem to perceive how critical the points raised by Wang are. Schwartz indeed virtually dismisses the operational significance of the Chinese world order for modern times and instead discusses the important questions that arise from a Chinese perception that bears only tangentially on state practice. As Schwartz seems to recognize, this is more than a question of matching theory to practice, and cannot be understood as a problem of ends versus means. Here one gets principally into the realm of beliefs and domestic politics rather than of international behavior (although the two are obviously related). In this sense, as contributor David Farquhar suggests at one point, the Chinese world order had more to do with the internal authority of the Emperor than with matters of foreign relations. By exaggerating external issues and his own international prominence, for example, the Emperor could silence domestic critics and limit internal political conflict to his advantage. In addition Truong Buu Lam shows how recourse to the rhetoric of Chinese world order could sometimes play a significant part in the saving of face and in masking political vulnerability in diplomatic negotiations. The Chinese thus manipulated their view for the purposes of conducting a winning political strategy or making it appear to be a winning one to critics in the imperial court. In this fact-filled volume the explicit theory thus bears little relation to the rich data of foreign relations which deserve a reanalysis in comparative and systemic terms.

In his magnificently written essay, Wang Gungwu makes an additional point that seems to escape the majority of authors whose point of departure is the Chinese world order as such. He presents the best case I have seen on the importance of sorting out the many different "Chinas" that have arisen on the Mainland. China's relative power position has made a crucial difference to its policies; the leadership's ability to perceive and adjust to this position in turn has changed with varying patterns of external communications and domestic political circumstances. By fastening on the grand theme of Chinese world order, the more usual tendency in this volume is to homogenize the evidence so that the crucial distinctions for political analysis are lost. Wang's point in arguing about the Mongol conquest as a watershed is that Chinese policies must be understood in space and time and that any theory concerning Chinese political behavior must accept variation as normal rather than consider it to be a deviation from a preconceived world order.

Finally, Professor Schwartz' short essay at the end of the volume raises equally fundamental questions concerning the persistence of the Chinese world order since the collapse of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911. What Mr. Schwartz says is not only that the question of world order was one of perception but also that the underpinnings of this perception were struck down with the collapse of the Empire. The apparent persistence of certain aspects of this perception, of course, can be explained as the transference of expressions and concepts dealing with traditional political attitudes to the new ideas of nationalism. But, the argument does not rest on the superficiality of historical continuity alone. The survival of bits and pieces, Schwartz argues, denies what was essential in the traditional perception: its integrated totality. The China of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung is different. The internal and external bases of the old order have irretrievably crumbled.

The Chinese World Order then is an important addition to a very thin field. It significantly contributes to our knowledge of the major dimensions of traditional China's external political behavior. These dimensions can now be studied more comprehensively by diplomatic historians and specialists in international politics and in much more concrete terms.

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NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Explanation in Social Science: A System Paradigm. BY EUGENE J. MEEHAN. (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968. Pp. 128. $1.95.)

Constructing Social Theories. BY ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968. Pp. 303. $3.95.)

Students of the method of science conventionally have asserted a distinction between what is called the context of scientific discovery and the context of scientific justification. Briefly put, it is held that methodology is concerned to explicate the logic of explanation and certain related epistemological problems. Where those explanations come from (how they are "thought up") is a problem for empirical investigation, and in principle does not bear upon methodological issues. Both Meehan and Stinchcombe seem to be arguing that philosophers of science have, perhaps unwittingly, misled practicing social scientists. We have accepted unrealistic criteria for being "scientific"; the business of doing science is not what philosophers of science seem to imply that it is.

Meehan argues that the "deductive paradigm" of explanation "currently accepted by most philosophers of science" is the villain. In Meehan's view, control is the central purpose of scientific explanation; therefore, we should consider any explanation a good one if it facilitates the desired control (he does not, of course, argue that all attempts to control are "good"). Meehan characterizes the deductive paradigm as follows: "An event is explained when it can be related to an established 'empirical generalization' or 'general law' according to the canons of formal logic. . . ." (p. 9) Such a paradigm is unduly restrictive and, indeed, impossible to achieve since "no proposition can be both empirical and general." Moreover, we cannot get out of the difficulty by concentrating on the confirmation of empirical generalizations "as Karl R. Popper and others suggest. No amount of empirical testing could possibly establish a general proposition. . . ." (p. 11) Meehan spends a little more time demonstrating that induction cannot justify a universal generalization and, therefore, that deduction from such generalizations is unwarranted. It makes little difference what Meehan says about that, though, since he is only constructing a straw man. Karl Popper—the very man Meehan singles out to attack—is most famous for his consistent argument that the only thing scientists can do is *reject* (disconfirm) generalizations; I cannot imagine how Meehan managed to read into Popper the contrary view.

What really puzzles me, however, is Meehan's alternative paradigm. He says that what we need for explanation is (1) a formal system (a calculus) which (2) is "loaded" with a given set of empirical terms (concepts) such that (3) the phenomenon to be explained appears as a formal entailment. Now, if Meehan thinks he has found an alternative paradigm of scientific explanation, he is flatly wrong. That just *is* the deductive paradigm, whatever he chooses to call it. If, on the other hand, Meehan thinks he is suggesting a new strategy for discovery, he is wrong again. May Brodbeck, in her widely reprinted article, "Models, Meaning, and Theories," speaks at some length to such a strategy. To provide empirical interpretation for the axioms of some formal calculus is not quite the piece of cake that Meehan seems to think, but it is being attempted all of the time, and it has long since been suggested to methodologists who have done their homework. In short, Meehan attacks the deductive paradigm with arguments from the context of discovery; he fails to say anything very useful about scientific discovery itself.

Stinchocombe's book is all about scientific discovery. He is attempting to teach the reader strategies conductive to constructing explanations. Why should we believe that he knows how to construct explanations—that his strategies are any good? Well, Stinchombe gives us several kinds of reasons. First, he spends quite a lot of time assuring us that he is great buddies with all sorts of brilliant theory-builders (e.g., Coleman and Duncan). Second, many of us are not at Berkeley, and we know that, so naturally we will accept any direct-from-Berkeley knowledge Stinchcombe cares to dispense (". . . I evidently learned a good deal that was new to people not at Berkeley" [p. vii]). Third, he promises pretty spectacular results: "One way of describing this chapter is that in it we will try to teach everyone to write such books [as Union Democracy]." (p. 58) After that, I wish I could pan the book; actually, however, I think it is very good. It may indeed inspire some—if not "every"—one to write a book like *Union Democracy.*

If I read him correctly, the heart of Stinchcombe's strategy is in learning to conceptualize causally. To a methodologist, the results occasionally are shocking (". . . every concept must be . . . a *hypothesis* that specified phenomena . . . are causally operative;" [p. 40] ". . . variables may be measured either by their *causes* or by their effects;" etc.). But this is not a methodology book; it is a book about the construction of social theories. Stinchcombe adopts an intuitively appealing definition of cause (it may be methodologically unsound, but I believe that it corresponds fairly closely to the way most of us *think* about things), and restates all sorts of theoretical frameworks (e.g., structural-functionalism) in his causal terminology. He does not put great emphasis upon the need for operationalizing concepts (although it is clear that he means for concepts to refer to the world of experience), but he puts great stress upon the notion that concept formation starts with ideas about causal connections. Methodologists will recognize this as a strategy for assuring theoretical significance in scientific concepts.

After preliminary work of this sort, Stinchcombe takes the reader through stages of theory-construction. In a chapter appendix he treats linear directed graphs as a particularly appropriate technique for causal analysis (he doesn't say much about partialling techniques, etc.); other chapters deal with demographic variables, the conceptualization of power, environmental effects and activity-structure concepts. The examples are laregly sociological, but so, for that matter, is much political science specialized sociology.

Although the methodologically unsophisticated reader may not notice it at first, Meehan has written a bad book; although it may offend good methodologists, Stinchcombe has written an excellent book. Neither author, however, has eased my growing concern that the social sciences are in a state of crisis. With the advent of the scientific method, a world-view has insinuated itself upon us. To be sure, science implies control. All around us, social systems small and large convulse from overdoes of control, but I suppose I shouldn't worry. Stinchcombe is going to go back to the concrete and particular, "to try to wrestle it into sufficiently general form that it can be conveyed economically to our colleagues and descendants." (p. 293)—RODERICK BELL, *The University of Texas at Austin.*

Political Dialogues. BY MAURICE CRANSTON. (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968. Pp. 192. $5.95.)

Readers of political theory whose eyes tire easily following graph lines can find relief in the comforting prose of a new book by Maurice Cranston, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the London School of Economics. Cranston is a representative of that vanishing species of political theorists which makes philosophy its sister discipline with no apologies and barely a courtesy to sociology. But of all Cranston has a felicitous way with words and a fine sense of style. Both in ideological position and style he suggests the best of A. D. Lindsay or Ernest Barker.

Using the format of imaginary dialogues, Cranston has contrived conversations between pairs of political philosophers ranging from Savonarola and Machiavelli on the State to Maine and Arnold on Democracy. Among the eight dialogues, Locke and Shaftesbury differ mildly over Tolerance, Diderot and Rousseau divide on Progress, Burke and Paine square off on Revolution, Marx and Bakunin fume over Anarchism, and Mill and Stephen coo about Liberty. Voltaire and Hume also have a session with Morality which meanders over too many subjects and proves to be the least satisfying of the dialogues.

It is easy to understand why writers shy away from the dialogue form. First of all there is going to be that inevitable comparison with Plato. Then there is the charge of presumption at orchestrating conversations which never took place. Also there is the necessity for a near complete command of the known writings of the subjects. What if a conversational coup with dialogue can be undone by an overlooked or unknown piece of writing? And there will always be the charge that the composer of the dialogues is being outrageously selective in his use of materials.

It is to Professor Cranston's glory that he has survived these objections. He had the boldness to use the Platonic format and not merely to be awed by it. Rather it is the reader who is awed by Cranston's impressive command of his materials. The conversations are based on the actual words of the discussants. In some instances unpublished letters and notebooks are used as sources. This puts the critic at some disadvantage, especially one who is expecting to find a string of the familiar quotations fondly remembered from the History of Political Thought or frequently found embellishing Container Corporation of America ads.

Sometimes the arguments or anecdotes used are so unfamiliar to even a well schooled eye that a reader may wonder just how much of this is being fabricated. I hasten to add that Professor Cranston has my full trust on this score. The honesty of his scholarship is not in question. However, to readers who are so used to diving down to footnoted confirmation of every fact or argument, it may come as a shock to preceed from one beautifully phrased comment to another without the usual security of citation. Perhaps this is the supreme act of trust required by the dialogue form. You have to be certain that the subject did say what is attributed to him, especially when you find your favorite character voicing the unexpected or the unfamiliar. This can make a reader extremely uneasy about the whole idea of contrived dialogues. Unless you enjoy the pastime of literary detective, it can be very disconcerting.

Once this initial act of faith in scholastic accuracy is established, the dialogue can become a very refreshing medium for airing propositions. Cranston has certainly mastered the medium. His selected materials are smoothly woven together. Even if some of the material is new, it all sounds very plausible. Within the brief confines of these dialogues and with a minimal biographical sketch, the personality of the philosophers emerges with remarkable few strokes of argument. This is a fine tribute to the pertinency and quality of the remarks chosen. So little says so much. Even when the disputants had never met historically, you are often left with the feeling that is is a pity they didn't meet because it was such a nice conversation.

There is very little card stacking. It must be a great temptation to over draw the characters for dramatic effect. Take Machiavelli and Savonarola. At the beginning of this dialogue, Savonarola seems to be pouring forth vacuous ecclesiastical rhetoric. You are certain he is being set up as Machiavelli's straight man. Soon you see this is only part of the characterization. There are good lines and a plausible case for both men. Neither is pictured one dimensionally, and if ever there could be an understandable temptation to oversimplify characters, these are two very likely candidates. Instead we get a very fine discussion of the nature of force and fraud.

Friends of Rousseau might object that Cranston has been overly severe. Rousseau is drawn as a vulnerable and intolerant romantic. In their discussion of Progress, Diderot is continually upstaging him as the voice of calm reason. Rousseau is shown as essentially a Calvinist dreaming of a Christian Sparta. This questionable analogy suggests but does not begin to resolve the complex relationship of Rousseau's individualism and his collectivism. A rather awkward last minute introduction of his idea of social contract gives one the feeling that perhaps Rousseau was not getting equal time to present his case, or at least better arguments could have been mustered in his defense.

A similar feeling of being short changed in the dialogue comes up in the discussion of Tolerance between Locke and Shaftesbury. Locke is clearly the favorite. When Shaftesbury asks how Locke can dondemn all atheists *a priori* when we do not praise all Christians similarly, but rather insist on the test of experience, Locke never answers. The dialogue proceeds to another point. Once again a point has been hit but not developed. This is a definite limitation of the medium. One has to be content with sketches of ideas. Actually where responses assume essay proportion, as in the Mill and Stephen exchange, interest flags. The discourse has to be kept short to be effective, and this can result in skimping on ideas.

In a departure from the pairing of antagonists, third disputants are introduced into the dialogues on Revolution and Democracy. It doesn't appear that Mary Wollstonecraft (Why not her husband William Godwin?) is much help to Paine in taking on Burke. Her arguments are Paine's. But Morley contributes perspective in the exchange with Maine and Arnold over Democracy. His is an independent position and adds significantly to the dialogue.

The credibility of the dialogues is a strong point of the book. One's eyebrow seldom arches, but one does wonder if Marx could ever have shown such patience and forbearance in a real conversation with Bakunin over anarchism. Yet on the whole these excellent conversations ring very true.

These dialogues were presented over BBC Radio. They are meant to be spoken. The trick is to read them this way, to revel in their justapositions, sophisticated repartee, wit, and color and not look for a set of depth essays.—EDWARD R. CAIN, *Suny, Brockport.*

The Basic Values in Law: A Study of the Ethico-legal Implications of Psychology and Anthropology. BY THOMAS DAVITT. (Philadelphia: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society. Vol. 58, part 5, 1968. Pp. 144. $4.00.)

Any venture into the breach between disciplines risks the likely consequence of being criticized only piecemeal and appreciated by no one. Yet some ventures may be worth the risks, since even a superficial punching and poking at the boundaries of our generalizations concerning social behavior may redefine some directions of inquiry. Professor Davitt's search for "basic values in law" must bear the scrutiny not only of his fellow jurisprudents, but of psychologists, anthropologists, and political scientists as well. But, regardless of the variety of shortcomings which might thus be levied against the endeavor, he asks us once again to consider the possibility of discovering (or inferring) universal value-judgments in the regularities of social behavior—and this means reassessing the possibilities for making comparative generalizations about legal "rules" or "norms" without necessarily contradicting our preoccupation with the study of decision-making processes which issue those norms.

Davitt presents his arguments for the universality of certain value-judgments in law in two parts: one linking values with law and the other surveying anthropological data for universal patterns of verification. In the first and much shorter part, it is argued that basic values—as certain appraisals of "our actions and their objects"—are derived from certain basic drives. The "naturalistic fallacy" is swept away by an insistence that "good" is merely an arbitrary designation for "the nonarbitrary and verifiable quality which some objects have of reducing drives, of fulfilling needs, of satisfying desires" (p. 8). And human motivations are presented as felt tendencies toward or away from objects, which are fundamentally evaluated according to the demands of basic drives. While not all actions are motivated and not all motives are *directly* related to basic drives, values are implied in all motivated activity. And lawmaking, it is argued, partakes of the motives, and hence the drives and values, common to all men. The basic drives, distinguished from instincts and characterized by a wide flexibility in means of fulfillment, are classified according to the familiar sort of motivational hierarchies which have been associated with the works of Abraham Maslow, Henry A. Murray, and Raymond McCall. Within the encompassing "master drive" of self-realization, man seeks self-preservation, sexual union, knowledge and freedom of decision, possession, and association in social and political unions. Further, Davitt contends that the basis of obligation and personal rights is derived from these basic drives, and that together values, obligations, and rights are the content of law.

Law, for Davitt, is particularly related to man's basic drives because the distinctive, definitional character of law—as a set of regulations—is found in its functional concern for the values common to all members of a society. Law if defined as "a directive judgment of those with authority regarding means necessary for the common welfare of the people" (p. 23). These directive judgments are distinguished from commands on the basis of general applicability and service to objectively common needs and values. Of course, since Davitt is concerned with data from preliterate peoples, he must insist with the directing authorities of law can be the people themselves, as well as their leaders or acknowledged delegates. And he hopes to clarify the proper inclusion of unwritten regulations in the identification of law on the basis of his notion of common welfare and the occurrence of public reaction to violations. Finally, it is argued that self-evident values in law are present universally (or almost universally) and require little or no reasoning or justification—while values which are not self-evident may be "general, common, frequent, and occasional," but not universal.

The second and greater part of the book is a presentation of the author's propositions about value judgments in law as their universality is supported by data from anthropological descriptions of preliterate societies. The universality of law, itself, is reaffirmed; and a classificatory schema is laid out for the location of value judgments along a continuum ranging from universal and almost universal through general, common, frequent, and occasional occurrences in societies. Of course, it is recognized that the reliability and inclusiveness of the evidence is only proportional to the accuracy and extent of the ethnographic reports; but Davitt argues that enough evidence is available to allow a classification of basic values in law which parallels his model of the basic drives encompassed by self-realization.

A brief overview of Davitt's findings reveals a small core of universal or almost universal value judgments derived from each of the basic drives—presented together with a much larger set of less than universal values. From the basic drive of self-preservation is derived the universal approval of self defense and regulations controlling killing, and condemnation of unjustified (relatively defined) killing. The drive toward sexual union delivers up such universal judgments as the approval of regulating sexual activity, of selectivity and permanence of relations, and of marriage and family. And the disapproval of polyandry, adultry, and incest are "almost" universal.

Man's drive to know results in the universality of values concerning the regulation of education and knowledge serving common needs, the good in language and artistic creation, and the desirability of cosmic explanations. The drive for freedom of decision is apparent in the universal values calling for regulations guiding decisions, the relating of responsibility to decisions to act, and even the "decision" to observe customary law. The essence of justice, found in the basic drive to distinguish "mine and thine," is the basis for universal value judgments regulating property relations, allowing individual title, and regulating relations of acquiring title to things—to the exclusion of theft. Finally, the basic drive to associate with others accounts for the universality of judgments which value protection and security, the necessity for cooperative effort, regulations assuring peace and security, conformity with directives, and the pursuit of relatively defined justice through the judging of cases. Almost universal is the value of distinguishing between direct and indirect offenses against the whole community.

While for each of the categories examined extensive references are made to anthropological literature, the book should not be taken for a systematic survey of "legal anthropology" or even for a treatise on the impact of anthropology upon definitions of law. Neither can it be expected to contribute much to our understanding of the judicial process as an analytically defined aspect of social interaction. For this is primarily a book about legal norms—about the inferred presence of value judgments considered as "facts"; and it speaks most forcefully in the field of jurisprudence. Davitt's straw man is the *legal* positivist, for whom values as absolute ethical judgments are excluded from law defined as command. And he argues that the *universality* of certain value judgments, which through logic and an implicit functionalism can be inferred from regularities in widely comparative contexts of social interaction, is demonstrative of the *necessary* inclusion of basic values in all law.

For social scientists, *The Basic Values in Law* will be less than satisfying in a number of respects. Davitt never seems to understand the need to clarify the methodological questions involved in the identification of the regulations or customs which in particular are law. He uses the distinguishing characteristic of service to "common welfare," but does not fully recognize his implicit dependence upon the concept of observable sanctions—as "common responses" to violations. And this failure contributes to serious difficulties in demonstrating how a number of his value judgments, even if accepted as "reported data," are necessarily part of customary law. The entire chapter on knowledge and decision, in particular, seems to be a presentation of apparently universal regularities in behavior without any attendant demonstration that these regularities are law—or "regulations for common welfare." Davitt cites no clarificatory examples of public reaction or sanction for transgressions of the norms which might distinguish them as *legal* rather than merely general, *social* postulates!

While it can be left to the anthropologists to correct or alter any questions concerning the accuracy or generality of the data collected, we might note that except perhaps through some process of negative demonstration it is difficult to understand the operational criterion for selecting the content for the universal category. And, as we have seen, the guidance of the basic drives model seems to allow an unwarranted *forcing* of certain values into the legal framework. The additional and extensive outlining of "less than universal" value judgments proceeds according to some "considered estimate" of generality—often in the face of anthropologist's recognitions of the lack of sufficient data.

In spite of the shortcomings mentioned here and in addition to the fundamental emphasis on jurisprudential concerns, Davitt's work is an interesting exploration in the area of comparative generalization which presses to a wider audience the possible uses of anthropological data and fosters renewed interest in the comparative analysis of values as legal content. The work is worth critical examination, if only because of the implications of the topic.—D KENT MCCALLUM, *York University, Toronto.*

Totalitarian Rule: Its Nature and Characteristics. BY HANS BUCHHEIM. Trans. by Ruth Hein. (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968. Pp. 112, $4.50.)

The author, an associate of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich, has both personally experienced and written widely of the Third Reich. The book under review here is a translation of a work published in Germany in 1962—the first of his studies to appear in English. With just under 100 pages of text, the book can best be characterized as a long essay containing a number of impressionistic theories about totalitarianism. There is no attempt at systematic empirical description, nor at the construction of empirical indices for various factors which are related. Concrete evidence is brought in only when needed to illustrate a point. Evidence is drawn primarily from the experience of Nazi Germany and the Communism of the Soviet Union, with brief references for the purpose of contrast to Mussolini's Italy (considered nontotalitarian) and other fascist regimes.

In the first and longest chapter, the author defines totalitarian rule ("the demand for unlimited control over the world and hence social life"), differentiates it from other non-democratic forms, and suggests its motive force: a threatened group (the Germans; the working class) can only be saved if certain theories are acted upon as historically valid laws (the good life comes with the "nordification" of the German people; or with the achievement of communist society). To create a wholly new society and type of man, every area of life must be manipulated—the family, scientific research, art, the individual conscience. From this arises the terrible oppressiveness of totalitarianism, which sometimes affects adherents of the regime even more than its opponents. The author also compares National Socialism with Communism and finds them more alike than different. Subsequent chapters examine life under totalitarian rule, especially various methods by which the regime seduces the populace into supporting it; the totalitarian goal of a life without politics; the totalitarian mode of thought and its historical antecedents; the role of the state in a totalitarian system (a tool); and the limits of totalitarian power.

To the author's credit, most of his theories appear reasonable and do not fly in the face of generally accepted knowledge about totalitarianism. This might be attributed, however, to the fact that there is little that is really new for the serious student—only here and there a novel emphasis or insight or different way of phrasing a well-known point. The lack of originality could not be considered a drawback if the author had attempted a synthesis of knowledge in the field. Unfortunately, he includes no footnotes, and except for a few references in the text, the reader is left unaware of how the author's theories have been influenced by the ideas of others.

In the several instances where theories are not convincing, the trouble seems to derive at least partially from theorizing at a level too far divorced from empirical referents. For example, the author attempts to explain the varying degrees of intensity of totalitarianism among fascist regimes by the relative lack of intellectual substance (e.g., clear-cut goals) in their ideologies, as compared with communist regimes. Thus, in the face of obstructions, such as "an ideologically solidly established society or strong political opposition," a Mussolini or Franco could "remain content with relatively minor changes" in society. Hitler's totalitarianism was more intense because the German body politic offered no significant obstructions. The author sums it up: "though Fascism contains the tendency to a totalitarian claim to power, it is not—unlike Marxism-Leninism—determined on such a course. . . ." The implication is that all communist regimes will have approximately the same totalitarian intensity, and a look at the real world would demonstrate that this is not true. In any case, without some kind of rough indicators of "intensity" or "intellectual substance" or "obstructions," it is impossible to say whether this theory seems valid or not. And the same criticism can be leveled against most of the author's theory-building.

Additionally, one can question the priorities which the author assigned in choosing topics to theorize about. For example, in explaining the success of totalitarian movements in Germany and Russia, the author focuses on very general conditions, such as man's yearning for a closed intellectual system or his proclivity in modern times for a rationalistic, social-engineering mode of thought, rather than on factors which seem more immediate, like the economic chaos of the two societies. Or in dealing with totalitarian politics, the author only makes the abstract point that the ruler cannot personally supervise everyone; thus, functionaries must necessarily exercise some discretion and thereby have political power. The author, however, does not take up actual manifestations of politics, for example, the interest group politics of the Soviet Union which seem to contribute so importantly to the dynamics of that system.

Because theorizing is done at a high level of abstraction with few references to concrete experience, this is not a work for a beginning student. To follow the author requires a great deal of knowledge about the real systems involved. Moreover, the vocabulary and manner of expression are not that of a modern, empirical political science, but a more formalistic school of German political philosophy. The knowledgeable lyaman might find the book interesting and worthwhile, however, for totalitarianism is intrinsically a fascinating subject, and theories about it are always provocative. And the political scientist might find it refreshing to be forced to reexamine his knowledge from a different persepctive. It is in these respects that the work has value.—RICHARD J. WILLEY, *Vassar College.*

Perspectives in the Study of Politics. EDITED BY MALCOLM B. PARSONS. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1968. Pp. 170. $7.50.)

According to the editor, the essays in this collection "attempt to explain how present-day scholars in disciplines other than political science view political phenomena, as well as how political scientists themselves view these phenomena." The former concern is the province of the eight contributors from other disciplines: Wayne A. R. Leys (philosophy), Norman A. Graebner (history), Harry W. Jones (law), James M. Buchanan (economics), Daniel Lerner (sociology), M. G. Smith (anthropology), Hadley Cantril (psychology), and Norman J. G. Pounds (geography). The latter concern is explored almost exclusively in editor Parsons' own introductory essay, which is essentially an historical sketch of trends in political science and a synopsis of the essays that follow.

Since there is no evidence of a prescribed format beyond the amorphous formulation quoted above, it is not surprising that the remaining essays are extremely varied in approach. They can, however, be sorted into two broad categories. In the first category (comprising the essays from philosophy, history, law, anthropology, and geography) the emphasis is on the relationship between political science and the approaches, concepts, and theories of the other discipline. The essays in this category are all informative, and, in many instances, they contain provocative ideas as well.

For example, Wayne Leys suggests that the unstable pluralism of contemporary political reality generates a central philosophical question: "How can a man, dealing with different issues in different kinds of games, achieve some sense of personal integrity and preserve his sanity?" On the way to an answer, we must somehow "escape from an idolatry, a worshipping of one kind of political process" and "secure and make available promptly accurate information regarding the consensus of effective participants as to the arena in which a given issue should be decided." This point of veiw seems eminently worth exploring.

In the essay from history, Norman Graebner states that, in his view, "social science cannot subject mankind to successful predictability." As a consequence of this estimate of the possibility of prediction, "the majority of practicing historians pursue their researches unmindful of the content of the new empirical studies." This state of affairs we must regret, and we hope that such barriers to disciplinary cross-pollinization are only temporary. (We might note that the use of the verb "subject" in the first quotation suggests an underlying ideological anxiety, a fear that mankind is perhaps predicatable after all, that scientific laws will be constructed "which will control human activity." We suspect that it is this unfortunate and, we believe, inaccurate equating of prediction with control that contributes to a lack of communication between history and political science.)

In the contribution from law, we have a concise and informative summary of legal research relevant to political science. The contributions from anthropology and geography both summarize and critically evaluate their disciplines' progress toward creating theoretical perspectives. Overall, this entire first category of essays provides useful introductions to recent work of relevance to political science.

In the second category of essays (comprising the contributions from economics, sociology, and psychology) the emphasis is on the personal theoretical approaches and ideas of the authors. James Buchanan, for example, fashions an argument against traditional treatment of political institutions by economists and in favor of what he calls "methodological individualism," an approach he and Gordon Tullock first championed in a major way in *The Calculus of Consent*. This sort of intentional semipolemic should help sharpen needed investigation into theoretical and methodological assumptions and approaches.

Daniel Lerner discusses the relation between sociology and policy research, not political science. How he relates the three remains somewhat unclear at the end of his contribution, over a third of which is a quotation from an earlier publication.

Hadley Cantril summarizes a number of his ideas within the framework of "transactional psychology," a term handed down from Dewey and Bentley. For political scientists, one of his more useful notions may be a classification of motivations, of "demands the human imposes on society." Among other things, this kind of effort may contribute to a more adequate way of describing and evaluating the effects of governmental decisions.

In sum, the essays in this volume, allowing for occasional lapses, are of good quality. Individually, they are worth the serious attention of the political scientist. However, granting that academics are notoriously difficult to hold to a common format, this collection inevitably suffers from discontinuity. The contributors scatter to the four winds, and, to be fair to them, there is no evidence of a serious attempt on the editor's part to keep them corralled. All this may be a function of a more general problem—the poorly defined purpose of the volume. Nowhere does the editor clearly state how interdisciplinary relationships were to be explored or what audiences he had in mind. It cannot be denied that there may be value in giving a number of intellects free rein with a given subject matter. However, in this context, with just one selection per discipline, the non-comparability from one essay to the next lessens the impact of the work as a whole.

The interrelating of political science and other disciplines is a topic of considerable importance. This volume indeed contributes to the understanding of these relationships. It seems to this reviewer, however, that the issues involved deserve far more explicit and extensive probing. To this end, a format which, for each discipline, would elicit the viewpoints of *several* of its representatives and *several* interested political scientists could be of inestimable value. (The interdisciplinary sections of Sidney Koch's edited series, *Psychology: A Study of a Science*, are a fair approximation of what we have in mind.) We need thorough discussion of such issues as the extent of substantive overlap among disciplines, the validity of borrowing theories, concepts, and methods, and the potentialities and dangers of interdisciplinary research. Hopefully, the present volume will help provide an impetus to these more ambitious undertakings.—ALLEN R. WILCOX, *University of Nevada.*

Hobbes's System of Ideas: A Study in the Political

Significance of Philosophical Theories. BY J. W. N. WATKINS. (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1968. Pp. 192. $1.95.)

In view of Hobbes's secure position as the most exciting and profound of all those who have written political philosophy in English, it is surprising that the amount of secondary literature about him which is both valuable for beginning students and interesting to more sophisticated readers is very small. Watkins has furnished a welcome addition to our small resources in these respects; his book is well-written, responsible, provocative, and altogether a pleasure to read. If the purpose of a review is to advise the relevant public whether a book is worth reading, the answer here is unhesitatingly in the affirmative.

There are some disappointments. Watkins' considerable abilities are apparent, but so also is a certain negligence in ordering his thoughts. The opening lines of the Preface state that the book answers the question: "How much of Hobbes's *political* theory is implied by his *philosophical* ideas?" It takes a close reading of the text to find the reply to this question and when found it is extraordinarily inconclusive. Fortunately, political theorists are less interested in such implication than in consistency, and about Hobbes's consistency there are only marginal doubts.

The organizing principle of the book is not evident; topics follow one another in no particular order. No serious attempt is made to convey an overall view of Hobbes's philosophy or political thought, to relate his thought to his period, to show what problems he attempted to solve, or what influence those solutions had. Of course, a book which attempted to do *all* these things might be intolerably long, but one or some of them might have been attempted, particularly given the author's gift for vivid and accurate summary.

The best parts of the book deal with topics in metaphysics. The author treats clearly and well of Hobbes's nominalism and materialism-motionalism and discovers what I believe is a previously unnoticed connection between Hobbes and Leibniz which increases considerably our appreciation of Hobbes's intellectual power and originality. More conventionally, but in a section which is a model of critical exposition, Watkins explains the relation between Hobbes's scientific approach and that of Galileo and earlier members of the School of Padua. More of this would have been a welcome addition.

A major topic in recent Hobbes literature has been the character of the obligation to obey the laws of nature in the state of nature and the relation of that obligation to the obligation to obey the laws of the sovereign in civil society. Watkins argues persuasively for what I suppose is now the general opinion, that such obligations are neither moral nor religious, but prudential. More precisely: "Hobbes's laws of nature are assertoric hypothetical imperatives in Kant's sense." (p. 83) In a footnote (p. 99), Watkins relates the contrary Taylor-Warrender thesis to those recent studies of Locke which tend to assimilate the latter to the austere authoritarianism usually associated with Hobbes and says:

> This situation is painful for examination candidates liable to be asked to 'compare and contrast' Hobbes and Locke. So let us all agree to the following compromise: Hobbes was a moralizing lawyer in the Hooker tradition, while Locke preached a mixture of egoism, fear, and authority; and Hobbes wrote *The Second Treatise,* while Locke wrote *Leviathan.*

The author writes from the standpoint of the contemporary English analytic school of philosophy ["My largest debt is to Karl Popper. His has been the main influence on the viewpoint from which the book is written . . ." (p. 11)] and the cramping effect of that commitment is visible throughout most of the book. On occasion, however, the commitment seems forgotten. On pp. 175–6, in connection with a discussion of Hobbes's definition of liberty as the ability to do what one wants, Watkins asks us to imagine two members of an underground organization in a totalitarian country, both of whom are captured and 'brainwashed.' A is rehabilitated and released and gets a good job with the regime; B successfully resists conversion and is sent to a labor camp:

> A is doing what he wants to do, B is not. But there is an important sense in which it is A who has become a captive of the regime, and B whose soul has remained unenslaved, although he is now doing slave-labour. Hobbes's concept of liberty makes no provision for this sort of inner defiance.

Is Watkins sending the founder of linguistic analysis back to study under Plato and Spinoza? Perhaps Watkins himself should go, for here, and elsewhere in discussing justice and morality, he transcends his adopted viewpoint only to land at the most unsophisticated level of the traditional normative position.

Watkins labels his own criticisms of Hobbes's political conclusions "pedestrian" and as only his "personal opinions." They are indeed pedestrian in the sense of being commonsensical, *i.e.,* culture-bound and ideological, but what it means to label them "personal opinions" escapes me. Is it implied that there is some transcendental ground of criticism which he admits not having reached, or some scientific approach which he has not mastered, or does it simply mean that we are not to take his thoughts here seriously? The reader will probably prefer the last alternative.

Yet, despite all these imperfections, it must be admitted on balance that Watkins has produced an excellent book. In the many matters on which he is competent, he shares with Hobbes some of the latter's inimitable instinct for the jugular, in instinct well appreciated by our best students. Perhaps, given a prior feeling for politics, history, and humanity, no other characteristic is more important in writing or understanding political theory.—ROBERT J. MCSHEA, *Boston University.*

Social Science in Latin America. EDITED BY MANUEL DIÉGUES JÚNIOR AND BRYCE WOOD. (New York, Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 336. $4.50.)

One does not expect discussions of scope and purpose in the social sciences to be particularly illuminating; this collection of papers presented at the Conference on Latin American Studies in Rio de Janeiro in 1965 confirms this apprehension. The contributors, all Latin Americans, were brought together under the auspices of the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council "to reinforce the bonds among social scientists in this hemisphere." The Conference may well have succeeded doing that, but the published papers add little more to the effort. Two of the essays are useful bibliographical contributions, one on Anthropology by Fernando Cámara Barbachano and the other on law and legal sociology by José María Franco. The other papers are confusing and unstimulating. This result reflects not so much shortcomings of the authors themselves but rather the difficulties inherent in addressing issues of scope in the abstract.

The scope of a discipline is the result of thousands of scholars producing, criticizing, modifying and extending specific lines of enquiry. Thus, a book review is a discussion of scope. The writer argues, in effect, that a particular topic should or should not be pursued in a particular way for these or those reasons. Obviously one cannot, in a single paper, make all the specific criticisms and corrections of all the work appearing in the discipline. Consequently, a generalized discussion of scope is usually a covert book review: the works treated are often unmentioned and the specific criticisms rarely detailed. The result is shadowboxing.

In his Introduction to the collection Manuel Diégues Júnior criticizes "foreign experts, whose models, although carefully prepared and highly refined, are rarely compatible with the social reality of our own countries" (p. 12). Which experts? Which models? Which reality? Why, specifically, are they not compatible? The author does not say.

Florestan Fernandes inveighs against North American scholars working in Latin America for diverse vices: being "more or less indifferent to what is happening in Latin American communities" (p. 53); holding "old stereotyped opinions about the significance and scope of indigenous advances [in the social sciences]" (p. 51); being, "as a rule, completely ignorant of the language and of the economic, cultural and social history of the areas selected" (p. 32). No names are given, no works cited; far worse, no concrete—let alone detailed or thoughtful—defense of such propositions is offered. It is tempting to criticize such criticisms, but to do so would plunge us into the same lack of concreteness which afflicts the criticism. We desperately need specific examples. If, for example, Fernandes knows of a neglected Latin American scholar, then for Heaven's sake, he should tell us about his work and explain its utility.

José Nun, writing on political science, argues that political philosophies—such as Marxism or liberal capitalism—are our "models" performing a function akin to that of the wave theory of light in physics. (Many of us would feel slippage between analogies.) Nun then speaks against certain philosophical positions and in favor of "critical Marxism" as a research model. Unfortunately, he does not explain what, in practical, concrete terms, the significant characteristics of each "model" are, nor how, specifically, each leads or does not lead to knowledge.

The writers of *The American Voter* are, for example, accused in a passing reference of "formalism" (p. 80). Formalism, incidentally, is "an ideology of liberal capitalism" which combines a "liberal democratic conception of politics" which is a belief in "equality as a function of liberty" and an "irreducible dualism: society and state" (see Locke, Hartz, Hobbes, Laski and Hegel for further clarification) *and* an abstract view of man which is man defined "by his essence"—if you know what I mean. Obscured by this metaphysical fog is the issue of interest to political scientists: what specific findings in *The American Voter* are undermined by the use of "formalism" (whatever it be) and how? Nun makes no attempt to show it. We are left with mere name-calling—only we do not even know what the names mean.

Melioration was one theme which appeared in most of the papers. The writers seemed agreed that research ought to be undertaken with the end of eventually making things better in Latin America. But again, the high level of abstraction prevented the concrete discussion of the real issue here, namely: which specific lines of enquiry lead most productively to useful knowledge and why? For example, what are we to make of the rhetorical question raised by Victor Flores Olea in his discussion of political science: "Are Latin American specialists only to be concerned with reinforcing the status quo and, ultimately, with defending and justifying an order that is unsatisfactory for the majority of the people, and, at times, unjust all around?" (p. 185) 'Is this merely banal demagogy or an exhortation to terrorism? No answer is provided by Flores who does not say *who* is justifying *which* unsatisfactory order, *how.* Which book is he reviewing?

The results of this conference suggest, then, that formal discussions of scope and purpose ought to be avoided in favor of substantive matters where issues of scope and purpose will be explicitly—and therefore productively—addressed.—JAMES L. PAYNE, *Wesleyan University.*

Social Class and Social Policy. BY S. M. MILLER AND FRANK RIESSMAN. (New York: Basic Books, 1968. Pp. 302. $7.95.)

At a time when social science is being asked to appraise and reevaluate its relationship to social problems (e.g. the "new sociology," the "new political science"), this volume by two scholars unambiguously committed to *applied* social science, is an excellent exercise in problem-science linkages. S. M. Miller, who is Professor of Sociology and Education at New York University and Program Advisor in Social Development at the Ford Foundation, and Frank Riessman, Professor of Educational Scoiology and Director of the New Careers Development Center at the same university, make it quite clear from the outset that the book represents a bridge between their concern with social problems and social change, and their social science training and interests. They are committed to a dialectic between social science and social problems: to develop and test social science theory by applying it, while enhancing the utility of social science to "actionists" by clarifying problems, and aiding in the development of effective strategies and techniques to solve them.

Although one would have to conclude that the book is primarily devoted to action programs and change strategies, these programs and strategies are based on sound analyses of existing situations in three substantive policy areas (poverty, education, mental health). The student of public policy will find many significant and useful insights, conceptualizations and typologies in this volume. However, both the action-oriented and the theory-oriented reader will have to pour through material of primary interest to the other in order to get at the parts he is primarily interested in. Both ought to benefit from the exposure.

Substantively, *Social Class and Social Policy* is about urban poverty and the urban poor (the "new working class") in America. The eighteen chapters of the book are divided into six sections. The opening section ("Policy Objectives") outlines what the authors call the "relative view of poverty," i.e., relative to the "possibilities of society and the 'average' standard of life in a society." To be poor is to be excluded from full membership in society. They criticize the "insufficiency of income" theory of poverty as inadequate, and offer a more broadly conceived concept of "inclusion through command over resources"—economic, political, service, psychological, and social. In an affluent society, the reduction of poverty involves increasing the range of meaningful choices in relation to the choice increase of the non-poor.

The next three chapters ("Social Class: The Poor Today") characterize the current state of poverty. The utility of distinguishing among the plurality of poverty types is stressed. By combining measures of class (economic security/insecurity) and life style (familial stability/instability) Miller and Riessman develop a typology of poverty diversity (stable, strained, copers, unstable). The authors assume that there are alternative poverty alleviation or melioration strategies available (direct economic aid, direct services, indirect change through "climate" changes) and suggest that the concept of poverty diversity is useful in fitting policy program to poverty type in order to maximize the amount of positive change.

In addition to a typology of the poor themselves, Miller and Riessman analyze and critique the major alternative views of the poor—the undeserving poor, the self-defeating poor, and the victimized poor—indicating how definition of the problem affects program proposals. Expectedly, they use this opportunity to criticize the "culture of poverty" thesis (a broader version of the self-defeating poor which implies "an intergenerational transmission of values and practices which inhibit constructive action") as unduly pessimistic. They insist that the positive qualities of the poor be emphasized if successful programs are to be developed.

Sections III, IV, and V, which constitute two-thirds of the book, critique three policy areas relevant to the poor—education, mental health, and community action programs. What we aren't told however, is why *these* three; no criteria of inclusion or exclusion are offered, despite the fact that mental health is not usually considered to be as critical as, say, housing or the welfare system.

The discussions of all three policy areas stress the necessity for developing a variety of "social interventions" to cope with the pluralism of poverty. In the six chapters on education, there is strong emphasis on flexibility and adaptability to get out of the "credentials trap" which represses the mobilization of what talents the poor have, to deal with the drop-out problem (education is a "discontinuous process") by providing meaningful "second chance schools," by accepting poverty and policy pluralism and avoiding the one solution syndrome in school administration, teacher training and utilization, pre-school programs, and integration (where a rigid position in opposition to segregated community control seems contradictory).

The plural approach to change strategies is continued in the section on mental health, where current institutional features of psychotherapy are described as "not congenial to low-income clients, not congruent with their expectations and traditions, and poorly understood by them." Miller and Riessman suggest modifying treatment approaches (e.g. introducing role-playing, use of non-professionals, "helper" therapy, family approaches, socio-therapy, and "pills and needles"), in addition to educating the poor to create new or modified expectations about treatment.

The four chapters which comprise the section on "Poverty and Community Action" are concerned with the variety of forces acting to alleviate poverty and improve conditions of the poor. Three forces are identified: the "inside" force of the established social agencies which constitute the social service network, "outside" militant pressure groups, and mediator agencies which work with both the inside and outside groups.

In light of the new action framework created by the war on poverty and the civil rights movement, new and more innovative programs and processes that are relevant to the demands and needs of the poor are suggested for the traditional agencies: neighborhood service centers, consumer participation in conduct of services, and the widespread use of non-professionals.

The conflict-confrontation oriented outside groups (examples cited are Alinsky and the New Left) are considered too revolutionary, and concerned too much with increasing a sense of efficacy among the poor and too little with substantive gains.

The "third force strategy" of the local poverty programs (CAPS) is designed to promote change in social service activities without inevitably creating community disruption. The strategy stresses intervention between the demanders (poor) and the suppliers (established community institutions). Although the authors, consistent with their concern with pluralism, insist that all three strategies have merit depending on the circumstances, they clearly favor the community-action strategy which "offers social delivery, not a social movement or a comforting continuation of past programs."

Despite the analytic insights spotted throughout the volume, the book suffers from theoretical eclecticism, substantive exclusion and unevenness of development. This may be the result of the division of labor among the authors (including several, in addition to Miller and Riessman, who coauthored some chapters). But this should not detract from the important insights into significant urban issues nor the highly relevant treatment of the policy science question. Besides, the authors promise us a follow-up volume in which they will distill the implications of their analysis for general social science theory. Hopefully, the promise of *Social Class and Social Policy* will be fulfilled in the authors' next book.—LOUIS H. MASOTTI, *Case Western Reserve University.*

Freedom and Community. BY YVES SIMON. Edited by Charles P. O'Donnell. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1968. Pp. 201. $5.50.)

Yves Simon was one of the foremost Thomist theorists of democracy. All those of us committed to constitutional democracy who have recognized the accuracy and significance of Paul Tillich's observations that "the intellectual defense of Anglo-Saxon civilization against Fascist ideologies is extremely weak," and that "common-sense philosophy and pragmatism are not able to provide criteria against the dynamic irrationalism of these movements" should regard with interest and appreciation Simon's conscientious attempt to make good this theoretical deficit from his own philosophical perspective. Simon concentrated his attention especially upon the too-often neglected problem of the role of authority in democratic society. The impetus behind his work was the conviction that a proper understanding of constitutional democracy can be obtained only through an appreciation of the interplay of freedom and authority—concepts which were widely and facilely held to be unqualifiedly antagonistic under the premises of classical liberalism's ontological simplicism.

For those who are not themselves either Catholics or Aristotelian universalists, however, Simon's answers to the critical problems he examines are bound to seem *ultimately* unsatisfactory. Admittedly, democratic liberty certainly must be conceived as something other than simple license ("absence of impediment," to use Hobbes's phrase), and we are in Simon's debt for his insistence on this score. But on the other hand, surely it is an excessive contraction of the notion of freedom that leads to the belief that "any guarantee against the risk of a wrong choice is purely advantageous to freedom as such." (p. 59.)

At a critical juncture the Catholic belief in and adherence to an institutionalized principle of authority which must be accepted on faith is perhaps not fully able to assimilate the deep epistemological humility in the realm of moral knowledge that is so basic to the rationale of constitutional democracy. Nevertheless, no political order, democratic or otherwise, can survive a complete lack of authority or complete moral skepticism, for order of any kind is incompatible with genuine anarchy or total nihilism. As political theorists try to discern the distinguishing features of democratic political order, therefore, they can profit from the thoughtful, theoretically sophisticated formulations of Simon, a committed and insightful analyst who took these problems seriously.

The present volume is a collection of six essays centered broadly around the problems of freedom and community. The editor, Professor Charles O'Donnell, remarks that *Freedom and Community* is intended to exemplify the author's dedication to freedom, a dedication which O'Donnell suggests may have been obscured by the fact that Simon's work "has been so closely associated with the idea of authority." (p. ix.) In fact, the general belief that Simon emphasizes the centrality of authority in any society, including democracy, will probably not be substantially modified by this book. It conceivably can be argued that freedom, rather than authority, was actually the central concern of his theory of democracy; but to do so it must be admitted that Simon's distinctive concept of "freedom" jettisons some of the elements which have generally been considered essential to that word's meaning.

Three of the six chapters have appeared previously in other formats. These previously published essays, "Freedom in Daily Life," "Liberty and Authority," and "Pessimism and the Philosophy of Progress" are by literary standards the most satisfactory parts of the book. The remaining essays, "Freedom and Community," "Autonomy and Authority," and "Political Society," previously unpublished, are manuscripts that Simon originally prepared as the basis for lectures given at the University of Chicago in 1955, and which he intended ultimately to comprise part of his proposed "Philosophical Encyclopedia." Since the manuscripts were still in incomplete form at the time of the author's untimely death in 1961, the editor has utilized notes which Dr. Vukan Kuic took from the original lectures as aids in supplementing them.

Admirers of Yves Simon will certainly be grateful to Professor O'Donnell for his efforts in making these essays available, even though the logical coherence and completeness of the new chapters is not all that might be desired. The editor understandably and wisely sought to keep his interpolations to a minimum; and the relative sketchiness of the final copy is an unavoidable result of this editorial fidelity. Nevertheless, the final product is a group of essays whose quality is not quite up to the usual standard of Simon's work; they are rough-hewn wood-work rather than polished gems. The present volume, therefore, constitutes a rather marginal addition to Simon's *corpus*, as the editor himself would undoubtedly attest; but in the case of thinkers of Simon's stature margins may justifiably be deemed significant.—THOMAS A. SPRAGENS, JR., *Duke University*.

The Political Philosophy of Rousseau. BY ROGER D. MASTERS. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. 464. $12.50.)

Among the many books on Rousseau's political philosophy, this one stands out because of its form. Some of Rousseau's major works are considered, in turn, as whole books: the *Emile*, the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, the *Social Contract*, and the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*. Reading a work written in this manner is almost always instructive for the reader because he can learn about the author by matching his understanding with that of the interpreter in the face of the text as it was meant to be read. This is true of Masters' books because it does contain some extraordinarily interesting remarks about Rousseau's writings.

What can we ask of a work written in this form? Unlike a commentary on one work, it does not attempt exclusively to find out the author's question and his answer. Rather, Masters examines a number of Rousseau's books in order to find out about his political philosophy. Because of Rousseau's pervasive concern with politics, it is clear that his whole teaching can not be found in any one book. One must accumulate an understanding from several of his works in order to have a full grasp of his politics. To come to such an understanding, Masters must examine a number of Rousseau's books in some order. The sufficiency of that understanding depends upon a wise choice of books, and the adequacy of the exposition depends upon the order in which they are presented. In examining Masters' work about Rousseau's political philosophy, one needs to question both the choice and the arrangement of the books to be analyzed as well as the understanding of particular books.

In respect to the arrangement of books to be considered, Masters' book is also different from most books about Rousseau's political philosophy. It begins with the *Emile*, proceeds to the works commonly understood to be the theoretical ground and theoretical exposition of Rousseau's political thought. It does not approach those such as the *Considerations on the government of Poland* and the *Letters Written from the Mountain* in which Rousseau is commonly thought to have expressed his practical recommendations for governments. Thus, Masters could be understood to go from an introduction, to the theoretical ground of the political works in the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality* and the *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences*, to the *Social Contract* itself. At this point he should be in a position to understand the *Social Contract* thoroughly, perhaps without reference back to the more practical works, particularly considering his discussion of the comments on the Roman government in the *Social Contract.*

Reading the *Emile* as an introduction to Rousseau's thought needs no defense. It was certainly one of Rousseau's most popular works, and it contains many comments on government. In addition, as Masters notices, Rousseau said that it was one of his major works and recommended it in the *Dialogues* as an introduction to his thought. The question then arises of what kind of an introduction the *Emile* could be. Masters says a number of times that the *Emile* is like a novel. But a novelistic work that could introduce a political philosophy is not simply book with characters that is easier to read than a treatise. In order to read such a work, it is necessary to be aware of the places where philosophy could appear, from which one could move from a novelistic impression to philosophic questions. A novel, at least at the time of Rousseau, had characters who acted according to the principles of human action understood by the author and whose fates were determined by the author's understanding of the way things happen. In the *Emile,* this is made evident by the presence of the tutor, who shapes the environment in which Emile grows and against which he is tested. Masters, however, treats the *Emile* as if it were a treatise, rather than a novelistic work grounded in philosophy. For example, although he remarks that the "confession of the Savoyard Vicar" was an "exoteric" discourse in the midst of this novelistic work, he treats its religious and metaphysical conclusions as if they were Rousseau's most profound. The consequence is that he turns up with a "detachable metaphysics," not required for Rousseau's other arguments and positions. Thus, although the *Emile* could be a good introduction to Rousseau's philosophy, Masters does not treat it as an introduction.

This same attitude toward the form of books is illustrated by his treatment of the *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality.* Although he understands this work to be a history of man, he does not inquire into the kind of history. He seems to think that men progressed evenly from the first page to the last, history being movement, as if there were no philosophic reason for its division into two parts. But one of the most striking things about the division of the *Discourse* into two parts is that a number of topics are covered in both parts. For example, there are two discussions of the origins of language, one demonstrating that it is impossible to develop language in the state of nature and the other how it could have developed. Masters' failure to observe this leads to his conclusion that the family could be understood to exist in the state of nature. One can make the mistake of reading back into the arguments for the most isolated state of nature, those considerations required to understand man's emergence from it. There clearly must be a relation between the two arguments, but it can only be understood after their differences are identified.

Although Masters' book does have these problems, it has the virtue, in contrast to much of the literature about Rousseau, of bringing our attention back to Rousseau's works and to the problem of what they say about politics.—ANNE M. COHLER, *Harvard University.*

Mass Behavior in Battle and Captivity: The Communist Soldier in the Korean War. ED. BY SAMUEL M. MEYERS AND ALBERT D. BIDERMAN (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968, Pp. 377. $11.00.)

This book may be of more than passing interest to students of military history but defects of method, presentation and insulation from major relevant literature severely limit its utility for the broader audience to which it is addressed. The book consists of five studies drawn from interviews with 118 North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war conducted, under the direction of the late William C. Bradbury, during the latter part of the Korean War. The stated purposes of publishing this material are: "to make available a body of data and . . . interpretations both to those interested in the China field and to those concerned with political warfare . . ." and to contribute "specifically to the understanding of Communist authority patterns."

In fact, however: 1) relatively little of the open-ended interview material is presented so that the reader will find it difficult to judge the appropriateness of the interpretations; 2) the interpretations themselves indicate only that a given variable is relevant but less of how it functions and almost nothing about its relative importance; 3) the interpretations are not explicitly related to more recent related research on the consequences of captivity (indeed, virtually none of the items in the bibliography post-date the middle 1950's); and 4) the methods used to secure the data make suspect the applicability of the interpretations, even to the population of Communist prisoners of the Korean War, let alone to Chinese or Communist socio-political authority patterns.

Forty-five interviews were conducted with Chinese prisoners of war. These interviews were conducted in an atmosphere of urgency because it was known that the respondents would "momentarily be moved," or a sample chosen as "knowledgeable" by the U.N. command, the judgment of U.S. compound officers, interpreters and even prisoners. The stimulus situation varied (not only by locale within the prison compound but by relative freedom—two interviews were conducted in a Prison restaurant, three in the U.S. a year later), the topics covered in the interview varied; the order of interview varied; recordation of response was unsystematized. No member of the research team spoke Korean or Chinese, so that all interviews were conducted through interpreters who were U.S. Army employees who had worked with the prisoners.

The editors are quite candid about these seeming shortcomings in design, but adopt Bradbury's assertion that knowledge about these phenomena is so meager that the studies are nonetheless valuable. Perhaps they will prove heuristic. Bradbury himself, however, argued that one could generalize from this data to Chinese Communist practices and their consequences. He writes: "At this stage in investigation . . . (we) are in the position of the boy who wants to find out whether the white crystals in the bowl are sugar, salt, or something else—tasting a pinch or two of crystals from the top will tell him what he wants to know." But this is true, of course, only if we assume that all the crystals are the same—that the sample of one or two crystals from the top does reflect the composition of the bowl. By the sampling procedures used here, we would expect to find systematic differences between these respondents and even the population of POW's and the data presented in Appendix A corroborates this.

If the problems in research design were necessitated by the pressures of the research situation, they might be at least somewhat alleviated by imaginative analyses of the data. Unfortunately, the coding procedures and the principles of evidence used by the authors in reaching their conclusions are not clearly presented. The analysis seems to have been largely intuitive. The editors suggest that this historical-descriptive mode of presentation was necessitated by the critical review of the government research sponsors. Perhaps, but maintaining this mode could not have been a precondition for permission to publish. It would have been considerably more useful if these pieces had been revised to more adequately present both their analytic procedures and the relationship of their findings to more recent research on prisoners of war, prison inmates, and others in captivity situations.

Although the book as a whole suffers from these defects, readers will find some idea or fact of interest in each of the individual chapters. Bradbury and Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick's "Determinants of Loyalty and Disaffection in Chinese Communist Soldiers . . ." presents a most balanced assessment of the utilities and disutilities of Communist control techniques and includes a fascinating 20-page series first-person vignettes of careers under initial post-revolutionary Communist control. Samuel M. Meyers' chapter, "The Role of Traditional Orientations Toward Social Relations in Chinese Responses to Communist Military-Political Control" not only traces the concern indicated in the title but indicates the centrality of physical coercion behind the effectiveness of Communist political-military control. Kirkpatrick and Uliassi's chapter, "Adjustment . . . to the Communist Demand for Ideological Participation" indicates how enforced verbalization of ideology functions as counter-attitudinal dissonance to achieve new loyalties for the Communist regime and shows how the Chinese Communists, in post-revolutionary consolidation, used the concomitant decrease in "real" communications to prevent institutionalization of anti-regime alienation. Finally, Meyers' and Bradbury's "The Political Behavior of Korean and Chinese Prisoners of War in the Korean Conflict: A Historical Analysis" is an interesting topical and chronological presentation of the surprising behavior and behavior shifts among the Communist POW's.—David C. Schwartz, *University of Pennsylvania.*

The Human Organization: Its Management and Value. By Rensis Likert. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Pp. 258. $7.95.)

In this book Professor Likert describes more fully and supports by additional research the "System 4" concept of management originally outlined in his previous book, *New Patterns of Management* (1961).

Most academicians would place this volume in the human relations field of organizational studies, although its author specifically denies this categorization. The system of management proposed focuses upon the accomplishment of organizational goals by satisfying employees psychological and social needs. This focus, perhaps with the emphasis upon the individual need satisfaction, has been the primary concern of human relations theorists for some time.

Most books concerned with human relations in management have a missionary zeal about them. Professor Likert's book has this enthusiasm. It also offers some interesting research data to support his "scientific-based system of management," labelled System 4.

System 4 is composed of a number of different "principles" which should be followed by managers in administering an organization. One principle, concerned with motivational forces within the organization, calls for more effective use of non-economic motives to create cooperative attitudes and behavior among organizational members. Another principle recommends group decision making at all levels of the organization. A third principle concludes that group methods of supervision are best. Other System 4 principles are dedicated to insuring that each experience of each individual will, to the extent possible, build and maintain his sense of personal worth and importance. The book contains other "principles."

Proof that System 4 is the best method of managing an organization is provided by empirical data gathered from members of many different firms. One study quoted at some length involved a business firm with approximately 100 branch sales offices. The researchers requested salesmen from the best 20 sales offices and from 20 other sales offices chosen at random to complete a questionnaire regarding their branch sales manager. The questionnaire was designed to ascertain the extent to which each branch sales manager incorporated important System 4 principles in his system of management. The results showed that the managers of the best offices were, for the most part, applying System 4 principles to a greater extent than the managers of the other twenty units.

Data from other studies is similarly examined.

Another concept presented by Professor Likert involves the division of organizational variables into three groups—causal, intervening, and end-result. Causal variables are those which determine the course of developments within an organization and which can be changed by the organization's management. These include organizational policies and behavior. System 4 principles such as group decision making and supportive relationships are causal variables.

Intervening variables reflect the internal state of the organization, e.g., the attitudes, motivations, and perceptions of its members. The condition of the intervening variables are the result, largely, of the causal variables.

The end-result variables are the achievements of the organization, e.g., productivity, costs, and earnings. These variables are influenced by the intervening variables.

Professor Likert points out that the usual method of calculating a firm's assets is in measuring the end-result variables. Since these end-results are dependent upon the other organizational variables, he recommends that causal and intervening variables be measured. This is especially important because fostering causal variables recommended by System 4 may not make an impact upon end-result variables for 2 or 3 years. Further, a manager can rapidly liquidate important causal and intervening variables—employee loyalty, quality standards, customer loyalty—and show a temporary increase in end-result variables, e.g., profit. Thus, unless causal and intervening variables are measured regularly, one may be over-rewarding managers who and supporting policies which are destroying important long-term organizational assets.

The book mentions ways causal and intervening variables can be measured, but cautions that only experts can take and evaluate these measurements.

While it claims to be applicable to both business and goverment, this publication is written with only an incidental eye for the governmental entity. The management techniques might be applicable to a broad range of organizations in our culture, but the causal/intervening/end-result variables concept is of limited value to organizations with significant problems in end-result definition and measurement.

The author suggests that his System 4 principles constitute a theory of organizations. However, his area of concern in the organization misses important elements which should be included in any organization theory. For example, the tasks which his organization members are performing are somehow given in advance. In the usual organization, decisions must be made as to what the employees of the organization will do. This important decision-making function is outside the purview of System 4 principles. Many of the tasks Philip Selznick assigns his "institutional leader," such as assessing and coping with the external demands upon the organization, are not touched upon in this book. Rather than being an analytically descriptive theory of organizations, System 4 is a prescriptive set of recommendations or principles for managers. As such, the book has value.—James F. Sullivan, *University of California, Riverside.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The Goldwater Coalition: Republican Strategies in 1964. By John H. Kessel. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1968. Pp. 371. $8.50, $4.75, paper.)

Far more than is usually the case, this is a book written on a numbler of levels—at least three, according to my reading. It is an account of Presidential politics in 1964; it is an analysis of the campaign strategies of the Johnson and Goldwater camps and an appraisal of their effectiveness; and it is an attempt to cast the events and reactions of 1964 into a broader theoretical approach to parties and politics. This review will move through these levels and in that order.

It is a brave man who undertakes an account of one year's Presidential politics now that the Theodore White has twice brought his practiced hand, considerable resources, and intensive efforts to the same task. But while Kessel may not write with all the authority of that experienced journalist (who among us does?), the account is smoothly told. The chapters dealing with the pre-convention and convention politics add comparatively little to what we know already. Once the narrative reaches the campaign, the increment over earlier works is more considerable, a result at least in part, one would suspect, of Kessel's position with the Republican national committee in 1964. The description and analyses of the Goldwater campaign will especially be of interest to students of campaign politics, especially the material on the attempts to establish state-wide Republican vote quotas.

But these materials, even though they absorb at least half of the book, are in the nature of background or preliminaries; the book should certainly not be judged in their terms. As its title suggests, the book focuses on the "second level," the study of the Republican strategies of 1964. After lengthy explications of the two Presidential strategies, Kessel examines the impact of the strategies in a long chapter (chapter nine) which is, I think, the most useful and stimulating segment of the book. He draws almost exclusively but effectively on the 1964 data of the Survey Research Center to gauge the impact and effectiveness of the strategies. (I use the plural repeatedly, because Kessel does also evaluate the Johnson strategies, the title notwithstanding.) It enables him to assess the parties' successes with groups they had marked as "target populations," the impact of the campaign over time, the effectiveness of various themes and issues, and the effect of canvassing and other organizational contacts. Even where the conclusions merely buttress what less thorough reports and observations (including our own) have earlier suggested, the information is more refined and precise here. Occasionally, too, it surprises—as in the strong case which Kessel builds that Republican canvassing did indeed apparently increase the Goldwater vote.

Valuable and stimulating as this analysis is, I do have several concerns about it. There is first of all the danger that the "strategies" and "coalitions" we have here and in similar analyses (I think also of the application of formal models) are at least in part the result of the author's own insight and intellectual organization. Do candidates and campaign organizations actually map out such detailed strategies and follow their consequent means-end corrolaries in the heat of the campaign? The day-to-day responses to events, people, resources and contingencies may indeed appear, after the fact, to have been explicit strategy, but it is "strategy" only in a very general, almost truistic sense. My other reservation (and a difficulty which the author recognizes) is over the difficulties in assessing the impact of a campaign with general sample survey data. One can note changes in the electorate over the course of the campaign (when the sample has been interviewed more than once), and one can note distributions of perceptions, attitudes, and preferences in the electorate. But to infer that this or that activity of one candidate or his party caused them is another matter. I am therefore hesitant, without more detailed information about the respondents' perceptions of and exposures to the campaign and non-campaign events and influences, to conclude, *inter alia,* that the 'Goldwater offensive of early to mid-October was having some impact until dramatic foreign events diverted the attention of the electorate" (p. 297).

Finally, on the "third level" this study of strategies in '64 is encased in beginning and concluding chapters which propound a more general theory of parties and politics. The theory—which strikes me as more of a model or paradigm—is built on interlocking concepts of electorate, group, coalition, and institution. "The electorate is a set of persons, potential voters. A group is also a set of persons, a relatively small set of persons who are members of the electorate. A coalition is a set of groups, and an institution is a set of coalitions." (page 323). The concluding chapter is involved with an extended statement of the linkages between attitudes and behavior in each of the four and with linkages between and among them. It serves Kessel as a framework for viewing the events of 1964, although it seemed to me not ot be an essential part of the strategic analysis. Certainly he does not use it extensively as a basis for empirical hypothesis or generalization.

Just how useful the reader will find the electorate-group-coalition-institution framework (even for heuristic purposes) may to a considerable extent depend on his preferred concept of the political party. The bias of the Kessel model is strongly toward a view of the parties which is nonorganizational, and which focuses on electoral coalitions, electoral politics, and voter behavior. It may be that the Kessel approach is partly a consequence of the focus of his present researches and his need to rely heavily on survey data on voting behavior. In any event, my own preferences are for a much more organizational view of the parties, one which recognizes the discontinuity between party and electorate and which does not try to subsume the full range of activity in the electorate into a concept or theory of the political parties.

In brief, this book will be of interest to political scientists chiefly for its additions·to the meager systematic literature on political campaigns. Its care and its imaginative use of data, especially the sample survey data, suggests a number of useful ways to integrate the study of political campaigns into the broader literature on American politics. —Frank J. Sorauf, *University of Minnesota.*

Democratic Representation: Reapportionment in Law and Politics. By Robert G. Dixon, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 654, $8.00).

The Reapportionment Revolution triggered by the Baker v. Carr decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1962 has occupied the attention of lawyers, politicians, judges, and scholars since its inception. In the future, it inevitably will receive comparable attention. But it also has raised the left unanswered complex and fundamental questions of representation.

Professor Dixon's book is a rich source of information and ideas for those who seek an understanding of the entire reapportionment issue. It includes the background to the major U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the area, set against historic and continuing problems of representation. It traces the problems of implementing the one man-one vote apportionment standard by courts deeply immersed in Frankfurter's political thicket. It is difficult to think of what Professor Dixon has omitted from this impressive volume, for it covers exhaustively just about every significant issue raised by the Revolution. For example, he discusses the bases for judicial intervention, the problems of establishing judicial standards, and the difficulties of courts applying equal representation standards, both substantively and procedurally, to legislative bodies. He also examines the use of non-legislative apportionment agencies, policy outcome studies, and computer apportionment techniques. He briefly summarizes, in the appendix, legislative apportionment in every state with relevant statistical data for each. In short, the book is complete and thoroughly researched, yet written in a pungent, concise style with a light touch where appropriate.

This is a critical book. There is little that escapes Professor Dixon's criticism. Combining his talents as political scientist and law professor, he draws upon a large volume of research materials which include not only the standard reapportionment works and the contributions of political science to various aspects of reapportionment, but the wealth of legal materials that have accumulated in a comparatively short period of time. Professor Dixon has utilized the law reviews of course, and the opinions of federal and state courts at all levels. But, he also has used to a considerable extent the briefs submitted to various courts by all parties—plaintiffs, defendants, and *amici curiae*. With these tools, and his own research efforts, he analyzes the arguments and actions of almost everyone involved in reapportionment. Few escape his censure—the Supreme Court, other courts, the lawyers' briefs, oral arguments in the courts, political theorists, political scientists, legislatures, non-legislative reapportionment agencies, constitution writers, reformers—all come in for criticism at some point, and, in the logic of Dixon's position, most deserve it. One doesn't agree with Dixon in all respects; but his critiques are well developed and throught-provoking.

If his general argument can be extracted from a volume of immense scope, Professor Dixon agrees that population must be the preeminent standard for representation but feels strongly that key questions of representation have not been settled, nor even raised, by the helter-skelter pattern of compliance with judicial one man-one vote standards. He argues that variant simple standards of mathematical equality hardly confront genuine issues of representation; indeed they permit them to be neatly sidestepped. In his analysis, he raises very real questions of what actually constitutes adequate or effective representation for contemporary democratic society.

Professor Dixon does recognize that apportionment involves essentially political decisions, even within the guidelines of equally populated districts. He stresses that functional inequality in representation may continue to exist, even under a one man-one vote standard, occasioned by the possible impact of varying districting schemes upon particular political situations. He notes the relevance to the measurement of representativeness of gerrymandering, single- and multi-member districting patterns, the geographic concentration of political party strength, and the use of local political boundary lines in districting, among other factors. He argues effectively that reapportionment efforts must accommodate political realities and operate within state constitutional and statutory frameworks which maximize political compromise. To anyone familiar with the endless possibilities of drawing legislative districts or devising apportionment formulae, this is an eminently reasonable position. Professor Dixon properly recognizes that neutral reapportionment is unattainable.

Yet, while he concedes the political nature of reapportionment, Professor Dixon is troubled seriously by judicial treatment of reapportionment cases. He is unhappy with the conduct of the arguments, poorly-prepared briefs, unanswered sallies by the adversaries, the logic of the opinions, the process for remedies fashioned by the courts, and especially the enunciation of simplistic arithmetical standards for equality. He argues that the virtues of swift compliance have been offset by the chaos of disparate judicial and legislative responses to mandates to reapportion.

But the questions of representation which concern him are not easily resolved. Beyond fundamental restructuring of American political systems, and of American political values, it can be suggested that these issues are not near settlement. They raise basic political questions that American society assiduously has avoided to date. Also, they raise questions upon which there is still very much disagreement. Considering the extent of disagreement and prevailing American values, however mythical in application, it is at least understandable that courts would avoid basic representation issues and confine themselves to simplistic artithmetical considerations, with room to apply them as standards as flexibly as state and local political systems are diverse.

There is much in Dixon's book to argue with because he raises so many appropriate questions. Indeed, this is its merit. His unhappiness with the remaining reapportionment issues is everyone's who has had to confront them. But alas Professor Dixon doesn't resolve them either.—Ralph Eisenberg, *University of Virginia.*

Electioneering in a Democracy: Campaigns for Congress. By David A. Leuthold. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968. Pp. 150. $6.95.)

Congressional campaigns are rather like perennial and abused step-children: largely ignored, under-financed, easily forgotten. Excluding occasional studies of individual efforts, the accumulation of systematic knowledge about political campaigning has, for obvious reasons, been mainly derived from focusing on the presidential struggle. Yet it is not obvious that the characteristic way resources—organization, money, workers, and issues—are acquired and utilized in presidential campaigns is transferable in miniature to congressional contests. Quite the contrary. Following the national conventions, both (perhaps I should say the three or four) presidential aspirants are more often concerned with properly utilizing resources, whereas for all but a handful of congressional candidates, resource acquisition still constitutes an often discouragingly large part of the post-primary campaign. So argues David Leuthold in this compact, empirically-based, cautiously-developed comparative case study of ten Northern California congressional races in the 1962 mid-term elections.

Utilizing the SRC's voter typology to suggest four of the six major resources candidates must acquire, Leuthold is primarily concerned with describing this process as it differentially affects the candidate's vote-getting power. Two of the book's ten chapters focus briefly on the use of these resources, e.g., the kind of appeals undertaken, but the emphasis is on acquisition: What are the personal characteristics that distinguish winners from losers? Incumbents from nonincumbents? How is the support of prominent party leaders gained and held? What are the major information sources candidates use to inform themselves about voters? About issues? How is the support of non-party groups obtained? What are the major sources of campaign funds? How are campaign workers recruited and motivated? How do they perceive the candidate? The campaign?

By examining a relatively small number of candidates (20) in districts clustering around the San Francisco Bay region, the author was able to employ a variety of research techniques and collect data from a variety of sources (personal interviews with the candidates and key campaign personnel, observation of candidates before meetings and at party gatherings, responses by campaign workers to a two-page questionnaire, financial reports submitted to the California Secretary of State, etc.) Leuthold, however, omits any serious discussion of the reliability of these multiple information sources and it is thus not clear, for example, how much emphasis was placed on the candidate interviews, or even what questions were asked, or what criteria were used in selecting and observing (or not observing) "campaign events." Since it was neither feasible nor essential that he cover all the races in equal detail (the book is a revised dissertation and most of his illustrative materials come from two of the ten campaigns), a brief discussion of these factors would have been helpful.

The most consistent finding, hardly surprising but patiently if not laboriously documented, it that inequalities in the distribution of campaign resources are not dispersed; not even modestly so. Incumbents of both parties are enormously advantaged by the cumulative nature of campaign resources, whether it involves comparatively incidental factors like family support, or more substantial matters like financing, gaining group support, controlling and manipulating information about issues, or developing a stable and effective campaign organization. One pathetic challenger greeted a mid-summer volunteer by saying, "Congratulations, you're the first to volunteer so you're the campaign manager." The only campaigns in which this pattern is even vaguely disturbed were in the three districts which could be classified as competitive, one of which had no incumbent running. Nevertheless, even in competitive districts the distribution is greatly skewed toward incumbents.

But the assumption cherished by most professional politicos, that by simply equalizing some resources, e.g., money, a campaign organization can convert these resources into votes, does not follow. Although one hazards to use 1968 as an example, the three million dollars reportedly raised and distributed by the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee to 81 "target" districts was not conspicuous for its success and these were districts most likely to be vulnerable. Moreover, as Leuthold notes in passing and as Nelson Polsby has forcefully argued, there are some demonstrable advantages in the historically decreasing turnover of personnel in the House (for both liberals and conservatives), advantages which would presumably disappear if that stability were threatened by increasing competition. Since Leuthold adopts Schumpeter's criteria of "democracy"—with its excessive emphasis on the mechanics of a competitive struggle over votes—he does not seriously consider what alternative functions are performed by the structure of defeat and the resulting existence of a guaranteed opposition in the House no matter how strongly electoral tides are moving in one or the other direction.

The author does show, on a variety of dimensions, that citizen participation increases in competitive districts, and ends his study by suggesting a number of reforms which would partially, if not increase electoral competition, help to disperse resources more equitably than is not the case, a necessary but not sufficient condition for meaningful competitiveness. Most have been suggested before (direct subsidies to challengers and their staffs, permitting candidates to compete simultaneously for two offices), others are relatively new and would require a revolution in the present habits of state legislators and federal judges (substituting competitiveness for compactness as a criteria for redistricting). Leuthold recognizes the dismal prospect for most of these proposals when with admirable and, one hopes, intentional irony he comments, "Some of these suggestions, especially the suggestion that congressmen vote campaign salaries to their challengers, are not likely to be adopted immediately . . ."

The chief strength of this study, however, resides in the careful manner in which descriptive materials are marshalled around the central question of resource acquisition, independent of whatever policy recommendations might be drawn from the findings. Regrettably, the small number of campaigns, while more adequate than traditional intensive case studies, does not really permit any solidly based generalizations. The book is loaded with tendency statements ("Democrats who worked in primary elections were found to be more liberal than Democrats who worked only in the general election," (p. 37), or ". . . experienced candidates were more likely to emphasize the Burkean notion of independent trusteeship, while inexperienced candidates thought of a congressman's role as that of an instructed delegate," (p. 115) which would have profited by noting exactly how many—3 of 10? 5 of 10? 8 of 10? Some other minor problems: The author's disciplined caution occasionally lapses into dissertation-like timidity—"In the Bay area, mail appeared to be more valuable for congressmen than for nonincumbents as a source of information about voter attitudes," or, "Most people would consider democracy weakened if the House of Representatives were to be appointed by the President, as is the Supreme Court." But these are quibbles. The book constitutes a welcome addition to what one hopes will be a research renaissance on congressional campaigns, elections and recruitment.—Jeff Fishel, *American University*.

The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841–1852. By Joel H. Silbey (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967. Pp. 292. $6.00.)

This study of voting in the House and Senate from 1841 to 1852 is of interest to political scientists on at least two grounds. Substantively, Silbey reveals a good deal about the relative strength of party and section during the 1840s. His analysis adds strong support to the thesis advanced by Richard P. McCormick in *The Second American Party System* that by 1840 two national parties had developed as highly organized institutions competing on substantially equal terms throughout all the major regions of the country. McCormick's study is a description of party formation in the various states; it ends in 1840. Silbey's study begins in 1841 and is an analysis of rolls calls in both houses of Congress.

Contrary to the views of some historians, Silbey finds that in the 1840s voting in Congress was marked by a rather high degree of cohesion within both the Whig Party and the Democratic Party, marked differences in the voting patterns of the two parties, and low cohesion among representatives from the major sections of the country. If Congress was polarized, in the 1840s the polarization was of parties, not of regions.

The situation was, of course, more complex than this. Voting along party lines that cut across sectional boundaries was more characteristic of the early than the late '40s. The Whigs regularly supported proposals for a national bank, tariff protection, and appropriations for rivers, harbors, canals and other "internal improvements." The Democrats regularly opposed these objectives. The Democrats were expansionist and agressive in foreign affairs; they sought new lands into which free farmers and slave owners could move as they exhausted the old. The Whigs were more cautious in foreign affairs and more likely to oppose expansionist schemes.

The voting patterns of the two parties seemed to reflect two conflicting and yet internally coherent ideological perspectives, each designed to appeal, though in different ways, to the major economic, social, and regional interests of the country. To the Whigs, economic and social progress required the mutual development of agriculture, commerce, finance, and industry under the benign regulation of the federal government: the Whigs were Hamiltonians. The Democrats, more Jeffersonian, sought to reduce the rule of government to the barest minimum because laissez faire was the best guarantee of freedom and prosperity, so they thought, in a nation of farmers, particularly since the income of farmers in the South and West depended on international markets.

Even if hindsight tempts one to over-interpret the strains of sectionalism (Silbey suggests that many historians have wrongly read the controversies of the late '50s into the '40s) there were nonetheless serious stresses within the parties. Western farmers needed appropriations for improvements in transportation in order to market their produce; Southerners did not, and feared that federal appropriations for roads and harbors would have to be paid for by higher tariffs. Thus on this issue, the South and the West had irreconcilable goals. John C. Calhoun never quite succeeded in getting Southern Democrats to support the West on internal improvements as a price for support by Western Democrats on issues involving slavery.

Slavery, of course, was the major sectional issue that threatened the unity of both parties. Whenever the issue of slavery expansion came up—and in the second half of the decade it could no longer be avoided—the party coalitions tended to fall apart and on this question voting assumed a markedly regional pattern. Possibly because of this, by the end of the decade the parties ceased to have the internal cohesion they previously had shown on other issues.

However, as Silbey shows, the decline of party cohesion did not mean that Congress was polarized into sectional blocs. Instead, "Congressional voting had broken down, more than ever before, into a multiplicity of factional groups, behavioral factors, and individual decision-makers, with only occasional alignments of these patterns into large-scale partisan or sectional groupings." An unpublished study of House roll calls in the 1850s by Donald Forbes and myself indicates that this unpolarized pattern of multiple, cross-cutting cleavages persisted throughout most of the '50s, except for a brief polarization into sectional blocs, during the dispute over Kansas in the 34th Congress (1855-6). Finally, to be sure, the long heralded, fearfully sudden, and virtually complete polarization into two regional blocs dominated the Congress in 1859-60 and terminated in civil war.

Silbey's study is interesting not only for its historical findings but also because of its methodology. If Lee Benson, Samuel P. Hays, Allan Bogue and a few other historians were the first generation of pioneers in the use of modern quantitative methods in political history, Joel Silbey can be said to be of the second generation. Silbey is probably the first historian to analyse a decade of Congressional roll calls in the nineteenth century by means of scaling techniques. The results seem to me fruitful, and we may expect that Silbey's generation of historians (aided perhaps by an occasional political scientist) will ultimately provide us with similar analyses of voting in Congress for its entire history.

In the application of quantitative methods to the study of history, that discipline is about where political science was less than two decades ago. Social and political historians trained in quantitative methods are few in number, predominantly young, and confronted by colleagues whose mood seems to be shifting from hostility to resignation, healthy skepticism, and even encouragement. Although large parts of the study of history may never lend themselves to quantitative methods, historians who use such methods skillfully are bound to have a significant effect on the discipline during the next several decades.—ROBERT A. DAHL, *Yale University*.

ESEA: The Office of Education Administers a Law. By STEPHEN K. BAILEY AND EDITH K. MOSHER. (Syracuse: The Syracuse University Press, 1968. Pp. 393. $10.00.)

"This is a study in public administration." These, the first words of Professors Bailey and Mosher in this exhaustive study of the Office of Education (USOE) and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), are wholly accurate but unduly modest. The book can be more accurately categorized as a study of public administration as an integral part of the political process. Such an approach is certainly not new, for we have been graced with the expanding literature of the Inter-University Case Program for nearly two decades (Professor Bailey having recently published a short ICP study on ESEA) and several general and theoretically directed works by Hyneman and Woll along with a few recently published anthologies with bureaucratic politics as their main focus. However, the Bailey and Mosher work is distinctive due to its analysis in depth of one situation involving a single administrative agency, its balance of focus on ESEA's pre-natal and post-natal history, and its careful mixture of descriptive-causal analysis with normative-prescriptive material. The fact that no study of such dimensions has yet appeared can be explained, in part, by the fact that only in recent years has the study of administration and politics developed the requisite maturity and depth of interest in the systematic measurement of revolutionary legislation on an administrative agency to make such investigations worthwhile.

Since it is likely that most students of public policy accept federal involvement in local education matters as a fact of life, most were not quick to recognize the adjustment crisis which ESEA caused for both USOE and for state and local school administrators. In consciously linking a sound educational system to the eradication of poverty, the law directed that most funds for elementary and secondary education be funnelled to school districts with high percentages of culturally and economically deprived children. Other sections provided funds for books and related instructional materials, for new experimental education centers, and for university and individual research projects.

Such challenges fostered much anxiety, frustration, and conflict within USOE and between USOE and external organizations affected by the law. The status quo is, due to both apathy and a natural fear of the unknown, preferred by many to the uncertainties and insecurity which could result from such sweeping changes in an agency's mission. The pre-ESEA period found USOE in an "old-line" status, characterized by hyper-specialization, a disjointed and irrational organizational structure, estrangement from its parent department (HEW), and gun-shyness due to constant bombardment by opponents of federal aid to education. ESEA necessitated more organizational integration, new blood at all levels and ranks, and a modernization of agency financial and management procedures. External conflict was met with a very intricate "give and take" between USOE and affected school officials, church spokesmen, and concerned interest groups, with USOE personnel demonstrating deplomacy and flexibility in adjusting programs to the administrative-political facts of life. Still, opposition from state and local school administrators was quite troublesome. USOE's insistence upon school desegregation as a prerequisite for program participation, its overly bureaucratic approach, and the timing for releasing funds all caused constant intergovernmental strain. While USOE officials expressed satisfaction over the first year's administrative record (to mid-June, 1966), the authors note that such self-defined success cannot be accurately assessed as yet.

While the book is strong on descriptive and causal analysis of ESEA's origin and early administration, it is equally strong on the analysis of both the adequacies and shortcomings of federal aid to education as it has evolved within the American political system. In reviewing a century of federal concern for education the authors conclude that, while today we are more able to appreciate the philosophical, political, religious, economic, and administrative problems associated with federal aid, we have failed to deal adequately with the important questions of proper public-parochial relations (basically because of the constitutional "limbo of uncertainty"), school desegregation, interagency administrative coordination, and with the relatively new challenge of tailoring educational policy to the needs of the poor. Striking a more positive note, they speak of how the case illustrates that an administrative agency can champion retionalist policies while remaining politically responsible. They cite how both advocates and critics of federal aid can take comfort from the ESEA story because the "administrative apparatus of a separation of powers, Federal, and politically diffuse polity, is too cumbersome for tyranny; too interdependent for anarchy." They note that "the bargaining processes of public administration" in the long run conform to prevailing social norms. This, they say, "makes reformers restive; but it also disturbs the satisfied from their callous slumbers." In graphically illustrating the "kaleidoscope of policy-making," ESEA was directed at mediating between opponents and proponents of federal aid "without unduly blunting the edge of true innovation . . . The real tailor was the bargaining processes of a domocratic polity shaped here and there by the unusual skills of a few cutters and seamstresses sensitive to emerging fashion."

There is, to be sure, abundant gloss to the book's style, especially when analysis is the major focus. But it is, above all, a very lucidly written work that calls for such expressive terminology to relate the honest assessment of the authors. In short, I find its style, depth, organization, and balance very appealing. Granted, it is a study of the experiences of one agency with an unusual challenge operating in an atypical political environment and, to that extent, it is not representative of the ledger of a typical agency with a routine mission. Yet the abnormalities of the situation help to underscore than amplify the intricacies of the American political system and enable the reader to appreciate the almost infinite complexities of the system, and to acquire an appreciation for the constant tug-of-war between administrative rationalism and political realism.

As a devotee of the case study as a teaching device, I must confess to a methodological bias on my part. I am also compelled to publicize my awareness of the tendency for some case study authors to become captivated by and overly appreciative of the system under study. While acknowledging the possibility that there may be some of this here, my feeling is that it is minimal if it exists at all. The book's major thesis is unquestionably valid and its contents true to its thesis. The unavoidable interdependence of politics and administration is portrayed with all its complexity, intrigue, confusion, and frustration. Students of public administration, legislation, public policy, and politics will undoubtedly argue as to whether the implications of this study give cause for optimism or pessimism. But let no one finish this book and argue against the thesis that the study of public administration, politics, and political theory are logically separate fields of inquiry. This book will serve many purposes for many political scientists, but above all it illustrates the inevitable interconnection of these areas, and it illustrates it very well.—WILLIAM L. MORROW, *DePauw University.*

Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era: Child Labor and the Law. BY STEPHEN B. WOOD. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. 320. $10.00.)

Stephen Wood's *Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era* is an extended, but incomplete, historical account of two episodes in the movement to regulate child labor by national legislation, the first culminating in *Hammer v. Dagenhart* (1918), barring the use of the commerce power for such purposes, the second ending in *Bailey v. Drexel* (1922) when the Supreme Court blocked a parallel effort based on the tax power. Wood presents a fuller study of some of the interest groups and individuals involved in these episodes than we have yet received. His work is nevertheless incomplete in at least the following respects: For reasons not made clear in the book, the research effort terminates with the Supreme Court's *Bailey* decision holding the child labor tax of 1919 unconstitutional. While reference is made to the *Darby* decision of 1941 upholding the child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, no effort is made to trace the legislative and judicial developments which led to this result. In addition, the volume leaves unexplained and unexplored the remarkable ineptitude, mismanagement or opposition to both child labor laws glimpsed in the account of the Justice Department's direction of the child labor cases through the courts. There are sharp studies of the counsel for the opponents of the legislation and of the egregious district court judge before whom both laws began their ill-fated adventures in the federal courts. There is near silence on the roles played by Solicitor General John W. Davis in the Dagenhart case and by Solicitor General James M. Beck in the Bailey case. Surely these apostles of limited government, the latter of whom could speak of the "perversion of federal powers" likely to result if the judiciary refused to inquire into the motives behind Congressional enactments, deserve as much attention as is given to James M. Emery, the brilliant and skillful general counsel of the National Association of Manufacturers, who supplied both direction and content to the first campaign of opposition to federal regulation of child labor.

It may well be that Wood conceives of his work as an intensive examination of one theme in the Progressive movement. If this is so, the work must be taxed for its complete neglect of the historiography of progressivism. Wood uses a simplistic dichotomy between "liberals" and "conservatives" as his fundamental classification of participants in the events he describes, going so far as to write without qualification of Justice Holmes as a "liberal," despite all the critical attention this old, if not hoary, chestnut has been given. He confounds, by unquestioning inattention, the designation of a political era (Progressivism) with a specific goal-orientation in politics (progressivism), thereby lightening his scholarly burden to the point where he can dismiss President Wilson's nomination of James C. McReynolds to the Supreme Court as a "mistake," without inquiring whether this phenomenon of Progressivism, like the presence of John W. Davis as Solicitor General in 1917, does not suggest a disjunction if not indeed an opposition between the Progressive Era and that policy of support for the needs of the depressed and disadvantaged designated as progressivism.

These reservations about the acuity of Wood's scholarly perceptions are unhappily reinforced by one of his more explicit methodological assumptions. He states that in using biographical data as sources of insight into the doctrinal positions of the justices he discusses, he will make inferences "only where what we know about factors influencing selection or explanatory of behavior appear to justify conclusions that transcend speculation" (118). What factors these are which are explanatory of behavior and yet transcend speculation does not appear from the impressionistic and fragmentary sketches Wood presents. The characterization of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Clarke as liberals is one result of this unspeculative method: Holmes and Brandeis voted, without separate opinions, in the eight-man majority that struck down the child labor tax; Clarke dissented in the same case, also without a written opinion. In this circumstance the characterization is a model of speculation unsupported by what "we know" of the rules of evidence and analytical reasoning. Wood writes as if he believes his documentary sources are so rich and so unambiguous in meaning that careful evaluation is unnecessary, a belief which would be folly in historians and a complete abdication of scholarly responsibility in political scientists.

One chapter of Wood's book is of a different order and demands special notice. "Judge and Company: Raising the Test Case," is an excellent study of the strategy and tactics of constitutional adjudication. Wood uses his sources—expecially the files of the National Child Labor Committee, and of the Department of Justice—to reconstruct the selection of the test case and the arrangement of an essentially friendly suit to test the constitutionality of the Keating-Owen Act. Effective resort to biographical data results in a detailed portrait of Judge James E. Boyd, the federal judge who presided in the case. The resulting trial and decision is at once a tribute to the skill with which opponents of the legislation sought to determine the outcome by control of "the issue, the judge, the particular circumstances and even the parties," (93) and a searching illumination of the extraordinary powers exercised by individual district court judges before the reforms of 1937 restricted them by requiring three-judge courts to sit in suits seeking injunctionive relief against allegedly unconstitutional Congressional acts. In the best sense of the phrase, this is "writing for the anthologies."

The contrast between this chapter and the remainder of the book is striking. The role of relevant groups, like the women's rights organizations, is minimized or ignored. Case analysis is pedestrian, painfully so when a footnote reference to T. R. Powell reminds us of five pages in which there is a sharper examination of the issues than in an equivalent number of chapters by Wood. Finally, an infelicity of expression is regrettably a fair indicator of the book's content. We read of "the Supreme Court's power of invalidity," (300) and find as a last paragraph the following lines, fully appropriate to support a negative assessment, but out of place as the last words in a scholarly endeavor:

> It is a commonplace of constitutional commentary to assert the controlling place of popularly determined policies in American democracy. However, the child labor history instructs—if nothing else—the vulnerability of this principle when conflict exists, as it almost always does, over "the extent of powers actually granted" Congress and over the purposes that government can legitimately pursue, whether the achievement of social welfare or the effectuation of equality.

[sic].—LEO WEINSTEIN, *Smith College.*

Negroes, Ballots and Judges: National Voting Rights Legislation in the Federal Courts. BY DONALD S. STRONG. (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1968. Pp. 100. $5.00.)

If the primary purpose of the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 was to enfranchise Negro citizens in the South, the efforts were futile. Donald Strong traces the attempts at implementing these laws through federal court action, and arrives at this conclusion.

The book is excellent as a reference source, both for the previously uncollected data and for the behavioral insights into legal processes in the area of Negro voting in the South. It includes a short summary of the 1957 and 1960 Acts, and that portion of the 1964 Bill relating to voting. Then comes an account of various instances of *official* discrimination which the federal government tried to resolve by suits. Firing of teachers involved in registration attempts, arrest, threats, actual beatings by sheriffs and deputies, and public harassment were among coercive devices employed. Registrars discriminated blantantly in literacy tests, and purges were conducted. Sheriffs refused to allow Negroes to pay their poll taxes. The Justice Department sought, and sometimes obtained, relief through cases on a county-by-county basis. Later, suits were filed against the entire states of Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana, claiming that the state laws were discriminatory *per se*.

There are few errors of commission in Strong's work; the author's shortcomings lie in the restrictive approach employed, and in the limited nature of his sources. He relies heavily on *Race Relations Law Reporter,* and largely ignores hearings and reports of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and numerous theses and dissertations on the subject. This causes him to omit reference to the coercion and intimidation which was heavily documented in these sources.

The other major section of the book, by far the best and most useful portion, deals with the problem of enforcement. Sometimes state legislatures, chiefly those of Alabama and Mississippi, tried to circumvent the federal acts by various methods—a sort of gamesmanship.

The other hindrance to enforcement was in the behavior of federal judges who openly professed to believe in segregation, and saw themselves as protectors of the White South. This superior section reveals the enormous role that these judges had in retarding or accelerating Negro enfranchisement. The author places on these men a major portion of the burden for failure of the 1957 and 1960 Acts, and the transfer of the responsibility from the judiciary to the executive branch in the resultant 1965 Voting Rights Act.

In this section, Strong's limited sources cause considerable error. He is hampered, as are all researchers in the field of Federal law, by the highly selective process by which Federal district court cases are included in the *Federal Supplement.* Less than twenty per cent of these opinions handed down are printed here. The rest are mimeographed or typed, and filed with clerks in various offices in each judge's district. Thus accurate quantitative research is extremely difficult.

For example, the author states that "Claude F. Clayton, the judge of the Northern District of Mississippi, appears to have handled only three cases in this area. Judge Clayton has a perfect record of ruling against the (Federal) Government—three to nothing." I was able to locate eleven cases against Mississippi officials; Clayton ruled for the federal government in eight of the eleven cases, and for state officials in only three cases—those listed by the author. Further, Clayton's language in these eight opinions was so strong that registrars were quite certain that harsh penalties would follow if they persisted in discriminatory practices. (The one registrar who tried was cited for contempt.) Similar errors concerning other judges are highly probable.

The author also ignores the role of the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in implementing the Civil Rights Acts. With a large part, possibly a majority, of these nine appellate judges being staunch segregationists, Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle had to carefully manipulate assignments to the three-judge courts on crucial cases. When his judgment failed, so did the efforts of the Federal Government.

The epilogue, a four-page comparison of the results of the 1965 Voting Rights Act with the previous efforts, is emphatic, but somewhat lacking. The author's premises that the older Acts were failures, and the 1965 Bill a success, are easily amenable to empirical testing. Negro registration *has* grown, largely as a result of the bill. This should have been documented more fully, and would have been a more credible put-down for those who contended Negroes did not register and vote because "they just don't care."—STEVE WHITAKER, *Temple University.*

The Jurisprudence of John Marshall. BY ROBERT K. FAULKNER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. 307. $10.00.)

The story (apocryphal?) is told that when John Marshall was Chief Justice (1801-1835) he would, on many a judicial occasion, turn to Story (Mr. Justice) and say: "This is the law, now find the precedents for it." A century later, in participating in a celebration of Marshall's accession to the Chief Justiceship, Oliver Wendell Holmes (then on the bench of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts) noted that ". . . If American law were to be represented by a single figure, sceptic and worshipper alike would agree without dispute that the figure would be one alone, and that one, John Marshall. The former statement obviously implies that if Marshall was indeed a great Chief Justice it was merely because he happened to preside over a Court that was writing large segments of the law of the land. The latter statement just as obviously implies that Marshall's individual contributions to American jurisprudence, as revealed in his opinions, justify the accolade expressed.

The beauty of Robert K. Faulkner's *The Jurisprudence of John Marshall* is that he does more than develop these two possible interpretations. He does even more than merely set his goal toward some kind of reconciliation of Marshall the statesman and Marshall the jurist. What he has done is to create a study in depth "of one comprehensive political, economic, and legal persuasion by which the Constitution is to be interpreted" and through that study to explore and set forth Marshall's jurisprudence. On one level that "jurisprudence revolved about the Constitution of the United States as understood at its framing, varied somewhat with great events and changing conditions in America, and encompassed practical skills in application as well as knowledge of the broad principles of American law." As such it might be said to be an early form of American pragmatism so vitally necessary in building a new nation and hence not a system of philosophic jurisprudence in the sense that "detailed prescriptions for the problems of our times" (today) can be extrapolated. But it is Professor Faulkner's worthy contribution to add to this generally accepted denominator a new value: and that is that Marshall developed "a Lockean interpretation of liberty and law which is separated from neither moral considerations nor a certain kind of political wisdom, and takes into account, moreover, America's peculiar conditions." Thus on a much higher and worthwhile level Marshall seemingly founded a legal philosophy that makes American law, American political thought, and American history an entity in its own right.

To achieve this end, and to achieve it with the distinction that Professor Faulkner gives to it, would seemingly be an insurmountable task. For one, it was necessary to avoid producing just another treatise on American Constitutional Law. For another, the facts about Marshall have already produced such a vast literature that one might instinctively say what more can be added. For still another, Marshall's own writings, aside from his judicial decisions, are either missing, scattered, or dull—and the mere fact, for example, that Professor Faulkner has mined the volumes of Marshall's *Life of Washington* merits high praise in and of itself.

Despite these obstacles Professor Faulkner has produced a most stimulating, thought provoking, and readable book which at one and the same time uses all that is known to add a new dimension about Marshall himself as well as about the American legal system and the society it is meant to serve. With real ingenuity Professor Faulkner has in reality written six essays (four in the text itself and two as appendixes)—each an important study in its own right—bound together by an era and a man. Instead of using the Constitution as text and analyzing Marshall's concept of say the commerce clause or the contract clause or whatever, we have here a bolder and more difficult undertaking: how did Marshall (and his era) conceive of such things as "Liberty, Interest, and Empire"; of Sovereign Government"; of "The Republic"; of "The Court and The Constitution"; and how did he instill them into the marrow of America while performing his task as Chief Justice participating in the task of expounding the Constitution as a legal and political document for a new nation. In the final analysis the values inherent in making these concepts meaningful are the enduring ones. They are the ones by which a people must live and be known. For any text, even a Constitution, can seemingly shift its emphasis as time dictates, as witnessed, for example, by the diminution of the contract clause in the wake of due process and equal protection. And it is through his development of these values in these areas that Marshall created his jurisprudence.

Yet Professor Faulkner is obviously too competent a scholar to present Marshall's jurisprudence in historical perspective alone as based on Locke and "natural rights". He recognizes that Marshall is now conceived to be the "older jurisprudence" and as a leitmotif (Appendix) examines its replacement: ". . . the assertion of social expediency as the standard of judicial decision, the doctrine of judicial deference, the change from the primacy of property rights to that of free speech, the rise of moral skepticism, sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, and many other things now widely taken for granted"—a "Holmesian victory" as he calls it. His analytical study of both Holmes and Marshall transcends a mere plaintiff appeal not to downgrade John Marshall. It is rather a plea for a greater understanding and comprehension that "the most fundamental concerns of the American order" must by founded, if they are to be dealt with in a manner that will endure, on a "moral, political, and legal philosophy," for it is only by a deep rooted philosophy that America's "purposes, its character, even its institutions" can be saved from "aimlessness and degradation."

And no better place can be found for such a reexamination and reappraisal than in Robert Faulkner's *The Jurisprudence of John Marshall*.—BENJAMIN MUNN ZIEGLER, *Amherst College*.

The Politics of Mental Health: Organizing Community Mental Health in Metropolitan Areas. BY ROBERT H. CONNERY *et al.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 595. $10.00.)

The Politics of Mental Health is a study of problems concerning the implementation of the Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act of 1963. Supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health, the study developed from discussions in NIMH's Committee on Social and Environmental Variables as Determinants of Mental Health. It reflects a growing interest among mental health specialists in social and community conditions of mental health. (For one student's satirical treatment of community mental health see *Transaction,* July-August, 1968.) The book includes separately authored case studies by local academic observers in Houston, Seattle, New Orleans, Syracuse, Boston, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. Analysis is based on data from published reports, records, and interviews with local observers and participants. Most of the data were collected in 1963-1964.

The Politics of Mental Health is partly a guide to community mental health action and partly an analysis of such action. As a guide to community mental health action, and to the implementation of the 1963 act, the book is an interesting discussion of obstacles and problems, and ways to overcome obstacles and problems. The Houston, Seattle, and Minneapolis-St. Paul studies seemed especially interesting to this reviewer. One of the main obstacles considered in the book is governmental fragmentation; but others are also considered. For example, difficulties in defining "mental health" and "community" are described. Also described are (1) problems stemming from the scattering of mental health functions among federal, state, and local governments (2) the splintering of mental health functions among several agencies at the same governmental level (3) problems of community financing and staffing and (4) the impact of community power structures. As a discussion of obstacles and ways to overcome them, *The Politics of Mental Health* should be a source of helpful ideas for mental health activists in other cities.

As an analysis of community action, however, the book has several shortcomings. The persons interviewed are not specified, and the nature of the data collected in the interviews is often unclear. With their data, and other evidence available to them, the researchers are forced to make logical guesses, plausible assumptions, and "stopgap assessments" about the impact of various factors, combined or separately, on the implementation of the 1963 act. No quantitative analysis is presented, and the book is not put in a broad theoretical context. No common research design is used in the case studies, although similar questions are pursued. None of the many models of community action analysis, or policy analysis—such as those used by Paul A. Miller, Delbert C. Miller, Kaufman, Banfield, Green and Mayo, or Dye—are used, or even mentioned. Mention is made, however, of professional, community, and federal "inputs" and of the impact of community environments on mental health. But variables affecting local mental health action are not systematically classified as political system and environmental variables, mental health system and non-mental health system variables, or community and extra-community variables. The findings are not systematically compared with other findings on community action, urban policy, or governmental fragmentation. Few recent studies by political scientists are discussed or even cited. In the six summary chapters only seven studies published later than 1964 are cited. None of the seven studies are by political scientists, and none were published later than 1966.

The senior author's preface claims only that *The Politics of Mental Health* should be valuable to mental health administrators and political leaders who must deal with mental health problems in their communities. I agree with this statement of its value. It should sensitize mental health activists to practical obstacles to the achievement of their goals. If it does *The Politics of Mental Health* will make an important contribution to community mental health action. Activists in other fields have often proceeded on the assumption that the only thing needed to achieve their goals was to publish a meritorious, above-politics plan and sit back while the plan sold itself.—BRETT W. HAWKINS, *University of Georgia.*

The Warren Court & Its Critics. BY CLIFFORD M. LYTLE. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1968. Pp. 233. $5.00.)

Clifford Lytle's goal is "to bring a degree of analytical order" to the criticisms which have been levied against the Supreme Court and "to project the attacks . . . into a manageable framework so that they may be better understood." (p. xi) His study spans a period beginning with the School Segregation Cases in 1954 and ending with the Miranda Case in 1966. Attention is given to the attacks on the Court engendered by its decisions in the areas of race relations, church-state separation, legislative apportionment, national security and rights of defendants.

Lytle's framework distinguishes two aspects of the attacks on the Court: the sources of criticism and the nature or rationale of the criticism. To begin with the latter, Lytle recognizes four bases for attacks on the Court. These are discordant social philosophy, intra-governmental conflict, decisional obstruction, and the operation of the judicial process. The first three categories are dubbed "result-oriented" criticisms and the last is viewed as "process-oriented" criticism.

One is hard pressed to find in Lytle's discussion the criteria which distinguish clearly the three categories of result-oriented criticism. The category of "discordant social philosophy" is, for instance, defined as embracing "ideological dissent which involves economic, political sociological and psychological differences." (p. 3) But it seems obvious that the "intra-governmental conflict" category involves ideological differences on a political matter, the proper distribution of authority between the branches of the national government and between the national government and the states. Similarly, the distinction between the "intra-governmental conflict" and "decisional obstruction" categories is unclear. The latter focuses "not so much on a positive struggle for power as on elimination of a 'functional obstruction.' This type of attack generally stems from those governmental agencies which have been hindered in the full and free exercise of their functions as a result of certain Supreme Court decisions." (p. 4) It is unclear whether the Court's 14th Amendment defendant's rights cases fall into this category or into the "intra-governmental conflict" category inasmuch as they impose restrictions on the "full and free exercise" of state executive and judicial functions while also pitting federal judicial power against state authority.

Lytle categorizes the sources of criticism as the Congress, interest groups, state government agencies, state and federal law enforcement agencies, and professional groups and their members. In the latter category he includes judges and academicians as well as bar associations. An important omission in his list of critics is the public. There are not available a substantial body of survey data and a number of excellent scholarly writings on the public's attitude toward the Supreme Court. These suggest some discrimination by at least the attentive public between the defendant's rights cases and School Prayer Cases, which tend to be disapproved, and the race relations and reapportionment cases, which tend to have at least majority support. The public's role as a critic of the Supreme Court ought not to be overlooked in a volume of this kind, both because of the implications for legislative efforts to curb the Court and the implications for the question raised by Dahl and other political scientists about the Court's proper role in a democratic society.

Even readers, such as this reviewer, who strongly favor the recent directions in Supreme Court policy-making will be disturbed by Lytle's treatment of the Court's critics. Lytle time and again dismisses criticism of the Court as "irrational" or "politically motivated" or "emotional" or "shallow" or "not judicially presented." In introductory and concluding sections of the book, he suggests that criticism may play an important role in the political process. (pp. 5, 111) But nowhere does he articulate the criteria which distinguish such valuable criticism from that which is to be viewed as unworthy, thus leaving the reader confused about how the author arrived at his judgements.

At some points the author runs afoul of his own rhetoric. He severely rebukes the Southern critics of the Court for "guilt-by-association" tactics because they attempt to link the Court to left-wing groups and viewpoints, particularly in the race relations cases. (pp. 16–17, 95) Elsewhere, however, admittedly reputable critics of the Court are chastized by associating them with the most reckless of the Court's opponents. Thus the action of the ABA's House of Delegates in adopting in 1959 resolutions critical of the Court's decisions in the national security area was "entirely proper" when "taken out of context" but must nonetheless be condemned because "the timing . . . all but nullified the good intentions" and "contributed an air of legitimacy not only to the well-intended critics of the Court, but also to those who had made reckless attacks." (p. 99)

Despite the disagreements between this reviewer and Lytle at a number of points cited above, it must be noted that Lytle's volume is well written and very well researched. It provides an excellent commentary on the development of controversial lines of cases and the responses of some of the critics. This will be helpful to teachers of civil liberties, including this one. Such a use is, however, limited by the weaknesses in the conceptual framework, the organization and the objectivity of the presentation.—DAVID ADAMANY, *Wesleyan University.*

Double Jeopardy and the Federal System. BY LEONARD G. MILLER. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, Pp. 152. $9.75.)

In United States v. Lanza, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unanimous Supreme Court, upheld the federal prosecution of defendants who had already been convicted by a state court for the same acts charged in the federal indictment. Although no justice had dissented in the case, J. A. C. Grant launched a vigorous attack upon the decision and the dual sovereignty rule which underlay it. Thirty-seven years later, in 1959, the Supreme Court reexamined the dual sovereignty rule in Abbate v. United States and Bartkus v. Illinois. The Court, through Justice Frankfurter in Bartkus and Justice Brennan in Abbate, affirmed the Lanza doctrine but this time Justice Black, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Douglas, dissented. Unconvinced by the majority, Walter T. Fisher, counsel for Bartkus, continued his arguments in the law reviews. Now Leonard G. Miller has joined the debate.

Double Jeopardy and the Federal System is a defense of the dual sovereignty rule and in a sense it is also a detailed rebuttal to J. A. C. Grant's attack, the Black dissents, and some of Fisher's arguments. Since the author focusses upon the dual sovereignty rule, he does not explore the intricacies of double jeopardy *per se* but rather only those special possibilities of successive prosecutions which arise from the federal system. Professor Miller agrees with the results in Abbate and Bartkus because they rest upon a "110 year old formulation." Indeed the decisions were an obvious response to considerations of "*stare decisis,* judicial self-restraint, effective law enforcement and the pre-requisites of federalism." In support of these conclusions the author devotes the major part of his book to tracing the origins and history of the dual sovereignty rule in judicial adjudication and to analyzing the Bartkus and Abbate cases.

The dual sovereignty rule, he concedes, does not by any means ensure just results in every case yet, assuming the value of punishing the guilty to be as great as that of freeing the innocent, less injustice will arise from retention of the rule than from its rejection. In earlier cases courts have exercised their education function to mention the possibilities of injustice and to suggest that other branches of the government guard against them. Steps have been taken. Through the doctrine of preemption and through flexibility in sentencing the courts themselves have mitigated some of the potential harshness in the rule. Congress and some twenty states have responded by erecting statutory bars to successive federal-state prosecutions under certain circumstances. Prosecutors may also avoid such successive prosecutions by adopting standard operating procedures or by exercising individual discretion to avoid those successive prosecutions which will not effectuate justice. Exercise of such discretion is particularly feasible within the framework of the traditional cooperation between federal and state law enforcement officials.

Since the success of these attempts to mitigate the potential harshness of successive prosecutions seems important to the author's conclusions, more discussion of such attempts and empirical evidence regarding them would have been welcome to this reviewer. However, the interesting subject, "Prosecutor's Discretion" is disposed of in five pages which are devoted mainly to the directive, issued by Attorney General Rogers a few days after the Supreme Court, handed down its Bartkus and Abbate decisions, instructing federal attorneys to continue avoiding successive prosecutions except under compelling circumstances.

This book, a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation, is a careful and exhaustive study within its selected limits. The materials of research consist almost entirely of the facts and reasoning in cases, arguments of counsel, legislation and law review articles. As approached, the subject does not lend itself to the newer methods employed in much research regarding the courts nor are such methods used. *Double Jeopardy and the Federal System* illuminates one segment of the constitutional law dealing with persons accused of crime. This segment has resisted the revisionism which has affected other parts of the general area and if Leonard G. Miller's arguments are heeded that revisionism will not be the wave of the future for the dual sovereignty rule.—THORNTON C. SINCLAIR, *University of Houston.*

The Australian Ballot: The Story of an American Reform. By L. E. Fredman. (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1968. Pp. 150. $5.75.)

In the post-civil War era, *laissez-faire* ideas prevailed in politics as well as in economics, and the notion that government should become involved in the printing and distribution of ballots was novel, and indeed radical. But in the late 1880's the hour for this reform suddenly arrived. In 1888 the states of Kentucky (for the city of Louisville only) and Massachusetts adopted legislation providing for an official ballot listing all offices and candidates, available only at the polling place, to be marked there by the voter in secret. Within four years, 36 other states enacted similar laws, and by 1910 the Australian ballot was being used in all but two states.

L. E. Fredman, who teaches history at the University of Newcastle in New South Wales, has written a brief account of the origin of this kind of ballot in Australia, its subsequent adoption in Great Britain, and its rapid acceptance in the United States. He finds that credit for first adoption should go to the state of Victoria, which preceded South Australia by one month (in 1856) though the idea had been advocated in both states during the preceding five years.

The Australian ballot was espoused by Americans from many social and political groups who shared an antipathy for the party organizations of their day. Henry George published one of the first articles advocating it while editing a California newspaper. Richard Henry Dana III, Boston aristocrat, was the prime mover in securing adoption in Massachusetts. Grover Cleveland gave his unqualified endorsement in a major address between his first and second terms. In many states, labor unions provided the main organized support. The midwestern Populists put the Australian ballot in their platform.

In opposition were most of the party bosses. Cleveland's arch-foe, Governor David B. Hill, eloquently denounced the system when he vetoed the first bill to pass the legislature. But popular support appears to have grown rapidly, and one party or the other was likely to endorse the reform in a close election. The only Republican to cast a negative vote in New York's lower house was boss Thomas Platt.

Of course the reformers soon found that the machines were not to be overturned by revision of election-day procedures. They appear to have assumed that the venal voters had so little honor that the secret ballot would make vote-buying impractical, and that the parties would stop assessing the candidates if government relieved them of the cost of printing ballots. But there were plenty of other party expenses for the candidates to defray; and, while some improvements in election-day behavior occurred, it is hard to tell whether these were due to the reform or to more basic social changes. In fact, Fredman's account is spiced with references to another import from Australia—the "Tasmanian dodge" or endless chain, which enabled a precinct captain to provide each paid or intimidated voter with a completely marked ballot, once a single official ballot had been spirited out of the polling place.

Fredman's approach is that of a historian, and he has made good use of manuscripts and contemporary periodicals in describing the adoption of the reform in Australia and several American states, with special attention to the leading personalities in each case. A few dates in some of the standard texts could well be revised on the basis of his work. But much of the book is devoted to a very sketchy treatment of two large subjects—the social characteristics and political ideas of the upper-class, intellectual reformers who provided much of the leadership and publicity for the Australian ballot; and the assortment of electoral reforms that accompanied or succeeded it (direct primary, control of campaign expenditures, initiative, referendum, etc.). Historians will find little new here, and political scientists will find that they must still turn to older works, such as that of Specer D. Albright, for information on the kinds of voting that preceded the Australian ballot, the historical process by which the new system finally became universal in this country, and the widely varying responses that the states made to the many questions of ballot design and administration.

Fredman suggests that two further reforms—the short ballot and the nonpartisan appointment of election officials—are needed to realize the hopes of those who first advanced the Australian ballot. But perhaps a more pertinent and useful extension of their philosophy, in the light of current conditions, would be governmental assumption of some responsibility for providing voters with information about candidates. Public financing of campaign publicity, suggested long ago by Theodore Roosevelt, appears to be as much needed today as was public provision of ballots in 1888.—Henry Bain, *Washington Center for Metropolitan Studying.*

Voting and Nonvoting: Implications of Broadcasting Returns Before Polls Are Closed. By Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang. (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. 172. $2.50.)

Election night broadcasts which feature computerized projections of voting results have raised a rather serious policy question concerning the possible impact of these broadcasts on potential voters on the West Coast. In an election year, such as 1964, when the landslide dimensions of the eastern vote can become known to westerners before they go to the polls, it might be assumed that many on the west coast would simply not bother to vote. Thus, with modern communications methods, the results of an election could be influenced by those very results—or at least the projections of those results.

In order to test the effect of these election night broadcasts on voting behavior in 1964, Land and Lang studied late voters selected from sample precincts in the East Bay area of California. These respondents were interviewed during the week immediately following the election (while memories of election day were still fresh). As a control, the Langs also surveyed a sample of late voters in similar precincts in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, where polls closed before network election coverage began. Ohio was selected since it was also a pivotal state in the presidential contest and also had a highly publicized senatorial contest similar to the Salinger-Murphy race in California.

In general, this is a rather well-conceived research design. Some might argue that a panel design should have been used, rather than just an after-election study. Lang and Lang deal with that argument, citing especially the spurious turnover effects inherent in panel studies.

The major findings of the study should not be surprising to those who, like the Langs, are familiar with the short-term effects of mass media: the election night coverage by the networks was inconsequential in altering voting behavior. Lang and Lang found only one demoralized Goldwater supporter who lost all interest in voting after hearing about the lopsided Johnson margin. In an interesting chapter on "Nonvoting and the Nonvoter," the Langs go on to document the null effects of the broadcasts on turnout. Since the study employed registration lists as sampling frames, it was possible to perform a very careful check on reported voting and non-voting of respondents. The study also explored the possibility of bandwagon effects and/or sympathy votes. Neither type of voting change was discovered.

The authors explain these null findings by what they call the "law of minimal consequences." In essence, the potential voter, if he listens to these broadcasts at all, perceives them within a nexus of other factors. His political attitudes such as involvement and intensity of candidate choice, his previous expectations about the election outcome—perhaps informed by polls and other news—all affect perceptions of election returns. Other factors, such as a close senatoral race, can mitigate the effects of presidential returns.

Lang and Lang explore in some depth the social-psychological factors associated with early knowledge of election returns. Although behavioral change was not manifest, attitudinal changes did take place. In particular, some respondents reported that, upon hearing news of the returns, they were less eager to vote. This was especially true of those who felt certain that the network projections were correct, and also of those whose previous expectations about the outcome were invalidated. The authors continually warn of the implications of their findings on future elections. As the technology of election night projections becomes more reliable and thus more credible to the public, the potential for non-voting becomes greater.

For those interested in utility models of voter choice, Lang and Lang offer a chapter which should prove of some interest. What happens to voters who believe that the utility of their vote is approaching zero? This utilitarian factor is contrasted with other explanations of voting choice based on social-psychological dimensions (partisanship and civic-mindedness). Unfortunately, the measures used are quite weak. "Whether it makes a great deal of difference who won" is used for both utility and partisanship measures; there is no measure of party identification, etc. But more importantly, the data do not shed light on the major proposition we would like to test—that utility changes with certainty of outcome.

In all, this is an excellent, informative study for those interested in the policy questions regarding the delaying of election night broadcasts—indeed that was the purpose of the study. In addition, it offers some useful new information for students of voting behavior.—David E. RePass, *University of Minnesota*.

Government Contracting and Technological Change. By Clarence H. Danhoff. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968. Pp. 472, $8.75.)

In 1954 Don K. Price wrote a perceptive essay on "Federalism by Contract," (*Government and Science*, Ch. III), bringing to our attention the fact that the federal government's research and development programs were creating a new dimension in public administration—the use of nonfederal contractors (business firms and universities) to perform government work. When Price wrote, about half of R&D was contracted out; by the 1960's the proportion had grown to 80 per cent, where it remains today.

With federal R&D expenditures running at a $17 billion annual level, accounting for two-thirds of all R&D in the United States, and drawing the presumably autonomous spheres of industry and higher education into novel relationships of interdependence with government, one might have thought that political scientists would have ploughed this ground thoroughly as an area of both practical importance and theoretical interest because of its implications for the conception of pluralism as a system of diverse, autonomous sets of institutions. Such, however, has not been the case. With the exception of scattered articles and a recent book on atomic energy contracting, we have not followed up Price's lead.

Danhoff's book is therefore to be welcomed as the first sustained treatment of the phenomenon of contracting-out for research and development. More descriptive than analytical, it comprises an excellent background reference for the student of government on both the substance of R&D programs and the processes of contracting-out.

Before World War II, legislation and regulations circumscribed governmental procurement contracts rather tightly. The fixed-price, competitive bid system was the norm and almost the exclusive instrument. This was satisfactory for the purchase of Army shoes and civilian typewriters, but broke down during World War II when the need was for the development of new weapons for which no specifications existed. Danhoff details well the gradual shift over to Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) negotiated contracts and the accompanying rise in the proportion of extra-to intra-murally performed R&D works (Chs. II-IV). After a summary of the roles played by the President and Congress in R&D policy formation (Ch. V), he describes in considerable depth the range of relationships between government agencies and the four categories of contractors: business firms, universities, not-for-profits, and government-owned contract research centers (Chs. VI-IX). These chapters are valuable for rheir detail (and for their bibliographic footnotes) and also constitute a useful introduction to the complexities of the subject for those not already familiar with it.

Given the author's evident intention—to produce a factual guide to the processes, policies and problems of R&D contracting—the book is quite successful. One can still wish, however, that one who had looked at the field in depth would have speculated at greater length on the larger impact on governmental processes and the political system. The material for extrapolation is there. For example, Danhoff notes (pp. 183–184) that by calling in private institutions, government "expands the technical abilities directed to the problem, increases the alternatives to be considered, and may generate more participation by private groups and individuals in the debate" over program development. So far, so good. But he also calls to our attention that (p. 4)

> government has relied upon private institutions, not only to carry out projects already judged necessary, but also to suggest how its objectives might best be achieved, and even what the objectives might or should be.

This is the larger significance of contracting-out, as it is extended from military hardware development to strategic advice, to the operation of domestic soical programs (e.g., Job Corps centers contracted to business firms). The processes of government policy formation are being altered, perhaps radically, and the distinction between private and public in our polity is rapidly becoming meaningless. What do these developments portend? While Danhoff (an economist) does not grapple with this type of question, his book provides much information relevant to a needed examination of an important political system development.—MICHAEL D. REAGAN, *University of California, Riverside.*

Poverty and Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Farm Security Administration. BY SIDNEY BALDWIN. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968. Pp. 438. $10.00.)

Sidney Baldwin has written a major book. In a clear and forceful style, and armed with 18 years of exhaustive research in the primary materials, including 43 interviews, he has analyzed the best part of the agricultural New Deal, the Farm Security Administration (FSA). Formed in 1937 out of antecedent agencies, crippled in 1943, the FSA was replaced in 1946 by the Farmers Home Administration which emerged chastened and "remained . . . docile . . . , attracting none of the enmities of the FSA, but also evoking much less of the excitement and hope that characterized its embattled predecessor."

In 1937–1943, the FSA dealt rather successfully with poverty in agriculture. Its "conservative" Tenant Purchase program had started some 40,000 tenants toward farm ownership by 1943, and its controversial Resettlement Program had tried to place some 10,000 farm families—small numbers in view of 6 million census farmers.

Meanwhile the Rural Rehabilitation (RR) program of FSA made loans and/or grants to approximately one million farm families in dire poverty, outside the ordinary public-private credit systems, often ridden with disease, always poorly educated and frequently semi-literate or less. In 1943, nevertheless, 75 per cent of them had paid back their loans or were fully current. The new social invention of supervised credit, including the joint bank account and the farm and home plan printed on reverse sides of a single sheet, and technical assistance had been successful—and were to be useful in some less developed countries. FSA reinforced them with ingenious programs of debt adjustment, group medical care, and producer and consumer cooperatives. Thus FSA proved that even society's outcasts could be reached and helped. Paternalistic? Maybe. John D. Black put it better: "You have to lead them by the hand." To their ever-lasting glory, Rex Tugwell, Will Alexander, Paul Appleby, Beanie Baldwin, Pete Hudgens, Jim Maddox, and their patriotic colleagues reached out a hand to those who were sore in need.

"Success" did not mean that the problem was solved. In 1967 President Johnson's Commission on Rural Poverty found millions still living in circumstances that were a "national disgrace" and asserted that urban riots "had their roots, in considerable part, in rural poverty." Had the reactionaries in Congress, in the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), and in the USDA been unable to beat the FSA to its knees, our urban travail might be much less. To be sure, FSA would have had to devise different methods of dealing with the poor as the situation changed; but the imagination shown in the 1930's might well have sufficed! Future attacks on poverty problems will be informed by Baldwin's impressive study, especially by his political and administrative analysis of the triumphs and mistakes (part of the mistakes may have been what Thaddeus Snow called FSA's "bad manners"; but I doubt it. FSA had to be aggressive to get anywhere, in my judgment; and the greatest error would be to confuse FSA's executioners with "gentlemen," Southern or otherwise.)

The FSA story fully justifies even more than the qualified encomiums of the book's last three paragraphs. We need more of Tugwell's "defiant and blasphemous faith" and less concern about "administrative minutiae [and] . . . institutional equilibrium, maintenance, and survival."

Chapters II through VI superbly describe farm poverty and tell the story through the creation of FSA. In chapter VII on "The FSA in Action," generally excellent, I missed an examination of regional differences in administration which might have compared Ernest A. Morgan's more vigorous attack on rural poverty in Alabama and the South East with the more cautious approaches of regions administered from Raleigh and Little Rock. Morgan dug more deeply into "the lower third of the lower third", I believe, and tried harder to reach Negro families. But then Morgan had the staunch support of the Bankheads and Richard Russell, whereas the Raleigh region was saddled with Senators McKellar and Byrd. In chapters VIII and X, despite the careful discussion of FSA's comparative disadvantages, I missed an examination of FSA's workload which ran between 100 and 125 RR families—an unwieldy number, considering the amount of individual counseling needed.

I am puzzled by the statement (p. 237) that Extension, the Forest Service, the AAA, and the SCS made up 30 per cent of the USDA's budget in 1937. Rather, I am sure that the price-support, production-control programs of the USDA have consistently accounted for some two-thirds of USDA's annual expenditures—a fact that has helped make the AAA and successors central in agricultural politics. Again, I should moderate the criticism of FSA for not fully exploiting the potential political support of local committees. AAA's committees became the priesthood of parity; SCS developed, an organization of district supervisors with political muscle. These and other agencies, however, could directly organize the more influential farmers. But FSA's clients were as out of it politically as they were economically and socially. FSA advisory committeemen I met in 1941 were much more interested in their Production Credit Associations!

All these points are dwarfed by my admiration for Baldwin's book. FSA's administrative aspects as well discussed, including the uses of governmental information programs (p. 117–118). Congressional relationships are fully treated, especially in regard to Congressional group alignments (p. 321), and the superior strength of the House of Representatives in finally crippling FSA (p. 381 and 386). The book deals comprehensively not only with FSA's relationships to blacks but also to Japanese-Americans after Pearl Harbor. The politically crucial migratory farm labor program is examined. The shortrun advantage and the long-run disaster in the lack of a sound base in legislation are shown. Perhaps above all, the significant role of strategic individuals (for good or ill) is persistently underlined.

Finally, I turn to Baldwin's use of social science theory, beginning in chapter I which, however, concludes that "the scholar's concern with political and administrative means and methods . . . [contains] danger of neglecting substantive ends; and without some attention to such ends, the study of politics and administration may lose its substantive soul . . . Politics and government are inconceivable and meaningless on an uninhabited desert island" (page 16). Subsequently, Baldwin's faithful references to theory are relevant enough but usually add little to his analysis. Indeed, the power and precision of his analytical narrative is often underscored by the frail and diffuse models he adduces. Exceptions are chiefly references to Paul Appleby which always illuminate Baldwin's interpretation.—CHARLES M. HARDIN, *University of California, Davis.*

California's Prodigal Sons: Hiram Johnson and the Progressives, 1911–1917. BY SPENCER C. OLIN, JR. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. Pp. 253. $6.95.)

For California, Hiram Johnson is the home politicus par excellence. No governor, before or since, has had such a profound impact on the political process and style of the State. In the preface to what is a short, clearly written monograph, Olin says he will focus on "the impressive gubernatorial administration of Hiram Johnson, and Johnson's role as a popular and extremely effective governor." In a lively narrative, Olin links together the major political events associated with Johnson's tenure in California (1911–1917): emergence and election as governor, important executive and legislative reforms, "Bull Moose" campaign, and in most detail, the circumstances of the 1916 Hughes defeat. More than six years in preparation, the monograph—a revised history dissertation—is exhaustively documented, with interpretations closely related to available scholarship. To the general reader, Olin presents an interesting and reliable historical account of the conspicuous political events of the Hiram Johnson era in California.

Beyond these noted achievements, however, the monograph proves disappointing. Written to update George Mowry's excellent *California Progressives* (1951), Olin does little more than add footnotes from new manuscript collections and recent dissertations; otherwise, nowhere does Olin attempt major departures or reinterpretations of Mowry. By design moreover, Olin eschews explanation in favor of description—"primary concern is with practice rather than ideology." The result is a facile exercise, however accurate, of historical journalism. At best, the monograph should be viewed as a modestly revised supplement rather than a serious rival to Mowry's work.

To a political scientist, the monograph reads much like an early article in *APSR* or *PSQ*. The book is resolutely descriptive, stressing specific events and avoiding concerns of concept or method. The framework for inquiry appears to be a chronological interest in Johnson's political adventures and reforms. The result is that Olin's selective tour through history lacks apparent direction, raising and abandoning ad hoc themes. Perhaps false hopes are created by the few historians most political scientists commonly read, for example, Benson and Hofstadter. But particularly when the subjects are electoral, legislative, and executive politics, the absence of even the most general findings or observations of political science becomes disturbing. Certainly Olin's statements about election results or "the means by which Johnson sought and won through politics" could benefit from more analytical attention.

Perhaps the most important disappointment was Olin's decision to identify and order events without devoting close attention to his stated focus on the Johnson administration. For in six years, Hiram Johnson led the State to adopt what was then a "radical" list of reforms. The State House record included direct primaries, nonpartisan elections for cities and counties, cross-filing, initiative, referendum, and recall, controls of public utilities, workmen's compensation, conversation of natural resources, comprehensive civil service law, establishment of a legal minimum wage for women and children, and many others. These measures profoundly changed the character and content of the politics of California. How and why Johnson was so signally successful are questions that merit the closest attention, but these unfortunately are not the concerns of Olin—Johnson's political tactics, strategies, goals, and style are, for the most part, left to the inferences of the reader.

Such criticism should be kept in perspective, for Olin's credentials and approach are not those of a political scientist, and perhaps more important, the literature we can offer on California politics is quite limited and with few exceptions, highly descriptive. Except in introductory textbooks for the lucrative junior and state college market, few political scientists have devoted any sustained attention to *California*. None have attempted anything like Seymour Lipset's *First New Nation* or even Duane Lockard's *New England State Politics*. Protests aside, most of the literature is singularly ahistorical. Thus, Olin's monograph is a useful reminder of the importance of the historical context on the practice and ideology of a state's politics. For Olin accurately scores the Johnson deeds and major political events between 1911–1917; and this description should provoke the serious reader to ask the more critical questions about political change and the "authoritative allocation of values" in California. Yet this reviewer hopes that in the future, Olin will use his demonstrated skills in research and writing to clarify and search for explanations rather than report on the news stories of political history.—RONALD O. LOVERIDGE, *U. of Cal. at Riverside.*

Moment in the Sun: A Report on the Deteriorating Quality of The American Environment. BY ROBERT AND LEONA TRAIN RIENOW. (New York: Dial Press, 1967. Pp. 286. $6.00.)

This book is reviewed here particularly because of the demand made at the APSA conference, 1968, for greater policy relevance in our journals. In terms of the concern, underlying that demand, the Rienows' book may well be more important than anything else published by professional political scientists in this generation; the only book which I recollect having reacted to similarly in my lifetime is Myrdal's *American Dilemma*. Yet, *Moment In the Sun* has not, to my knowledge, been reviewed in any social science journal; as it stands, there are understandable reasons why this should be so; and, by one of the characteristic ironies of political ideology, it is likely that the proponents of a "more relevant" political science will be less receptive to its emphases than their less relevance-conscious colleagues!

For, essentially, it makes an extremely comprehensive indictment of the whole notion of economic growth and technological progress as this is generally admired in the United States today. In making their indictment, they have placed in perspective many discrete items of which we are in general only aware as specifics. They have shown how the deterioration of the environment and the reduction in many ways of the quality of life is a consequence of *ungoverned* technology.

The approach is, of course, ecological. The environment is becoming progressively less livable because of such matters as: (a) the unpleasantness of breathing and the contamination of oxygen (with such effects as increased incidence of emphysema and in extreme smog even suffocation) (b) the excruciating increase in noise levels (with consequences not only in irritability but in such physical defects as deafness and possibly even ulcers) (c) the greater severity of flooding in much of the country, and resultant greater danger from hurricanes, etc. (because of the removal of the forest and grass cover) (d) the stench and ugliness of what used to be beautiful lakes and beaches (e) the reckless killing-off of many beautiful and useful species of animals and birds, and the consequent multiplication of destructive insects and "real" vermin, that is to say the upsetting of the balance of nature (f) and, partly following on the last, spraying with and ingestion of pesticides, the dangers of which are unknown and potentially great—which are not regulated, to any significant degree, as yet. Instead "when a proscribed poison becomes too prevalent in a product, (the F.D.A., Department of Agriculture, etc.) simply legalize it." (p. 162). Not content with all these costs of technology, progressive men—including some who advocate conservation in other areas—see a great future in similar exploitation of the ocean depths, because they do not "conceive that the powerful force which slams our coasts . . . is (also) a delicately balanced creation. (Already) in a ceaseless stream . . . man pours his wastes and poisons to transform this primeval cradle of abundant life into a graveyard. This is the 'untrammelled ocean' in which mankind sets so much store (as a source of future foodstuffs!) (p. 197)."

The Rienows have, in actuality, brought Malthus up to date for the waste-producing affluent society. "Science, lassoed by the lariat of commerce, . . . is likely to be a destructive force . . . Desperate to remedy environmental deficiencies, we shall without careful social consideration deface our surroundings even more . . . (for example) engineers are eager to control water shortages by building "hydraulic empires, but "we have seen how all these 'hydraulic empires' now long buried under Mediterranean sands went into a frenzy of . . . building, only to find themselves every year buried deeper in upland silt from the stripped watersheds. Unlike the ancient civilizations, we can not plead ignorance of ecological principles . . ." (p. 207)

But, unlike the ancient civilizations, we must contend with continual population increase, due to the control of epidemic diseases, *and* we have the democratic insistence that everybody is entitled to be affluent—which means to pollute the atmosphere, poison the soil, and leave wastes which destroy the quality of life. If we focus on the problem of poverty, we get campaigns against poverty, emphasis upon economic growth, etc., but if we focus on the problems of the quality of the environment, we have to rethink our emphasis on technological "betterment." If we think about the two together, we are confronted with considerable cognitive strain (until we get accustomed to the juxtaposition). What, for instance, will be the effect of raising economic standards, according to present proposals, in Appalchia, the Ozarks, rural Maine, and the rural South? The people who have been pushing for a policy-conscious political science, by and large, are the people who are committed to, e.g., campaigns against poverty; because of this commitment, they are likely to find the emphasis which the Rienows make unacceptable.

The greatest weakness of the Rienows' book, the other way around, is that it, too, is not written in terms of balance; obviously, for instance, once a control for malaria has been discovered, it will be used; obviously, in human terms, such a control is, on the whole, desirable; as Frank Graham, Jr., says in a review of their book: sometimes "they pile horror upon horror in the manner of an early Elizabethan tragedy" . . . in such a way as to cause some readers to "succumb to shell shock." The weakness is comparable to their predecessor, Malthus; the atmosphere of gloom overwhelms. How, one might want to know, do you strike a balance? Optimally? Or granted a world in which a presumptive Secretary of the Interior expresses grave doubts about "conservation for conservation's sake" incrementally?

At this point, we come to the kind of policy relevance which concerned people everywhere have a right to ask from political scientists. For policy problems, taken seriously, as analytic conceptions, rather than as the bases for doctrines, involve weighing and balancing, in the words of former Congressman and Philosophy Professor T. V. Smith, "the turning of principles into interests."

But, since no other writer, either on conservation or on civil rights, poverty, et cetera, has to my knowledge tried to balance the seemingly incompatible values here against each other or tried rigorously to work out ways to escape between the horns of the apparent dilemma, *Moment In the Sun* must be enthusiastically recommended.—LEWIS A. DEXTER, *Dalhousie University (visiting).*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Political Development in Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary Change. BY MARTIN C. NEEDLER. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. 210. $2.45.)

Latin Americanists in our discipline have long been criticized for their failure to incorporate modern methods of political analysis into their research. Past studies have tended to rely on recognizably outmoded, traditional approaches or have failed to take note of significant work emanating from related fields. Consequently, the study of Latin American politics has acquired an altogether too well-deserved reputation for archaism, loose methodology, and, in a few cases, poor scholarship. Notable exceptions exist to be sure; Kalman Silvert and Charles Anderson are only two of a growing number that have urged the application of more stringent techniques and have attempted to set examples through their publications. On the whole, however, Latin America has taken a back seat regarding modern political science. Specialists trained in other geographic areas have produced some of our most valuable studies, although unfamiliarity with historical, cultural, and anthropological patterns of the continent has caused certain additional problems.

Happily, Professor Needler has combined the talents of the methodologist with those of the professional Latin Americanist. *Political Development in Latin America* is a short but firm step to remedy the lamentable situation described above and is exactly what the author intends it to be, ". . . no more than an early stage of succession of increasingly exact or comprehensive approximations." (p. 7) A concise and conceptually clear model is presented, hypotheses are drawn and tested, and the reader feels that loose ends are finally being pulled together. At the same time, Needler is plagued by the same old bugaboo that has discouraged other Latin Americanists from attempting quantitative studies; sufficiently accurate "hard data" suitable for comparative purposes are not available. This dilemma is readily acknowledged, and the reader is cautioned to accept all conclusions as "suggestions" rather than demonstrable proofs. The suggestions are condensed into a set of twenty-three theorems that will hopefully become hypothetical assumptions to be tested by future analysts as data become available.

One might not always agree with either the definitions or operationalizations of Needler's concepts, yet they seem tenable given the dearth of data and previous systematic studies. The reader is assured that the major dependent variable, political development, should not necessarily be confused with "democracy" or "democracy as currently practiced in the United States." Development is defined as the transition from one stable state of equilibrium to another so long as that transition is in the general direction of the societal goal; the societal goal, in turn, is defined in terms of the ideological norms a polity posits for itself. In the case of Latin America, Needler argues, the ideological norms do, in fact, approximate current North American and Western European political practices since the area has been so heavily influenced by the western powers. Written constitutions are often little more than Spanish translations of the Philadelphia document, the mass media has been fed by western news services, and generations of Latin political leaders have received their educations in the *patrias* of Jefferson, Locke, and Montesquieu. Hence, although developmental goals are not synonymous with democracy in a theoretical sense, the peculiarities of the Latin experience make them alike in practice. In other words, the Latin Americans have posited democracy as the ideological goal of their polities. Democracy itself is conceptualized as: 1) the maintenance of constitutional integrity (assuming that written constitutions are democratic in content) plus 2) extensive popular political participation.

Certain semantic problems occur regarding the words "stability," "development," "change," and "democracy." Stability, we are told in the introductory chapter, is to be regarded as a type of homeostatic equilibrium; development is the transition from state to state in the direction of the ultimate goal. One, then, must regard "change" as any type of movement, whether in the general direction of the goal or not. Unfortunately, "stability" is often used in subsequent chapters as a synonym for "constitutional stability" or "constitutionality" (which is, by definition, one aspect of the societal goal, democracy); at other times "stability" appears to mean nothing more than the absence of open violence. Likewise, change and development tend to be used interchangeably, as do development (the transitory process) and democracy (the final goal). Consequently, the reader becomes somewhat confused. Normally, these substitutions could be excused as stylistic attempts to avoid cumbersome repetition, but they cannot be overlooked in a book whose *raison d'etre* lies in the purity of its methodology and the "tightness" of its concepts. These problems should be regarded more as inconvenient nuisances than major faults, however.

This reader found the chapter concerning interrelationships between economic and political development the most intriguing. Past studies have attempted to correlate either constitutionality or, to a lesser extent, political participation with economic growth, but the simultaneous comparison of both aspects is a genuine contribution. Through very crude statistical tests Needler proves (suggests) that political development toward democracy is indeed positively related to economic development, although not necessarily in the "intermediate ranges." In simplest terms, both aspects of political transition cannot occur simultaneously unless economic growth is parallel. For example, if participation increases faster than the economy, depressed participants will overload the system with "other-than-peaceful" demands, often provoking military intervention and consequent loss of constitutionality. Alternately, if constitutionality outdistances economic growth, mass participation cannot be prevalent. The deference displayed by the British masses is cited as an example of the latter alternative. Numerous other hypothetical implications could be derived from this thesis—hopefully they will be analyzed in the near future.

In conclusion, the serious scholar seeking to incorporate modern theory and techniques into his research can gain much from this modest though significant study. The conceptual framework is sound, operationalizations and tests are crude but reasonably exact, and a host of new insights are suggested. Every bit as noteworthy, important contributions of Almond, Coleman, Easton, LaPalombara, Powell, Pye, Verba, Weiner and other innovators are finally being applied to the study of Latin American politics. This book definitely merits its adoption as a supplementary text in graduate and undergraduate courses concerning politics of the Latin American republics or political development in general.—Burt H. English, *The University of Kansas.*

Egypt: Military Society. Anwar Abdel-Malek. Trans. C. L. Markmann. (New York: Random House, 1968. Pp. 458. $8.95.)

Egypt: Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left and Social Change Under Nasser (a translation and revised updating of *Egypte: Societe Militaire* first published in 1962) clearly qualifies as the most important socio-political analysis to appear dealing with post-1952 Egyptian politics. Ahe combined product of reflective intellectual insight and exhaustive scholarly research (based almost entirely on Arabic sources but also accompanied by a command of European and American secondary scholarship) it is simultaneously thematic and exhaustive. Its theme derives from the Egyptian-Coptic birthright and Marxist ideological commitment of the author. Thus a portrayal of Egypt's essential national identity (rather than Arab identity) emerges while the substance of the book details the vacillating fortunes of the Egyptian Communist Party under President Nasser. The conceptual framework of the book is also Marxist in its concern with the economic basis of social and political factors. The utilization of this framework, as one might anticipate, has its difficulties but Abdel-Malek more than any other present scholar elaborates for us in a sympathetic manner the social basis of the regime and its policy shortcomings.

The book consists of four sections entitled: (I) "Egyptian Society Before the Coup d'Etat," (II) "The Social Character of the Military Regime," (III) "In Search of a National Ideology" and (IV) "The Value of the Egyptian Experiment."

In Part One "Egyptian Society Before the Coup d'Etat" there is found a compact treatment of largely nineteenth century and pre-1952 history which is instructive in its discussion of the relation of the growth of individual land ownership in nineteenth century Egypt to Egyptian social structure and the manner in which this relationship is related to the politics of particularly the post-1924 parliamentary period. What emerges is a strongly sympathetic interpretation which sees the Wafd during the entire period and the Left after 1945 as the true registers of Egyptian political sentiment while the large landowning class and industrial class are seen (correctly) as having dominated the formal processes of government in collaboration with the Palace. As he accurately notes, the Wafd as the truest political expression of the Egyptian people only ruled a total of seven out of twenty-eight years and, he might have noted, never for more than twenty-four months and this only in 1950–52 when perhaps partly as a result of persistent exclusion from the political process it was flaccid, energyless and without authority.

In Part II, "The Social Character of the Military Regime" he presents an acute sociological analysis of the shifting class alliances of the lower middle class military regime. Thus the 1952 Agrarian Reform Laws are seen primarily as political and economic in intent and not drafted in terms of the aims of social justice. They were successful in destroying the economic base of the large landowning class but they were unsuccessful in diverting this class's economic resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector. In the late 1950's his economic failure became apparent and the alliance of the regime came to be with the industrial middle class. The failure of the union with Syria was due at least partly to the manner in which this class sought to take economic advantage of the Syrians and the July, 1961 reform laws and arrests in late 1961 and early 1962 were intended to remove this class. Since that date the military has ruled in alliance with the technocrats of what the author terms the American-German school of administration.

Part Three "In Search of a National Ideology" documents the ideological groping of an essentially pragmatic regime. The regime is characterized as being persistently and forceably opposed to a Marxist ideology and incapable of generating one of its own. In the course of his discussion he elaborates at length upon what can be said to be one of the two greatest failings of the regime, that of its inability to attract to it the abundant imagination and creative talents of Egypt's intellectuals (the other failing is that of not having enlisted in spontaneous fashion the support of Egypt's rural masses).

Finally in Part Four, "The Value of the Egyptian Experiment" he concludes that contrary to the regime's claims it is not socialist because the profit motive operates in the milieu of state capitalism with all decisions being made at the top and with no provision for the expression of popular demands. He concludes with an appeal for a return to pluralistic democratic politics in Egypt while at the same time noting that the present regime's fifteen years in power and the June, 1967 defeat have created the potentialities for genuine social reform.

As already noted, Abdel Malek analyzes in detail the nature of one major failing of the regime namely its alienation of Egyptian intellectuals. His explication of the failure of the regime to mobilize the rural masses and transform (contrary to the author's assertion, p. 62) their historical political passiveness is perhaps the least convincing portion of his analysis. His analysis rests largely on the distracting qualities of the regime's agrarian reform programs and its unsysmpathetic bureaucracy rather than upon the actual sociology of the countryside. As long as the maximum land holding (as of July, 1961) continues to be 100 feddans (roughly acres) we can speculate that the peasant's traditional subservient relationship to his umda (village headman) and the latter's subservience in turn to the resident landowning class (50–100 feddans is usually considered a large holding) has not changed. It is this relatively untouched character of the countryside which perhaps at least partially explains both the relative stability and the persistency of libertarian or from the point of view of the regime "rightest" sentiments in Egypt after fifteen years of revolution. The dilemna of the regime is real, for to reduce the size of the maximum land holding would probably result in an amount of agricultural economic dislocation that Egypt's tightly drawn economy can not tolerate.

A further minor comment is in order in reference to the development in the last chapter of how the army in modern Egyptian history (i.e. from 1882) has grown with Egyptian nationalism (p. 360). This is not true and is lost sight of by many analysts of the army and the Egyptian regime. After the disbandment of the army in the wake of the Arabi rebellion Egyptians had little military and no political role in their army until the date of Nasser's entry into the military academy in 1937. Once alerted to the potential bias involved in a Marxist analysis, this book can be read with equal profit on the two levels of general background and minute attention to its detailed documentation.—LOUIS J. CANTORI, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Managerial Power and Soviet Politics. BY JEREMY R. AZRAEL. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 258. $4.95.)

The political potential of Soviet managers and economic administrators to influence the development of the Soviet regime has been a subject of speculation ever since the Bolsheviks came to power. Even before the Revolution, as Azrael shows, anarchist writers had argued that the result of Marxist revolution would be to replace the capitalist exploiters with a new ruling stratum of engineers and technicians. Since the Revolution its enemies have relied on Soviet administrators and technicans to divert the regime from revolutionary aims, while such functionaries have appeared to friends of the Revolution as a chief source of the danger of its subversion.

The worst fears of some, including men who dwell in Peking, have been realized—or so they say, but they obviously exaggerate. Even if, as may plausibly be argued, the regime's revolutionary dynamism has been attenuated and economic technicians have contributed to this result, fundamentally the regime remains what it was. It has not been transformed into the administrative-technocratic state predicted by some, or into the liberal-democratic state hoped for by others. Were such expectations warranted in the past? Are they warranted today?

In his effort to answer these questions, Professor Azrael of the University of Chicago has reviewed the place of managers and specialists in the Soviet scheme of things. His definition of the managerial elite—"those executives who have borne primary responsibility for the administration of Soviet heavy industry" (p. 7)—properly includes economic administrators as well as factory managers. (By limiting their sphere to heavy industry, however, Azrael creates some unnecessary difficulties.) He was not satisfied to look only at recent developments, but carried his research back to the beginnings of the regime and even to the doctrinal controversies that preceded its founding. *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* is at once *scholarly*—being based on a close reading of Soviet writings on the subject, as well as on relevant speeches of Soviet leaders; *journalistic*—since Azrael reports on views he encountered among managers during an extended stay in the USSR; and *polemical,* since he has strong opinions which he sets against those who have written differently on the subject. The result is a closely argued analysis which, though somewhat involuted at times, is written with a lively and forceful style and is both rewarding and often extremely interesting. One of the book's chief virtues is that it makes accessible a great deal of information on the problem of the managers, that lay buried in old Soviet books, and has directed Soviet scholars to the sources where more can be found, and where Azrael's own findings—some of them disputable—may be further tested.

The book is not without flaws. At times, after making a valid and original point, Azrael carries his argument further than the evidence warrants. He is able to show, for example, that contrary to a common view, the patristic writers (Marx, Engels and Lenin) recognized the need for authority and discipline in socialist industry. He goes on to assert, however, that according to the patristic doctrine "the old management forms . . . were to remain essentially what they were" under capitalism (p. 15). The evidence he cites does not prove this; moreover, we are told that many party theorists believed the patristic doctrine to be the opposite of what Azrael says it was (p. 41), and that Lenin himself engaged in "purposeful obfuscation" of that doctrine. Occasionally Azrael mis-stated the evidence, as when he says that Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress "proposed that the central ministries should be stripped of most of their operational functions and perhaps even completely abolished" (p. 132). Actually, Khrushchev never mentioned the possibility of abolishing the central ministries before he suffered a defeat at the hands of the economic bureaucracy at a meeting of the Central Committee in December, 1956.

On the central theme of the book, Azrael succeeds in exposing the serious difficulties in the determinist view that industrialization and economic development inevitably lead to the administrative-technocratic state, or, as some would argue, to the democratic state. This is a useful service. Azrael's target is not limited, however, to such economic determinists. He is also critical of the view that the managers have a large political potential which, if realized and used in accordance with their inclinations, could lead to major changes in the character of the Soviet political system. Unlike some critics of this view, Azrael does not deny that the managers constitute a distinctive political group in the Soviet system, or that it has characteristic political views that have sometimes brought it into conflict with the party apparatus. However, he is inclined to emphasize the docility of Soviet managers and their willingness to submit to the will of the power-oriented leaders of the party apparatus. He also stresses their political incapacity once they do enter the political arena. The managers have failed to take power or win great political influence in the past and, in Azrael's view, the prospects are that they will not do so in the future.

What of the widely held view among Sovietologists that economic administrators played an important political role in the Stalin succession crisis? Azrael will concede only that "managerial support was not a completely negligible factor in the political arena" (p. 131). This assessment—oddly, it is perhaps Azrael's strongest acknowledgement of the political significance of the managers—indicates how far his zeal to refute the economic determinists has carried him in downgrading managerial power. Actually, the economic bureaucracy played a major role in recent Soviet political history, and its political potential remains high. How far it is realized will depend on such circumstances as the political capacity of its leaders and partisans and the depth of factional divisions among leaders of the party apparatus, especially during crises of succession.

By providing the first systematic examination of managerial power and Soviet politics Azrael has contributed importantly to Soviet studies. Political scientists who are interested in the role of managers in other regimes, as well as in the broader question of the relation of economic progress to political development, will find here much that is relevant and useful for their purposes.—MYRON RUSH, *Cornell University.*

Les Familles Politiques Aujourd 'hui en France. BY EMERIC DEUTSCH, DENIS LINDON, PIERRE WEILL. (Paris: Minuit, 1966. Pp. 126.)

The book presents the political opinions of the six "political families"—extreme left, moderate left, center, moderate right, extreme right, and the *marais* (nonparticipants)—into which the French electorate is divided, the party identifications of the families, and their voting patterns in the 1965 presidential elections. Classification was by self-assignment on a left-right scale.

Responses to questions on political issues reveal the absence of sharp ideological division between left and right. Except for the extreme left, considerable heterogeneity of opinion exists on most issues within each political family. On no question do as many as three fourths of those in the moderate and extreme left oppose three fourths of those in the moderate and extreme right. In some cases, a large segment of the left takes a "right" position, e.g., against nationalization; in others, the right takes a "left" position. Despite the lack of sharp ideological cleavage, the authors assert that a "temperamental" difference continues to divide left from right, with the two groups having broadly different opinions on most issues.

The survey data on which the study relies suggests an asymmetry between left and right, stemming from greater ideological homogeneity on the right than the left and a greater affinity of the center for the right. Analysis of the political families' attitudes toward political parties also reveals a cleavage between the moderate and the extreme left. Whereas the right is relatively united politically, the moderate left displays great hostility toward the PCF. (And the surprisingly lukewarm approval of the moderate left for its "natural" home, the FGDS, helps explain the FGDS' collapse in 1968.) The survey data also underline the fundamental conservatism of French politics. Political and ideological fragmentation on the left constrasts with homogeneity on the right. The center and the *marais* lean toward the right. (The *marais* hardly participates politically but, when it does, expresses rightist opinions and behaves in a rightist manner.) The center, moderate right, extreme right and *marais* total 65 per cent of the sample, the left, 35 per cent.

As one of the early efforts in French survey research, it is to be expected that the book contains weaknesses. The assertion that French political opinion is divided into six families is an artifact of the scale; if respondents had been asked to place themselves on a scale with a larger or smaller number of segments, the number of political families would have varied accordingly. Futhermore, while the authors are free to choose which groups to analyze, one might question the emphasis placed on the six families. Especially given their lack of ideological and political homogeneity, more profitable results might have been obtained from a focus on the different groups of party identifiers—who have a political reality that, as the authors themselves argue, is lacking for the political families.

More serious, if major attention is to be centered on the political families, they should be defined with care. Yet the *marais* is constructed—and distinguished from the center—in a most questionable manner. Two groups of respondents are combined to form the *marais*. One, the non-participant center, consists of respondents who classified themselves in the center of the political continuum but reported little or no political interest. Whereas respondents placing themselves anywhere but the center who reported little or no political interest were considered part of their self-assigned group, the non-participant centrists were assigned to the *marais*. The other constituent of the *marais* consists of respondents who refused to classify themselves on the left-right continuum. The two steps requiring explanation are thus the separation of the participant and non-participant centers (unlike the two segments of the other political families), and the grouping of the non-participant center with the politically unclassified.

The authors explain that, for all political families but the center, "There weren't sufficiently large differences to justify separating participants and non-participants." For these families, "there weren't appreciable differences in opinions and behavior between participants and non-participants. On the other hand, the participant center distinguished itself sharply from the non-participant center, which closely resembled the unclassified." (p. 20) However, inspection of appendix 10, where responses to questions on issues are tabulated for participants and non-participants in each family, suggests that the data do not support the hypotheses. Within the extreme left, participants and non-participants diverge more than the two center groups as frequently as the reverse. The two wings of the extreme right are also nearly as divergent as the two wings of the center. The divergence between the two groups of the center is thus not necessarily greater than the divergence between the two components of other political families.

Moreover, the additional step of combining the non-participant center with the unclassified is also unwarranted: the non-participant center resembles the participant center and the non-participant right about as often as it does the unclassified. While the authors might be perfectly justified in assigning the non-participant center to the *marais*, the reason would be their lack of interest, not their opinions. Either way, however, the non-participant center should not have been treated differently than non-participants from other political families.

The consequence of the methodological flaw is that the proportion of the nonactivists, the *marais*—32 per cent of the sample, according to the authors—is either inflated (by erroneously assigning to it the non-participant center, which constitutes 22 per cent of the sample), or depressed (by not including the 31 per cent of the sample constituted by non-participants located elsewhere on the political spectrum). Whereas the authors express surprise at the large dimensions of the *marais,* American political scientists might assert that, on the basis of the data presented in *Les Familles Politiques,* the proportion of nonactivists in France is double the size of the *marais*. Subsequent survey research in France should benefit from the book's strengths—and weaknesses.—MARK KESSELMAN, *Columbia University.*

Il comportamento elettorale in Italia. BY VITTORIO CAPECCHI et al. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1968. Pp. 474. L. 10,000.)

This book is the first product (there are to be three additional volumes) of a major research undertaking conducted by the *Istituto Carlo Cattaneo* in Bologna and sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund. The overall theme, or object of inquiry, is political participation in Italy. Capechi's work, as befits an introductory volume, is concerned with that broadest of all modes of political participation, national voting behavior.

The method of voting analysis employed might best be described as self-consciously ecological; it is ecological in the sense that the study reports associations between particular geographic voting patterns and census-derived demographic variables, while it is self-conscious in that the authors are aware of the predictive limitations imposed by this approach. There is, in fact, a methodological essay in the Appendix in which the warnings of Alker and Ranney along these lines are catalogued and discussed. As to the inevitable question about why no use was made of the available survey data (the *Istituto DOXA* has been sampling Italian opinion since 1948), the authors respond by noting that such surveys have tended to underestimate the extent of popular support for Left parties, particularly the Communists. They explain this latter phenomenon in terms of the wariness with which Italians, especially those hostile to the regime, confront the interview situation.

More specifically, the book is organized so as to portray continuities and shifts in party strength throughout the country over the 1946–1963 period. After a short and useful chapter on Italian electoral history since unification, concerned with the extension of the franchise and the rise of mass parties in the pre-Fascist epoch, the authors begin their analysis making use throughout of two basic sets of data: electoral returns at the communal level and the censuses of 1951 and 1961. The version of the party system employed is a simplified one with only the Communists and Christian Democrats treated as discrete entities. The remaining parties are reducted to two *ragruppamenti:* the Non-Communist Left and the Right.

Although Italy's seven thousand some-odd *communi* are taken as the basic units of analysis, the writers cluster them in ways which permit the examination of broader regional voting configurations. To this end the analysis is conducted not only at the communal and provincial levels, but also at the "zonal." The country is divided into six "zones;" the Iron Triangle of Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria, a "White" zone which is defined as having a Catholic sub-culture and includes the Veneto plus surrounding provinces, a "Red" zone in the center of Italy—Emilia, Tuscany, Umbria and the Marches—to which a left or socialist sub-culture is ascribed, and finally the South plus Sicily and Sardinia are accorded separate zonal statuses. Having defined the geographic entities to be used, the authors then go about their task, making imaginative use of transition and correlation matrices and linear causal circuits along the way, of relating party voting patterns to an array of independent variables.

Perhaps the most general and striking of the authors' substantive observations is the growing stability and/or nationalization of Italian electoral behavior over the post-war period. First, with respect to the Left, it is reported that the percentage of the vote received by all Left parties, including the Communist, has remained relatively constant, but within this gross pattern the Communists have been receiving a growing share of the other Left parties in the "Red" zone of central by the party's ability to attract voters away from the other Left parties in the "Red" zone of central Italy and its increased attractiveness in the just-now modernizing South—thus off-setting Left losses in the North. In other words, the Communist gains may, in large measure, be explained by the fact the South is becoming more like the North.

Second, there appears to be a rather similar pattern occurring at the Center and Right of the party spectrum as well. Namely, the Christian Democracy has been gradually increasing, at a slower rate and more unevenly than the Communists to be sure, its proportion of the total Right vote. Here again, it is in the South where most of the Christian Democratic gains have been registered. The Liberal party's role in the North, as a repository for disaffected Christian Democratic voters, has seemingly limited the latter's absorptive capacity.

What impresses the authors most about the electorate's growing homogenization is that this secular trend has taken place against a socio-economic background of unparalleled urbanization and industrialization. But what strikes this reviewer as being of significant interest is the incompatibility between the work's empirical findings and Sartori's recent analytical theorizing about the Italian party system's growing fractionalization and centrifugal drives.

It is also relevant to note that Communist strength has grown in areas undergoing rapid socio-economic change i.e., increasing urbanization, literacy and industrialization, while an expanded Christian Democratic vote, for the most part, shows either no correlation or a negative correlation with the introduction of these processes. A point at issue here is whether the Communists' vote benefits from the presence of these characteristics per se or if the party's growth derives more from the process of change itself. On the basis of a considerable amount of data, the authors opt for the second alternative. They point out, for example, that the Non-Communist Left's vote is strongest, or has declined least, in areas like the Iron Triangle which are already heavily industrialized. This observation, in turn, may be interpreted as providing additional evidence in support of the Benjamin-Kautsky hypothesis about the curvilinear relationship between Communism and modernization.

The book's findings are marred by the strategy of analysis in at least two ways: First, the authors' decision to regard the Italian Right—Liberals, Monarchists and Neo-Fascists—as a single unit rather than as modern, business-oriented Right and traditional, clientele Right, leads them into drawing some rather bizarre conclusions about the relationship between "Right" voting and economic growth. Second, with respect to the construction of "White" and "Red" zones—areas reputedly possessing Catholic and socialist sub-cultures—the writers ascribe the Christian Democratic and Communist successes in these areas to some ill-defined form of community pressure. Yet they offer no data which might serve to demonstrate the existence of these sub-cultures other than the tautological proof of habitual voting patterns.

On balance though, the volume represents a considerable advance, particularly in terms of the rigor of the statistical measures used, over the earlier work of such scholars as Mattei Doggan and Giovanni Schepis.—LEONARD WEINBERG, *University of Nevada.*

Local-Level Politics: Social and Cultural Perspectives. ED. BY MARC J. SWARTZ (Chicago: Aldine, 1968. Pp. 437. $9.75.)

This book is the revised publication of papers presented at a conference on political anthropology held in Austria in 1966. A theoretical introduction by the editor is followed by seventeen empirical case studies and one methodological piece on the study and measurement of social networks (Barnes). Seven of the cases are African, including one that compares African and Melanesian meterials; five are from India, and one each from Burma, Norway, Mexico, circumpolar regions—particularly Siberia and the Aleutians, and Taiwan. In all of the cases, the emphasis is on the political life of local communities, or ethnic groups as polities in and of themselves and as parts of larger wholes. There is as well a refreshing sense of time and change introduced. In each of the cases, we are able to see the local political system, not as some timeless, assumedly equilibrated system operating in a fictionalized ethnographic present, but as living political structures whose actors adapt and change (or fail to) in a changing world.

The theoretical introduction by Swartz carries forward the ideas he presented with Turner and Tuden in his pervious book, Political Anthropology. Swartz eschews what he calls the structural-functional approach and uses instead the analysis of events which are sorted basically into political "fields" and "supports." A field is defined as the "interest and involvement of the participants in the process being studied . . ." (p. 9). Supports are seen as "anything that contributes to the formulation or implementation of political ends" (p. 19). The editor feels that by analyzing the political goals of actors in the "field" as these go through a set of phases, and by isolating the various supports given to actors or groups, a processual and "dynamics" analysis of political activity can be obtained from data collected at the local non-Western level. This level is often characterized by a non-differentiation of political activity from other action and thus a mode of analysis of *the* political is a difficult methodological problem in anthropology.

Swartz admits that he has not presented a full-blown theory and more importantly he also admits that most of the material in the book is "chiefly concerned with different aspects of the structure of the political arena" (p. 49). In other words the editor has adopted a number of conceptual categories, "field," "arena," "support," "regime," "phase" which he feels can be used more adequately to describe (e.g. "field") and analyze (e.g. "support") political phenomena. However the concepts are not related to one another in a systemic manner such as to create a general, explanatory picture of a local-level polity, nor are hypotheses generated for wider testing on larger, or other samples of cases.

On the other hand, this is the strength of the theoretical approach that Swartz wishes to run away from (but which re-appears in the case descriptions). Using political structure as a variable to define boundaries around a political system as well as the skeleton of the system itself creates the basis of a general theory from which explanation and hypotheses can flow. By contrast the use of a "field" of political activities creates serious boundary problems (as Swartz admits) which make it a difficult unit of analysis. The criticism that structural approaches are not dynamic is refuted by the case studies—almost all of which deal with change and focus on the political structure in order to carry out the analysis. The most ambitious essay in the book (Bailey) attempts to create a theoretical environment in which various types of conflict are operating. In creating the model Bailey states categorically that he is using political structure as a dependent variable (p. 292). Another example of this denial, but affirmation by operation, is the chapter by Nicholas who sharply criticizes structuralism (p. 297–98) then proceeds to develop a flexible approach to the categorization of rules (the content of structure) which he then applies to Indian case material.

The only real exception to a structural analysis is the chapter by Hughes who writes a fascinating psychological analysis of Eskimo leadership. In it he develops further his transactional approach and introduces the concept of competence to explain various aspects of role behavior. Since the editor's use of Lewinian field theory depends by definition on "involvement" and "interest" i.e. on motivations, it would have been useful to have a more full-blown integration of Hughes' psychological theories fitted into the more general ideas in the introduction. In this vein it is interesting that Hughes, unlike the editor, does not criticize structural approaches as being wrong-headed. Instead, he performs the task of adding psychological depth to a structural feature, that of leadership.

What Professor Swartz and some of his colleagues wish to criticize and change can be labelled naive structural-functional analysis. In this approach the researcher describes the set of rules which are the traditional constitutional basis of political action for the actors, as if such rules were the sum total of all political behavior of the actors in these small societies. Then, as Radcliffe-Brown claimed, social process is assumed to be the functioning of structure. This produces a timeless, static, functionally integrated system common enough in the ethnographic literature, and probably non-existent in empirical reality. The criticism is well-taken, but as the essays themselves prove, naive structuralism is something of a dead issue. The question then becomes—should we tinker and adopt the structural approach to include the actual processes of political behavior, of which structure is one element, or should we look for an entirely new paradigm? As the editor notes (p. 2), I lean to the former view, while he spouses the latter, although as I have already noted, espousal and practice seem to differ—at least in this multi-authored volume.

In terms of the information presented, this collection is rich and varied. Only rarely if at all does the formally trained political scientist invest the time and energy in such far away places to obtain the kind of data presented in this volume. And yet this is the day-to-day stuff out of which politics is made in the new nations. Elites come and go; some have greater impact than others. But what that impact is and how the life of the nation is affected by the modern world is to be found in materials such as the excellent case studies in this book.—Ronald Cohen, *Northwestern University.*

The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and Its Foreign Policy. By J. A. A. Stockwin. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. 197. $6.50.)

Recent scholarship which has just begun to "explain" postwar Japanese politics rather than to merely outline its effects, has been well served by Dr. Stockwin's new study of Japanese Socialist foreign policy. It concentrates on one of the most important and divisive issues which has effected the Japanese Socialist party since the end of the Second World War. Neutralism in the sense of keeping Japan out of the cold war has had strong adherents among all the opposition parties ever since the question of independence from the occupation came up. It has taken the form of the desire to avoid military alliances or foreign bases in Japan, and to make peace treaties with both West and East including Communist China and the Soviet Union. Since such neutralism means greater independence from the United States, it also means a certain degree of anti-Americanism—at least in basic foreign policy orientations. Nor, is this feeling confined only to the opposition. Even among some major leaders in the dominant Liberal Democratic party today a desire for a more independent foreign policy permitting Japan to have better relations with its Communist neighbors is quite influential.

Although the book reviewed here is confined to the Japan Socialist party in general, it does not neglect to carefully consider the effects of the external environment of the relations of the major powers upon Japan as well as important changes in domestic politics. This has the effect of making the study of considerable value to anyone wishing to understand the most divisive issue which has beset Japan since World War II. It is the key issue influencing relations between it and the United States today.

To explain the genesis and changes in the neutralist policy, the book delves into the most basic processes at work within what is the leading opposition party in Japan—a party which looks increasingly as though it can not govern or replace the dominant Liberal Democrats for whom it supplies the principal competition and criticism in politics. It is especially interesting to note, as does the former Prime Minister Yoshida in his memoirs, that it was a coalition cabinet under the Socialist Prime Minister Katayama in 1947 which first conceived the notion of relying upon the United States for Japan's security. Yet, since 1949, when the NATO allies first seriously determined to obtain a peace treaty with Japan, the Socialist party has consistently opposed dependence upon the Western bloc for its security. This apparent *volte-face* is explained by the weakening through loss of Diet seats of the early dominant rightwing faction to which Mr. Katayama belonged and the subsequent ascendency of the more radical Marxist factions. The latters' doctrinaire anti-capitalism makes them anti-American and prefer non-aligned neutralist policies when these do not take a form which favors "socialist" countries like Communist China or the Soviet Union.

The Japanese Socialist party factions have long been noted for the extraordinary doctrinal consistency with which their leaders went back to early socialist parties organized in the 1920's for answers to questions about the nature of Japanese capitalism and the best means of overthrowing it. This consistency of doctrine was found in several streams identified with different leaders who survived the militarism and nationalism of the 1930's and 1940's. Some of these same men have led their factions in the parliamentary party till rather recently. Their rivalry for the major posts—particularly the secretary general or chairman—usually determined the direction of party policy. Since this struggle has taken the form of a rather rigid argument over points of socialist theory, the party has had a reputation for impracticality. This has not been tempered by the need to be ready to take office quickly because of the long continued disparity of votes and seats with those of the dominant parties.

Dr. Stockwin demonstrates, however, that beneath this intra-party maneuvering there is considerable awareness of conditions abroad and in Japan by the Socialist leaders who, after all, show considerable political sophistication in working within the peculiar framework of doctrine and group expectations which make up the party's own internal political process. He also believes the party shows increasing similarity to the less ideological conservative Liberal Democratic party whose factions are also mainly parliamentary party ones supported by personal ties to a few prominent local supporters but without any really significant mass organization. This presents an interesting contrast with the much smaller parliamentary groups of Communists and the Buddhist Soka Gakkai parties which have active local organizations vastly outnumbering the Socialists. The last named here, nevertheless, still managed to garner the major share of the opposition vote in Japan, although the ability to do so is shrinking perceptibly.

The Japanese party also contrasts with the Italian Socialist party which is compared in the last chapter. The European party shows an interesting similarity to the Japanese in foreign policy positions and in its factional alliances. The ability of Nenni to revitalize his party through appeal to the rank and file over the heads of its entrenched officials contrasts, however, with the unsuccessful Japanese party attempt under a leader like Eda to do the same in Japan where such local organized membership and voter loyalty is lacking.

It is striking in a wider context how the influence of more pragmatic Japanese Socialist leaders like Eda seems to rise with the tendency toward detente between the major powers in the Far East. The recent signs of a real Far Eastern "thaw" since the book was written has already given further evidence of this influence in the shaky but renewed appearance of Eda in the office of secretary general. The account of the often close but internally vexing relations of the party with the leaders of Communist China in recent years provides a particularly informative and valuable kind of reference material on the relations between external foreign contacts and internal intra-party competition.—FRANK LANGDON, *University of British Columbia.*

Angels in Marble: Working Class Conservatives in Urban England. BY ROBERT MCKENZIE AND ALLAN SILVER. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. 295. $11.00.)

At the outset of the era of mass electorates, Disraeli became the prophet of working class conservatism. As Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party he mobilized a reluctant parliamentary majority to support the Second Reform Bill (1867) which granted the franchise to the British working class. Disraeli successfully overcame grave Tory misgivings by arguing that the Conservative Party surely would benefit politically if it played the major role in transferring potential control of the machinery of government to the industrial masses. For its efforts in this "betrayal of the status quo" John Stuart Mill branded the Conservative Party—a party whose members consistently had been drawn from the upper strata of society and whose concerns had been to resist any basic transformation of the political power structure—as "the stupid party."

Time has demonstrated the accuracy of Disraeli's prediction. Since 1885 there have been fifteen elections in which one party won a clear majority, with the Conservatives winning eleven and the Liberal and Labour parties splitting the remaining four. In most of these cases, even in recent decades, "about one-third of working class voters for the two major parties have supported Conservative candidates." Thus, for nearly a century a sizeable portion of the British working class has been the guardian if not the guiding angel of the Conservative Party.

To discover why the urban working class has contributed so heavily to Conservative Party electoral strength, McKenzie and Silver combine three kinds of interpretation: historical, qualitative and quantitative. The historical perspective is provided in Chapter 2—"Conservatism and Its Appeal to the Working Class." Here the authors describe the Conservative Party's efforts to appeal to the working class on the basis of the party's record of initiating and/or improving laws affecting the working class's own self-interest. The central theme of this political communication has been the special ability of the Tories to govern the country and their competence in managing the economy for the benefit of the working class. These aspects of Conservative ideology have been more widely and successfully diffused than is suggested by the fact that only a third of the working class typically support Conservative candidates. While Labour voters readily endorse the Labour Party as the agent of the class interests, they also concede that the Conservatives are generally more qualified and competent to deal with most domestic and international policy domains. Working class Conservatives rarely accord such favorable judgments to the Labour Party. The singular attraction of Labour is "its reputation for concern for the common man . . ." Thus, the Conservative's historical claim of competence in governing appears to be widely acknowledged by the entire working class regardless of partisan preference.

The successful appeal by Conservative elites to the working class is the underlying theme of the remaining four chapters which constitute the core of the study. The analysis is based on data acquired in a four-phase, modified panel survey of urban workers employed in manual occupations. The interviews were conducted between 1958 and 1963 in what the authors term "'non-electoral' situations." By minimizing short-term stimuli associated with political campaigns, McKenzie and Silver sought "to explore the enduring matrix of attitudes, values, and social characteristics which predispose voters to support one or another party"—a strategy which American studies might well adopt. They interpret their data with both skill and clarity. In terms of social characteristics, for example, working class Conservatives do not differ markedly from those who support the Labour Party (Chapter 3). Both groups also share many of the same social values and political perspectives (Chapter 4). But when Conservative voters are separated into "deferentials" (about a fourth of the Conservatives see the leaders of that party as the "natural rulers of Britain" and as the "sole source of whatever benefits are possible to attain") and "seculars" (better than a third of the Conservative voters evaluate their party on the more pragmatic basis of present performance and the prospects of future benefit), the groups do differ in their social characteristics (Chapter 5) and in their attitudes on social and political questions (Chapter 6). A final chapter summarizes the major findings in terms of the context, nature, and prospects of working class Conservatism in England.

In analyzing their data McKenzie and Silver detect changes in the social and ideological nature of working class conservatism. The social deference which has traditionally sustained the political preference of many working class conservative voters apparently is being displaced as the younger and better paid working class members gradually adopt a more secular political outlook. But how and why these changes are occurring is not fully explained. McKenzie and Silver are not sure how stable this change will be or how it will affect the partisan balance in the immediate future. They readily admit that the accuracy of their speculations are contingent on future political events. Another Labour victory, for example, "may greatly diminish the disposition of a considerable section of the working class to attribute unique government skills to the Conservatives." Likewise, a Labour defeat could reinforce working class deference toward the Conservative Party. In short, McKenzie and Silver conclude that British political alignments are in a state of flux and wisely conclude that future electoral outcomes will have consequences that are more far-reaching than simply determining who shall govern in the short-run.—Edward C. Dreyer, *University of Missouri, St. Louis.*

Chinese Communism in Crisis: Maoism and the Cultural Revolution. By Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968. Pp. 279. $6.00.)

Both the general reader, for whom the book is primarily written, and the specialist are indebted to the authors for this excellent study of the Cultural Revolution. The specialist will find little new information, but this book will provide him with new insights into the complexities of Chinese politics; moreover, the work will serve as a convenient reference for the leading events in this perplexing period in Chinese history.

For the reader with little background in modern Chinese history, the first chapter is indispensable for a proper understanding of the problems confronting the Chinese Communists upon their advent to power. In the following chapter the authors analyze in chronological order the policies adopted by the leaders of the CCP to cope with those problems. In retrospect, it is now clear that the conflicts at the top echelon of policy-making were far more intense than Western observers had suspected. Certainly a broad consensus did not exist regarding the adoption of the Commune system. If one can believe the allegations made by the Maoists against the "anit-Maoists," such party stalwarts as Liu Shao ch'i led the opposition forces. Since Gray and Cavendish contend that the fate of the Commune is the essential issue in the Cultural Revolution, they analyze in depth the "great debate" preceding the adoption of the decision to undertake the total mobilization of the manpower and womanpower of China.

The authors' treatment of the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" is not entirely satisfactory. Their analysis of the concept of contradictions fails to convey to the general reader the actual meaning and the centrality of this concept in the Maoist world view. It is doubtful that such a reader could sense the virtual adulation of the "laws" of the dialectic demanded of the "95 per cent" who allegedly follow faithfully the teachings of Chairman Mao. The writers' contention that the idea of contradiction "compels to a habit of analysis" (p. 59) is also the dubious validity. Would it not be more accurate to say that the Maoists urge that the dialectic be used as a tool of analysis by those investigating problems in all realms of existence? In short, Communists *should* habitually analyze situations in light of the theory of contradictions. Nor can I accpet the authors' characterization of the concept as a "mnemonic formula" that was "useful to a political leadership composed of a mass of village cadres and former querrillas who are politically unsophisticated and mostly subliterate," but who may not, as they grow more literate, need this tool of analysis. How can Mao and his associates lay aside the theory without doing violence to the myth that the dialectic is the most dependable "weapon" of the Marxist confronted with any problem?

The assertion of the authors that Mao, unlike Stalin, has taken a consistent position regarding material incentives is subject to question. Was his stand in the early stage of the Commune period vis-a-vis the relative weight to be given "material" and "moral" incentives identical to that taken by him before the shift in economic policy? The addition of the free supply system to the system of material incentives was based on the assumption that the CCP was building socialism so rapidly that it must prepare immediately for the transition to communism. Mao, in the early stage of the Commune period, placed less stress on material incentives and more emphasis on moral incentives. Similarly, Mao, in his struggle with Cultural Revolution foes, is waging a relentless attack on those who place too much weight on material incentives.

The last two chapters dealing respectively with the cultural and political aspects of the crisis confronting the Chinese Communist leaders are doubtless those that will be of greatest interest to the general reader. The authors demonstrate most effectively that the Cultural Revolution as commonly understood was a continuation of campaigns begun in the early and mid 60's (the Socialist Education Campaign, for example). They are to be commended for their delineation of the issues and objects of attacks in these campaigns. Their explanation of the reasons underlying the attacks on certain plays, operas, and films is especially valuable. Equally impressive is the dispassionate manner in which they evaluate such acts of the Maoists as the formation of the Red Guard Movement as the principal instrument for smashing the "main" enemy, the bureaucracy. Those reading this well researched book will gain a clearer picture of the principal figures, trends, and issues involved in this most confusing period in Chinese history because the authors place them in the proper historical perspective.

Enhancing the value of the book is a documentary appendix consisting of representative literary texts and doctrinal and national policy texts. The collection would have been strengthened by the inclusion of the "three constantly read articles" ["Serve the People," "In Memory of Norman Bethune," and "The Follish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains"], all "required" reading in Mainland China.—Cecil Johnson, *Southern Methodist University.*

Black Intellectuals Come to Power. By Ivar Oxaal. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1968. Pp. 194. $7.95.)

Social Change and Images of the Future. By James A. Mau. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., 1968. Pp. 145. $5.95.)

The Sociology of Political Independence. By Charles C. Moskos, Jr. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc. 1967. Pp. 120. $4.95.)

The publication of these studies of the British West Indies, based on field research completed during the early 1960's, essentially completes the major efforts of the U.C.L.A. West Indies Study Program. These books extend geographical coverage of the study of social and political development to the Caribbean. While the populations and territories discussed are small compared with other newly independent nations in Africa and Asia, the setting in no way diminishes the theoretical utility for social science of the substantive findings. Furthermore, these studies help fill a geographical void in our learnings about the "developing nations."

The respective modes of analysis and exposition differ. Oxaal, reflecting his journalistic background, provides an extremely well-written, entertaining (an adjective which could be profitably attached to more studies of politics), lucid description of the events leading to independence in the multiracial setting of Trinidad. The development of party politics—Dr. Eric Williams' Negro supported Peoples National Movement and the East Indian supported Democratic Labor Party now headed by Dr. Rudranath Capildeo—is a dominant theme. A lesson of ethnic politics is that numbers are supreme. The D. L. P. was defeated because the Indian population comprises only 36 per cent of the island's population.

Oxaal contributes to our understanding of the phenomena of social and political integration in multi-racial, developing societies. On page 178 he observes that "color tended to diminish in actual importance in determining mobility as educational opportunity and achievement increased over the years." Although color has declined as a social and occupational barrier in recent years, ethnic voting has increased. Therefore, Trinidad can be described as a society exhibiting politically disintegrative tendencies, even though social mobility and social integration has risen from much lower levels, particularly for dark-skinned Trinidadians who previously lived under a color bar.

In contrast with Oxaal's historical and descriptive style, both Mau and Moskos attempt systematic social science, basing their analyses mainly on the responses obtained from elite interviews. Mau's study is limited to Jamaican leaders and one mass group in Kingston, whereas Moskos interviewed leaders in Dominica, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad. Both selected their elites using a combination of positional and reputational criteria. Persons in high positions were asked to identify influentials by reputation. Those named comprised the units of study.

Mau sought to analyze attitudes held by elites toward the various social, economic, and political changes which characterized Jamaica during the transition from colony to independent nation. Leaders who professed belief in egalitarian principles, exercised decision-making power and who were knowledgeable of the complaints and discontents of lower class West Kingston residents were generally optimistic about the prospects for progress. Furthermore, these leaders identified the masses as hostile in much smaller proportions than leaders less egalitarian, less powerful and less knowledgeable. Thus Mau concludes favorably for the future of Jamaica. More than half the leaders interviewed expressed belief in Jamaica's future potential for progressive change.

Moskos investigated the development of West Indian nationalism during the pre-independence period in the British Caribbean. His format first describes the elite structure in the West Indies followed by the results of a series of interviews held with West Indian leaders. A typology of nationalist leaders was constructed (colonialist, acquiescing nationalists, and true nationalists) and correlated with (1) standard background characteristics (sex, age, education, color and ethnicity, personal wealth, life-style, and institutional sector; and (2) the economic, political and social views of these leaders.

Moskos presents several substantive findings: (1) West Indian leaders are better educated, wealthier and possess life-styles markedly different from that of the general population; (2) nationalism is a function of territorial size, i.e., leaders in smaller islands are less nationalistic; (3) colonialist types are in economically dominant positions and often white or near-white, while true nationalists are younger and more provincial West Indian middle class; (4) true nationalists express "left" economic ideologies, colonials profess "right" economic ideologies, while the acquiescing nationalists admit to intermediate economic ideologies; and (5) nationalist movements in the West Indies exhibit properties comparable with movements which have occurred in Western Europe.

Methodologically, Mau and Moskos suffer from inadequate samples. Mau's analysis of Jamaica is based on 54 interviews and Moskos relies on 112 total interviews from six different territories. The small samples restrict the statistical analysis to an almost uninteresting simple distribution of percentages, which often lack meaningful theoretical motivation. Controls are not applied to the data since the *n's* in the cells would quickly diminish to zero. For instance, Table 22 in Mau's book gives a percentage breakdown of knowledgeable leaders by type of elite position even though the number of cases on which the per cent is based ranges from 8 to 13. A change in the responses of only a few leaders could reverse the findings. Thus, the reliability and utility of most of the tables is sharply diminished. Furthermore, tests of statistical significance are not reported, nor is an explanation provided to account for their absence. Similar criticisms apply to Moskos.

One may question whether it is fair for Moskos to combine his 112 respondents for any analytic purposes. His findings that leaders living in larger territories tended to be more nationalistic than those in smaller territories may be inconsistent with assessing the correlates of nationalism for all leaders taken together without a control for territorial size.

Methodological shortcomings may prejudice the acceptability of the substantive findings reported in the latter two elite studies. However, the truth and generality of the findings are in principle testable in other locations and, properly verified, may aid our theorizing about nationalism and attitudes held by elites in newly independent nations.

It should be noted that these books in the Schenkman series are illustrated with splendid photographs and are reasonably priced. This series of reports provides an important beginning for the study of Caribbean political development.—ALVIN RABUSHKA, *University of Rochester.*

Kassenärzte und Krankenversicherungsreform: Zu einer Theorie der Statuspolitik. BY FRIEDER NASCHOLD. (Freiburg i/B: Rombach, 1967. Pp. 288.)

A German student of interest group politics is confronted with a greater variety of problems than his American colleague: the prevalent idea that pressure politics is dirty, illegal or even subversive; the relative scarcity of empirical studies; the legalistic tradition that informs much of West German political science; and the need to import "Anglo-American" group theories as models for German case studies.

In light of these problems, the present book on medical politics is a considerable scholarly achievement. It deals with one segment of organized medicine: the health insurance physician and his main organization, the KBV; his attitudes toward statutory provisions; and his perception of the physician's predicament in a pluralistic welfare state. It discusses the relationship between the KBV and other medical associations; the KBV's decision-making processes and oligarchical leadership; and its access to the political authorities.

Organized medicine cannot be treated in the same way as workers' or employers' groups: the latter operate more or less autonomously, engaging in "political" activities to promote essentially economic goals; while the former is basically professional in its aims, and hence apolitical. Such a view of the medical profession, which the author supports with (not entirely convincing) statistics on comparative professional attitudes, precludes an analysis of medical politics in terms of marxist theory or bread-and-butter aspirations, and explains why he concentrates on status politics. The author admits that status politics is elusive, incoherent and often ineffectual, owing to unrealistic and conflicting ideologies and status perceptions, including the "estate consciousness" of the profession; the glorification of the traditional GP; the view of the physician as scientist, public servant or entrepreneur; and, finally, the flight into "the ideal of the essence of being a physician" (*das eigentliche Arztsein*)—whatever that may mean. The progressive nationalization of medical care has led to a transformation of the status and role expectations of the doctor. The fee system and the doctor-patient relationship have become dependent on the dynamics of statutory health care programs and on the general economic situation. The physician in "socialized medicine" is no longer free, nor is his status based on professional mystique. This dependence has, of course, not been entirely unwelcome: physicians want to be institutionalized not only because rendering a public service appeals to their sense of professionalism, but also because they gain a secure clientele and a guaranteed income.

For a long time, the medical profession remained politically passive, because its conflicting ideologies and organizational fragmentation weakened its cohesion and because the professional self-image required an apolitical stance. All this changed dramatically in the late 1950's: the health insurance reform bill, which envisaged an administratively determined fee schedule, threatened to transform the physician into a minor bureaucrat. The threat to medical apoliticism resulted in "status polarization" which transformed the profession into a cohesive force and enabled it to employ "political" means. But the physician can have his cake and eat it: he maintains his apolitical pose but transfers political responsibility to the organizational physicians "who are less socialized on the basis of medical norms." Ultimately all doctors must become political, in order to counter any acute threats to their apolitical status.

Unfortunately, the author tends to think of "political means" in terms of parliaments, electorates and parties. If politics is construed more broadly, the medical profession has always been political, despite its argument that its intervention with the bureaucracy and similar activities prior to "status polarization" merely constituted an exchange of objective information.

A more serious problem is the author's rejection of the financial in favor of the "status" hypothesis. While he admits that the privileged status and the entrepreneurialism of many doctors have been "dysfunctional with respect to the health care requirements of society as a whole," he does not conclude that doctors are as interested in exerting pressure for monetary gain as other groups; he does not adequately analyze the medical associations' quest for the retention of bargaining powers, or their interest in keeping the health insurance funds fragmented to avoid being confronted with a united opponent; or the demand of specialists for better fees than those received by GP's. The author does admit that there has been "a decline of the spiritual outlook of the doctors," but he attributes this not to the profession's cupidity but rahter to "the dominance of materialistic attitudes in man." Had money been an important consideration—so the author argues—the physicians would have favored, in the early postwar period when medical pay was relatively low, a *Verbeamtung,* i.e. civil service status. But then civil servants were paid badly, too. Moreover, if the preference of status to income were so compelling, the doctors should have welcomed an incorporation into the bureaucracy, since status and psychic income have often been more important to bureaucrats than real economic advantages. In fact, the health insurance physicians have sometimes found "governmentalization" to their advantage, because public-law status has conferred the label of legitimacy and objectivity upon their demands.

One may also question the author's thesis that the threat to the doctor's image produced an effective status polarization and cohesion. The internecine fights between medical associations continued at the height of the medical reform struggle; one medical group brought suit against another, and new medical associations fought each other over fee distribution. Furthermore, one may question the author's contention that the status politics of the physicians represents a deviant case. The white collar sector has long striven to preserve its status and organizational identity despite the economic disadvantages it has thereby encountered.

There are a few minor shortcomings: no adequate discussion of the linkage between the KBV and the federal medical chamber, of the importance of medical journals in politicizing the doctor, or of the dynamics of medical pressure on the political decision-makers. The many complex details about the development of medical statutes, organization, and attitudes are impressive, but despite the marshalling of group and status theories—which precedes the factual analysis without necessarily clarifying it—medical politics is treated as a case *sui generis,* and no general principles emerge with respect to West German group politics. What makes it difficult for the reader to follow the book is its organization: it is not divided into chapters but rather scores of numbered, often brief, paragraphs—as in a legal text; the author switches back and forth in his analysis, which remains indicative rather than fully developed. Finally, there is no index. Hopefully, however, this book will contribute useful raw material for future attempts at generalization about interest groups. —WILLIAM SAFRAN, *University of Colorado.*

Constructive Change in Latin America. ED. BY COLE BLASIER. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1968. Pp. 243. $7.50.)

The French have an appropriate term for describing this sort of non-book: *macédoine,* "a work composed of diverse pieces forming a disparate whole." Beyond their common regional focus and the fact that they were all presented to the same faculty seminar at the University of Pittsburgh, there is little the editor can use to justify the joint publication of these original essays. Prudently, he leaves the provocative title concept, "constructive change," undefined. Unconvincingly, he argues that all the authors share a common preoccupation with the lot of the lower classes and with the need for consensus to accompany social and economic transformations.

Multi- or Interdisciplinary relevance is the usual justification for such a compilation. The seven authors do represent a variety of approaches and disciplines: anthropology, economics, sociology, political science and literature—but each stays strictly within the confines of his professional specialization. Merely juxtagposing their isolated efforts, however competent, does little to meet the stated objective of overcoming "the excessive compartmentalization in teaching and research that has handicapped the development of Latin American studies and knowledge in general." Rather, it underscores its persistence.

One of the more unfortunate consequences of a *macé-doine* is that, amid the disparity in quality and diffuseness of scope, essays of major significance get overlooked. In this format they are initially less widely distributed than a well-placed journal article and subsequently less likely to be reprinted. The essay by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Josá Luis Reyna, "Industrialization, Occupational Structure and Social Stratification in Latin America" is, I believe, of such stature. The two authors, one a Brazilian, the other a Mexican sociologist, but both formerly associated with the Latin American Institute of Economic and Social Planning (ILPES) in Santiago de Chile, take on a major and hiterto unexamined issue: Is the development process in Latin America repeating the same basic patterns of structural change which characterized the evolution of today's older industrialized societies? Their answer is a qualified negative. By extensive resort to aggregate data on the major countries of the area, Cardoso and Reyna document a number of significant deviations from the Western Europe-North American pattern: (1) Urban growth precedes and far surpasses that of industrial growth; (2) While movement out of agricultural pursuits parallels that of the "early take-off countries", proportional employment in industry is much lower and shows marked signs of stagnation; (3) The great absorber of newly mobilized urban manpower is the tertiary sector—an omnibus category which disguises the existence of a growing proportion of economic marginals. The resulting configuration is paradoxical: on the one hand: the gradual formation, increase and consolidation of a proletariat and other modern status groups based on relatively open, performance-oriented criteria and values; on the other hand, the more accelerated growth of undifferentiated, underemployed and unassimilated urban masses, "recruited" by geographic mobility and rapid demographic growth and only latently "available" for participation in the values and institutions of a modern industrial society. This configuration differs markedly from that of industrializing Europe and while its bloated tertiary resembles that of contemporary post-industrial societies, it lacks the latter's high level of productivity. From this stratification model, the authors launch into some speculative propositions about elite responsiveness and persistence, social mobility, class conflict, fragmentation within lower strata and center-periphery relations. While the authors' imagination clearly outruns their data—itself of questionable reliability and comparability—their essay represents a major effort at understanding the Latin American development process in a critical, but nonpolemic Marxist perspective.

The remaining six essays are of lesser originality and general relevance. John Gillin discusses the values of the lower classes in a rather vague and quite undocumented sequel to his earlier and much reprinted essay on the middle class ethos. John Powelson takes a long time to make a simple *Hirschmanesque* point about the ECLA doctrine: that ideologically deformed, empirically unfounded (in his opinion) economic analysis may result indirectly in more appropriate and effective policy sequences than objective, correct (i.e., North American) economic analysis. Both place great emphasis on values and the need for consensus over them, but in their compartmentalized way seem unaware of the survey research work of scholars such as Joseph Kahl on Brazil and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba on Mexico.

Two essays deal with the perennial issues of private foreign capital and the Alliance for Progress. Neither contributes anything new to the discussion, conceptually or substantively. Richard Thorn's summary of the fortunes of the Alliance for Progress, for example, starts like a State Department press release, switches to the hard-hitting, disjointedly factual style of the Annual Reports of the Social Progress Trust Fund and concludes with the usual lament over the lack of a political will to implement reforms at the national level, a plea for more effective salesmanship on the part of intellectuals and a call for the establishment of a Great Power Executive Committee with United States participation to guide regional integration!

Germán Arciniegas provides an erudite—if controversial—reminder that students of Latin American politics stand to learn as much from the area's literature, "a humanized form of polemics," as from "Marxist babblers (who) have picked up the phrase, 'structural change' and are applying it with rigor as an easy answer to any solution."

In the final essay, James Malloy draws a concise and objective political history of the Bolivian revolutionary experience, but cast in a conceptual framework clearly intended to provoke comparison. He orients his account around a number of interesting working propositions about both the pre-revolutionary dilemma and the post-revolutionary process of reconsolidating central authoritative control. Unfortunately, in this short format, the exposition is much longer on inference than systematically compiled evidence. It does, however, set a promising standard for the fully-documented study of which it is a résumé.—PHILIPPE SCHMITTER, *University of Chicago.*

Communism in Malaysia and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey. BY JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967. Pp. 268. $11.30.)

This is a highly informative and insightful survey of Communist organizations and activities in Malaysia and Singapore with primary emphasis on the 1963-67 period. After a succinct discussion of various stages of Communist activity in this area, the author analyzes specific problems and prospects in each territorial unit—Singapore, Malaya, Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. Special attention is paid to the pattern of Communist tactics applied in the processes of formation and disintegration of the Malaysian Federation. And the author evaluates the consequences of Indonesia's erstwhile "confrontation" campaign against Malaysia and of Communist China's policies in Southeast Asia.

The fact that Communism in the Singapore-Malaysian area is almost entirely a Chinese phenomenon is deeply rooted in the persistent ethnic and cultural identity of Chinese groups. Although they enjoy commanding economic positions and high educational development, a variety of their communal grievances, coupled with their chauvinistic outlooks, become a fertile soil for Communist appeals and operations. In Malaya the Chinese, as "second class" citizens, suffered most from discriminatory measures in such fields as citizenship regulations, business licenses, governmental recruitment, language requirements and public assistance. In recent years Malaysia and Thailand concluded a frontier defense agreement and conducted the joint patrols to suppress the growing Communist guerilla activities along the border, given an impetus by a combination of Chinese communalism and ultra-orthodox Islamic currents. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) fully exploited the Chinese grievances to maximize its revolutionary objectives and to further radicalize political dynamics along communal lines. Yet the heightened sense of communal differences tended to militate against ideological ties. Among leftwing Malays and Chinese, therefore, communal suspicions and tensions undermined common ideological commitments and destroyed a number of MPC's united front organizations and movements. In this sense, the author concludes, communalism is not only Malaysian Communism's greatest asset but also a major barrier to its success.

The fusion of Communism and Chinese communal interests is particularly effective in Sarawak. The so-called Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO), most significantly identified with Mao-tung's political doctrines, recruited a considerable number of young Chinese radicals and made a substantial penetration into Chinese communities. While the CCO and its front complex advocated complete national independence for Sarawak and instigated subversive activities, the Goverernment arbitrarily arrested suspects and resettled some Chinese into a more controllable area. This intensified atmosphere increased the possibility of a Communist insurgency of major proportions. In Sabah where Chinese radicalism was less evident than elsewhere, Communist activities were largely an appendix of CCO operations. But Chinese status ambiguities and grievances in Sabah contained a seedbed for political radicalism. In Brunei, however, A. M. Azahari, in apparent cooperation with the MP, opposed the Malaysian Federation, advanced the notion of a unified North Borneo state comprising Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak, and led an unsuccessful armed revolt.

The People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore was once bipolarized between the moderate non-Communist faction led by Lee Kuan Yew and the radical Communist-oriented and communally minded faction influenced by the MCP. One reason for Tunku Abdul Rahman's acceptance of Singapore into the Malaysian Federation was to make the split of PAP complete and to contain MCP's activities in the island state. The PAP's leftwing faction established the *Barisan Sosialis* (Socialist Front) Party and appealed to labor unions, militant student groups at Nanyang University and chauvinistic Chinese communities. In the face of the Malaysian Government's suppressive measures, Singapore Communists adopted a militant strategy along the line of Peking's "revolutionary hard-line" and in conjunction with Djakarta's "saboteurs and guerillas." Although the author alludes to the MCP's control over the PAP's leftwing and later over the Barisan, he fails to clarify the extent of the MCP's control, either organizational or financial. Moreover, such crucial aspects of the MCP and the Barisan as internal organizations, ideological assertions and leadership techniques are left unclear. The term "front organization" is not defined in this book and thus vulnerable to abuse.

While the author often makes references to Peking's "militancy" and "expansionism" in the Singapore-Malaysian area, nowhere does he attempt a satisfactory examination of Communist China's strategies and tactics regarding this area. Unless such an explanation is given, it is difficult to accept that overt and organized support for the anti-Malaysian movement shifted from Djakarta to Peking in the wake of the abortive PKI-sponsored coup of September 1965 or that opposition to Malaysia was for Peking a kind of Asian test case of its ideological and tactical differences with the Soviet Union. And Professor Justus M. van der Kroef implies that a profound communal divisiveness, especially the basic clash of Malay and Chinese political cultures, continues to characterize Singapore-Malaysian political life and to promote the interest of Communist movement. But it remains to be seen whether most overseas Chinese will perpetually preserve a parochial and chauvinistic loyalty toward their ancestral homeland or will gradually develop a significant sence of attachment to their adopted countries.—Chae-Jin Lee, *University of Kansas.*

Agrarian Reform in Colombia. By Ernest A. Duff. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 240. $14.00.)

The test of any case study is not only its validity but its relevance to an issue of general significance. Ernest Duff's study of Colombia's agrarian reform fairly well succeeds according to these criteria. In relating land reform to political processes, this book may serve as an admirable basis for other ones concerned with the politics of reform.

Chronologically and topically, Duff correctly distinguishes the legislation of land reform from its implementation. Although a number of precedents nourished them, land reform measures enacted in Colombia in 1961 were facilitated by a unique constitutional arrangement (the *Frente Nacional,* which alternates executive power between Colombia's major parties), international pressures (most especially, the examples of other Latin countries, and growing American awareness of the issue), and "reformmongering" by able and principled politicians earlier described in Hirschman's book, *Journeys Toward Progress.* Once enacted, however, new issues arose—funding, administrating, staffing, and developing support for the enterprise. Duff praises the country's current president, Carlos Lleras Restrepo, for skillfully maneuvering the bill through Congress. He is also properly impressed by the imaginative activism of the Agrarian Reform Institute's first General Manager, Dr. Enrique Penalosa. But, by terminating his study in 1967, Duff unfortunately relates only an incomplete story. Has the Land Reform Institute overcome financial, technical, and political obstacles to become a viable institution within the framework of public and private agencies active in Colombian agricultural policy making? More time is needed for a definitive answer.

Perhaps this book's principal value to those concerned with political development is its simple but careful elaboration of alternatives within the rubric, "land reform." Many who earlier wrote about land reform were obsessed by the general theme and explained it as merely an "either/or" confrontation between large landholders and peasants. Duff devotes considerable detail to the political significance of expropriation and distribution procedures, colonization, marketing arrangements, credit programs, infrastructure projects, extension work, etc. The reader will gain considerably from Duff's first-hand knowledge of many earlier projects. He will, in sum, come to appreciate the complexity of the issue in Colombia and elsewhere.

Yet, the reader will not come away fully satisfied. Despite careful documentation, Duff relies too much on published material which often over-states particular views. Unfortunately, Duff does not construct a political basis (one which might relate demands and supports within the system) to consider the activities of various affected agencies. Repetitions of party positions contrast with the scarce information on interest groups—the army, landholders' associations, regional development corporations, peasant groups, etc. There is, for example, no discussion of how the Society of Colombian Agriculturalists has attempted to broaden its clientele in order to defend key interests. Reliable information on interest articulators in the context of any reform movement is, of course, as difficult to find as it is valuable to uncover.

Duff notes how neighboring Venezuela's reform has surpassed Colombia's, partly at least because of the way that country's political parties mobilized peasant support. Why haven't reform-minded Colombian politicians profited more from this experience? Could it be because of the "oligarchy" which some believe rules without competition in Colombia? Or might this failure be attributed to the lack of active political cadres within the reformist parties, the peculiar apathy of the Colombian peasant, or the legacy of *la violencia?* These questions are vital ones since their answers will suggest much about the hopes for reform not only in Colombia but in other countries as well. From the experience he has gained in writing this book, one can reasonably expect that Ernest Duff will ably explore them in the future.—WILLIAM J. BRISK, *University of New Mexico.*

The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century. BY ANIL SEAL. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Pp. 416. $11.50.)

At first glance, it may seem inappropriate that an historical work like Seal's should be reviewed in this journal and presumtuous of a political scientist to undertake the task. However, the author himself foreswears "spiritless historiography which clings to the particular and eschews the general" and sees in Indian history broader patterns of the encounter between European imperialism and colonial nationalism. For instance, he asserts that "all over the world, nationalist leaders have been formed out of government subordinates, men who put their working hours to good use in studying the mechanics of power, and devoted their leisure to studying the obstacles barring their own promotion." Furthermore, he employs some of the current jargon of political development such as "political mobilization" and displays the redundancy of statistical tables now expected in behavioral science. His chapter titles such as "The Political Arithmetic of the Presidencies," "The Rewards of Education" and "The Politics of the Associations" are also topical rather than chronological. Therefore it is fair to appraise his work as social science.

The general problem Seal sets for himself is how and why modern politics began in India when they did. "Modern" is never defined except tautologically in terms of the associations formed by the western-educated. His thesis is that the new elite created by the British to man the lower rungs of the imperial bureaucracy entered into a contingent collaboration with the foreing rulers for the sake of caste or communal advantage over other Indians, but then turned into critics when the demand for government jobs outran the supply. The uneven timing of development (and in this he sees the essence of historical analysis) between the coastal and interior regions of India provided the British with a series of collaborators as each new wave of horizontal and vertical mobilization intensified competition. Once alienated, the western-educated elite was more dangerous to the rulers than traditional foes because it could at least claim to represent all of India and could imitate more effective British modes of political debate and organization. They even invaded British domestic politics.

Seal's analysis is a kind of elitist-materialist determinism wihtout economic social classes. He bases this position on a controversial denial that British rule revitalized the Indian economy. What economic growth there was "was not sufficient to give Indian social classes based on economic categories." Instead, bureaucratic institutional change created the new elite drawn from the high status, but low income castes and therefore unlike the modernizing bourgeoisie of Europe.

The author's theses are not altogether novel except as applied to the communal split between Hindus and Muslims which ultimately led to Partition and the creation of Pakistan. He argues that the Muslim community despite its formal adherence to the ideal of Islamic brotherhood was no more homogeneous than the Hindus. Far from being backward and oppressed throughout India as those of its leaders claimed who collaborated with the British in order to obtain "reservations" in the civil service, the Muslims of Upper India were relatively better off educationally and in proportion of jobs held than the Hindu majority. Where the Muslim minority was disadvantaged, as in Bengal, this was due to poverty rather than religious prejudice as often alleged. Misrepresentation of the true Muslim condition he blames on an influential work, *The Indian Musalmans* by Sir William Hunter which, though culled from the context of Bengal, was the basis for many of the polemics on behalf of the two-nation theory (one Hindu, one Muslim). Seal disagrees with both the Indian Nationalists and the proponents of Pakistan by concluding that there was no nation at all in the subcontinent in the nineteenth century. While the tone of his presentation is determinist, implying the inevitability of the outcome (Independence and Partition), in a few places he hints that the communal split could have been avoided at this turning point of Indian history (1885) if Hindus and Muslims in the backward regions had recognized that they had more interests in common than with their co-religionists on the coasts. What he fails to stress is that Muslims in general were less inclined to be adaptable to western ways in the crucial decades because it was they who had lost most of India to the British.

The author of this volume displays immense scholarship of a kind many of our political science experts on political development avoid in favor of baseless and sweeping generalization. Seal asks the right questions, but doesn't quite push his conclusions to the level where they would lend themselves to comparisons with other cases of political mobilization in colonial areas. This suggests the need for a more fruitful partnership between the two disciplines informulating and executing such projects.—THEODORE P. WRIGHT, JR., *State University of New York at Albany.*

Urban Government for Zagreb, Yugoslavia. BY EUGEN PUSÍC AND ANNMARIE HAUCK WALSH. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Pp. 151. $10.00.)

Yugoslavia—A Multinational State. BY JACK C. FISHER. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. 244. $8.00.)

The two books under consideration here, although they both concern themselves with Yugoslavia, are quite different both in approach and in effectiveness of analysis. The one (Pusic and Walsh, *Urban Government for Zagreb, Yugoslavia*) comes off as a quite routine, if not pedestrian, descriptive case-study of municipal-commune government in Yugoslavia. The other book (Fisher, *Yugoslavia—A Multinational State*) represents a solid attempt at a new and useful application of factor analysis to the well-documented phenomenon of regional variation in Yugoslav society.

The book by Pusic and Walsh is one in a series of case-studies of urban government under the auspices of the Institute of Public Administration in New York that includes municipalities of various countries. The authors open with an introductory chapter outlining the basic environmental contours of Zagreb; this is followed by a discussion of the institutions of government in their formal and structural aspect; then we have a chapter on inter-governmental relations that analyzes the different levels of administration; there is a chapter dealing with the process of social and economic planning in Zagreb; and, finally, a chapter is appended that describes assorted public service functions performed in the city. On the whole, the authors' style strikes me as plodding, quite unimaginative, with a high redundancy of terminology, a style not untypical of much writing in the field of municipal administration. One has to be either very interested specifically in Zagreb or in the details of municipal government to be stimulated, moved intellectually, or absorbed by the material that the reader is expected to digest. Despite these qualifications as to presentation and style, the Pusic and Walsh volume affords a very adequate, and indeed convenient, manual-type description of the functioning of municipal government in Yugoslavia. The book also affords insights into the special nature of Yugoslav political institutions that derive from the Yugoslav innovations of decentralization and social self-administration (e.g., one conclusion points to the wide range of citizen participation in Zagreb as compared to the cities studied in other countries). On balance, I would recommend this book to anyone seeking a focused, straight-forward, and concise descriptive summary of local governmental institutions in Yugoslav society. In other words, this case-study treatment of Zagreb affords us a convenient handbook outlining basic aspects of local government (i.e., the commune, the municipality, the council system, etc.) that characterize the Yugoslav system of decentralized authority. For this reason, if not for its depth of analysis, the book represents a quite worthwhile and respectable piece of scholarly work.

The second book under review here by Fisher represents an impressive attempt to examine regional variation (and, more specifically, urbanization) by the application of contemporary quantitative methods. The author begins with two chapters that define the landscape for the reader in terms of broad societal-ecological features and historical aspects of Yugoslav society; then a chapter follows that presents some general indicators of economic growth and a factor analysis based upon aggregate variables for fifty-five Yugoslav cities to allow for comparisons of levels of development across the country; the next chapter focuses upon housing policy and housing conditions that exist in Yugoslavia, a chapter that fits a bit uncomfortably within the broader concerns of regional variation and economic growth; and, finally, the author devotes a chapter to the commune system which contains both descriptive materials and a factor analysis used to compare varying development-levels across Yugoslav communes. A word might be added here as regards the development of the volume—namely, somehow the assorted parts fail to mesh with one another as well as they might. In part this reflects the fact that Prof. Fisher has drawn materials for his book from several research tasks that he had completed earlier. Accordingly, he resurrects some of his descriptive work on Yugoslav communes that appeared a number of years ago in *World Politics,* and he also includes materials from a more specialized study of housing problems in Yugoslavia that has occupied him more recently. Prof. Fisher combines these two research efforts with his innovative application of factor analysis to aspects of Yugoslav regional development, and then rounds out the volume with two impressive introductory chapters to put more narrowly focused aspects of the book into perspective. The piecing together of a volume in this way (although commonly done) always leaves its effects upon the flow of the argument and the organization of the finished product. As a result, the Fisher volume comes off as being a bit disjointed, although none the less worthwhile and effective in its many other aspects.

In a more positive vein, the attempt by Prof. Fisher to apply factor analysis as a means of getting at regional variation by using aggregate indicators (e.g., age-groups, income-patterns, occupational structure, etc.) is the most interesting and most academically profitable aspect of the book. This use of factor analysis is not only appropriate but also imaginatively conceived, while being suggestive as regards a number of theoretical issues of development that go beyond the specific application of Yugoslavia. There are in fact two separate applications of factor analysis in the book—the one to the sample of fifty-five Yugoslav cities, and the other to the full array of communes in the country. Both are instructive and analytically informative standing alone and could easily be so justified; however, the relationship between the *different* factors that are derived from the two distinct operations is not made clear by the author. In addition, Prof. Fisher fails to indicate why different (although related) sets of variables' are used in two separate instances of factor analysis, and what relevance this might have for his more general study of Yugoslav developmental and regional variation. It would have been useful if Prof. Fisher had defined in more explicit terms the exact nature of both the methodological and the theoretical relationship between these two applications of the factor analytic technique. Despite these reservations, I found that the use of factor analysis by Prof. Fisher as a means of ranking and defining communes along a broadly developmental (and, more narrowly, urbanization) spectrum to be both a fascinating and a fruitful application of the method. On balance, the merit of Prof. Fisher's work is reflected in the attempt to employ a new method of analysis to an essentially old and well-known problem that plagues the Yugoslav scene—namely, its severe and dramatic regional variation. And, it seems to me, that the author has indeed been quite successful in this application to the Yugoslav setting.

In general, Prof. Fisher concludes that a basically north-to-south regional variation exists in Yugoslavia and that, for example, one finds more urbanization in Slovenia, Croatia, and north Serbia than in other parts of the country. Although this hardly represents a startling finding as regards Yugoslavia, the fact that Prof. Fisher has given this a precise quantitative expression (i.e., he provides a concrete, operational measure of regional variation) does suggest that now "old" information is made available in more acceptable and perhaps more usable form given current trends in soical science. As a result, in my view, this would represent an important step in the direction of improving our fund of knowledge about both Yugoslavia and the problems of economic growth more generally. I might add as a footnote that the large number of maps that Prof. Fisher has included in the book are also very useful and contribute importantly to the value of his work. In concluding, let me say that Prof. Fisher, in providing us with new data and expanded knowledge about regional variation in Yugoslavia, has made a significant contribution to the existing body of literature on Yugoslav society.—M. GEORGE ZANINOVICH, *University of Oregon.*

Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study of Collectivization. BY M. LEWIN. Trans. by Irene Nove. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968. Pp. 539. $11.50)

One of the key periods of Soviet history in general and the evolution of the Soviet political system in particular—up to now very much neglected by Western scholarship—is the period of acute crisis which followed the initial successes of Lenin's New Economic Policy. It was during this period that the Soviet leadership found itself at an important crossroads in the development of the "new Russia" and, being in disagreement over basic policy questions, could not agree on the directions.

Lenin had envisaged NEP as a phase in Russia's development toward communism which would last a long time. When in the years after 1927 the Bolshevik leadership saw itself confronted with the "accursed" problem of the relationship between town and country (or more pointedly: between the Soviet regime and the peasantry!), Bukharin advocated the continuation of more or less pure NEP measures; the exiled Left, while wanting to retain a market economy, favored rapid industrialization; Stalin, who by this time was in control, decided to solve the crisis—epitomized in the grain procurement problem—by ending NEP.

Lewin's study, spanning the years 1925–1930, was originally published in French as *La Paysannerie et Pouvoir Soviétique* (Mouton, 1966). It is the first full-length treatment in a Western language of this crucial period in Soviet history and a major contribution to our understanding of the events which led to the decision to transform the Russian *muzhik* (peasant) into a Soviet collective farmer, and to achieve this transformation, as well as rapid industrialization, at breakneck speed.

Dr. Lewin brings to his task not only meticulous scholarship and a rare mastery of sources, but also valuable personal insights and a unique feeling for his subject. The value of his study is enhanced by his own personal experiences in the USSR during 1940–1946, i.e., only 10–12 years after the events which he describes and analyzes in his book.

In the first part of his book, primarily devoted to the years 1925–1927, the author deals with the factors which led to the breakdown of NEP. He presents a lucid analysis of class stratification within the peasantry and a detailed account of the enormous difficulties encountered by the Soviet regime in its attempt to extend "Soviet power" to the countryside. Lewin argues that the heterogeneous character of the peasantry presented both theoretical and practical problems for the Soviet regime, whose initial policies were predicated on the assumption that the peasants could be readily classified into three categories, *viz.,* poor (*bedniaks*), middle (*seredniaks*), and well-to-do peasants (*kulaks*). The present volume leads to the conclusion that the ideological distinction made by the Soviet regime (and by Soviet historians) between the various segments of the peasantry concealed the real issue: the fact that the major obstacles confronting the Soviet regime in rural Russia could not be reduced to the existence of the *kulak* class, but involved the middle peasants, i.e., the vast majority. Lewin's subsequent analysis shows how Stalin turned the very vagueness of the concepts of *kulak* and *seredniak* into a political advantage. In fact, the author argues that for Stalin the terms *kulak* and *muzhik* came to be identical (p. 252).

In part II of the book the author interprets the years 1928–1929 as a kind of interlude during which the regime failed to develop a coherent long-range economic policy and attempted instead to deal with the procurement crisis of 1928 and subsequent problems through "measures of a partial and provisional nature." (p. 267). This is the heart of the book: a thorough and meticulously researched account of the events which "drove the Communist Party leadership to embark upon mass collectivization."

Part III deals with the "great turning point" of 1929—the "spinal year" (Krzizhanovsky's phrase!) of the first Five Year Plan—and with the Party's attempt to achieve collectivization on a mass scale through "dekulakization" in order to ensure the first "Bolshevik spring," as Molotov had put it in November of 1929.

Lewin suggests that the attack on the *kulaks,* which resulted in an outbreak of mass violence and brought the country to the brink of civil war, was motivated by the desire of the central leadership to coerce the middle peasant into believing that joining the collective farm was the only remaining alternative. Any opposition to collectivization and Soviet policy in the countryside in general came to be regarded as *kulak* activity" and was dealt with accordingly.

In the author's view, Stalin's decision to embark upon forced collectivization, coupled with a policy of continued rapid industrialization, took shape during 1928 and was dictated by an ever-growing economic crisis and by his maneuvers in the factional struggle, as well as by his personality. (The latter point is not well developed.) While Lewin may be right in arguing that collectivization "was not the outcome of long premeditation in the doctrinal sense" (p. 163), Stalin's political maneuvers during 1928 suggest that he probably had decided on his subsequent course of action as early as 1927—before the 15th Party Congress in December of that year. In fact, an examination of Stalin's views of the peasantry before 1927 reveals an extremely negative attitude (cf., e.g., Stalin, *Sochineniia,* vol. VII, pp. 28, 213; vol. VIII, p. 93), which hardly suggests a continuation of the regime's policy toward the peasants on the model of Lein's NEP. And while the author may be right in noting that the term *kolkhoz* (collective farm) does not occur in Stalin's writings before the 15th Congress, as early as June 1925 Stalin spoke of the necessity of organizing the millions of the peasant masses into cooperatives (*ibid.,* vol. VII, p. 157) and emphasized that the proletariat would have to wage a struggle not only against the *kulaks* but aginst the *peasantry as a whole.* (p. 173).

Perhaps Dr. Lewin has defined the explanatory parameters of his investigation somewhat too narrowly. His study would have benefited from a critical examination of the problematic nature of Lenin's concept of the alliance (*smychka*) between the proletariat and the peasantry, as well as by a thorough analysis of the character of the agrarian revolution of 1917. In general, Lenin's position on the peasant question does not emerge clearly in the book—in spite of the author's implicit recognition that Lenin *was* a participant in the "great debate." And the exposition of Bukharin's position is not without serious shortcomings. At times the author does not make clear whether Bukharin is expressing his own ideas or quoting Lenin.

Unfortunately, the translation of Dr. Lewin's work leaves much to be desired, especially in regard to grammatical construction. The general reader may object to the often excessive and unnecessary use of Russian terms, some of which are not explained, either in the text or in the glossary.—Rolf H. W. Theen, *Iowa State University.*

Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union. Edited by Erich Goldhagen. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968. Published for the Institute of East European Jewish Studies of the Philip W. Lown School of Near Eastern and Judaic Studies, Brandeis University. Pp. 351. $8.75.)

Until now the nationality problem in the Soviet Union has not been considered sufficiently important to attract wider attention. Even books of recent vintage that survey the half century of Soviet development frequently brush off the consideration of this question. This neglect can be explained and understood, but can not be justified. The problem deserves close attention because the nationality policy is an integral part of Soviet development. It has considerably influenced the shaping of the Soviet system and has continuously affected the making of the Kremlin's policies. The Bolshevik solution of the national question decisively affected the establishment of the Soviet federal state. Stalin's decision that favored the development of a national Russian state as against a Soviet commonwealth of nations has added to the remaking of the Soviet Union from an originally intended revolutionary ideological power into an intensely ambitious imperialist nation-state. The resurgent non Russian nationalism now threatens this concept and, taken together with the general dissent demanding liberalization, presents grevious problems to the Kremlin rulers. Professor Brzezinski's recent suggestion that the national question in the Soviet Union represents one of the most explosive issues indeed is a good reminder of this empirically demonstrable yet unjustifiably disregarded fact.

The volume edited by Mr. Goldhagen, therefore, is the more welcome, because it signifies the growing recognition of the problem. It is not as all-inclusive and systematic as the editor suggests in the introduction (for example, Georgia should not be missing, the new developments of Siberia and autonomous republics are of utmost importance) and indeed the principle of the organization of the book is not very clear. Generally, it focuses on the phenomenon of non Russian self-assertiveness. The book contains five excellent, very well researched and documented articles that deal with individual nationalities. These cover the Ukraine (Yaroslav Bilinsky), the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Jaan Pennar), the Turkic peoples (Garip Sultan), the legal situation of the Jews (William Korey) and the Yiddish *Sovetish Heimland* whose contents are analyzed with gusto by Joseph and Abraham Brumbergs. The other nationality studies, unfortunately, are not as instructive though they too offer some insights into the ambiguity of Belorussian nationhood (Nicholas Vakar), social change in Armenia (Mary Matossian) or the complexity of nationality consciousness in Central Asia (Edward Allworth). Generally, the authors maintain that with the exception of Belorussia, national assertiveness is strong among the non Russians, even among the Jews, whose cultural and religious life has recently been, as Korey well explains, the most suppressed of all.

In addition to individual case studies, Mr. Goldhagen's book is valuable for discussions of broader issues. One of those is Jacob Ornstein's informative review of Soviet language policy. Another is John Armstrong's excellent analysis of Soviet nationalities in the Soviet system of power. There are of course alternative methods of dealing with the problem and one can legitimately question whether the functional model, even in the adjusted form that is used by Armstrong, is adequate for capturing the very dynamic, rapidly changing and complex process of Soviet nation building and indeed whether social communications indexes alone provide a sufficient basis for reconstructing a theoretical framework within which the Kremlin deals with its nationalities. This remark is not meant to detract from Professor Armstrong's accomplishment. His study is one of the very first in scholarly literature that examines the nationality development as an integral part of the Soviet system. The author thus elevates the study of Soviet "minorities" to the plane of an empirical analysis of the political system itself and his article is a "must" for any serious student of Soviet nationalities.

Finally, in a long but rewarding article Vsevolod Holubnychy tackles one of the most controversial questions in the field, namely, whether the Russians economically exploit the non Russian republics. In this very learned and well documented study the author uses a purely economic model to prove his thesis that economic exploitation constitutes the essence of Soviet nationality policy. The statistical evidence presented, however, is mostly limited to the Ukraine and is not as convincing as the wealth of material used suggests it would be. Holubnychy, however, has raised important questions, presented cogent arguments and thus has triggered off some overdue but very useful and badly needed discussion that might and should lead toward a better clarification of the role of economics in Soviet nationality policy. Too frequently this role has been either too narrowly understood or denied altogether.

Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union is a result of a conference that the Institute of East European Jewish Studies of Brandeis University had organized in 1965. Both the Institute and the editor of the book should be commended for its efforts and encouraged to continue such research.—V. STANLEY VARDYS, *University of Oklahoma.*

Communism and the Yugoslav National Question. BY PAUL SHOUP. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 308. $9.50.)

Among the countries in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia appears to have the greatest mania for reorganization which currently embraces the political system, economy, and cultural life. Its communist party allegedly no longer will govern in the future but merely represent a guiding force. At least, such a change had been envisaged as far back as the July 1966 plenum of the Central Committee which met on the island of Brioni. The author of the scholarly work under review ends his coverage with this event.

Professor Shoup has had the great advantage of studying at the law faculty of Belgrade University, and his book is based on original source materials in the Serbo-Croatian language. In the thesis, he contends that "the Yugoslav national question today is very much part of the contemporary drama of nation-building and economic development now being played out in many parts of the world." (12)

Returning to intra-communist relations, for the moment, it is interesting to note the parallels between Comintern policy *vis-a-vis* the Yugoslav party and other parties in Eastern Europe. The author describes the former relationship in the background to his excellent study. Thus, after 1928 the Comintern called for peasant uprisings and in 1934 even ordered a policy of secession for Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia by communists in these provinces. Professor Shoup also concludes that already in May 1941 the "Yugoslav Communist Party was beginning to act independently of the Soviet Union and to conceal its actions from the Comintern, if only in matters of local importance." (p. 62) He also suggests that peasant nationalism during World War Two was based on hostility toward alien [i.e., German] rule. How many of the 3,000 communist secret police killed after that war can be blamed on the peasantry, which may have considered the victims "alien," is probably classified information at Belgrade.

Moving on to foreign affairs, the author discusses a proposed Balkan Federation, with Bulgaria envisaged as a seventh republic within Yugoslavia. This never materialized. Had the plan been implemented, then perhaps the current Macedonian dispute might never have arisen. Professor Shoup contends that solution of the nationality question for the Yugoslavs "could serve as a model for the newly developing nations of Africa and Asia with problems similar to their own." (pp. 188–189). The possibility of a single, amalgamated Yugoslave culture apparently has been abandoned due to local resistance and the need to rely on more nationalistically oriented republics like Croatia and Slovenia in order to implement economic reforms.

In his conclusion, the author suggests that nation-building in Yugoslavia may never be completed. "It is clear that one transitional phase, at least, has come to an end with the breakdown of the effort to create a new type of nationalism based on the quasi-communist, quasi-democratic institutions of Titoist Communism." (p. 265). The book includes valuable appendices portraying nationality statistics for the population, the Yugoslav communist party, republic communist parties; opinions about relations among the various nationalities; the national origin of key government and party officials; and an excellent bibliography.—RICHARD F. STAAR, *The National War College.*

Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924. BY SEYMOUR BECKER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 416. $12.50.)

Since Churchill's famous dicta on Russia, much firstrate research has reduced the enigma to more manageable proportions. Some riddles, however, remain to engage our attention. These would include aspects of the decision-making process at various elite levels, the succession problem, and the theory and practice of the regime's policies toward the nationalities; Professor Beck's book is a valuable addition to the growing literature in the latter field.

Russia's Protectorates does not attempt to address itself to contemporary problems of Soviet politics. Yet it explicates these through a detailed, scholarly, immensely readable history of the two Central Asian Protectorates. On clear aspect of Russian policy in Bukhara and Khiva is that, instead of the the stereotyped "Prison House of Nations," St. Petersburg followed enlightened policies. The two Protectorates did eventually succumb to Russification, as the more advanced Russian state brought the benefits of civilization, and as the frontier between British and Russian spheres was stabilized; but "civilization" came as the result of a more advanced state coming into contact with a relatively more backward one.

Thus Bukhara and Khiva became part of Russia through a process of attrition, in the manner of the old truism that power abhors a vacuum. Yet the sovereignty of the two Protectorates, with the exception of their foreign relations over which they lost control at an early stage, was ended only when the Bolsheviks seized their territory as an aftermath of the Civil War. Another myth is shattered along the way: the Russian Governors in Central Asia were able, competent, far sighted men. Their policies were usually supported by St. Petersburg; when opposition arose, it came about either as a result of national preoccupation elsewhere, or local policy recommendations were ultimately adopted. But let Prof. Becker summarize the ultimate causes of Russification:

> In short, Russia was spurred on in Central Asia by a whole complex of motives—the quest for a secure frontier, the provocations offered by unstable neighbors, the fear of being excluded from the area by England, and the temptation of diplomatic leverage, economic profit, and military glory. (p. 23)

Advanced nations cannot expand their influence into less developed territories without eventuating political change. The coming of the railroad and telegraph first brought enclaves for the citizens of *Russia,* then granted them extraterritorial justice and law. These changes, beginning in the 1880s, were *ad hoc*; just the same they slowly, imperceptibly, but profoundly, changed the relationship between St. Petersburg and the Protectorates. If the latter retained their *de jure* independence, it was only because the Russians so willed it. In actual fact, both Bukhara and Khiva became dependencies; their respective rulers attempted to oppose the new trend, and to retain their previous personal perogatives. In this they were ultimately unsuccessful. They were, however, able to retard the process.

Nor was Russian policy consistent. A long period of neglect—or, more accurately, a period of classical *laissez faire* on part of the Russian state—came between times of active interest in the Protectorates. Becker gives a detailed analysis of economic, military and political factors in the changing relationships. The Russian regime was not to be rushed into colonization. The reason soon became clear:

> St. Petersburg did the inescapable minimum to protect and promote Russian private interests in the khanates and acted to restrain those interests when they threatened the foreign ministry's policy of non-intervention. Concern for her own strategic position was more important to official Russia than were the economic interests of her own subjects. (p. 191).

Nevertheless, Russian technology slowly gnawed into the Protectorates' independence. Even though the policy of Russification was renounced, the Russian presence inexorably led to loss of local autonomy and privileges.

After the turn of the century, however, the pressures toward greater Russian influence became increasingly hard to resist. New local rulers, especially in Khiva, lost the awe in which their fathers had held Russian military prowess. Rebellions against "foreign" rule multiplied. Successive defeats of the rebels drew the Russians ever deeper into local administration of the Protectorates. These trends suited the Leninists; after the defeat of the Whites, the region was gradually absorbed into the Soviet Union. Anti-Soviet activities and opposition to the Red Army in the Civil War may have hastened their end as semi-independent states; but it is unthinkable that the old dispensation could have endured into the Stalinist period.

Professor Becker has written the definitive work of Bukhara and Khiva during the period discussed. This reviwer might wish that more attention had been devoted to foreign affairs (which he hopes Prof. Becker will cover in a subsequent volume), and the price, which will confine the book to libraries and specialists. All those with an interest in cultural and political history are urged to take this truly excellent work, both scholarly and exciting, from the shelves. Good maps, bibliography (exhaustive, and exhaustively read and skillfully applied), glossary of terms (essential to a work of this nature), adequate index, pertinent treaties given in appendixes, aid the reader and add to his enjoyment.—PETER MAYER, *Westinghouse Electric Corp.*

Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918–1945. BY BARBARA MILLER LANE. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968. Pp. 278. $15.00.)

The politics of culture is a new topic for most political scientists. Although other problems of social policy often seem more pressing than those relating to the arts, cultural and aesthetic questions are being inscribed on the agenda of public concerns in increasing numbers. Barbara Miller Lane's book, *Architecture and Politics in Germany,* 1918–1945, is the kind of work on which the study of politics and culture will thrive. It is thoroughly researched, beautifully illustrated, and a paradigm of objectivity—especially important in the chapters on Nazi architecture, usually dismissed as "piles of unwiedly blocks," or an "endless repetition of dead forms."

A major theme of this study is that in politicizing architecture, the Nazis were not fulfilling some imperitive of a fascist form of political organization but carrying on a tradition begun in the twenties. The most detailed chapters of the work are devoted to the two political disputes which resulted in the exiling of the Bauhaus, haven for radical architects in the twenties, from Thuringia to Dessau in 1924, and finally in its permanent dissolution in 1932. Using the large collection of material from Walter Gropius' personal archive, the author draws a vivid picture of the artistic ferment in Wiemar Germany. Radical architects, under the leadership of Groupius and Bruno Taut formulated their goals in clearly ideological terms. They sought a "new totalism" through the medium of a socially conscious architecture carried out by men washed of traditional ideas by submission to a new regimen of courses in abstract design, form and color. The first "Battle of the Bauhaus" pitted these architects against local politicians who accused them of foreign influence, cultural decadence, and "art bolshevism."

After 1924 the argument shifted somewhat for with the new prosperity proponents of the international style found themselves favored with many commissions. In Frankfort Ernst May constructed large tracts of public housing in the new style, and building societies such as the Gehag brought the new ideas to Berlin. But with national prominence came national enemies. Paul Schultze-Naumberg led the enlarged opposition by reviving claims that the new style fostered racial decline by offering the people a faulty "wish picture."

By the time the Nazis came to power in 1933, national opposition to the new architecture had been consolidated in the Kampfbund under the tutelage of Alfred Rosenberg. Soon, however, both Schultze-Naumberg and this group fell from favor, only their negative proposal (purging of the Bauhaus) being accepted. Sponsorship of architecture under the Nazis was never fully centralized. Under the leadership of its frustrated architect, the regime boldly proclaimed that its new building program would create a common will, foster a feeling of proud togetherness and contribute to political unification. Beneath the monolithic rhetoric, however several different styles flourished. Albert Speer's party congress buildings brought the strong simplifying impetus of the international sytle to a classical revival, Clemens Klotz enlarged on medieval themes in his design of party leadership schools, and a wide variety of minor party buildings were constructed in various regional folk idioms.

Readers will be rewarded by a special asset of this book, the excellence of its design and typography. The book is set in Nelior, a typeface with strong architectural elements, strong, column-like verticals and squared-off forms. Beginning and end pages are designed in forms reminiscent of the Bauhaus-style itself, and the body of the work is given interest by a scheme of organization which adjusts the masses of each page up- and centerward. The placement of the illustrations creates pleasing variations on this theme except perhaps on pp. 29, 91 and 124 where the compression of elements leads in other directions and tends to make for crowding. The book, however, offers strong encouragement to those resigned to finding mundane texts in beautiful books and worthy manuscripts in nondescript editions.

This study is a work of history. It would be wrong to complain that it contains little theorizing and no explicit models of personal behavior or political interaction. No enterprise of understanding can survive flaws in its assumptions, but history, unlike political science, can plead modesty in making a show of its theoretical framework. The lack of explicit theory will tantalize political scientists, however. There are several indirect references to questions of space and behavior, for example. Nazi public housing projects returned to a "German" form of house plan with many small rooms form the plan popularized by radical architects which consolidated public rooms into a single area. Any comprehensive theory of architecture and politics will have to deal with the interplay of created environment and social behavior of the kind hinted at here. The dynamics of architecture as a political "issue area" provides another important theoretical viewpoint. This framework would ask, for example, whether the pluralism of building styles under the Nazis was inherent in the nature of architecture or a result of the "opportunism" of the Nazi regime. Evidence regarding the architectural programs of the other fascist regimes is becoming available and could be integrated into a larger theory of architecture and politics. It is a tribute to this book that it will be found not only on coffee tables and shelves of art books but in the working files of those interested in conceptual questions such as these. It is a work of many sensibilities.—W. CURTIS LAMB, *Yale University.*

Specialists and Generalists: A Comparative Study of the Professional Civil Servant at Home and Abroad by a Group of University Teachers. ED. BY F. F. RIDLEY. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1968. Pp. 213. $5.00.)

The "professional" versus the "amateur" in administration continues to be a major concern of British public service. The Institution of Professional Civil Servants commissioned a study of the professional bureaucrat in Britain, Australia, France, West Germany, Sweden, and the United States to submit to the Fulton Committee reviewing the Structure, Recruitment and Management of the Home Civil Service. This volume, *Specialists and Generalists,* evolved from the submission.

Although the IPCS represents scientific, technical, professional and specialist classes in the British Civil Service and other public bodies, this symposium argues no case, but analyzes the role of the specialist in six governmental systems. Nevertheless, the study is prompted by the widely expressed fear that British administration is not coping successfully with the critical problems of a scientific and technological age. Professor F. F. Ridley, University of Liverpool, and co-author of *Public Administration in France,* directed the work of the group and contributed the introduction, summation, and excellent account of the professional in France. Other contributors were Dr. B. B. Schaffer, University of Sussex; Dr. Nevil Johnson, University of Warwick; Dr. H. Parris, University of Durham; and Professor R. H. Pear, University of Nottingham. The baseline paper on Great Britain was provided by T. H. Profitt, Deputy Secretary General of IPCS.

A study of this sort runs into problems of definition. What is considered generalist in one system may be specialist in another. Does education in political science, public administration or other social science, or in law, really produce a specialist for public service? To minimize different understandings of such terms as generalist, specialist, professional, administration, management, technology, etc., the studies proceed by illustrating the career ladders, pay and status, and access to politicians that may be expected by arts graduates, lawyers and jurists, engineers, scientists, accountants, and others in the various systems.

In the British context, both persons and functions are separated into generalist and specialist. Generalists advise Ministers, formulate administrative policy, and as Mr. Profitt states, control the Governmental machine. The professional carries out the work of specialist agencies under administrative and financial control of the generalist, and advises the generalist on policy. In Sweden, ministries function as policy-planning staffs and more routine administration is carried out by boards. In the other four countries, there is little structural separation of specialist or advisory work from general administration. In Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, and the U.S.A., the specialist and professional have greater opportunities at the top than in Britain. On the Continent and in Australia, some senior administrative posts are restricted to specialists. In particular, the Australian federal service is characterized by respect for specialists, and rights and opportunities for the professional are built into the structure of the service. The generalist-specialist dichotomy in British Civil Service is linked to the practice of selecting ministers, not for their expertise, but for their ability to make balanced judgments based on evidence submitted by experts. The senior administrator is expected to bring to the work of the department the same kind of judgment. Another important influence on the public service has been the generalist orientation of the British universities, where administrative class is recruited, and the development of technical education outside the universities. Certification in technical fields has been undertaken by professional and technical associations, and such certification often lacks the prestige of the university degree. The authors show that outside Britain, recruitment to the public service from "non-vocational" education is rare. As Prof. Ridley observes: "The notion that a man who has done well at Cherokee is *ipso facto* likely to make good civil servant is not found elsewhere."

Civil services must be seen against their wider institutional, social and historical backgrounds. The British system has been based on ninteenth century concepts of liberalism, private enterprise, and local self-government which saw the function of government as arbitration between interests, adjudication of proposals, and regulation of the activities of others. In France, there is a tradition since Napoleon for state intervention in many spheres of life, and it is accepted that the state has active responsibility for direct provision of services. In Germany, the home of professional public service, the administrative machine was designed for the management of important social and economic functions in addition to the maintenance of law and order. In Australia and America, strong egalitarian influences have had much to do with the doctrine and structure of the public service.

This little book is interesting not just for what it tells us about civil service but also for what it says about higher educational systems and how they relate to governments. Values inculcated in universities are reflected in the views of their graduates in public service and in what they consider to be most worthwhile and prestigious in the way of duties. In Britain and the United States, government has had little to say about university curricula; but in America, legislative action, particularly the Morrill Act, has given stature to the "applied arts," a prestige that has been carried over into civil service. French government assumes more direct responsibility for higher education that the British and has more often prescribed qualifications for professional practice, which has led to a more career-oriented higher education. Civil service career schools form an important part of the French system of higher education. Germany goes farther than any of the countries surveyed in linking university and professional training to particular public service careers. In law and medicine, university courses do not lead to a degree but to a state examination. There is no state examination for engineering, but the curriculum is under state supervision. In other technical fields, government will determine the qualification and in some areas will provide the training for it.

Some chapters of the book make generalizations without sufficient supporting data. At times, there is mere restatement of prevailing opinion about the effectiveness of public services. This is noticeably true in the United States paper where the argument is made for a high-level generalist administrative service of the sort outlined in the Second Hoover Commission Report. Bibliographic references are from the most standard texts and up-to-date citations are few. A number of important questions remain unanswered and perhaps cannot be answered. What kind of civil service organization can cope most effectively with modern problems? What education and aptitudes should a civil servant possess to perform best his functions in a modern society? One gets the uneasy feeling in reading these accounts that a service can be dedicated and efficient in performance of its duties and yet be irrelevant in many ways to the needs of the time. Conversely, states may be doing some of the right things though not always competently.

The book makes no prescription for British administration, but in the concluding chapter Prof. Ridley performs the best function of a generalist by ably summing up the evidence in the generalist-specialist debate and giving the whole subject a fuller and clearer statement than it has had. Dual hierarchy is not a central question in U. S. public administration, but American students will find the tracing of the broad theme of generalist-specialist through six governmental systems a valuable addition to the too-brief list of materials in comparative bureaucracies.—HUGH G. MACNIVEN, *University of Oklahoma.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Alliances and Small Powers. BY ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. 331. $10.00.)

This book is in essence a collection of essays unified only by the central proposition that "Small Powers are something more than or different from Great Powers writ small." (1) On the whole, it is a sound and carefully reasoned analysis of a thesis often obscured in the literature of international relations: that despite changes in the international system, Small Powers have continued to exhibit behavioral patterns different in kind and not merely in degree from those characteristic of Great Powers.

The author, discarding the "outmoded" method of calculating the distinction between Great and Small solely in terms of material capabilities, has defined Small Powers in a manner which takes account of psychological factors as well. Thus a Small Power is a state which in the eyes of itself and of other actors in the system is unable to "obtain security principally by use of its own capabilities," and which thus "must rely fundamentally on the aid of the other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so. . . ." (29)

But not *all* of the Small Powers so defined are examined in Professor Rothstein's study. He explicitly excludes from his analysis 1) Latin American states; 2) the behavior of all small states prior to 1815; 3) those small states which do not perceive a potential or actual threat from the policies of Great Powers.

The book is organized in three "self-contained" parts. The first, the most abstract and analytical, seeks to derive propositions about Small Power behavior "which are valid for any historical period." (7) Quickly dismissing as illusory or unattainable policies of neutrality, disarmament or world government, the author focuses on Small Power difficulties in achieving security by means of an alliance policy. He describes the unique advantages and disadvantages for Small Powers of three different types of alliances: unequal bilateral alliances between a Great Power and a Small Power, multilateral alliances among Small Powers, and multilateral pacts mixing Great and Small Powers.

Rothstein's analysis of Small Power behavior in the first two types of alliances is accompanied by two lengthy case studies, one tracing the history of the Belgian-French Military Accord of 1920, the second examining the rise and fall of the "Little Entente" between 1920 and 1938. The actual utility of these long and repetitive studies is difficult to discern. They are not well-told narratives, for they lack careful organization and fail to impart a clear sense of the flow of successive events. They seem excessively detailed for the author's purposes, and indeed only serve to obscure his basic points. (Especially irritating to this reviewer was the author's insistence on incorporating untranslated passages of French into the text, with only occasional translations included in the footnotes—a reversal of what would seem to be the proper procedure.)

Rothestein's subsequent generalizations about the two varieties of alliances not only (as he freely admits) are not limited to the lessons which can be drawn from the case studies, but, indeed, only occasionally refer to them. And his concluding generalization—that while the Small Power alliance is politically and strategically preferable to the unequal bilateral pact, both are inferior to a mixed, multilateral alliance—is, for some unexplained reason, unsupported by a study of the operation of this third type of alliance.

Part II examines the alliance strategy of Small Powers in the context of three historical international systems, those existing in 1815–1854, 1854–1914, and 1919–1939. Professor Rothstein utilizes systems theory not as an explanation of the activity of Small Powers, but as "merely another variable" setting limits to their behavior. (184) A basic difference in the actions of Great and Small Powers is discerned in the fact that the behavior of the latter is "conditioned, even determined, by the nature of the system itself." Though Small Powers can rarely "create their own opportunities" (182) and remain dependent on outside forces, some international systems are found to be relatively more conducive to the security and influence of these states.

Part III examines the central thesis in the context of the contemporary international setting, which the author declines to subsume under a single "systems" label. One section, most of which was published as an article in 1966, argues that the nonalignment of Small Powers in the contemporary world, viewed both as a tactical principle and as a "mystique," constitutes an order of behavior different from traditional "neutrality," fails to achieve "real" independence from Great Power interference, and is, in essence, a "scavenger" policy in new clothing.

The second section, dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation among Small Powers, is taken largely from a 1967 article in which the author sought to establish that Great Powers and Small Powers both *ought* to and *do* calculate differently when deciding whether to acquire nuclear weapons. The analysis, focused on the behavior of the actors rather than on the prospects of stability for the system, concludes that while from a standpoint of military security the marginal utility of nuclear weapons for small powers is not high, when psychological and political factors are added in the option may become more attractive. Asserting that proliferation is the most critical problem of our time. Professor Rothstein suggests for the United States as the "minimum conceivable" measure for preventing proliferation a policy of bolstering nuclear guarantees with pledges to *give* nuclear forces to nuclear-capable countries facing a critical threat from a nuclear power. The author's policy prescriptions in this area are unfortunately dated by his failure to discuss the pending Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is simply dismissed in a footnote as "limited." (323)

One of the virtues of this book is the author's consciousness of its limitations and his great care in qualifying his analysis, which he describes as a "stationary target for future investigations." (8) He has built a well-reasoned argument in support of the conclusion that Small Powers, continually confronting the dilemma that "the necessity of insuring short-run security by supporting the strongest power" is in conflict with "the necessity of bolstering long-run security by supporting the weaker powers," (270) have indeed behaved in a manner unlike the Great Powers. And he has argued persuasively that, if the resulting Small Power policy of delaying commitment until the last possible moment seems unsatisfactory as a principle of action, then it at least illuminates "the impossibility of devising specific principles for Small Powers short of knowing all the circumstances affecting their situation." (270)—ROBERT H. DONALDSON, *Vanderbilt University.*

The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, 1943–1956. By STÉPHANE BERNARD. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, Pp. 680. $17.50.)

Is the "Academy of Colonial Sciences," which Marshal Alphonse Juin (who was then France's Resident-General in Morocco) addressed on the theme of Franco-Moroccan "cosovereignty" in November 1949, still holding sessions? If so, its program director might well invite sociologist Stéphane Bernard to present his conclusions on the irreversibility of the forces promoting decolonization at its next meeting. For though his analysis offers little solace to any remaining partisans of schemes like cosovereignty, certainly Bernard has brought to bear an imposing array of social science concepts and techniques upon one major episode in the history of colonialism. In attempting to reconstruct the "sociological mechanism" of the Franco-Moroccan conflict from 1943–1956, he presents an elaborate "theory of a political system in the process of decolonization" (p. xvii), a theory grounded in the structural-functional approach.

This edition is a translation of volumes I and II of a three volume work published in Brussels in 1963 as part of a series of studies of international conflict commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The research was carried out by a team under the direction of Bernard, who is Director of the Center for Political Theory of the Institute of Sociology of the Free University of Brussels. The work is an ambitious one, uniting disciplines in order to define a theoretical perspective upon decolonization, a political process of interest to students of both comparative and international politics. Bernard seeks to embrace both these dimensions in his model of the conflict. While the total achievement of the work is impressive, the theoretical edifice will perhaps be more satisfying to sociologists than to political scientists.

Bernard offers us in volume I a detailed history of the period in Franco-Moroccan relations that began when President Roosevelt met Sultan Mohammed V in 1943 and ended with the reestablishment of Moroccan independence in 1956. Shortly after the termination of the protectorate, Bernard's researchers began conducting interviews with officials from Morocco's two communities, European and Muslim, and within French political circles. The resultant historical account is fresh and authoritative. Nevertheless it focuses primarily upon the evolving strategy of successive Residents—General in their attempt to contain Moroccan nationalism—from the thwarted reforms of Labonne to the hard line of Juin to the conspiracies of the Guillaume period that led to the deposition of Mohammed V.

Less attention is given to the nationalist leadership, relatively little emphasis is placed upon the nationalist conception of the struggle or the evolution of nationalist strategy. This characteristic of Bernard's account reflects his conviction that forces inherent in the social situation determined the eventual outcome. Implicit throughout his argument is the idea that the fundamental anti-French attitude of the Moroccan masses was the prime mover of the course of events, and the nationalist leadership essentially a secondary agent of this force. Bernard's interpretation is at once apt and misleading. On the one hand, most observers would agree that the social force underlying nationalist movements is the most important explanation of the general phenomenon of decolonization, and that nationalist leaders are expressions of such movements. Yet precisely because of this agreement, students of politics have turned their attention to more subtle mechanisms, concerning themselves for example with the determinants and the consequences of particular decisions of tactics and strategy which nationalist leaders have been forced to make. Something of the political drama of the struggle for independence as seen from Istiqlal headquarters is lost at the same time that we gain an appreciation of the view from the Residency-General as it waged its "stubborn struggle against an inevitable process." (p. 16).

Volume II presents the model. Bernard argues that a "valid theory of colonial conflict" requires answers to three questions, namely to what extent are political attitudes a function of the social situation, to what extent is decision-making capacity a function of these attitudes, and to what extent can a colonial regime, given its specific milieu, fulfill its problem-solving function (p. 422). These questions are indeed pertinent ones to formulate, and Bernard answers them comprehensively for both France and the protectorate. Yet the 200 odd pages in which he treats them do not clearly demonstrate why these three sets of data constitute a "valid theory of colonial conflict." Why not ask only the third inasmuch as the first two seem germane to a behavioral analysis of any political system, colonial or otherwise? Or why not pose other questions such as to what extent is the "consensual potential" (to evoke another term and theme central to Bernard's analysis: the relationship between authority and consent) of a colonial regime diminished by a given nationalist strategy? Perhaps Bernard would argue that this question is subsumed under one of his three categories; my point is that he does not adequately demonstrate the theoretical necessity and sufficiency of these three.

Bernard concludes that one can view the decolonization of Morocco either in mechanistic or functional terms as a transformation of political control. Both of these perspectives bring into focus instructive aspects of the conflict, the dwindling consent enjoyed by the residential authority or the decline in its ability to solve problems. Yet though Bernard may elucidate the sociological mechanism of this transformation, the political scientist is likely to stress that colonial legitimacy dwindled as nationalist leaders built effective organizations, and problem-solving capability diminished as the nationalists succeeded in defining the problems more in political terms than in technological terms. Bernard is to be sure well aware of this dimension of colonial conflict, but his emphasis lies elsewhere.

Indeed as a sociologist concerned with political theory, Bernard brings a valuable perspective to political scientists concerned with the various consequences of decolonization for Morocco and France. The total impact of his enterprise is engaging and impressive. It contributes valuably to our understanding of the processes of colonial systems coping with the very movements of social change that colonialism accelerated.—ROBERT A. MORTIMER, *Haverford College.*

The Nuclear Revolution In Soviet Military Affairs. TRANS. AND ED. BY WILLIAM R. KINTNER AND HARRIET FAST SCOTT. (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1968. Pp. 420. $6.95).

Several years ago the Soviet Union deployed the world's first anti-ballistic missile defense system. During 1968 the numbers of Soviet land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles surged close, or possibly equalled, the 1054 ICBM's possessed by the United States. At the same time the number of Soviet missile launching submarines increased also, but at a lesser rate. The undeniable Soviet activity regarding strategic nuclear weapons (increases also were noticed in the size and equipment of conventional forces) raises grave questions for the United States as it looks to its security for the 1970's.

To some, most notably the military and their supporters in the Congress and elsewhere, the Soviet actions are interpreted to mean the Russian Communists are still doggedly pursuing the goal of world domination, although with a new emphasis being placed upon strategic nuclear war as being "the continuation of policy by other means." Beneath the concern of these individuals is the belief that a major cause for the American success in the Cuba missile confrontation was the knowledge in both Washington and Moscow that the former possessed strategic nuclear superiority, as well as conventional superiority in the immediate zone of possible conflict. The fear expressed by this group is that the Soviets mean to surpass the United States for the first time in strategic nuclear weapons and that Moscow will then use the new relationship to advance its hegemonic objectives. On the other hand those who fear nuclear war more than they do Soviet expansionist designs are voicing alarm that the United States will overly and unnecessarily respond to the Soviet activity; and that in so doing the United States will launch a new, costly, and dangerous arms race.

In regard to the debate which is shaping up over what should be the proper American response to the Soviet activity it comes as no surprise that Kintner, Deputy Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and Mrs. Scott an associate who is fluent in the Russian language, assign ominous intentions to the Soviet Union. Some may be tempted to lightly dismiss Kintner's effort as simply another "hawkish" book consistent with his views expressed together with those of Robert Strausz-Hupé *et al* in books such as *Protracted Conflict* and *A Forward Strategy For America.* This would be unfair because, although the message is much the same (the United States must be ever on guard against Soviet expansionism), the technique is different. Instead of telling the reader why the Soviets are dangerous Kintner and Scott offer translations of Soviet doctrinal and strategic writing which will, in the editors' view, "afford the reader an opportunity to examine for himself Soviet views on their 'revolution in military affairs' and to relate this to the future security of the non-Communist world and to the United States in particular."

The translations which are presented are drawn from recent [October 1964 to March 1967] authoritative Soviet military sources such as *Red Star,* the newspaper published daily by the Defense Ministry; *Communist of the Armed Forces,* the theoretical journal published by the Army and Navy; a set of volumes on military affairs entitled *Officer's Library;* several books published by the Soviet military press, and speeches made before the XXIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1966). The translations are in the form of most Soviet official writing, turgid and repetitive. Of much more importance is the fact the reader may not interpret them as have the editors. For example, Kintner and Scott present a translation of an attack upon the much read, at least in the West, 1965 article by General N. O. Talensky in which Talensky stated it was a "dangerous illustration" to believe thermonuclear war can advance a nation's political goals. In the translated article the Talensky thesis is criticized as follows, "Such an assertation is not only in error, but it is harmful because it can shake one's assurance in our victory over the aggressor, and the consciousness of the necessity to be ready at any moment for armed struggle with the use of nuclear rocket weapons." Whether such statements, and similar ones, should be interpreted as suggesting the Soviets mean to surpass the United States in strategic weapons as a prelude to advancing Soviet hegemony is open to argument. Another explanation is that the cited statement, and the others of like character which abound in the book, compromise nothing more than the normal expression of a military man's confidence in his nation's capacity for victory. Herein one finds the major problem with *The Nuclear Revolution In Soviet Military Affairs*, and indeed with all efforts to understand Soviet writing—as every intelligence officer knows it is much easier to determine an enemy's capabilities (in this case how many ICBM's he has) than to learn his intentions.

Because of its contents, and the implications for American policy suggested by Kintner and Scott, their book would normally be provocative and important. However both characteristics have been heightened by the election of Richard Nixon to the Presidency. It will be recalled that Mr. Nixon charged during his campaign that the Democrats had permitted a "security gap" to develop, and he stated if elected he would deal with the Soviets from a position of superior military strength. Unless Mr. Nixon's statements were only campaign oratory carrying little substance, it is logical to expect that the school of thought whose views are supported by *The Nuclear Revolution In Soviet Military Affairs* will receive sympathetic reading in Washington—unless of course someone steps forward to refute its message, and that being ascribed to the Soviet military activity.—ROBERT M. LAWRENCE, *University of Arizona.*

The "Other" State Department: The United States Mission to the United Nations—It's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy. By Arnold Beichman. (New York: Basic Books, 1968. Pp. 221. $5.95.)

This short volume by a verteran journalist is a contribution to the existing literature on the policy-making role of the United States Mission to the United Nations (USUN). Though limited, this literature is characterized by a split between those who find USUN and the missions of other nations playing a substantial policy-making role and those who judge these roles to be marginal. Professor Robert E. Riggs seemed to have joined the latter group when he stated in his *Politics in the United Nations* published in 1958 that he could find only one or two instances when the U.S. Delegation* exercised an important influence upon major questions of policy. The following year, after having served on the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, Senators Hickenlooper and Mansfield complained of exessive control from Washington. They charged that Washington spelled out the official U.S. position in minute detail on almost every issue and when new developments required changes, these had to be cleared in Washington. Professor David Kay and Mr. Richard F. Pedersen disagree. The latter, former Chief of the Political Section of USUN, argues that national missions (presumably including USUN) enjoy a large measure of discretion in tactics and considerable influence on policy. He alleges that their role in the policy area, though advisory, is significant, particularly after an issue has been joined.

With the publication of *The "Other" State Department* Mr. Arnold Beichman has taken his stand with the latter group. He views USUN as a major factor in the decision-making of American foreign policy, reaching a position suggesting autonomy. Its position will continue to grow, so he avers, so long as it continues to enjoy the support of Congress and the American public, and so long as influential Americans to whom the President feels beholden continue to head it. Given their special relationship with the President, the heads of USUN have not had to fear reprisals from the State Department. Mr. Beichman alleges that they can commit the United States to a course of action, contrary to the wishes of the State Department. He recounts a most dramatic example of this: the successful attempt of Adlai Stevenson to reverse administration policy to enforce article nineteen of the Charter against the defaulting Soviet Union by depriving her of her vote in the General Assembly. The author maintains that this policy had received support from every appropriate official in Washington and New York including the President. By the manner of his negotiations with the Soviet Union in New York, however, Mr. Stevenson undermined any belief that the United States would hold firm. These he initiated without prior consultation with State, and they sucessfully undercut settled American policy.

The author envisages USUN as an actor in several subststems, principally those of the U.N. and the State Department, and he alleges that its role in the U.N. often conflicts with its role in the Department. He finds the milieu of the U.N. with its multilateral diplomacy to be a powerful force luring USUN away from its Washington connection. Mission personnel are constantly in danger of being "U.N. ationized." If this force is as powerful as Mr. Beichman contends and if USUN is as independent as he alleges, then we could logically expect many policy differences between USUN and State. But he is able to point to only a limited number of instances of such divergence—the one already mentioned plus mainly Ambassador Goldberg's iniatives with respect to South Africa and the Soviet Union. James J. Wadsworth, who has served with USUN, confirms the impression that these differences seldom occur. He estimates that USUN only once or twice a session finds its position sufficiently at odds with that of State to appeal for a change in official policy.

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* Although USUN is not the same as the U.S. Delegation to the U.N., the two can be used interchangeably in this review without affecting the essential meaning.

Mr. Beichman does provide evidence, some of it new, for his major thesis: that USUN enjoys an important policy-making role. But the evidence, consisting of a few case studies and the opinions of experts, is not systematic, nor is it conclusive. His principle sources are his own experience, memoir literature, and the statements of confidential informants. Some members of the political science fraternity will be happy to learn that he makes use of the latest concepts and terminology, perhaps the result of his recent graduate study at Columbia. His statement that all nations at the United Nations are equal we can excuse as carelessness or undue preoccupation with the formal rules of voting in the Assembly. Professor Goodrich's comment in the foreword about Mr. Beichman's contribution is close to the mark: while not the last word, this volume is a substantial introduction to the subject.—FREDERICK H. GAREAU, *Florida State University.*

America and Swaraj: The U.S. Role in Indian Independence. BY A. GUY HOPE. (Washington, D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1968. Pp. 106. $4.50)

This book demonstrates both the value and the danger of research which concentrates on a narrow slice of a complex, slowly-unfolding historical development. Guy Hope is, as the subtitle suggests, concerned with the specifically American contribution to the long and complicated series of events which eventuated in the independence of India.

Mr. Hope outlines exhaustively the activities of various groups in this country who were interested in independence for India. This is the great value of his work for it presents in one place a detailed and comprehensive account of the American concern. This is also the danger of this type of research for the narrow concentration of attention leads the author on occasion to recount every detail without sufficient evaluation of its significance. The result is the implication, and occasionally the imputation, of a greater American influence on the events leading to Indian independence than seems warranted if one studies these events in a broader context.

Nearly half of the book consists of a detailed account of the activities of different groups in the United States who, Mr. Hope argues, helped to influence the course of events in India. The best sections concern the role of Indian Nationals, such as the energetic and persuasive J. J. Singh, who were resident in this country and the internal policy discussion within the State Department. Mr. Hope's careful study of State Department documents, in particular, produces a detailed and interesting account of the evolution of official views on the Indian question and some penetrating comments on the dilemmas confronting the decision-maker in the foreign policy area. He also discusses sensitively the impact which an individual's official position in the State Department hierarchy has upon his perspective as he approaches a decision.

Some of the other sections are less impressive. In his commendable effort to provide a comprehensive account of the American role, the author frequently fails to distinguish adequately between the trivial and the significant. There is much raw data here and too little critical evaluation of it.

The discussion on activities of the American academic community, for example, includes an account of a petition signed by ninety-nine students from Miami University in Ohio. Student activism, it seems, is not so new and revolutionary as some of its exponents today assume. But how significant was this petition in securing Indian independence? Does it merit a quarter of a page in a book of slightly more than one hundred pages? One has no feeling that the author has distinguished in his research between mere activity and activity which has a significant impact upon historical events. Can he then convincingly specify the impact which America did, indeed, have on Indian independence?

The section on the role of Congress raises similar methodological concerns. The author has made a detailed study of the *Congressional Record* to document the influence of Congress. A study based largely upon insertions in the *Record* can, however, be exceedingly misleading as anyone who has served as a Congressional intern and prepared items for inclusion in the *Record* knows. Mr. Hope provides a wealth of raw data from the *Record,* but he fails adequately to evaluate the nature and strength of the Congressional concern and, as a result, its impact on the achievement of Indian independence. He does, however, understand the role of Congress in this situation—that of a forum through which voices supporting Indian independence could speak.

The best and most valuable portion of the book is concerned with the activities of three unusual diplomats during World War II. Mr. Hope examines in detail the subtle and sensitive contribution of Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the first official representative in Washington of the British Government in India, a man aware of his responsibilities and loyal in his discharge of them, but also an Indian with strong personal convictions. The discussion of Louis Johnson's mission is also good, but the most significant new contribution to our understanding of American involvement in India's struggle for independence comes in the section on Ambassador William Phillips where the author has used material gathered in personal interviews with the former diplomat.

Mr. Hope concludes with what he describes as a theory "to explain how American influence meshed into the pattern of British policy making." He argues that activity by Americans in India's cause "was strongly inspired by progressive elements in British politics." The result was "astute prompting . . . of public statements and private and official diplomacy by Americans at various levels of authority." These statements were then used by the group in the British Parliament as a "principal resource in the campaign to achieve liberalized treatment of Indian demands."

One might question the words, "principal resource," and still agree that this was indeed the American role. That leaves unanswered, however, the significance of the American role in the totality of pressure and events which led to the independence of India.—PHILIP M. PHIBBS, *Wellesley College.*

Arms Control Agreements: Designs for Verification and Organization. BY DAVID W. WAINHOUSE in association with BERNHARD G. BECHHOEFER, HARRY D. HUGHES, BYRON V. LEARY, THEODORE ROCKWELL III, ANNE P. SIMONS, AND ARNOLD WOLFERS. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. Pp. 179. $6.95.)

Further evidence of this kind is probably superfluous, but if this book accomplishes nothing else, it should help to disarm the Senatorial inquisition that has asked, for several years now, why the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) subsidizes work that is more properly the domain of Ph. D. theses. The volume at hand is the work of a team skilled mainly in law and foreign affairs, but including also one technological and one military expert. Their study has assimilated a large and complicated body of technical and political data; analyzed it in four detailed case studies; and derived operating principles to guide the design of an International Disarmament Organization (IDO) to verify the implementation of both narrow and broad gauge arms control measures. Initially a report to the ACDA by the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, the work has been revised and condensed for publication.

The book is an important contribution for many reasons. First, it appears at a time when the superpowers and others may escalate the arms race to new levels unless mutually acceptable arms controls can be reached. While political obstacles are more severe than technical ones, solutions to the latter must also be overcome. The Wainhouse study suggests ways to reconcile the U.S. concern with reliability and the Soviet interest in minimum instrusion. To begin with,. the authors believe that the intrusion required for adequate reliability is less than earlier assumed. More particularly, if one considers the objects needing inspection given a superpower cut-off of fissionable material production or a Central European atom-free zone, for example, it turns out that a far smaller inspection staff is needed in the Communist than in the Western states concerned. Unless the Communist regimes decide they want parity, this asymmetry might make inspection more palatable for them.

A book such as this may easily be criticized for its emphases and its omissions. More space is given to U.S. proposals such as a production cut-off and a deployment freeze than to Communist proposals. Although the aughors indicate they will not discuss the political-military implications of the Rapacki and Gomulka plans (p. 44), they do in fact provide a negative assessment of these implications (pp. 47–49). By comparison, the book tends to presume the utility of most measures endorsed by the White House (although there is no visible enthusiasm for the fourth case studied: the first stage of the general disarmament plans submitted by Washington and Moscow).

It is unfortunate that this book does not consider the problems that have already arisen regarding compliance with the 1963 nuclear test ban, the 1964 understanding of fissionable material production, and the 1967 space treaty. Surely these difficulties are significant for the proposed IDO. Although Wainhouse has directed another study for ACDA entitled *Alternative Methods for Dealing with Breaches of Arms Control Agreements,* the conclusions of that study are not spelled out in the present work.

Similarly, the book does not consider the suggestions made to surmount the problem of verifying an underground test ban. One would think that such notions as "challenge inspection" and "international detection club" would have relevance to the proposed IDO.

Despite the heroic effort here to bridge the gap between U.S. and Soviet positions, a great distance remains to be travelled. The authors have elucidated their answer to some extremely complex problems, but alternative answers are also conceivable. The book may spur others (hopefully including Soviet researchers) to produce such answers, while in the interval technological and military developments change the nature of the problem. For example, Wainhouse *et al.* would rely upon gross physical inspection techniques to verify a freeze on strategic delivery vehicles, but is this approach adequate at the moment when multiple warheads could be mounted on each missile?

Looking beyond the immediate concerns of the study, one wonders whether an IDO—*if* created on a model like that recommended here—would not move the nations toward a limited form of world government much more rapidly than fuctional collaboration confined to technical spheres. The IDO inspectorate is supposed merely to report the facts to the great power members of the organization, who, in turn, must determine whether a violation has occurred and what response to make. This distinction is too facile, however, for the content and tone of the reporting would prove to be sensitive political acts. Because of this sensitivity potential, the IDO may never be established; but if it is, nations may well feel strong incentives to keep the system from collapsing.—WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR.., *Boston University.*

The Aland Islands Question: Its Settlement by the League of Nations. BY JAMES BARROS. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968. Pp. 362. $10.00.)

Despite nearly a quarter century of evidence and argument to the contrary, many scholars, most statesmen, and, one suspects, nearly all of the otherwise shrewd men in the street persist in thinking of the United Nations as an appropriate dumping ground for the world's major conflicts. And if the overburdened organization, with almost no resources of power of its own, doesn't come up with a remedy to these often insoluble dilemmas, the Russians are accused of obstructionism or worse, and the organization itself is judged a failure.

Fortunately, though, scholars and statesmen are beginning to recognize that the UN was never expected to resolve clashes between the Great Powers if the peculiar WW II alliance came apart. Increasingly, we are recognizing that the UN should not be adjudged a failure when it doesn't do what it was never meant to do. And there is a slowly growing awareness that it is a mistake to bring all the major world problems to the UN for solution. Often the problems simply are exacerbated there and the organization staggers dangerously under their weight.

But, while the UN has made little contribution to easing Cold War confrontations in Europe and Asia, it has proved quite helpful in resolving, or at least managing, peripheral clashes and problems, most notably with its peace-keeping operations for the Suez, Congo, and Cyprus imbroglios. Under certain rather special conditions, the UN can be a useful instrument of conflict management.

In these general respects, the UN and the League of Nations are quite similar. The League was no more able to stop Hitler and the Japanese imperialists than the UN has been capable of ending the Cold War. But the League did register some modest achievements during its brief lifetime. One of these was the League's contribution to the settlement of the Aland Islands dispute between Finland and Sweden. James Barros has presented us with what must certainly be the definitive analysis of this dispute and its resolution. As such, his book is a welcome addition to the literature on the modest role international organizations can occasionally play in conflict management.

The Aland Islands, a group of small islands in the Baltic Sea, had been disputed territory for over 60 years when both Finland and Sweden claimed them after WW I. When bilateral negotiations broke down in the early summer of 1920, it appeared that Sweden, militarily much stronger than Finland but protective of its neutralist image, might resort to force. At that point, however, the British and French brought the matter to the League which established two special commissions that led to agreement a year later: the islands went to Finland, but a large measure of autonomy was given to the islanders who are Swedish in language and culture. The League enabled the parties to continue the diplomatic struggle in another forum rather than go to war. League involvement provided a safety valve for the tense situation and later a face-saving aura of justice for the compromise settlement. Concessions were made through the League that could not have been made directly by one party to the other. Each government could justify its acceptance of half a loaf since the agreement bore League sanctification. Inis L. Claude has pointed out that this function of collective legitimization has been even further developed by the United Nations. But the rudiments of the process were worked out during the 1920s as Barros demonstrates.

One might have wished for an arrangement of the materials in Professor Barros' book other than the day-by-day, blow-by-blow chronicle which is exhausing as well as exhaustive. Moreover, Professor Barros fails to highlight adequately the key points he wants to make along the way which it is even more necessary to do in a chronologically-ordered account than it is in a topically-organized essay since in the latter form we at least have the selected topics for clues as to what the author thinks is important. Finally, the surprisingly short final chapter of conclusions is not really the chapter of conclusions about the League's settlement of the Aland Islands problem that we should have; rather, it is a collection of conclusions and assertions about the role of international organizations in today's world that would be more appropriate and more credible at the end of a volume of supporting case studies of League and UN interventions—a book still needed, incidentally.—JAMES A. STEGENGA, *Purdue University*.

European Community Law and Organizational Development. BY W. ANDREW AXLINE. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968. Pp. 214. $7.50.)

There are many possible approaches to studying political integration either as a process or a fait accompli. Mr. Axline has chosen to employ law and organization as relevant measures of determining the existence of European integration or social development toward it. In constructing his theoretical framework and justifying his methods, he appears to argue that a society is built upon organizations and institutions reflecting the existence of "valid" normative (ought) as well as actually "effective" (is) law. These organizations, in turn, can further generate such law. Through this interaction each can promote the other. A point may finally be reached where the nature of the organization, its law-making capacity, and the "effectiveness" of the law evidence a fully integrated society. Evolution of the society toward that point can be recognized by examining first the structure and functions of the society's organization with the methods of the Functionalists; second the existence of "valid" law with the help of the methods elaborated by Analytical Jurisprudence; and third the prevalence of "effective" law as Sociological Jurisprudence understands this. Since the "effectiveness" of law lies in its ability to determine actual behavior of the society's members, it can serve as a mirror of the society's integration. To the extent that it possesses three qualities, to that extent integration can be said to exist. (1) "Effective" law must have the same significance for all members of the European Community. The author is satisfied that in a large measure it does. (2) It must be equally binding upon all members and have equal meaning for them. (3) The Community's law must be superior to the constitutions of the members; it must have primacy within their own legal systems. In this respect, the author finds the situation differs from state to state and only a trend toward the growth of these qualities can be discovered. The data for these findings of the author are the decisions of the national European courts and the Court of Justice of the European Communities. As measured by these criteria, European Community integration remains incomplete. The author thinks his analysis and findings justify the suggestion that national judges have it in their power to further European Community integration by interpreting laws whenever possible in favor of the European Community rather than national sovereignty.

Because of the obfuscous style of the book I cannot be certain that this summary is fair to the author. If it is, I should maintain that the extreme narrowness and formalism of the author's approach can only result in conclusions of limited significance. The vast range of social behavior which may contain important clues to social integration is inadequately reflected in "effective" law, especially if this law is culled only from court decisions. Moreover, upon the author's own grounds, I have serious doubts about the general validity of his particular approach. The nature of behavior revealed by court decisions has little relation to objective or subjective factors leading to or constituting integration. The same overt, objective behavior may or may not be indicative of integration. It is, however, always indicative of "effective" law. How then can "effective" law as a mirror of integration be distinguished from "effective" law arising from any multilateral treaty having no goal of integrating its signatories? No amount of argument about the legal significance of Community law for the national legal systems of the member states—its superiority or primacy—can answer this question. It cannot be answered in legal terms because integration is not a legal question. The answer requires an examination of the motivation and the social context of the behavior. They determine whether a given behavior is related to integration or not. The author recognizes this problem but treats it cavalierly. There is a brief reference, out of context with this particular problem, to an alleged community of feelings among Europeans potentially supportive of integration. The reader may thus be expected to share with the author the assumption that because there are feelings in common within the European Community and because these feelings are allegedly favorable to integration, the "effective" law to be found in the Community makes it identical with integration. However in this case, the integration rests not on a legal foundation but on psychological grounds for which no empirical support is provided.

This is not the only occasion on which the reader must complete the author's argument by assembling points scattered throughout the book. Loose organization, aggravated by indifference to the English language, makes it difficult to follow the author's thoughts and leads him to be imprecise regarding his central concepts. A few references to particulars must suffice to demonstrate that this criticism is more than subjective reaction.

The concept of integration is crucial to the author's presentation. It is nowhere analyzed in depth or made operational. On page two it is called a "fundamentally sociological concept," on page six a "psychological" concept. On page fourteen integration is declared indentical with "effective" law while on page 62 "effective" law is said to represent "political integration." Definitions by other authors which Mr. Axline quotes fail to clarify his own understanding and use of the concept of integration and are, in fact, ignored in his analysis. The literature most relevant to Mr. Axline's subject—for instance Rudolf Smend's *Verfassung and Verfassungsrecht,* Hermann Heller's writings, and the vast literature on legal philosophy—is nowhere taken into account. "Cohesion," "sense of community," "solidarity," "shared values" are unquestioningly accepted as prerequisites of integration, but either not defined or not operationalized. Yet the author does not hesitate to talk about them in quantitative terms: "amounts" and "degrees" of integration, "a great deal" of solidarity, etc. (pp. 3, 5, 83, 96). Conclusions are drawn from such undefined concepts as "primitive" or "elementary" societies and law. No meaning is given to such terms as "stable legal systems," a "real common market," a "positive peace," a "higher order" of rules (pp. 7, 70, 84, 95). And not least as long as language is an important tool of one's trade: the English language is violated by dangling participles, misused prepositions, ambiguous referents of such pronouns as "this" and "it," and the inexact use of words (there are several "primary" concerns; "in terms of" is used ad nauseam—ten times on page 64—and often incorrectly).

In principle Mr. Axline's project is interesting and has some value for the study of social integration. One can only wish that the author had handled it with more precision, in a wider context, and with a better sense of aesthetics.—WERNER LEVI, *University of Hawaii.*

International Systems and the Modernization of Societies. BY J. P. NETTL AND ROLAND ROBERTSON. (New York: Basic Books, 1968. Pp. 216. $5.95.)

Apriori frameworks for the analysis of political development are in such abundance nowadays that each new proposal tends to be perceived as having declining marginal utility within the literature. The present volume, though aimed at presenting new schemas, tends to be more of an eclectic adventure in ideas. The three chapters are separate essays that for the most part do not follow cumulatively or logically from one another but instead explore a number of problems, both conceptual and theoretical. Just as the commentary becomes most exciting and promising one's train of thought is terminated abruptly by fascinating footnote references. No specific connection between their ideas and a strategy for empirical research is provided, despite their recognition in the preface of the need for empirical testing. Illustrative material is used in order to point out conceptual difficulties rather than to concretize or to clinch arguments.

Chapter I points out pitfalls in defining three terms—industrialization, modernization, and development—an exercise more in keeping with concept formation by intuition than by postulation. The definitions, the authors claim, are more in accord with their actual usage within developing countries than with the alternative frameworks in vogue among academicians, an assertion that is not matched with empirical evidence.

Chapter II sets forth a paradigm, based upon the legal concept of inheritance, which attempts to account for two postcolonial alternatives—reform and revolution. Elite (or mass public) perceptions of the role of the newly independent government vis-à-vis the departing imperial power, especially the level of hostility held by the former toward the latter are postulated as predictors of revolutionary inheritance, in which militant groups contest the will drawn up by the power granting independence to a former colony. Although the authors admit that their paradigm "does not apply to Latin America," and their explication lacks references to actual statements by decision makers in the newer states, their stress on the attitudinal component of political development remedies a lack of such a *systematic* focus among those currently applying the frameworks of Almond and Riggs.

Chapter III proposes a societal system framework for analyzing international systems, and it overzealously purports to solve the problem of linkage between the political subsystem and other subsystems of the international societal system by concentrating on attitudinal cleavages. The most discussed dependent variables are international stratification systems. Galtung's rank disequilibrium approach is turned upside down into a quest for factors that account for compliance or noncompliance to the existing stratification systems on the part of various types of states.

Alternative natural languages and approaches within the social sciences, however, can best be evaluated in terms of their role in an ongoing research process. A proposal for a new symbol system is always welcome if it alerts a scholarly community to a new field for inquiry or if it orders previous partial frameworks into a homogeneous synthesis. After alternative languages (such as those of Almond and Riggs) reach the stage of competing schools of thought, and once empirical research has begun, a new language may often be suggested out of an awareness for the procrusteanness of the models as guides to the reality under investigation. Whereas the authors of this volume appear to feel that no previous framework adequately encompasses evaluative aspects of domestic political and international societal development, one could counter that now is the time for research to uncover data that are consistent or inconsistent with the propositional theories advanced by Almond, Riggs, and others, which do in fact have attitudimal orientations. Whether more scholars will take the path of empirical research or will prefer to await the formulation of additional natural languages may be a loaded question, yet it will be asked by the reader of this preliminary formulation.—MICHAEL HAAS, *University of Hawaii.*

Conference Diplomacy. BY JOHN KAUFMANN. (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1968. Pp. 222. $6.90.)

Given the ever increasing number of international conferences, a volume on conference diplomacy does not seem untimely. The author of this book, a Dutch diplomat of considerable experience, presents essentially a guide or handbook to the organization and operation of international conferences.

Hardly an element of conference diplomacy is missed, though some are dealt with in a rather cursory fashion. The variety of delegations, their composition, and their organization are examined, as well as the requirements and characteristics of conference diplomats. Special attention is given a somewhat neglected area of scholarship, the role of the secretariat in conference diplomacy. This emphasis reflects, perhaps, the increasing importance of secretariats as international conferences become larger and their subject matter more complex. Special attention is also given the role of the presiding officer at international conferences.

Other sections of Kaufmann's book are concerned with some of the principal areas of conflict at international conferences, conference leadership—by individual delegations, the president, an "inner circle," groups, and the secretariat, and types and functions of groups and their role in the negotiating process.

This book in many ways fails to capture the dynamics of conference diplomacy, however. Granted, discussions of missions, protocol, the nationality of delegations and the like are not very stimulating subjects, but when the reader gets to a section on tactics, he expects more than he finds in this volume. Most of the methods employed by diplomats to get a proposal adopted or to cause it to be rejected are mentioned, but the description is of rather static processes. The reader might also expect a little more from a chapter on dicision-making. And one wonders why, if it is to be included at all, a discussion of summit diplomacy is allotted only thirteen lines. We learn here, simply, that decisions of an intergovernmental conference are not usually affected by the presence of a head of state or a head of government.

The last chapter of this book deals with three case studies in conference diplomacy, and this is the author's most successful chapter. The first two sections are concerned with trade negotiations and disarmament negotiations, and include a summary of developments in each of these areas since the Second World War. In section three the author compares trade and disarmament negotiations, the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade, especially the Kennedy Round and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee focusing on the elements of conference diplomacy examined in the preceding pages, such as the role of the large powers, the role of the smaller powers, participation of UN organs and the Secretariat, group activities, outside influences, and publicity and privacy. The final section of this chapter analyzes an international conference held in February, 1967, called by the Netherlands to consider Indonesia's economic future. Again the discussion centers on the elements mentioned earlier in the book.

Kaufmann suggests in this chapter that contrary to the disarmament negotiations where it was the basic interests of the super-powers that caused constraints, in the Kennedy Round it was the structure of the negotiating machinery that became a delaying factor. The author's analysis of the Kennedy Round negotiations also reveals the special role that the Director-General of GATT played in bringing about a compromise agreement when negotiations on certain major issues seemed at a standstill.

Kaufmann's third case study is perhaps his best choice. This section could be subtitled: "How to Have a Successful International Conference." Kaufmann asserts that the success of the conference concerned with Indonesia's economic problems was due to the fact that the "right conference diplomacy techniques" were employed. He lists the following: careful preparation; limited objective and simple agenda; the right type of documents ("neither too voluminous nor too brief"); unity of meeting place and delegate residence; high quality of services; efficient chairmanship; and full cooperation of important international organizations interested in the subjects discussed.

Conference Diplomacy is especially strong on the organizational aspects of international conferences. In a sense, as already suggested, it is a "How to" book. It also convincingly indicates how intergovernmental conferences have modified some of the traditional methods of diplomacy. The book seems to take for granted, however, that international conferences are good and useful. At no point does the author take a hard look at some of the disadvantages of conference diplomacy. This is a major omission. Kaufmann has put together a rather complete book but not a very stimulating one. Perhaps this is because of his attempt to keep the book concise. Concise it is, though the illustrations used are excellent and the notes indicate a thorough familiarity with the literature on the subject and on international organization generally. Exactly for whom this work was written is not quite clear. It seems rather elementary even for those technical experts or private citizens who might be attending an international conference for the first time, a use suggested in the Forward. This book will, also, not detain the scholar long. Perhaps it will find its greatest use in an introductory international organization or international relations course in conjunction with other works.—JOHN A. EILERS, *Arizona State University*.

Capitulación sin guerra. BY FERDINAND OTTO MIKSCHE. (Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Políticos. Translation from the French and Preface by Luis Cano Portal. 1967. Pp. 273.)

In the first part of the book Mr. Miksche discusses the present situation of the West since the floodgates were opened to Soviet Imperialism in 1945, and he feels that the initiative has passed to Moscow after the Suez crisis of 1956. Two factors are of prime importance in this development. One, internal, the exaggeration of liberty, has turned into increasing Byzantine confusion and, together with pacisfism, appeasement and paralysis, extends its influence all over the Western world, so that the West is well on its way to perish despite its unsurpassed economic and technical advances. The other, external, concerns decolonization, relentlessly pursued by the Soviet Union and the United States. He feels that the early departure of the Western powers from several strategic areas was just as unwise as allowing the Soviets to get as far as the Elbe, and the author blames the Europeans for their lack of solidarity and the Americans for their political naivete. In view of growing Soviet threats and the different strategic concentration of Western Europe and the United States, whose interests are no longer identical, a united Western Europe is an absolute *sine qua non,* otherwise Europe will not survive the new division of the world by the three superpowers and the extraordinary changes in the world which will develop dramatically the closer we come to the year 2000.

The second part of the book which deals with the security problems of Western Europe, especially the success of Soviet co-existance policies after the death of Stalin resulting in the psychological disarmament of Western Europe, is essentially a realistic appraisal of the situation. Nuclear dissuasion is considered by the author as bluff, since he believes neither side would ever employ atomic weapons; the balance of terror by necessity has given conventional forces a greater significance. Moreover, United States strategy is meant to be purely defensive and therefore, the author feels, is condemned to a progressive weakening.

The author discusses the decline of NATO which he links essentially to the refusal of the United States to treat France on a par with Britain and to the "nuclear complicity" between Washington and Moscow. Should the United States continue with this policy it will not only lose control over the production but likewise over the military use of the atom. Instead of pursuing these aims, the United States should put the Soviets on notice that, since it cannot stay forever in Europe, it intends to help Western Europe with nuclear arms. The author does not foresee any major war in Central Europe, but instead a great likelihood of civil wars throughout the world, possibly in Germany or the Mediterranean. Therefore, Western strategy, he asserts, is not realistic, since NATO offers no guarantees, and in the mind of the masses the security of Western Europe is identified with a line—the Iron Curtain—whereas what should be defended are not geometrical lines but geographical positions outside the geographic limitations of NATO. Hence, a global outlook is necessary, otherwise the West will not be able to survive. The idea that in a world of quick change nations can defend their interests with a purely defensive attitude is nothing but a dream.

For a reform of NATO the author proposes: *De-Americanization* (defense of Europe by Europeans), *integration* (Continental Western Europe), and *simplification* (armaments). The new NATO would be divided into two blocks: one, *Anglo-American* (United States, Canada, Britain, Iceland), the other, *Western European* (France, West Germany, Benelux, Italy, Spain). Besides these *active* members, there would be *associate* members like Norway or Greece, countries which would not enjoy the treaty's guarantees. It might also be possible to establish a Nordic Defense Community with Norway, Denmark and neutral Sweden. These are certainly interesting proposals which seem to offer some solution to the present disagreements between France and the United States.

This reviewer feels that Mr. Miksche's analysis of the West's decline is valid, since nowhere have we seen so far any successful reaction to Soviet strategy. On the other hand, while certainly the wisdom of the United States' refusal to aid France in the development of its nuclear arsenal and to treat it on an equal basis with Britain can be questioned, it is also true that the French were equally not willing to share nuclear weapons with West Germany, a fact that Mr. Miksche omits in his discussion. Finally, while the inclusion of Spain into the new NATO seems to this reviewer pertinent and logical, it is doubtful that it will be accepted, since many Western Europeans and Americans seem to be more obsessed with pure democracy in Spain (and Greece) than with the dangerous threat from the East.

All in all, a fascinating and passionately-written book which should receive the widest circulation.—O. CARLOS STOETZER, *Fordham University.*

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 2–6, 1969, at the Commodore Hotel, New York City.

1969 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1969–70

The 1969 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 2–6 at the Commodore Hotel, New York City. Professor Robert E. Lane, Yale University, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association, to be held at 4:00 P.M. Wednesday, September 3 (the room will be announced in the Final Program) the Nominating Committee will propose a slate of officers for 1969–70. The Committee is composed of three members appointed by President Merle Fainsod: Harry Eckstein, Princeton University; Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin; and William S. Livingston, University of Texas; and three members appointed by President David Easton: Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina, Chairman; Duncan MacRae, University of Chicago; and Sheldon S. Wolin, University of California, Berkeley. The Committee will propose the following officers for 1969–70:

President Elect: Robert E. Lane, Yale University

Vice Presidents: Grant McConnell, University of California, Santa Cruz

William H. Riker, University of Rochester

Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan

Secretary: Thomas R. Dye, Florida State University

Treasurer: Francis E. Rourke, Johns Hopkins University

Members of the Council for two years:

Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University

Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii

John H. Kessel, Allegheny College

Lewis Lipsitz, University of North Carolina

John Meisel, Queens University, Kingston

Jewel L. Prestage, Southern University

Robert H. Salisbury, Washington University, St. Louis

Ellis Waldron, University of Montana

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1970 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1970 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in Los Angeles, California, September 1–5 (the hotel will be announced later). Suggestions for papers to be presented at the 1970 Annual Meeting are earnestly solicited. Unlike previous years, the 1970 program will comprise more than two dozen sections, each of which will have as many as four panels, with each panel providing an opportunity for one or more papers. No section chairman can possibly be familiar with all of the work going on in his domain. Thus it becomes necessary for scholars whose work is just coming to fruition to make this work known either to the Program Chairman or to the relevant section chairmen. This is particularly true when the research forms part of a dissertation currently under way.

Please advise the Program Chairman or the section chairmen listed below of research which, either now or within a year, will very likely form the basis for a high quality research report at the meetings. Since the program is currently being shaped, it is not too early to anticipate events more than a year in the future.

Chairman, Richard L. Merritt, University of Illinois

A. *General*

American Political Science: Growth and Prospects, 1945–1970–1995—Austin Ranney, University of Wisconsin
Political Knowledge and Policy Decisions—Davis B. Bobrow, Office of the Deputy Director, Research and Technology (Room 3D 1021, The Pentagon)
Formal Political Analysis ....Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology
History of Theory ....Judith N. Shklar, Harvard University
Data and Analysis ....

B. Interaction among National Systems

Patterns of Interaction ....Ole R. Holsti, University of British Columbia
Community-Building ....Ernst B. Haas, University of California, Berkeley
Strategy and Bargaining ....Jeremy J. Stone, Council on Foreign Relations Fellow (mailing address ℅ APSA, Washington, D.C.)
Conflict and Peace Research .... Bruce M. Russett, Yale University
International Communication ....Richard L. Merritt, University of Illinois

C. Cross-National Comparisons of System Performance

Cross-National Comparison ....Samuel H. Barnes, University of Michigan
Comparative Communist Systems ....Jan F. Triska, Stanford University
Foreign Policy: Formulation and Implementation ....Wolfram F. Hanrieder, University of California, Santa Barbara
Political Development ....Martin Kilson, Harvard University
Civil Violence and Revolution ....Raymond Tanter, University of Michigan
State and Local Government ....Thomas J. Anton, University of Michigan
Urban and Metropolitan Affairs ....Robert R. Alford, Sociology Department, University of Wisconsin

D. Cross-National Comparisons of National Processes

Political Socialization .... Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University (current address: Government Department, University of Essex, Colchester, Essex, England)
Parties and Politics ....Theodore J. Lowi, University of Chicago
Leadership ....James David Barber, Yale University (current address: Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California)
Legislatures and Legislative Behavior ....G. Robert Boynton, University of Iowa
Administrative Behavior ....Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia
Judicial Systems and Behavior ....Stuart S. Nagel, University of Illinois
Intergovernmental Relations ....Samuel H. Beer, Harvard University

NOTICE

RESOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS AT THE ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, the attention of members of the Association is hereby directed to the provisions of the Constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting." (Article VIII)

"Amendments to this Constitution shall be proposed by the Council and adopted by a majority vote of the members present at any regular or special meeting of the Association.

"Ten members of the Association may propose amendments to this Constitution. Such proposed amendments shall be referred to the Council for consideration, and by them referred to the Association for its action thereon at the next Annual Business Meeting with such recommendations as the Council may see fit to make." (Article IX)

The Council of the Association will meet during the afternoon of Sunday, August 31, the afternoon of Monday, September 1, and the morning of Tuesday, September 2 (the room will be announced in the Final Program).

The Constitution of the Association is printed in both the 1961 and 1968 editions of the Association's Biographical Directory.

The American Political Science Association's Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession will hold an open meeting at the Annual Meeting on Wednesday, September 3, at 11:30 a.m. The purpose of this meeting will be to review (1) the problems faced by women in the profession, (2) questionnaires concerning these problems which will be sent to members of the profession, and (3) possible means of dealing with these problems.

ERRATUM

In Arthur S. Goldberg's article on "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," published in the issue of March, 1969, line 4 in footnote 17, p. 10, should read: "see Arthur S. Goldberger, *Econometric Theory*. . . ."

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

September, 1969

Graham T. Allison, Harvard University, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis"

Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, University of Wisconsin, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States"

Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., Stanford University, "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico"

Ralph M. Goldman, San Francisco State College, "A Transactional Theory of Political Integration and Arms Control"

Henry S. Kariel, University of Hawaii, "Expanding the Political Present"

Manfred Kochen, University of Michigan, and Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard University, "Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Some Implications of a Mathematical Approach"

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* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Richard M. Merelman, University of Wisconsin, "The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization"

Norman H. Nie, University of Chicago, G. Bingham Powell, University of California, Berkeley, and C. Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, "Social Structure and Political Participation:, Developmental Relationships, II"

Nelson W. Polsby, University of California, Berkeley, Miriam Gallaher, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and Barry Spencer Rundquist, Stanford University, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives"

Ira Sharkansky, University of Wisconsin, and Richard I. Hofferbert, Cornell University, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy"

Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "The Adoption of Innovations by the American States"

Michael Walzer, Harvard University, "Prisoners of War: Does the Fight Continue After the Battle?"

December, 1968

James W. Clarke, Florida State University, "Environment, Process and Policy: A Reconsideration"

Philip E. Converse and Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan, "The 1968 Elections"

Jeff Fishel, American University, "Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger"

John G. Gunnell, State University of New York, Albany, Arthur S. Goldberg, University of Rochester, and A. James Gregor, University of California, Berkeley, Symposium on "Explanation, Deduction, and Social Scientific Inquiry"

Alex Inkeles, Harvard University, "Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries"

Edward J. Mitchell, Institute for Advanced Study, "Some Econometrics of the Huk Rebellion"

John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in California"

James C. Scott, University of Wisconsin, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Social Change"

Michael J. Shapiro, University of California, Berkeley, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives"

W. Phillips Shively, Yale University, " 'Ecological' Inference: The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals"

Sheldon S. Wolin, University of California, Berkeley, "Political Theory as a Vocation"

March, 1970

Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, University of Michigan, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan"

Barry Ames, Stanford University, "Bases of Support for Mexico's Dominant Party"

Michael Haas, University of Hawaii, "International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity"

Howard D. Hamilton, Bowling Green State University, "Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda"

John E. Mueller, University of Rochester, "Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson"

Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati, "On the Grounds for Civil Disobedience within American Democratic Thought"

Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago, "Political Ambition and Democratic Accountability"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "Rational Behavior in Politics"

Patrick Riley, Harvard University, "A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will"

Stanley Rothman, Smith College, "Barrington Moore and the Dialectics of Revolution"

Martin Shubik, Yale University, "Voting, or a Price System in a Competitive Market Structure"

Duff Spafford, University of Saskatchewan, "The Electoral System of Canada"

Professional Placement Service at 1969 Annual Meeting

(September 2-6, 1969)

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

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

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

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

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

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